Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar: From historical perspectives to contemporary realities in the Dry zone and the Delta: Of lives of land Myanmar research series. by Boutry, Maxime et al.
HAL Id: halshs-02372225
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02372225
Submitted on 20 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - ShareAlike| 4.0 International
License
Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar: From historical
perspectives to contemporary realities in the Dry zone
and the Delta
Maxime Boutry, Céline Allaverdian, Marie Mellac, Stephen Huard, San Thein,
Tin Myo Win, Khin Sone
To cite this version:
Maxime Boutry, Céline Allaverdian, Marie Mellac, Stephen Huard, San Thein, et al.. Land tenure in
rural lowland Myanmar: From historical perspectives to contemporary realities in the Dry zone and the
Delta: Of lives of land Myanmar research series.. [Research Report] GRET. 2017. ￿halshs-02372225￿
From historical perspectives to contemporary realities 
in the Dry zone and the Delta
M. Boutry, C. Allaverdian, M. Mellac,
S. Huard, U San Thein, Tin Myo Win, Khin Pyae Sone
LAND 
TENURE 
IN RURAL 
LOWLAND 
MYANMAR
Of Lives and Land Myanmar research series
3 
LAND 
TENURE 
IN RURAL 
LOWLAND 
MYANMAR
From historical perspectives to contemporary realities 
in the Dry zone and the Delta
M. Boutry, C. Allaverdian, M. Mellac,
S. Huard, U San Thein, Tin Myo Win, Khin Pyae Sone
Of Lives and Land Myanmar research series
4   
Disclaimer
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: We thank the European Union and governments of 
Australia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America for their kind 
contributions to improving the livelihoods and food security of rural people in Myanmar. 
We would also like to thank the Mitsubishi Corporation, as a private sector donor.
DISCLAIMER: This document is supported with financial assistance from Australia, 
Denmark, the European Union, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and 
the Mitsubishi Corporation. The views expressed herein are not to be taken to reflect the 
official opinion of any of the LIFT donors.
Published by GRET © 2017
Suggested citation: 
Boutry, M., Allaverdian, C., Mellac, M., Huard, S., San Thein, Tin Myo Win, Khin Pyae 
Sone. (2017). Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar: From historical perspectives to 
contemporary realities in the Dry zone and the Delta. Of lives of land Myanmar research 
series. Gret: Yangon.
Written by: 
Maxime Boutry and Celine Allaverdian, with contributions of Marie Mellac, Stephen Huard, 
U San Thein, Tin Myo Win, and Khin Pyae Sone
Reviewed by: 
Jean-Christophe Diepart, Jean-Philippe Lavigne Delville, Elliott Prasse Freeman, Tania 
Murray Li, Aurore Mansion and Kevin Woods 
Coordinated by: Celine Allaverdian and Maxime Boutry
Design and layout: Katherine Gibney | www.accurateyak.carbonmade.com
Of Lives and Land Myanmar research series
The Of Lives and Land series emanates from in-depth socio-anthropological research on 
land and livelihoods dynamics. Through various thematic focuses – urban, peri-urban 
and rural land issues, migration, conflict and resettlement – the series presents a rigorous 
analysis of how people from various regions of Myanmar shape land relations in a rapidly 
changing social, economic and political context. From the exploration of grounded realities, 
the series aims to address some of the challenges that Myanmar people, the state and other 
stakeholders are facing in managing land and associated resources and seeks to provide 
insights to inform policy dialogue and law formulation processes. The series is peer reviewed 
by a committee of professionals and academics.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons  
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License 
5 
Contents
Acronyms 9
Burmese terminology terms  11
Lists of boxes, figures and tables 17
Acknowledgements 24
Executive summary 25
I.     Introduction 33
1.    Towards a new land framework 33
2.    A study to improve understanding on land issues 35
3.    Brief overview of the contents 36
II.    Methodology 39
1.    Analytical framework and starting assumptions 39
2.    Site selection 42
3.    Architecture of the study and data collection methods 44
3.1  Phase 1: Descriptive approach 44
3.2  Phase 2: Qualitative approach 45
3.3  Phase 3: Quantitative approach 46
4.    Limitations of the research 49
III.  The making of contemporary land tenure in lowland Myanmar 51
1.    The making of modern land tenure (1800s to 1948) 51
1.1  From subjects to tenants 51
1.2  Dispossession: from state’s tenants to the state of tenancy 54
1.3  Ayeyarwaddy Delta: the rice frontier 58
1.4  Upper Burma: the rise of a land owning class 61
1.5  Impacts of colonization on landlordism 63
2.    The post-independence Burmese agrarian society: State policies as a  
        factor of land insecurity (1949 onwards)      65
3.    A brief overview of institutions involved in current land management   69
IV.  Overview of the areas under study: History, policies and land 70
1.    Ayeyarwaddy Delta (Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships): a world 
        of water and paddy, and a changing agricultural frontier     70
2.    Dry Zone (Monywa and Yinmabin townships): a diversified and resilient 
        agriculture, in the cradle of Burmese culture                            78
3.    Land uses  82
3.1  Village lands 82
3.2  Forestlands  84
3.3  Communal lands  86
3.4  Farmland 88
Table of contents
6   
Contents
4.    Delta and Dry Zone households’ demographic and social profile 95
4.1  Household life cycle 95
4.2  Migration  96
V.    Transfers of land use rights 98
1.    Land use rights transfers and papers 98
1.1  The ban on land use right transfers 98
1.2  Farmer booklets 99
1.3  Tax receipts 100
2.    Inheritance and land fragmentation 101
2.1  Customary principles of farm succession (Dry Zone)  101
2.2  Delta: more unequal inheritance patterns among siblings 104
2.3  Current issues concerning land inheritance 105
2.4  Land fragmentation 106
3.    Land sales since 1988 106
3.1  Government policies as a driver of land use rights transfers (Delta) 107
3.2  Contracting a land sale before 2012 108
3.3  Is there a ‘land market’? 111
4.    Land arrangements and “derived rights” 112
4.1  Different types of agrarian contracts 112
4.2  Qualitative and quantitative analysis on contracting in 119
4.3  Making numbers meaningful: how discrepancies between in and out  
        temporary arrangements shed light on unsecure land tenure framework 123
4.4  Quantitative analysis on contracting out    125
VI.  The new land framework: impact, issues and land disputes 127
1.    The hasty land registration process 128
1.1  Disparities in LUC delivery rates 128
1.2  Top down process and exclusion of the smallest farming households 129
1.3  Errors in LUCs and objections  131
1.4  The land registration process on the ground 132
1.5  Gender and land registration 134
2.    Land Use Certificates: new opportunities or more problems to come?      134
2.1  New opportunities, for whom? 134
2.2  The continued issue of restrictions over land use rights 136
2.3  What improvements brought by the LUCs? 138
3.    Land use disputes under the 2012 land reform 142
3.1  The result of legal pluralism and stacked laws 142
3.2  Land reforms and the creation of a new arena: the case of Tet Tet Ku  
        plowing contestation       143
3.3  The limited capacities of local institutions in conflict resolution 146
7 
Contents
VII. Land tenure and livelihood security 148
1.    Land ownership in Dry Zone and Delta 148
1.1  Historical roots of landlessness  150
1.2  Major disparities among villages in each area 151
2.    Other key differentiation factors in access to farmlands 153
2.1  Age and the household life cycle  155
2.2  Household size and link with landholding size 156 
2.3  Landlessness and recent migration 157
2.4  Access to land and social position 158
2.5  Gender, access to land and land security 161
3.    Farming capital and household labor 161
3.1  Livestock 161
3.2  Farm equipment 166
3.3  Agricultural credit 167
3.4  Labor 168
4.    Farming systems and agricultural income 170
4.1  The Delta farming systems: high level of specialization in paddy  170
4.2  Dry Zone: a diversified and resilient agriculture 175
4.3  Comparing land productivity in Delta and Dry Zone 178
5.    Income diversification 180
5.1  On-farm wage labor 180
5.2  Fishing: an essential Delta activity  182
5.3  Off farm activities 185
6.    Discussion: Land distribution, access and livelihood strategies                187
6.1  Categorising farmers 187
6.2  Land access 192
6.3  Farmers strategies and socioeconomic mobility 196
6.4  Discussion on the two zones 205
7.    Who are the rural landless households? Discussing the concepts of  
        landlessness and ‘land-exclusion’                     209
7.1  Landlessness in Delta 213
7.2  Landlessness in Dry Zone  217
7.3  A changing agrarian landscape?  222
VIII. Landlessness as a result of intimate exclusion 225
1.    Village-based class division and exclusion 226
1.1  Dry Zone: intimate exclusion through power of legitimation  226
1.2  Delta: intimate exclusion through force and market 229
2.    Credit, indebtedness, and intimate exclusion  232
2.1  Credit and dispossession, a historical constant: the example of the Delta 233
2.2  MADB, credit and indebtedness 234
2.3  Delta: a stronger dependency on loans  238
8   
Contents
2.4  Land exclusion due to indebtedness 245
3.    The village headman, cornerstone of exclusion processes? 247
3.1  The village headman in pre-2012 land management 247
3.2  The village headman in the midst of land reform 249
3.3  Linking the different dimensions of exclusion 252
IX.  Conclusions and recommendations         254
1.    A century and a half of uprooting Burmese agrarian society…   
        for its own interest?                       254 
2.    Land access and livelihoods’ security: does the problem lie   
        in land tenure?                                256
2.1  Access to land and livelihoods security: a different relationship in Delta  
       and Dry Zone       257
2.2  The need for deeper reforms for improved access to land? 258
3.    Improving the current land reform 259
3.1  A formalization process adapted to the reality of land rights 260
3.2  Mapping and zoning: reflecting land use practices on the ground 262 
3.3  Empowering land users through full disposal rights  263
3.4  Land conflict resolution 264
3.5  LUCs: individualized (and gendered) vs. familial land management 266
4.    Building a conducive context for securing agricultural livelihoods         268
4.1  Improving access to institutional credit schemes 268
4.2  Increasing sustainable intensification, diversification and resilience  269
4.3  Mechanization versus farm-labor opportunities  271
5.    Taking into account the diversity of rural households for effective  
        targeting of policy and action                                  272
5.1  Smallholders are not one uniform category 272
5.2  Targeting “young” households: life cycle and land patrimony’s trajectories  273
5.3  Better understand and tackle the issue of ‘landlessness’ 274
X.    References 276
XI.  Annexes 282
1.    Basic demography data (Delta and Dry Zone combined) 282
2.    Key figures on contracting out lands for farming by others 285
3.    Livestock  287
4.    Farm gate paddy prices at Bogale-Malamyinegun area – for 4 different      
        varieties (2012-2014)                                               289
5.    Profit and loss statement of paddy production (monsoon and  
        summer) in Delta                          291
6.    Supporting data for income generation (on farm wage labor,  
        fishing, off farm activities)                             294
7.     Total income per farmers categories  299 
8.    Methodology for quantitative survey  300
9 
Acronyms
ARDC Agriculture and Rural Development Corporation
CNRS Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (France)
CSO Civil Society Organization
DALMS DALMS Department of Agricultural Land Management and 
Statistics (former SLRD)
DoA Department of Agriculture
DZGD Dry Zone Greening Department
FAB Farmland Administration Body
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FD Forest Department
GAD General Administration Department
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HH Household
HHH Household Head/ Head of Household
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRRI International Rice Research Institute
LIFT Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund
LUC Land Use Certificate
MADB Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank
MAS Myanmar Agricultural Service (former DoA) 
MFI Micro Finance Institution
MMK Myanmar Kyat
MOAI Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (former name before May 2016)
MOALI Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (name after May 2016)
MOECAF Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry
MONREC Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NLD National League for Democracy
NLUP National Land Use Policy
PRF Protected Public Forest
RF Reserve Forest
SEE State Economic Enterprise
Acronyms
10   
Acronyms
SHG Self Help Group
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council
SLRD Settlement and Land Records Department
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party
UN United Nations
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
VFV Virgin, Fallow and Vacant
VTFMC Village Tract Farmland Management Committee
VT Village Tract
VTA Village Tract Administrator
WRUD Water Resource Utilisation Department
11 
Burmese terminology
Correct 
transliteration
Definition
amwei Inheritance
a-nu-gan-myei See le-pyan-ngwei-pyan
apyin pyis-si” ‘Outside property’ (inheritance): includes money, gold, 
gems
atwin pys-si” ‘Inside property’ (inheritance): includes farmlands, cattle, 
farm tools
athis Freemen
bauk-thama’ As opposed to le-thama’, general worker
bei gya lei Variety of monsoon paddy
bo”bapaing Land transferred through generation, generally after 
being reclaimed through clearing (see dama-u-gya)
da”ma’-u-khja ‘first (to)  wield the machete’, designates the right of 
the first person clearing a piece of land to put under 
cultivation / a term applied to land which has become 
the property of the owner, by right of his having been the 
first to clear it of jungle, or by right of his having cleared 
it of jungle after its owner had deserted it. (Judson dic: 
p. 518)
dokkhita Destituted’ people exempted from the Thathameda tax 
under King Mindon (1853-1878)
eim khyan Home garden
kaing-kjun” Alluvial land
khayaing-wun District officer (pre-colonial Burma)
kwat Unit for measuring cultivation plots, equal to 1.25 acres
kwat-pyat Task based arrangement between a landowner and a 
worker (based on the number of kwat to be worked)
kwet-pyauk Plots escaping cadastral maps
Burmese terminology terms 
The Burmese words are rendered in this report using the conventional 
transcription with raised comma tones as in Okell, 1971 (Okell, John. 1971, A guide 
to the romanisation of Burmese, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland: 
London.)
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Burmese terminology
kwin Field, cadastral unit
kyauk-lok Stonewalls built across water ways in Dry Zone to transform 
hill slopes into arable lands
kyei”zu”shin Master of gratitude
kjun Slave, servant-tenant
le Paddy land
le-pyan-ngwei-pya Mortgage (litt. the paddy land against the money)
le-thama’ Farmer
le-ya-myei lok-paing-
khwin
Right to cultivate the land
lon-khji” The Burmese sarong
lu-kyi” Important / repsectable person / authorities
lu-mu-yei” Social (practice)
lwe-pyaung” To transfer
mahalwari (Hindi) a village based system in which village bodies 
which jointly owned the village were responsible for the 
land revenue
myo’ Town
myosa Town’s governor (pre-colonial times)
myo’-thukyi” Town’s administrator
nga”pi Shrimp/fish paste
ok-thukyi” Person in charge of cooking the meal during social 
events, donations
paing sain-tho Ownership
Patta (system) (Hindi) system, aimed at encouraging cultivators to 
cultivate state land that had previously not been under 
cultivation. This system granted tenure before the 
cultivator cleared the land without collecting revenue 
during a period varying according to the difficulty to 
transform the land into productive farmland. Such land 
could not be mortgaged and cultivators had to show 
sufficient means to cultivate the land without resorting 
to money-lenders
phaya taka” Lay individual actively involved (including financially 
supporting) in monastery’s activities
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Burmese terminology
ryotwari (Hindi) an individual based system where revenue 
settlement was fixed directly with individuals (colonial 
period)
shin-pyu’ Buddhist noviciate
taik Pre-colonial administration unit corresponding to a 
grouping of villages
tawak-sa” ‘eat half’, name of a sharecropping arrangement
thanaka Perennial tree (Limonia acidissima)
thathameda Tax introduced under King Mindon  (1853-1878), of tenth 
of the household’s income and replacing all other existing 
taxes and fees as known under previous monarchs.
Thi”- sa”-khja’ Sharecropping
thon”–su’-thasu’  ‘1 measure-3 measures (of crop) ‘, name of a sharecropping 
arrangement:
thu-kyi” Headman
u-yin Garden/orchard land
u-paing Individual landholding
ya Dry land
ya-eim-hmu 100 households’ leader, himself referring to the village 
tract administrator 
yap-mi’-yap-pha’ ‘traditional’ elders
ye”-mye” shin Lord of water and earth’
ywa myay Village land
ywa-thukyi” Village headman
zamindari (Hindi) the landlord based system (zamindari) where 
landlords established the tax to be collected for 
themselves, from which they would pay the requested 
amount to the British administration
zin”gama” myei Temporary alluvial areas that are created in river beds 
through the accumulation of alluviums during rainy 
seasons, managed communaly by the village
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Short guidance note for interpretation of tables...
Short guidance note for interpretation 
of tables (cross-tabulations)
The quantitative analysis used a French software, Modalisa®, for interpreting 
the relationship between different modalities. This program has been created in the 
objective of reuniting both quantitative and qualitative statistical tools in a single 
software. 
Throughout the report, the reader will come across cross-tabulations tables 
consisting in confronting the different modalities of two variables in a single table. 
Modalisa® offers a graphical reading of the ties existing between the modalities of 2 
variables, based on the calculation of PEM (percentage from maximum deviation), 
that is an index of ties between modalities of a contingency table. 
The local PEM allows the relevant cross-tabulations to be filtered according to 
whether they have at least one box with a significant local PEM. For a PEM to be 
chosen the number must be sufficient and the Chi-Square must be significant. For 
the PEM to be considered significant it is necessary that the test of Chi-Square over 
the whole table is greater than 90% (value of p less than or equal to 0.1).
The colorimetric index reflects the strength of ties between modalities (the darker 
the stronger): positive ties are shown in green and negative ties in blue. As shown 
in the table below, the “Capitalized family farmers” category in positively correlated 
to the fact of having enough rice throughout the year (dark green) and negatively 
correlated to having not enough rice (dark blue). The “Agri-specialized small farmers” 
category is positively correlated, yet with a less stronger tie (light green), of lacking 
rice throughout the year. 
Table 59: Distribution of households declaring lacking rice at least once in the 
year, among the 3 farmers categories (Dry Zone)
Capitalised 
family farmers 
Multi-active 
farmers 
Farm-specialised 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Not enough 
rice
2 1.8 17 15.3 22 17.2 41 11.6
Enough rice 112 98.2 94 84.7 106 82.8 312 88.4
Total 114 100.0 111 100.0 128 100.0 353 100.0
Chi-Square=16.1  dof=2  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.214
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Short guidance note for interpretation of tables...
Effectives in each cell can be shown as per the number of households concerned 
(eff. (or Nb HH)), in percentage of a column (%C) and percentage of a row (%R).
Dof designated the Degree of Freedom which refers to the number of random 
variables that can not be determined or fixed by the statistical test.
For more details see: https://www.modalisa.com/pdf/CiboisPEM.pdf
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AREA
Unit Square feet Kwat Hectare 
1 Acre (standard) 43,551 0.8 0.4046
VOLUMES AND WEIGHTS
 
Standardized measurements in Myanmar:
Governement 
basket (GB) 
Imperial Gallon Pound
(lbs)
Kilogram (Kg) Item
1 9 46 20.861 Paddy
(Source: Bernot, 1974)
1 GB  =  16 pyi  =  128 condensed milk cans    (128 x 11.25 fluid ounce = 9 imp gal)
Units KG Viss
1 GB = 20.86*
1 Kg = 1 0.612
1 Viss = 1.633 1
 
*For paddy
(Source: Bernot, 1974)
PADDY YIELDS
GB / Acre KG/hectare KG/hectare
10 209 522.5
20 418 1,045 ~ 1 ton
40 836 2,090 ~ 2 tons
50 1,045 2,612.5
60 1,254 3,135 ~ 3 tons
100 2,090 5,225 ~ 5 tons
 
Conversion of Units
Conversion of Units
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Executive summary
Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar 
Executive summary
During the critical years following the 2012 land reforms undertaken in the 
midst of Myanmar’s political transition, Gret conducted an in-depth study combining 
qualitative and quantitative surveys in nine villages of Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun 
townships (Delta) and nine villages in Monywa and Yinmabin townships (Dry Zone). 
The full report and the synthesis are the result of more than two years in-depth research 
and 13 months of fieldwork that involved an inter-disciplinary team of 11 international 
and Myanmar researchers. It provides a better understanding of land dynamics at the 
local level and proposes a new reading of issues faced by rural households in these days 
of reform. 
 A historical perspective on land policies in Myanmar
In precolonial times, farmers were in fact highly integrated in a relationship to 
local patrons (headmen, crown officers) that would ensure their protection both 
in social and economic terms. In contrast to the supposed British goal, the last 
150 years have actually been about undoing patron-client ties for diverse reasons, 
the first and foremost being systemizing the collection of taxes for the State on 
an individual basis. What was long established as hereditary rights on land was 
transformed into individual claims on land, and land turned into a commodity. 
The country’s administrative division into village tracts marked the rise of the 
village headman who became a local elite backed by the colonial administration. 
The integration of rice production into international markets and its subsequent 
monetization and value chain integration contributed to a fragmentation of former 
comprehensive patron-client relationships. As a whole, rural society changed with 
landlords and money-lenders overturning legitimate headmen and patrons. The 
1948 nationalization act and subsequent policies (Land Nationalization Act 1953; 
Tenancy Act and Rules 1964) aimed at reversing this situation to create a body 
of peasant-proprietors rather than tenants. But the Burmese agrarian society 
had already been uprooted from its sociocultural framework1, and the closing 
of the agrarian frontier together with the 1930s Great Depression left many 
1. Dry Zone farmers better resisted the impact of such change thanks to a greater historical depth than the Delta 
society that was principally developed through the British colonization.
From historical perspectives to contemporary realities in the Dry zone and the 
Delta Maxime Boutry , Celine Allaverdian, Marie Mellac, Stephen Huard, U San Thein, 
Tin Myo Win, Pyae Sone GRET – Myanmar / Land tenure research May 2017
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peasants without the financial capacity to undertake cultivation. Not only was 
the redistribution of land under the Land Nationalization Act poorly implemented 
(with only 17% of all cultivated lands nationalized), but harmful policies such as 
the compulsory procurement of a fixed quota of harvested crop – particularly for 
paddy – (at a fixed low prices) also severely affected small holders while benefitting 
the bigger farmers.
 The 2012 land reforms and their challenges 
In 2012, the new Land Law, a reform “in the interest of the entire people”2, came 
to sanction the pre-existing system based on individual land rights by distributing 
Land Use Certificates (LUCs) and legalize transfers of land use rights. This reform 
did not much change the on-the-ground reality of land tenure and land dynamics, 
since farmers did not wait for formal reform to sell, rent, or mortgage their land 
(despite the legal ban on such transfers prior to 2012). LUCs are supposedly 
bringing more security by legalizing these transfers, yet many practical barriers 
remain, notably when it comes to dividing an LUC over a plot of land into two or 
more pieces. But most of all, the precariousness of land tenure in Burmese lowlands 
lies in the system itself rather than the modalities of its implementation. 
Although the division of land through inheritance did not bring many issues 
under the 2012 reform, previous arrangements on land use rights that were often 
done on an oral basis were challenged by formalization. The distribution of LUCs 
rekindled old conflicts (such as land transfers forced by farmers’ incapacity to 
deliver the compulsory paddy quota to the government) and created new ones 
(notably between parties involved in mortgage arrangements). In other words, 
both British and 2012 reforms brought into light the complexity of formalizing – 
allegedly in order to secure – land tenure with top-down policies, especially when 
little is done to understand local realities. Farmers in Burmese lowlands were not 
lacking documents formalizing their claims. Yet, farmers have always been at threat 
of arbitrary land confiscations by the State. In that sense, LUCs do not seem to 
provide more security than the previous documents. However, it will surely lead to 
more insecurity to the farmers who have not received LUCs. Key recommendations 
are to conduct a review of the 2012 land registration process in order to identify 
gaps and prioritize how those gaps will be addressed so that public confidence can 
be improved. Also, accessible and affordable deed registration procedures need to 
be set in place in order to record land transfers and update land records properly. 
A proper land taxation system may also improve land administration. Capacity 
building of authorities involved in land governance is also crucial in the process.
2.  According to a speech by Vice President Dr Sai Mauk Kham (2011-2015) introducing the land reform in May 2012.
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There are many discrepancies between the actual use of lands and their official 
classification under the legal land categories. The lack of coordination between the 
different institutions in charge of, respectively, farmlands, forestlands, and vacant, 
virgin, and fallow lands is evidently part of the issue. This issue highlights the need 
for more systematic land use planning processes and to move from a system in 
which each government agency is perceived as the “owner” of respective land 
categories to a custodianship model in which there would be a single land-agency 
for administration of lands3. 
In addition, farmers’ needs and agricultural practices do not match with the 
legal restrictions on land use which have remained with the 2012 land reform, 
highlighting the contradiction between the broadening of land use rights, on 
one hand, and the government’s enduring tendency to control land on paddy 
production (the staple crop constituting Myanmar’s national identity) on the other. 
In many cases, these discrepancies hinder farm productivity and farmers’ resilience 
to shocks. It also generates land insecurity and opportunities for local corruption 
and abuse of power towards incompliant farmers. It is urgent that farmers be given 
full disposal rights on the choice of crops and review restrictions on fallows as 
farmers are the best suited to make optimal decisions to enhance their livelihoods 
and land productivity, and respond to market dynamics. This also entails extending 
the land use categories over which tenure can be secured by simplifying the land 
use classification system and integrating into the farmland category uses such as 
agroforestry and aquaculture. Legal procedures for land use changes and transfers 
must be affordable and accessible through simplified and decentralized processes. 
Finally, sanctions in case of non-compliance with restrictions of land use should 
not result in livelihood insecurity (eg: in case of heavy sanctions such as land 
confiscations and high fine amounts).
During the past decades, land governance has been highly concentrated in 
the hands of Village tract headmen, who were acting as political brokers4 between 
government and villagers. In the absence of checks and balances, corrupt practices 
have prevailed at the expenses of the weakest and dispute arbitration decisions 
were often done in favor of the “highest bidder”. This generated a lack of trust within 
the community towards the Village tract administrator and the members of the 
diverse forms of local land committees that have existed through time. In addition, 
the social capital at the village level has often been crippled in the past decades and 
informal institutions lack capacity to deal with land conflict. Finally, there is a lack 
of independent conflict resolution mechanisms. To handle these major issues, the 
government needs to enact a close review of the Farmland Management Body – 
3. This does not exclude the involvement of concerned line ministries in land use related issues.
4. Bierschenk & al. 2000.
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particularly its Village tract level representation – in order to address its very limited 
capacity in resolving intra-villages conflicts. Despite the recommendations of the 
Commission for the Assessment of Legal Affairs and Special Issues, it is suggested 
to maintain and promote the establishment of independent monitoring bodies- as 
proposed in the National Land Use policy, with participation of all stakeholders, 
and by appointing monitors that have no direct interest, to observe settlement of 
land disputes. Sound processes for selection of community representatives need 
to be defined as part of this.  These conflict resolution mechanisms need to take 
into account lands’ history and trajectories. Concrete mechanisms for transparency 
and accountability of the actors in charge of translating the legal framework into 
practice on the ground and promote legal awareness capacity building at local 
level, both for communities and authorities.
From a gender perspective, it is necessary to encourage women’s representation 
in land administration bodies and provide gender sensitive information about 
the current land framework at ground level. Measures should be taken to reduce 
vulnerability of women in case of divorce or separation or death of the husband, 
something that can be accomplished whether through joint registration of 
spouses on LUCs or through other complementary laws relating to family and 
social protection issues.
 Building a conducive context for securing agricultural livelihoods
Policies to support agriculture and rural livelihoods in a broader sense need a 
comprehensive cross-sectoral approach that obviously goes far beyond the land 
question. Transport and water management infrastructure, rural finance, access to 
markets, research, agricultural education and extension services, and structuring 
of farmers’ organizations are crucial issues to address. In addition, further strategic 
thinking is needed to formulate consistent trade policies on agricultural products.
 Improving rural finance
Rural finance is a crucial key for rural development. While the MADB’s loan 
scheme seems to be the most effective at the moment in terms of high geographic 
coverage and very low interest rates, the poor quality of services, limited human 
resource capacity, and issues in relaying MADB policies at the village level hinder 
much of its potential benefits. A deep reform of MADB is needed to improve the 
quality of services: adapt the timing of loans (disbursement, repayments, etc.) 
so they appropriately align with crop cycles and farmers’ cash flow constraints, 
increase MADB loan amounts, especially for non-paddy crops, train and appoint 
professional MADB staff employees at the village tract level to facilitate application, 
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management, disbursement, and reimbursement of loans. As indebtedness is still 
a strong driver of land exclusion, it is also recommended to reduce rural cultivators’ 
dependency on private money-lenders by promoting access to affordable credit 
schemes, simultaneously with financial education aiming at improving households’ 
financial management skills so as to reduce indebtedness. In this process, it is also 
important to ensure coordination among the publicly funded initiatives5 and 
microfinance institutions to avoid indebtedness of those who contract multiple 
loans. 
 Investing in sustainable agriculture and promoting resilience
Dry zone rainfed land crop systems are rather extensive in order to cope 
with the scarce and unpredictable rainfall while in the Delta, agriculture is highly 
specialised in paddy. Despite these differences, state-led investment in irrigation 
and water management is crucial, combined with the promotion of context-
specific sustainable agricultural practices, in both those areas. This requires 
adapted extension services to provide technical knowledge on crops (investment, 
profitability, suitability according to agro-ecological regions) for farmers so that 
they can make efficient choices.
Rural livelihoods’ sustainability also relies on households’ capacity to absorb 
shocks. Land insecurity is often an impact of such shocks. Resilience of rural 
households could be strengthened through social protection schemes, notably 
to cover health expenses. Sustainability of such schemes may be achieved 
through their structuring beyond the village level. Interesting initiatives through 
the federation of village groups have been conducted in Myanmar that would 
be important to build on. Exploring options to cover crop-related risks through 
national level crop insurance schemes would be useful. 
 The issue of farm labor 
Small scale agriculture is a huge source of employment. The majority of Delta 
and Dry Zone farming households (over 80%) must employ agricultural labor to 
work on their farms. 42% of households have at least one member of the family 
earning some income as an agricultural wage laborer. As a consequence, pushing 
mechanization through large farm machines6, such as big combined harvesters, 
needs very careful thought to avoid driving away families depending on farm 
labor, keeping in mind that options for other livelihoods and jobs in urban areas 
5. There are multiple publicly funded initiatives, namely from MADB, Cooperative Department (Tha Ma), Rural 
development department (Mya Sein Yaung), and some other smaller scale initiatives. 
6. Access to small scale machinery (such as power tillers for paddy lands) is however essential.
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are still relatively limited. This risk may be particularly strong for those in the Delta, 
where working as a farm laborer is very specific to the landless and to very small 
landowners (owning less than three acres)7. On the other hand, the qualitative 
study found that in the Delta, finding farm laborers during peak periods (such 
as for transplanting and harvesting) can prove to be very challenging and partly 
explains why many farmers are unable to cultivate the entirety of their lands in 
summer. However this constraint allows temporary access to lands to landless or 
very small farmers in summer. As such, the recourse to farm laborers can somewhat 
be interpreted as a wealth redistribution mechanism, not only by the fact that it 
provides jobs but also because constraints promote temporary land access to the 
landless. New forms of win-win arrangements between laborers and farmers need 
to be experimented. 
 Taking into account the diversity of rural households for effective targeting of 
policy and action
Policies and rural livelihood support actions need to take into consideration 
the fact that “smallholders” are not one uniform category.  Indeed, based on the 
life cycle, landholding size and livelihood strategies, different types of smallholders 
can be distinguished. For example, “farm-specialized small farmers” rely mostly 
on agriculture (and on-farm labor) while “multi-active small farmers” are much 
more diversified in their activities, including in the off-farm sector. The former are 
generally more precarious in terms of livelihood security than the latter regardless 
of the cultivated surfaces. 
Likewise, a closer look at landless households’ livelihoods can provide with 
more nuanced features regarding the precariousness of land access in the studied 
regions. Indeed, the “landless” categories covers a wide range of households who 
have very different levels of dependency to agriculture-related activities: from the 
“farming landless” who cultivate lands accessed through temporary arrangements 
(rent, sharecropping…), those depending heavily on farm wage labor, those 
characterized by multi-activity to those depending exclusively on off-farm activities 
outside of the primary sector.  
The household’s life cycle is recognized as one of the major factors differentiating 
whether a given household has access to agricultural land. The study shows that 
landlessness can often be a temporary state for younger households who will 
inherit and are saving to buy land, while landlessness becomes a permanent form 
of land exclusion for households headed by a person over 40-50 years old. Policies 
and livelihood support actions should address the specific needs of different age 
7. In the Dry Zone this activity is more evenly practiced by different landholding categories.
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groups. “Young” small holders and landless households need to get priority for 
specific support for their farming projects, such as for example access to cattle 
for “young” Dry Zone households and access to vacant lands through temporary 
arrangements, for “young”  smallholders and landless households of the delta. 
The occurrence of landlessness has much to do with historical and agricultural 
features of the studied zones. For instance, the Dry Zone is the cradle of Burmese 
society, with long-established villages and stronger social organization, while 
the Delta is a frontier society and has been more impacted by predatory policies 
such as the ‘Compulsory Paddy Quota’. For these reasons, landlessness rates are 
often higher in the Delta than in Dry Zone villages. In addition, there are strong 
disparities between villages of the same region, highlighting the complexity and 
intertwinement of different factors – such as agro-ecological conditions and the 
importance of power relations at the local level – for determining land access. 
These disparities demonstrate that large scale surveys and uniform “one size fits all” 
solutions on land tenure bear risks as they are not able to effectively address local 
and context-specific problems. Land redistribution projects should for instance 
prioritize older agrarian landless households (whose head is more than 40 years 
old) and landless households relying mainly on farm-labor.
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Figure 1: Maps of the study areas in Myanmar
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 I.    Introduction
 
1.   Towards a new land framework 
Myanmar has an area of 670,000 square kilometers and a population of almost 
51,486,2538. The large majority of the population (70%) is rural9 and the average 
household size is 4.4 persons. Myanmar is a low-income country with a high 
poverty rate. Accounting for 36% of GDP, the agriculture sector (including livestock 
and fisheries) is considered to be the backbone of the economy. More than two 
thirds of the labor force is engaged in agriculture or depends to a great extent on 
agriculture for income10. Rice is the most important crop, accounting for about 60 
per cent of the net sown area and 80 per cent of the value of agricultural production. 
Despite its potential for growth, the agriculture sector has suffered from poor and 
sometimes predatory state policies, deficient infrastructure, insufficient extension 
services, as well as financing and value chain constraints.
Myanmar’s rural society is characterized by landlessness rates (46% of landless 
households in average11) that are the highest in the whole Mekong region. 
Indeed, in Cambodia, landless farmers now make up 28% of the rural population 
(Phann et al., 2015) while in Vietnam, landlessness rates among rural households 
are estimated at 12%12. Among the reforms engaged by the new quasi-civilian 
government, the return of lands confiscated under the military regime retains most 
of attention from observers (UN, NGOs, and CSOs). Yet, despite millions of acres13 
implicated in these past – and in some cases, very recent14 – exactions, landlessness 
in the country cannot be solely explained and resolved by tackling direct land-grab 
cases. Socio-economic features of Myanmar lowland societies, specific exclusion 
processes, and livelihoods dynamics are often overlooked factors shaping the 
current agrarian landscape that require specific attention. 
Myanmar inherited in great part its contemporary land tenure framework 
from British colonial legacies. While the British system put emphasis on individual 
holdings (u-paing in Burmese), distributed in kwin (the basic territorial division), 
8. Myanmar population and housing census, 2014: The population figure includes 1,206,353 persons estimated not to 
have been counted during the census in parts of Rakhine State, Kachin State and Kayin State. 
9. Myanmar population and housing census, 2014. 
10. IFAD, 2010: 1. 
11. LIFT, 2012. 
12. Mellac and Castellanet, 2015. 
13. There is no precise figures on the extent of land which has been confiscated under the previous government. Yet, 
by 2001, more than one million acres of large scale agricultural concessions had been allocated to nearly 100 Burmese 
private companies, and surface doubled by 2011 (Woods, 2013: 15).
14. See for example Htusan, 2013. 
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but where agriculturists receive land use rights, the state remaining the ultimate 
owner of all lands. With the 1953 Land Nationalization Act and a series of land 
reforms through the 1960s, the post-colonial Myanmar government sought to 
break up the landowner-tenant relationship, granting agriculturists land use rights 
while retaining for the state the ultimate ownership of all lands. The objective here 
was both to create a government/owner-cultivator relationship and, at the same 
time, to strengthen government control over farmers. 
However, the situation in the first half of the twentieth century – with a 
growing class of absentee landowners and tenants being impoverished by high 
rents – could still be observed in the latter post-1953 days. In these very days of 
political transition toward more democratic governance, the success and failures 
of such reforms still need to be analysed so as to improve access to land and 
land security for Myanmar farmers. Issues may not only lie in weak governance 
or abusive practices, but also in more deeply rooted socio-cultural features, such 
as inter-individual, hierarchized (vertical), relationships often prevailing over intra-
class (horizontal) ties. 
The latest series of reforms came into force on 31st August 201215 under the 
Farmland Law 2012, followed by the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management 
Law, both of which took a view to developing business opportunities and the 
country’s economy through the improved utilization of these lands. These two laws 
represent the most substantial change to the legal framework for land since the 
early 1960s. The main impacts have been a massive delivery of land use certificates 
to farmers16 and the reintroduction of the concept of private property with land use 
rights that can be sold, mortgaged, rented, pawned, and inherited. These changes 
may however be more formal than substantive. While the new land framework 
brings greater freedom and visibility for farmers to dispose of their land use rights, 
not only does the state still remain the sole landowner, but we must not ignore the 
development of practices among farmers and local authorities that have over the 
past decades effectively circumvented restrictions. 
Reforming Myanmar’s agricultural sector and rural economy was a strong 
component in the agenda of the first quasi-civilian government under President 
Thein Sein and is probably one of the major stakes for the newly elected NLD17 
government. If such reforms were undertaken “in the interest of the entire people, 
not in the interest of a handful of people”, as Dr Sai Mauk Kham, Vice President of 
15. For more details on the different laws enacted on land tenure in the country since the British rule, see Chapter 
III. 
16. Strong disparities seem to exist between Myanmar low lands and the ethnic states where LUC delivery rates have 
been much lower. 
17. National League for Democracy. 
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Myanmar (2011-2015), put it in May 2012, this entails addressing important issues 
such as land tenure security, landlessness, and repairing the scars of the abusive 
actions (such as arbitrary confiscations) that have been implemented by the past 
military regimes. A vibrant and diverse civil society is also bringing these issues 
to the front lines, so that they can be taken into account by future policies – for 
instance the recently promulgated National Land Use Policy that has become 
the over-arching framework that is supposed to shape land and natural resource 
governance for the years to come. Hence, in this decisive moment of change, the 
necessity to understand land tenure and land governance issues in Myanmar in 
their complexity (including historical, economic, social, and political dimensions) 
is highly critical. 
2.   A study to improve understanding on land issues 
Despite a variety of studies that have recently been produced on Myanmar 
tenure and governance of land-based resources, there remains a strong need for 
studies which document social processes leading to land insecurity, and those 
leading to investment and sustainable use of lands by rural populations. Land 
markets and their impact on equity, the dynamic of landlessness, the interplay 
between state intervention and local authorities in current regulations regarding 
land tenure in different social and socioeconomic contexts, access to natural 
resources as a base for livelihoods, etc. are issues that have to be analysed. Indeed, 
addressing land insecurity in general does not enable a full understanding of 
the key issues and challenges to be examined, nor the actions and policies to 
implement. This emphasizes again on the importance to provide in-depth studies 
that characterize the diversity of situations, and that enable the formulation of 
accurate projects, policy and legislation, for effective and efficient support for the 
country’s rural population.
The final purpose of the study is to improve understanding on how land tenure 
links with livelihood security for enhanced and comprehensive policy dialogue. 
Its objective is to provide accurate and documented material on land dynamics, 
focusing on two issues: access to land and land tenure security. It documents forms 
of land access, land markets, land tenure insecurity and processes of securing land 
tenure. It also analyses interrelations of such aspects with farming practices, natural 
resources harvesting, and livelihoods security. 
Indeed, relations between land and livelihoods security are complex as they 
simultaneously embrace cultural, social, economic, legal, and political realities. 
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There are clear cause and effect links between food security, livelihoods, and land, 
the latter of which is an essential productive asset for rural households. Access 
to land can enable food production. The area of cultivated land per household is 
often a key factor determining a household’s food security and its socioeconomic 
status. Land tenure security encourages sustainable farming practices and long 
term agricultural investments (such as trees, irrigation canals, drains…) which 
can enhance productivity. Securing land rights may also facilitate access to credit, 
which can help secure improved production means (inputs, tools, etc.), which in 
turn can lead to increased productivity. Beyond these general observations and 
‘mechanical’ links, situations are sometimes more complex than they may appear 
and need in depth research for proper understanding. 
However, this study does not intend to be representative of the country, nor 
of the entire Delta and Dry Zone regions. Its methodology – focused on in-depth 
studies of 18 villages across the Delta (Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships) and 
Dry Zone (Monywa and Yinmabin townships), was not designed as such. However, 
it provides detailed information on daily issues and key dynamics that are currently 
occurring at the local level in lowland Myanmar. It also provides useful insights 
into rural households’ livelihood trajectories. These encompass forms of access to 
land as well as paths to losing or accumulating land over the past decades. Finally, 
it explores the links between livelihood security and land in Myanmar’s specific 
political-economic context.
 
3.  Brief overview of the contents
The three first chapters are introductory chapters which are critical for the 
readers’ understanding: 
• I. Chapter One introduces the study’s background, its objectives, and the 
overall structure of the report.
• II. Chapter Two presents the study’s methodology in detail in all of its 3 
different phases. It also provides some key concepts concerning the study’s 
conceptual framework. Finally, it also sheds light on the study’s limitations and 
the constraints faced.
• III. Chapter Three links the introductory chapters and the following ones – 
which are essentially the study’s own ‘first hand’ research findings. Essentially 
based on an extensive bibliographic review in light of the study’s own findings, 
chapter three provides in-depth analysis of the historical events that have 
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shaped Myanmar’s current land governance system. As such, it provides keys 
to understanding the findings of the following chapters. It sheds light on the 
fact that despite major changes in socio-political context, the main issues 
concerning land governance and livelihoods security have remained very 
much the same.
The following chapters (four to nine) are based on the analysis and combination 
of both qualitative findings (based on more than one year of field research) and 
quantitative survey results (based on surveys with 1,129 households).
• IV. Chapter Four provides a general overview of the 2 study areas, including 
the environmental context, historical background, main livelihoods, land use, 
and demography. The latter part on demography is based on the study survey 
results. 
• V. Chapter Five presents the diversity and varying intensities of land 
transactions and transfers of land-use rights that exist in the study areas. It 
analyses inheritance patterns as well as features of land sales, particularly 
in the informal market preceding the 2012 land law. It also highlights the 
prevalence of the diverse agrarian arrangements, which allow different actors 
(from local to foreign, landless to investors) to access lands through temporary 
contracts. Finally, it provides a detailed analysis of the diversity of documents 
(both informal and formal) that have been used to ‘formalize’ rights on land, 
and whether these documents have operated within or outside of the legal 
frameworks of the last decades.
• VI. Chapter Six focuses on the implementation of the 2012 land law. It looks 
into the land registration process (which took place during the study) and 
its most recent impacts. It presents the different forms of land conflicts and 
contestations that currently exist, from individual claims on specific land use 
rights to collective contestations on a broader dimension – such as past state 
actions which are perceived as illegitimate by rural communities. It sheds 
light on the complexity of the current context and the challenges for effective 
conflict resolution at the local level.
• VII. Chapter Seven presents the main findings concerning livelihoods. It 
describes households’ main features and provides a detailed analysis of the 
main livelihoods sources, such as on-farm and off-farm activities. Taking 
household and livelihoods features together, the chapter proposes a typology 
of households, outlining how livelihood and household features are associated 
with land access and landownership, and how in turn those patterns can 
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predict levels of social mobility. Finally, it explores the over-used and unspecific 
concept of landlessness, which obscures different levels of vulnerability and 
opportunities. As such, it aims to drill down on the landlessness issue to reveal 
the critical points that should urgently be addressed by policies.
• VIII. Chapter Eight presents key findings on the process of ‘intimate exclusion’, 
that is the processes through which social intimates, neighbors and kin, 
exclude each other from access to agricultural land. To bring up these issues, 
we proceed by analysing first how class division between large landholders and 
landless or smallholders shapes exclusion at the village level. The second entry 
point is access to credit, that is how the power of the market – yet one highly 
connected to regulation and force – shapes exclusion again at the village level. 
We conclude by analysing more particularly the role of the headman in land 
management, both in history and during this era of reform, as a particularly 
important stakeholder at the village level, a figure who concentrates most of 
the powers at work in exclusion processes: regulation, force, market access, 
and legitimation (these notions are expanded in Chapter III.).
• IX. Chapter Nine is the conclusion. It provides a synthesis of the most 
important findings and recommendations for land-related and agriculture-
related policies and laws, in order to improve land governance and create a 
more conducive context for smallholder farmers. 
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 II.   Methodology 
 
Land as a research field encompasses different disciplines. Obviously, 
the most visible in Myanmar has been agricultural sciences, pushed by every 
successive Myanmar government so as to improve agricultural production for 
this predominantly rural country. However, land tenure also highly relates to 
social sciences. In this latter field, political ecology and political economy studies 
are by far the most developed approaches in studying land issues in Myanmar18. 
Yet, these studies often remain at a macro-level, and focus on interventions of 
agro-companies, large investors, and government policies. Far from undervaluing 
such studies and their contribution to understanding factors impacting farmers’ 
livelihoods (land grabbing issues, agricultural policies, non-pro-poor investment 
policies, etc.), ethnographic descriptions of land tenure and land rights at the village 
level can provide critical insights that macro studies neglect. And yet, these are 
still lacking in the contemporary literature on land tenure in Myanmar19. With land 
tenure being defined as “the full range of relationships between humans with regard 
to access to and control over land and natural resource management” (Lavigne, 2008), 
the study had an anthropological focus. An ethnographic approach was used to 
understand land rights – how they are defined, enforced, negotiated, contested, 
transformed, and transferred – as well as the power relations that condition these 
processes. Social scientists have addressed land tenure issues through various 
entry points: conflicts, agrarian arrangements, exclusion, etc. These conceptual 
entry points have also been mobilized in this study whenever relevant. The study 
also drew upon expertise and concepts from other disciplines such as geography 
and agrarian studies. By doing so, it has adopted a pluri-disciplinary and system 
approach which enables to address complex issues such as agrarian change by 
considering the different components that constitute a system and how changes 
in one component can affect the other components and the whole system. Here 
below are some of the key concepts that have been considered: 
• Land security: Despite the overall consensus of the importance of land 
tenure security in land policy debates, the lack of clarity on the terms of ‘land 
security’ and ‘land insecurity’ reveals divergent views and perceptions on 
what is land insecurity, what are its causes, and what possible solutions may 
address it. As such, the conceptual framework produced by Philippe Lavigne 
18. Among the most recent, see for example, Woods 2013, TNI working papers. 
19. Some ethnographical studies have been done earlier, like for example Thawnghmung, 2001. 
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Delville20 helps clarify these notions: “Land tenure security should not be 
confused with private ownership, nor should the nature of the rights (e.g. formal 
or informal, permanent or temporary) be confused with the notion of whether or 
not these are secure. Land tenure security signifies that legitimately held rights, 
whatever their contents, will not be questioned without foundation, and if 
questioned, will be settled with sound dispute settlement mechanisms“.  As such, 
Lavigne distinguishes the term of ‘land insecurity’ from ‘land precariousness’ 
which is defined as a household’s lack of certainty over short, medium, and 
long terms regarding its land use rights (eg: a farm tenant who does not 
know whether his/her tenancy contract will be renewed). 
• Livelihoods security refers to adequate and sustainable access to income 
and resources to meet basic needs, including adequate access to food, 
potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, time 
for community participation, and social integration (Frankenberger, 1996). 
A livelihood “comprizes the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims, and 
access) and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable 
which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the 
next generation.” (Chambers and Conway, 1992). 
• Land conflicts: Each society has its own kinds of conflicts and its own ways 
to resolve them21. While a conflict can be generally defined as an open clash 
between at least two groups, the term also expresses the way politico-
legal institutions and new stakes and interests negotiate divergent goals or 
objectives22. Furthermore, conflicts stand at the articulation between illegal 
or/and illegitimate mechanisms for access to land rights and mechanisms 
defined by law, custom, or convention. Conflicts bring together multiples 
actors, including a ‘third’ party, and participate in the framing of everyday land 
governance systems23. Conflict arbitrations are processes that can reconfigure, 
reproduce, and/or recognize rights, rules, and positions. As such, conflicts can 
produce legitimacy. 
• Land transfers are complex and must be understood as land rights transfer. 
This does not only concern private landownership (with its full set of rights 
including the right to sell), but also with various forms of delegation of 
‘derived rights’ such as, for instance, the right of access to the land or the 
20. Lavigne Delville, Ph. 2006.  A conceptual framework for land tenure security, insecurity and securement. Land 
reform 2006/2. FAO. 
21. Chauveau and Mathieu, 1998: 243. 
22. Lavigne-Delville and Hochet, 2005: 102. 
23. Le Meur and Lund, 2001. 
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right to use the land. Derived rights are mainly granted on a non-permanent 
basis and delegation can take the form of ‘agrarian contracts’ (i.e institutional 
arrangements between actors involving various political-legal authorities) 
or ‘agrarian arrangements’ which are informal contracts between actors 
(for example landlords and landless) made in order to cultivate a plot of 
land or to value a resource (trees, cattle...) (Sokha, Lemeur et al., 2007) 
• Land exclusion: “Exclusion is not a random process, nor does it occur on a level 
playing field. It is structured by power relations. Across rural Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere, exclusion from land can be understood in terms of the interaction 
between regulation, force, the market and legitimation.” (Hall et al., 2011). 
In “Powers of exclusion, Land Dilemmas in Southeast Asia”24, the authors 
identify different forms of exclusion which exist at different levels: 
“Regulation, often but not exclusively associated with the state and legal 
instruments, sets the rules regarding access to land and conditions of use. Force 
excludes by violence or the threat of violence, and is brought to bear by both state 
and non-state actors. The market is a power of exclusion as it limits access through 
price and through the creation of incentives to lay more individualized claims to 
land. Legitimation establishes the moral basis for exclusive claims, and indeed for 
entrenching regulation, the market and force as politically and socially acceptable 
bases for exclusion.”
Finally, the methodology took into account the following assumptions:
• Land tenure is an evolving system that, despite reforms and successive policies, 
presents forms of continuity, especially at the local level. From this point of 
view, historical review of the regions concerned for this study has explanatory 
power for understanding land dynamics in their present form. 
• Sociocultural features of Myanmar lowland societies also shape land tenure. 
The Dry Zone, a historical location in which former Burmese kingdoms reigned, 
may have more stable socioeconomic categories than the Delta, which was 
put into cultivation only under the British colonial occupation of the country 
(1824-1947). Moreover, the recent devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis 
(May 2008) may have kept Delta society in (or even driven it back to) a more 
‘pioneering’ frontier context than in the established settlements of the Dry 
Zone.
• In most situations, the village level is the most relevant scale through which 
to understand the links between land and livelihoods and to gain deeper 
understanding of the way policies and laws implemented throughout history 
have shaped on-the-ground realities.
24. Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch and Tania Murray Li, 2011.
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• Land transfers under their various forms – inheritance, sales, and agrarian 
arrangements of derived rights (rent, sharecropping…) – are an essential entry 
point to understand modalities of access to land, and the processes leading to 
land accumulation or land exclusion. 
• Another important entry point for understanding land dynamics are land 
conflicts and their resolution mechanisms. Especially during a transition period, 
land conflicts can better reveal the relationships to land of each category of 
stakeholders, both at local and national levels, and what influence new policies 
have on these relationships.
• Villagers, regardless of whether they have access to land or not, are not passive. 
On the contrary, they actively shape the land tenure framework at the local 
level in its social, economic, and even legal dimensions. Indeed, they actively 
circumvent legal restrictions and find extralegal arrangements as per their 
livelihoods needs.
• There is not one single category of farming households. Not all socioeconomic 
categories of farmers have the same relationship to land, to livelihoods, or to 
assets. We may be able to disaggregate different livelihood strategies, as well 
as different strategies regarding either pursuing access to land or securing this 
access.
• Finally, the term ‘landless’ encompasses a wide diversity of situations. As such, 
it needs to be considered with much care, as it does not necessarily find an 
equivalent term in the Burmese conception of access to farmland. In addition, 
not all landless households may aspire to work farmland, nor are all landless 
households ‘condemned’ to remain in this category. As for farmers, different 
livelihood and land-access strategies may be deciphered through a careful 
study. 
2.  Site selection
The study has been implemented in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta (Bogale and 
Mawlamyinegyun townships), and in the Dry Zone (Monywa and Yinmabin 
townships).  The areas were selected through the following criteria. Prior 
knowledge of the area was a key criteria. Existing grassroots links with farmers, 
local organizations, and authorities were important conditions for successful 
implementation of the study, as it addressed highly sensitive issues25. However, while 
the existing development projects constituted a useful entry point for implementing 
research, the study also selected villages out of GRET’s intervention villages, in 
order to take into account potential biases. In addition, the research study targeted 
25. Especially in Dry Zone due to the proximity of Wun Paung Copper mining project at Let Pa Daung Hill (Salin Gyi 
township). 
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Myanmar lowlands areas, essentially populated by Bamars and that have been the 
closest to state interventions. They are in the country’s most rural states26, and the 
Dry Zone and Ayeyarwaddy constitute an important part of the territory. Sagaing 
and Ayeyarwaddy regions account for more than 43% of the country’s population. 
In addition, as the study explores linkages between food security and land tenure, it 
appeared relevant to select the country’s main rice bowl areas. 
Furthermore, these two areas offer a diachronic perspective. Burmese 
kingdoms created their states in Upper Myanmar (the Dry Zone) and flourished by 
mastering irrigation and cultivating paddy – but leaving the southern Burma of the 
Ayeyarwaddy Delta mostly ungoverned. The British colonial administration annexed 
these two areas at different times (Lower Burma in 1952 and Upper Burma in 1886) 
and governed Upper Burma and Lower Burma in different ways, transforming the 
latter into Myanmar’s rice granary. Hence, exploring land tenure in these two zones 
that share a common history, yet have been affected by different policies, aims to 
offer a deeper understanding of what ‘land’ means in Burmese society and how 
the Burmese relationship to land shaped and continues to shape the agricultural 
landscapes of lowland Myanmar in these days of reform. In each area, nine villages 
were selected so as to cover a high range of agro-ecological characteristics and the 
key land tenure issues that were identified during initial exploratory missions. Part 
of the survey also focused on the village tracts27 (VT) level to understand spatial 
and social dynamics of settlements. 
In the Delta area, nine villages distributed across four VTs have been chosen 
to cover: a wide range of situations along a north/south ecological gradient as 
per water salinity (freshwater, brackish water and salt water areas); various types 
of land categories (farmland and forestland); and village accessibility/remoteness 
from the closest towns of Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun.
In the Dry Zone, nine villages in seven VTs have been studied. They were chosen 
to cover a diversity of agro-ecological conditions (mainly soil and access to water 
for irrigation), accessibility/remoteness from Monywa and Yinmabin, and key land 
issues (disputes, land use, and transactions dynamics).
26. Ayeyarwaddy (total pop: 12 million) and Sagaing (total pol: 10.3 million) have the lowest urbanization rates (14% 
and 17% respectively). 2014 Census. 
27. The village tract unit has been introduced by the British as the lowest minimum unit of administration, with the 
primary objective of levying taxes (see Chapter History III.1.1). It is generally constituted of several villages. 
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3.  Architecture of the study and data collection methods
II. Methodology
     First phase – descriptive approach – context
     social and agro-ecological conditions, local history
     and land issue identification
Survey 
design
     Second phase – qualitative approach – land rights  
     transfer and agrarian arrangements
     land differentiation amongst villages and villagers
Choose 
indicators 
and analyse
     Third phase – quantitative approach –  statistically explore  
     the relations between land access and HH livelihoods
Statistically 
verify
As presented in the Figure 2 above, the study’s architecture was structured 
around three phases. The survey used both qualitative and qualitative approaches 
in order to produce ‘meaningful data’ (information). These approaches were 
implemented in separate phases so the quantitative survey could be designed 
in the light of the qualitative data collected in the first place. The qualitative 
approach was central to the survey as it allowed building meaningful indicators 
and hypotheses that would be statistically described and confirmed (or not) by the 
following quantitative survey. The quantitative data were analysed in the light of 
findings from the first descriptive phase and the second in-depth qualitative one.
 3.1 Phase 1: Descriptive approach
The first phase was designed to produce a base set of information necessary 
for the design of the two following phases. It was based on open interviews of 
key informants (mainly local stakeholders involved in land governance and 
administration, and persons such as elders and former local officials with significant 
knowledge of local land tenure issues), focus group discussions, as well as individual 
household semi-structured interviews (six to nine per village). 
The key indicators used for interviews with these informants and for focus groups 
discussions addressed the following aspects: 
• Context: history of settlement, agri-ecological constraints and zoning, main 
sources of income, and key holders of power positions
• Social organization: local history of land tenure and policy, identifying 
local and external stakeholder groups with interests in land issues (including 
landless groups), formal and informal politico-legal institutions involved in 
land issues and conflict-resolution, indebtedness processes, and stakeholders 
involved in land transactions. 
Figure 2: The three key phases of the study 
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• Land dynamics and transactions: cases of land conflicts, land use certificate 
allocation process, modalities of access to land and resources, main public 
interventions affecting land tenure, processes concerning land sales and 
purchases, and other types of temporary or permanent land transfers. 
The household semi-structured interviews documented the main 
characteristics of the household (including social status of its members), land 
patrimony and other assets, and on-farm and off-farm activities.
 Table 1: Selected villages for the survey phase 1
Zone Township Village tract Village
Delta Bogale Magu Magu
Bogale Magu Poe Laung
Bogale Magu Pay Chaung Lay
Bogale Mya Thein Tan Aye
Bogale Tha Byu Gone VT Tha Byu Gone
Mawlamyinegyun Kyet Shar Pay Chaung 
Mawlamyinegyun Pyar Mut Shaw Chaung Ah Lel Chaung
Mawlamyinegyun Kyar Hone Tet Tet Ku
Mawlamyinegyun Kyar Hone Kyar Hone
Dry Zone Monywa In Taing Hnaw Pin
Monywa Kha Tet Kan North Nyaung Pin Thar
Monywa Kha Tet Kan South Farmland
Monywa Khoe Than Khoe Than
Monywa Myin Mee Laung Gaw Gyi
Yinmabin Min Zu Min Zu
Yinmabin Si Laung Aung Chan Thar
Yinmabin Si Laung Si Laung
Yinmabin Zee Phyu Pin Zee Phyu Pin
 3.2 Phase 2: Qualitative approach
The second qualitative phase focused on land rights transfer and agrarian 
arrangements in a long term perspective with the final objective to understand the 
process of land and resource access differentiation amongst villages and villagers. 
Due to the in-depth nature of the qualitative phase, only three villages in each zone 
were selected for exhaustive household interviews; selection was based on their 
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representativeness (in terms of agro-ecological features, settlement processes, 
conflicts, etc.). 
The interviews were actually implemented in several sessions, due to their 
exhaustive nature. They addressed the household’s history, patrimony, and 
livelihoods, and included an in-depth description of recent land rights transfers and 
arrangements. It enabled us to draw each family’s trajectory. In Delta, 40 household 
interviews were conducted, while in the Dry Zone, 44 interviews were performed. 
In addition, numerous key informant interviews were done in each zone. 
 Table 2: Selected villages for the survey phase 2
Township Village tract Village
Bogale Mya Thein Tan Aye
Mawlamyinegyun Kyet Shar Pay Chaung 
Mawlamyinegyun Kyar Hone Tet Tet Ku
Monywa Kha Tet Kan South Farmland
Monywa Khoe Than Khoe Than
Monywa Myin Mee Laung Gaw Gyi
Yinmabin Zee Phyu Pin Zee Phyu Pin
 3.3 Phase 3: Quantitative approach
Finally, the third phase was a quantitative approach aiming at 
statistically exploring the hypothesis on relations between land access 
and households livelihoods. The key hypothesis used to build the 
quantitative survey concerned trends in household trajectories, based on 
specific household demographic, social and technico-economic features 
and strategies for land access. Through a quasi-exhaustive village-based 
survey covering nine villages and a total of 1,128 households (531 in Delta 
and 598 in Dry Zone) were interviewed following a questionnaire which 
was first tested twice (through a pre-pilot and a pilot) in other villages. 
The choice made to conduct an exhaustive village-based survey (100% of 
households living in the targeted villages) was based on the following reasons:
• The lack of statistical data available at both national and local – township 
– levels: Without statistical data and a current census (the 2014 national census 
was on-going at the time), it was impossible to construct any representative 
II. Methodology
47 
sample of any mother population. It is also difficult to determine the limits of 
the mother population to be described. 
• The lack of understanding of relations between land dynamics and 
livelihoods security: Such relations are still poorly described in Myanmar and 
it is difficult to identify the critical determinants. Thus, the sample could not be 
constructed on any existing reliable and verified hypotheses. 
• The ‘qualitative’ dimension of the survey (even for data to be collected 
during phase 3). In this survey, households are not to be considered only as 
‘rational’ and autonomous economic decision makers but also as part of social 
groups and networks which are important for what they are both able (in 
terms of position) and capable (in terms of capacity) of doing. Villages – which 
constitute the social basic unit in Burmese society – are then the most relevant, 
evident, and easy unit to study. As verified in the two first phases, the village 
is a social unit where most land-based social interactions take place. Most 
of the land transfers (including agrarian contracts) involve people from the 
same village. The village is thus the key unit for let allocation and land conflict 
resolution.
It is then logical: 
• To choose surveyed villages according to their qualitative representativeness 
within the two areas.
• To survey the whole population in the village, so to avoid constructing a non-
representative sample and to better understand land-based social relations 
within the social unit where those are more intense and potentially more 
significant.
Due to differences in the size of villages between Delta (generally smaller) and 
Dry Zone, the same number of villages in both zones could not provide equivalent 
samples of population. For this reason – added to the expected difficulties in 
covering all 100% households in Dry Zone villages28 – five villages were surveyed 
in Delta and four in Dry Zone, altogether producing 1,129 entries corresponding to 
1,129 households, for a total of 4,887 individuals. 
28. These expectations were based on the highly sensitive nature of land tenure issues in the region (close the 
Lapetdaung copper mine) rendering this kind of systematic interviews delicate and subject to confusions in the midst 
of the national census implemented in 2014.
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Table 3: Number of interviews and quantitative survey coverage per village
Delta
Villages Pay 
Chaung
 Aye Ywar  Tet Tet Ku  Tha Byu 
Gone
 Magu TOTAL
Surveyed HH 55 78 113 127 158 531
Total POP (HH) 55 85 148 150 166 604
% Surveyed HH 
/total Pop
100% 92% 76% 85% 95% 88%
Dry Zone
Villages Hledar  Zee Phyu Pin Khoe Than Gaw Gyi TOTAL
Surveyed HH 130 138 210 120 598
Total POP (HH) 143 167 250 122 682
% Surveyed HH 
/total Pop
91% 83% 84% 98% 88%
Design of the questionnaire
On the basis of the hypothesis defined under phase 1 and phase 2, the survey 
questions were listed and organized in five main sections: 
• General household information: demographic information on household 
members, and settlement history
• Land patrimony: landownership, land use, status of lands, land transactions 
and transfers since 1988, perceptions on land registration 
• Agrarian activities: crops, income and costs incurred for each crop, details 
on other agrarian activities such as livestock raising, fishing, and agricultural 
wage labor 
• Other activities and income: details on off-farm activities, remittances, current 
savings and loans, household main sources of income, and expenditures
• Food security and wealth: nutrition indicators, empirical wealth indicators.
The questionnaire was translated into Myanmar and was first tested twice 
(through a pre-pilot and a pilot) in other villages and adapted after each of the two 
pilots. Each questionnaire contained more than a 1,000 entries. Data entry was then 
ensured by the enumerators, with a data checking system. Data processing and 
analysis was then performed with statistics software by the research coordination 
team, supported by the external land tenure expert and senior statistician. 
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4.  Limitations of the research
Similarly, the ethnographic approach is far from being well understood in 
Myanmar (let alone academic ethnographic studies), thus gathering and training 
apprentice ethnographers remains a challenge. We tried and mostly succeeded in 
recruiting and training local social science researchers for this study, though a few 
limitations remained.
The first limitation was in terms of reporting and in terms of translating a mass 
of information, impressions, and hunches into written, documented, analysed 
findings. Qualitative data takes time to collect. However, it takes even more time 
to analyse it and to write findings. Going beyond a list of facts and anecdotes to 
formulate new questions and hypotheses, to identify inter-relations between 
issues, to define trends and typologies requires very specific skills. Here again, 
there were disparities within the field survey team but overall, the difficulties in 
analysis, writing (especially in English language, but not only) and reporting on a 
regular basis the information collected, led to some data loss. 
Another issue, this time faced by local researchers themselves, was the reliability 
of the information they collected. Indeed, land issues may rapidly become sensitive 
ones, especially if one is enquiring into land acquisition processes while talking to 
a farmer who owns hundreds of acres. 
At such a moment, looking for the truth can turn into something akin to a 
criminal investigation. Although the team practiced triangulation techniques in 
order to cross-check information, it proved difficult for the team to account for the 
informative value of people’s discourses over the ‘facts’ they attempt to display. 
Clearly, the interpretation of discourses remained an important challenge during 
the survey work. Quantitative research would prove also to be full of pitfalls. The 
first one was the research coordination team’s desire to test ‘everything’. This was 
also aggravated by the necessity to take into account the specificities of each of 
two very different contexts (Delta and Dry Zone) in one single questionnaire. 
As a result, the questionnaire was too detailed and too long (up to two and a half 
hours needed to complete the questionnaire for large landowners). The excessive 
precision of some questions led to difficulties in data processing and analysis, and 
in some instances having figures too small to be properly analysed and/or to be 
statistically significant. In addition, the quantitative survey did not allow to collect 
the information necessary to analyse properly farm’s agricultural labor constraints, 
nor did it allow to assess fluctuations of income and farm production across years.
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Then, enumerators’ understanding of the questionnaire, despite intensive 
trainings and multiple pilots before implementing the study, retained bias in some 
cases. Finally, some information was doomed to be approximate, exemplified by 
income and expense related questions, whether because rural households most 
often don’t record incomes and expenditures throughout the year, or because 
of differences in units (some farmers measuring surfaces in kwat, others in acres 
for example), and sometimes simply by indolence (yet understandable when 
summarising with the interviewee during a two hour interview).  
We should nonetheless conclude that high quality information was gathered 
during this study, and the team worked hard and developed unique skills, which 
altogether led to producing what we believe is a critical work on land tenure in 
lowland Myanmar. 
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1.   The making of modern land tenure (1800s to 1948)
 1.1 From subjects to tenants
An important part of contemporary Myanmar land tenure framework derives 
from the British colonial period (1824 to 194829). But before the British, land was 
already central in supporting the crown’s administration (Lieberman, 1980), though 
taxation and tenure were shaped to fit governance based on people’s allegiances 
to powerful individuals (including the ‘charismatic monarch’30), rather than 
decentralized administration. Basically, lands were divided into two categories: 
crown lands and private lands. 
• Crown lands were situated within the royal sphere of influence and generally 
composed of the best irrigated and more fertile lands of the Dry Zone (Aung 
Thwin, 1984: 224). Islands and alluvial formations on rivers, that is, land 
liable to periodic change due to the action of the river, were also royal land 
(Siok Hwa, 1965a: 106). These crown lands were administered by temporary 
and permanent clients of the king in return for certain rights and privileges 
(appanages). 
• Private lands encompassed communal and ancestral lands worked by 
individuals non-bonded to the king. While produce from crown lands supplied 
royal granaries, individuals working ‘private land’ were taxed per capita based 
on their wealth (including lands) (Aung Thwin, 1984: 224). Rights on such 
lands were acquired by clearing and cultivating plots (dama-u-gya – ‘the first 
clearing (of land) by knife’). These lands then became the property of the 
cultivator (u-paing), including the right to mortgage, sell or pass them to their 
descendants (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 107). 
Between the annexation of Lower Burma (1852) and Upper Burma (1885-
1886), the taxation system faced a profound reform under King Mindon (1853-
1878). The new system intended to compensate the loss of revenue coming from 
appanages in Lower Burma which had passed under British administration. For 
29. The first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-1826), led to the annexation of Assam, Manipur, and Arakan. The British also 
took the region of Tenasserim. The second Anglo-Burmese war (1852) led to the annexation of Pegu Province (later 
renamed Lower Burma and including the Ayeyarwaddy Delta), before annexing Upper Burma in 1885-56 after the third 
Anglo-Burmese war, leading the last Burmese king, Thibaw (1859-1916), to exile. 
30. Leach, 1960.
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this reason, King Mindon introduced the thathameda tax, theoretically collected 
from each household, supposedly at a tenth of their income. This system was 
supposed to replace all other existing taxes and fees as known under previous 
monarchs31. However, in practice it was much more a property tax, which local 
patrons were expected to collect, based on the number of households they took 
charge of. Revenue was collected in kind or in cash within villages, based mainly 
on the property wealth of the particular household. Under this system, destitute 
households or individuals were not expected to pay any tax (Than Myint-U, 2004: 
122). Despite the reform, it seems that the previous social organization and 
associated feudal-like tax system endured until the British annexation of Upper 
Burma in 1885-1886 (ibid.: 34). 
Despite careful thoughts on the most appropriate taxation system (at least 
on land and agricultural taxes) the new rulers would apply first on the annexed 
territories (Furnivall, 1939), the British had only little time to learn carefully about 
the practices already in place prior to their coming to administer the country. The 
colonial administration believed they inherited the thathameda tax as an effective 
one, which was only partly true, as other taxes and fees collected by local village 
heads and ‘governors’ (myo-thu-gyi, myo-sa) tended to remain and overlap with 
the thathameda. British rulers decided after several years of discussions that this 
‘household’ tax would remain and its amount would vary according to the wealth 
of the area, but not to the same extent as under Burmese rule: 
“Local community leaders would actively participate in ascribing individual 
household shares. Once the annual thathameda for a given township was 
decided (normally at ten rupees per household), rates on individual households 
would depend on income, ranging from just one rupee to over fifteen. This was 
another departure from the Burmese method, in which assessment was based on 
wealth or property rather than income. Some exemptions were allowed. But the 
system whereby an entire ‘destitute’ class of people (dokkhita) was recognized and 
exempted, was not continued.” (Than Myint-U, 2004: 229)
Consequently, prior to the British rule, Burmese subjects already knew about 
‘household’ tax, as they knew about ‘private tenure’ of the land (Furnivall, 1939: 
102, Lieberman, 2003: 148, 185, 298, 421) under the practice of dama-u-gya. Under 
dama-u-gya, customary rights were acquired through clearing and cultivating 
any vacant land, after which the cultivator could sell, mortgage, or pass to his 
descendants. The main difference actually introduced by the British regarding land 
tenure and the whole governance of the region was that the taxation system would 
31. That is an appanage system based on royal let allocation, tax collection on crown land and taxes payable in kind 
and in cash for people non-bounded to the king. 
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no longer be based on individuals (hence on social groups organized along vertical 
patron-client relationships), but on territorial boundaries and, for our purpose, on 
agricultural land size. This territorialization process was efficiently implemented 
through the new administrative concept of village tract, borrowed from British 
administration in India. Charles Crosthwaithe, Chief Commissioner of Upper Burma, 
would finalize the transition to the village tract administration by introducing the 
figure of the village headman (ywa-thugyi”) through the Village Act (1887). This 
Village Act was implemented in order to break former administrative structures 
(such as those based on myo and taik) as well as counter Burmese resistance in the 
first years of British rule, “thus further enhancing the role of new-style township and 
placing greater responsibilities on the village headman” (Taylor, 2009: 82). 
In planning land tenure in colonized Burma, colonial rulers would have logically 
drawn on their previous experiences in British-India. There, three main systems 
dominated: a) the landlord based system (zamindari) where landlords established 
the tax to be collected for themselves, from which they would pay the requested 
amount to the British administration; b) a village based system (mahalwari) in 
which village bodies which jointly owned the village were responsible for the land 
revenue; and c) an individual based system (ryotwari) where revenue settlement was 
fixed directly with individuals (Banerjee and Lyer, 2005: 1193-1194). The fact that 
different systems coexisted throughout British India derived from the same rationale: 
sustaining maximum land revenue for the British administration. In some situations, 
landlords – able to invest more – served this purpose; in others, individuals – having 
more incentives than landlords to improve their own productivity – delivered better 
outcomes. In Burma, local commissioners (such as Maingy in Tenasserim region), 
would argue for years with the British-Indian government about the most appropriate 
system to apply to Burma. The arguments that would lead to the implementation of 
an individual based – ryotwari – system in Burma were that since “there was not a well-
established landed group in Lower Burma, it appeared possible to develop a rural economy 
in which the small proprietor received the profits of his labors and the rent surplus went to 
the state rather than to intermediaries” (Adas, 2011: 32). This vision was grounded in 
the political-ecological realities of administrating Lower Burma, ones not prevailing 
in Upper Burma where the best-irrigated tracks of land were already cultivated and 
where “easily cleared and fertile land was very difficult to get” (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 120). 
Indeed, this very situation had already led to massive migration (mostly from Upper 
Burma) toward the newly opened grounds of the Delta. By 1881, “more than 300,000 
people living in Lower Burma were recorded as having been born outside of the region, the 
vast majority being cultivators from the Ava kingdom” (Thant Myint-U, 2004: 107). 
Various land tenure systems were introduced under British rule, all relying on 
the same rationale: developing land as quickly as possible “to help defray the costs of 
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administration and, at the same time, to establish a body of peasant proprietors” (Siok 
Hwa, 1965a: 107). As noted earlier, Burmese were already familiar with individual use 
rights. In 1889, the Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation would appropriate 
the former land categorization of ‘crown’ or ‘private’ dividing land into ‘state’ and 
‘non-state’ respectively (Thant Myint-U, 2004: 228). Another major change was that 
under royal administration, “there was very little if any direct taxation on agricultural 
production other than rent on land constituting crown estates” (ibid: 37). Most taxes 
were in the form of fees for judicial and other services performed, licenses, local 
tariffs on trade, transport and virtually every kind of economic activity. Colonial 
authorities, on the other hand, decided to impose a tax on ‘non-state’ land in 
addition to the rent on ‘state land’ and the thathameda. This was made “in line with 
the long-standing British Indian concept of the state being the ultimate owner of the 
land or was justified in part by citing the Burmese notion of the king as the ‘lord of 
water and earth’ (ye”-mye” shin). Thus, what had been an abstract Burmese theory of 
government, never practiced, in this way became a codified and enforced reality under 
the British administration” (ibid.: 230). 
Implementation of this ryotwari system would require costly and time 
consuming surveys to record individual holdings. Moreover, the classification of 
land between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ would prove a source of conflicts and tensions 
between the British government and the Burmese cultivators from Upper Burma, 
where a long tradition of tenure under the crown already existed (Mizuno, 2000: 
122). Indeed, occupants of ‘state land’ had to pay a tax on land, besides the already 
collected thathameda tax. For this reason, some British officers were tempted to 
declare as much land as possible as ‘state land’, while farmers tended to “conceal so 
far as possible the customs relating to tenures (to British officers), lest any information 
might be used against them as an argument for demanding rent”32 (Furnivall, 1931: 
89). Due to many difficulties in determining whether a parcel would fall into ‘state’ 
or ‘non-state’ classification, as well as the gradual ‘privatization’ of land through 
increasing claims brought to courts by individuals, the entire distinction was 
abandoned by the end of the 19th century so that all land were finally considered 
equally taxable under the land revenue tax. 
 1.2 Dispossession: from state’s tenants to the state of tenancy
The state experimented with several land tenure policies in order to secure land 
revenue collection and foster land development, especially in Lower Burma. During 
the decades of rapid expansion of cultivated lands, two coexisting tenure systems 
dominated:
32. To establish if a land should fall into one or the other category, officers would notably look at tenure rights: 
occupants of ‘crown-land’ (classified as state land by the British) didn’t have the right to transfer, mortgage or sell the 
land. 
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• The squatter system resembled the traditional dama-u-gya, in which any 
person was able to clear and settle on any vacant land. By paying land revenue 
tax continuously over a 12 years period, the cultivator received a permanent, 
inheritable, and transferable right of use and occupancy of the land provided 
he continued to pay the tax regularly. Before this period, the cultivator was 
liable to eviction if he failed to pay the annual land revenue. This system 
prevailed in more-established areas (i.e. Dry Zone and upper part of Delta) 
where cultivators were expanding their long-settled holdings by clearing 
adjacent land (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 107-108). 
• The second system was the patta (i.e. a small piece of land) system, aimed at 
encouraging cultivators to cultivate state land that had previously not been 
under cultivation. This system granted tenure before the cultivator cleared 
the land without collecting revenue during a period varying according to the 
difficulty to transform the land into productive farmland. Such land could not 
be mortgaged and cultivators had to show sufficient means to cultivate the 
land without resorting to money-lenders (ibid.: 108). 
In both systems, however, money-lenders became crucial stakeholders 
in expanding land under British rule, particularly in Lower Burma. Indeed, it 
was found that even the patta system could not prevent landholders from 
mortgaging or exchanging land to money-lenders, traders and landlords as 
collateral. By 1900, the patta system was found to be inefficient in constituting 
a large body of peasant-proprietors and was abandoned. Other systems would 
be introduced, such as a lease of state land for five to ten-year periods with the 
possibility for cultivators to cultivate any adjacent vacant land without paying 
extra revenue, and a grant system through which the government offered 
large tracts of land to investors, hoping these would bring laborers to work 
their estate. However, it appeared that most of the successful investors in these 
schemes were chiefly speculators, administrative officers, etc., rather than 
proper cultivators (ibid.: 110). 
Following the implementation of these systems, especially the squatter and 
patta ones, the results appeared to be contrary to the putative British objectives of 
creating a large body of peasant proprietors (more exactly, landholders). By 1930, 
one third of the total cultivated land had fallen into the hands of non-agriculturists 
and one quarter was held by absentee non-agriculturists (ibid.: 112). This marked 
a significant difference from the numbers found in the 1891 census, which “listed 
1.8 per cent of the population as landlords, 64 per cent as landowning cultivators, 26 
per cent as tenants and 8 per cent as agricultural laborers” (Than Myint-U, 2004: 235). 
This increasing state of tenancy among cultivators under British rule and until the 
Land Nationalization Act of 1948 (see infra) can be explained by two main factors 
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during this period: the entry of Burmese rice on the international market, and the 
introduction of a new – village tract-based – governance system. The British, as 
briefly mentioned above, aimed at extracting as much revenue as possible from 
its Burma annexation, and land was a profitable post for levying taxes. Besides, 
the opening of Burma to the international market, especially for rice exportation 
purposes, changed peasants’ lifestyles in the course of the late 19th and beginning 
of 20th centuries through the monetization of rural economy and introduction of 
imported goods. Under Burmese monarchs of the Konbaung dynasty, exporting 
rice outside the empire was forbidden. 
Accordingly, surplus rice produced in the country and notably in Lower Burma 
was stored and redistributed to areas where there were food shortages. As a result, 
the limited domestic market was regulated and stabilized by the great quantities of 
rice held by the government. The price of rice was therefore quite low during this 
period and the “low return which the cultivator received for the extra labor required 
to produce a surplus provided little incentive for him to harvest more than he needed 
for food, seed and taxes” (Adas, 1972: 187). There were therefore few reasons for 
farmers to bring new areas under cultivation – maybe except for assisting children 
who had married and were establishing separate households. Besides, “there were 
many sumptuary laws in Konbaung society (so the) type and size of a man’s house, the 
domestic implements he was permitted to use, his clothing and jewellery were all rigidly 
regulated by his position and social standing. The cultivator was low on the social 
scale and thus his options as a consumer were very limited.” (ibid.: 187) By entering 
international trade under the British rule, surplus-production became necessary 
(at least for the British) and the money earned through this production offered 
access to a number of goods long inaccessible to the cultivators under Burmese 
monarchs. 
However, even once this incentive was introduced, clearing new lands, 
especially in the malaria-infested Delta, and turning them into productive rice fields, 
necessitated massive labor and investments, increasing the need for cultivators to 
rely on money-lenders. The farmers’ relationship to these money-lenders may have 
resembled the more ‘traditional’ patron-client relationship structuring most vertical 
bonds between farmers and elites under Burmese rule. In that system, resorting 
to the law and administration was barely achievable outside the dynastic power 
center. Hence, local patrons had to rely on locally acquired legitimacy rather than 
outside support. To win the loyalty of his clients, the master’s duty is to redistribute 
part of his wealth within his social group, either in collective ritual ceremonies or by 
lending some money to his clients for extra-professional needs such as weddings, 
burials, or Buddhist initiation ceremonies (shin-pyu’). This relationship is well 
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conveyed by the bonds one has with his kyei”zu”shin33 (Boutry, 2015). 
However, the change in governance, exemplified by the village tract based 
administration ramifying deep into the countryside, altered this system – both 
for the farmer and for the patron. First, it hindered the farmers’ bargaining power. 
As Scott puts it, “the growth of colonial administration increased the peasant need 
for protection and influence, while providing the legal and coercive backing that 
allowed local elites to ignore local opinion and become more exploitive”  (1972: 7). 
On the other hand, the integration of rice production into international markets 
and its subsequent monetization also contributed to the fragmentation of the 
formerly comprehensive patron-client relationships, (which normally encompass 
the economic frame and project themselves into the social one). But social 
differentiation tended to multiply interlocutors for borrowing money, for buying 
inputs, etc., hence multiplying dependency bonds. Farmers’ relationships to upper 
socioeconomic classes was therefore divided into different sectors and their 
bargaining power reduced. Coupled with the relative closure of the rice frontier at 
the turn of the 20th century and the 1930s financial crisis, the colonial era achieved 
the transformation of a pre-colonial body of (majority) peasant-proprietors, into a 
body of peasant-tenants. While it is known that foreign money-lenders (especially 
Chettiars) aimed at making money rather than acquiring land, the impossibility of 
Burmese peasants to repay their own loans ended in the concentration of land 
into the hands of money-lenders and landlords, among whom a great part were 
absentees. The land accumulation in Delta by the Chettiars is explained by Turnell 
as follows:
“The combination of the collapse of paddy prices in the Great depression, the 
Chettiars’ insistence on land as collateral, and the imposition of British land title 
land did bring a substantial transfer of Burmans’ cultivable land into their hands.” 
(2009: 13) 
Indebtedness already affected farmers during the booming phase of the Delta’s 
agricultural expansion. In the 1880s and 1890s, it was estimated that over 70% of 
agricultural debts could be repaid at the end of the crop season, while desperate 
cases of debt with farmers at risk of losing their land were estimated at 3.7 to 5.4% 
of borrowers. In the 1900s and 1910s, the percentage of borrowers able to repay 
their loans within a crop season decreased to 60%, while serious indebtedness 
cases had increased to 9.5% (Adas, 1974b: 68). That being said, indebtedness was 
33. This literally means the ‘master of one’s good deeds’, which could be translated in a Buddhist context as ‘the master 
of one’s life’, given the rebirth cycle tying every living being to this world and the good deeds needed to acquire merits 
in order to free oneself from this cycle. There are three principal kyei”zu”shin in one’s life: Buddha, one’s parents and 
teachers. See Schober, 1989.
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still much lower than in the following decades during which the agricultural crisis, 
aggravated by the Great Depression, led to the deterioration of living conditions of 
farmers (ibid.).
The main cause of land dispossession during the British colonial period is 
that cultivators generally contracted debts beyond their capacity of repayment. 
Historian Siok Hwa’s summary of the central causes of indebtedness warrants 
extensive quotation:
“(…) indebtedness (could be attributed) to the inexperience and ignorance of 
borrowers caught in the rapid change from a subsistence to a cash economy; 
vicissitudes befalling the borrower like drought, flood, pests, illness and cattle 
disease; the use of loans for unproductive purposes such as elaborate ceremonies 
in connection with marriages, funerals, the entry of boys into the monastic 
novitiate and ear-borings for girls; the use of loans for speculative ventures which 
failed, and the unfavorable conditions under which loans were made such as the 
excessively high interest rates charged; the lack of differentiation of treatment for 
long term and short term loans and the practice of money-lenders to allow and 
even encourage borrowers to borrow amounts up to the limit of the value of the 
collateral offered rather than the amount which would make their loan most 
profitable. A less important cause of let alienation by agriculturists lies in the 
Buddhist inheritance customs. This operated less evidently in Lower than in Upper 
Burma where holdings tended to be smaller and where property was often divided 
among the children.” (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 155-6) 
We should note that most of the factors remained throughout proceeding 
periods and continue to characterize rural lowland societies in Myanmar, especially 
in Delta.
 1.3 Ayeyarwaddy Delta: the rice frontier
The British, by annexing Lower Burma (including the Delta from 1852 onwards), 
transformed large tracts of wastelands into the rice granary of the British-India 
Empire, making the country a leader in worldwide international paddy trade until 
Ne Win’s military coup in 1962. It has long been asserted that Lower Burma and the 
Ayeyarwaddy Delta were ravaged by unsuccessful Mon uprisings against ethnic 
Burmans in the 18th century, reducing a once fertile and productive region into 
a scarcely populated and cultivated one (Harvey, 1967: 236, Siok Hwa, 1965b: 
69). It is however more likely that the lower part of the Delta, in the absence of 
embankments, had always been perennially flooded during the annual monsoon 
and hence unsuited for settlement (South 2003: 21). It seems that paddy cultivation 
in the Delta was “concentrated around the towns of Bassein (Pathein), Myaungmya 
III. The making of contemporary land tenure in lowland Myanmar
59 
and Ngathainggyaung in the western portion of the Ayeyarwaddy Delta; near the 
town of Myaunaung, north west of Henzada (Hinthada) and between Prome (Pyay) 
and Thayetmyo on the upper Ayeyarwaddy; and near Pyapon, Dallah, Danubyu and 
Toungoo in the central and east portions of Lower Burma” (Adas, 1972: 186). Yet, even 
these regions were not intensively cultivated until the late 18th century, following 
the conquest of Lower Burma by Ava in the 1750s and the arrival of migrants coming 
from Upper Burma (ibid.: 181). Still, it was only with the British annexation of Lower 
Burma that the ‘rice frontier’ (Adas, 2011) would appear, moving constantly south 
to the lowest part of the Delta. 
This intensive colonization of the Ayeyarwaddy Delta happened in three stages 
from 1858 to 1941: i) spectacular agricultural growth (1852-1901), ii) the gradual 
closing of the agricultural frontier (1901-1929), and iii) the major agricultural crisis 
period following the Great Depression. 
During the first stage, the rice economy of Lower Burma rapidly extended 
owing to the cultivation of large areas of virgin land. The amount of rice exported 
from Lower Burma rose from 162,000 tons in 1855 to two million tons in 1905-
06 while rice prices tripled34. Paddy cultivation area went from 600,000 acres in 
1852-53, to 6.7 million acres in 1902-03 and 8.9 million acres in 1922-23 (Mya Than, 
2001: 7). This agricultural boom was linked with spectacular population growth: 
one million people in 1852 became more than four million by 1901 (Adas, 1974: 
58). This was fueled by massive migration that came south from Upper Burma 
via the Ayeyarwaddy River35. Migrants were mostly poor farmers, and migration 
waves were strongly correlated to droughts and food shortages occurring in 
Upper Burma. Afterwards came the Indians and, to a lesser extent, foreign Asians, 
mainly Chinese. The role of these diasporas, and particularly the money-lending 
class of Chettiars (originating from South India), was of the utmost importance in 
developing the rice frontier from the 1880s until independence. Yet, as underlined 
by Adas (1974b: 390), the rice production growth of the first three decades after 
Lower Burma’s annexation indicates that the advance of the rice frontier36 could 
have been achieved, though at a slower pace, with indigenous money-lenders 
– principally successful agriculturists and rice brokers. Yet, thanks to the large 
scale transactions they executed, Chettiars were also practicing fairer interest 
rates than most local money-lenders (ibid.: 389). Actually, the main role of non-
European immigrants in colonization processes throughout the globe was to 
link ‘subsistence economies’ and ‘global commercial networks’, by conducting 
34. Cheng, Rice Industry in Burma , in Adas, 1974: 58. 
35. 93% (in1881) and 87% (in 1901) of migrants arriving to Delta originated from Dry Zone (ibid, 44). 
36. During the first three decades after annexation of Lower Burma, areas under cultivation increased by nearly two 
millions and exports rose from virtually zero to 850,000 tons (Adas 1974: 390). 
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activities Europeans were reluctant or did not have the manpower to engage 
(ibid.: 385). Hence, “perhaps the major reason for the limited involvement of the 
Chettiars in Lower Burma in the early decades of British rule was the low level of the 
demand for agricultural credit” (Adas, 1974b: 390). After 1869 and the opening of 
the Suez Canal, coupled with a growing demand for rice on the European market 
increasingly dependent on Asian production and a workforce relying more and 
more on imported goods (Adas, 1974b: 390, Siok Hwa, 1965b: 79-80), need for 
investments and credits grew enough to overwhelm indigenous money-lenders’ 
capacities. Therefore, by the 1880s, the Chettiars were actively involved in Delta 
rice economy. At that time, the ryotwari system of tenure that defined peasants as 
primary holders (the government being the ultimate owner) also made it possible 
for cultivators to use land as collateral for loans obtained from money-lenders 
and other sources. By 1930, Chettiars were providing 60% of the crop loans37 in 
Lower Burma districts. Adas attributes the extent of Chettiar involvement in the 
Lower Burma rice economy to the connections developed with Western banks – 
such as the Imperial Bank of India and the Indian Overseas Bank – as well as their 
corporate organization (Adas, 1974: 393, 395-6). Despite attempts by the colonial 
government to provide loans though agricultural funds and cooperatives, Chettiar 
and other private money-lender loans were more accessible, were available with 
fewer delays, were of a greater amount, and came with fewer penalties in case of 
delay in repaying creditors than those obtained from governmental institutions 
(ibid.:397). 
Yet, once again, it is important to underline here the exceptional extent of 
loans provided by Burmese money-lenders compared to other indigenous money-
lending communities elsewhere in the colonies. There seemed to be a division of 
clientele between Chettiars and Burmese money-lenders, the latter providing loans 
to less secure individuals and at higher interest rates. Besides, Burmese money-
lenders were able by the end of the nineteenth century to borrow from Chettiars, 
who progressively supplied most of indigenous money-lenders’ capital (ibid.:398). 
This feature of the Delta Burmese society, in which private money-lenders play 
a crucial role in credit provision has remained throughout successive governments 
and policies until today. Indeed, as we will see later (Chapter VIII.2.2), even with 
agricultural loan reforms undertaken by 2011’s quasi-civil government – with a 
sharp increase of loan amounts and reduced interest rates for farmers – private 
money-lenders remained key players in the Delta economy. We will also see that the 
Land Nationalization Act of 1948 that repossessed land held by foreigners (mainly 
Chettiars and Chinese), in theory for the benefit of Burmese citizens, ultimately 
benefited large Burmese landholders and money-lenders (see Chapter III.1.6). 
37. In number of loans. 
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Progressively, starting from 1900, the rapid economic growth of the Delta 
rice industry slowed as new fertile lands gradually became rare and the ‘frontier’ 
disappeared. Consequently land prices increased while production tended to 
decrease due to lower land fertility, generating more and more debts among 
peasants. The closing of the rice frontier also left many tenants and gangs of laborers 
jobless. The economic crisis of the early 1930s, linked to the Great Depression and 
the collapse of the international paddy market would act as a final blow, leaving 
most landholders so indebted they had to transfer their lands to money-lenders. 
Despite the fact that Chettiars were not interested in holding land, the conditions 
described above made it such that many small and large holders alike were unable 
to repay their debts, and with Chettiars’ financial capacity being likewise affected 
by the crisis, they had little choice but to foreclose on mortgaged lands. Hence, by 
the late 1930s, Chettiars controlled 25% of the total cultivated land in Lower Burma 
and 50% of the let alienated to non-agriculturists (Adas, 1974: 400). 
 1.4 Upper Burma: the rise of a land owning class
Contrary to the large tracts of newly conquered land in Lower Burma, much 
of Upper Burma’s land suited to agriculture was already cultivated and under 
customary tenure. Yet, British officers, when drafting the 1889 Upper Burma Land 
and Revenue Regulation, still had little knowledge of prior tenure conditions, apart 
that the “primary Burmese tax was the thathameda household tax and that there 
existed ‘royal lands’ which paid rent to the state” (Than Myint-U, 2004: 228). Through 
the enforcement of land revenue based on a division of ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ land, 
British policy-makers were pushing even further the prior reforms of the Konbaung 
era, “creating for the first time a structure of genuinely private ownership, entirely free 
of gentry or aristocratic control or involvement” (ibid.: 231). As already underlined, 
the annexation of Upper Burma also came with a new governance system 
emphasizing the village territorial unit and the figure of village headman or thu-gyi, 
while dispossessing most former individuals linked to the crown of their privileges 
(notably prebendal land). Hence, there was increasing competition among Upper 
Burma cultivators to claim ownership of lands that were previously held by 
hereditary officials under the crown (such as myo-thugyi, khayaing-wun and other 
noblemen). Besides, it has been noted that gathering enough evidence to classify 
land (whether ‘state’ or ‘non-state’) was far from easy, such that Burmese individuals 
started to fight to register land as private wherever doubt existed. Hence, during 
the first years after annexation of Upper Burma, the amount of litigation brought 
to British courts raised steadily38, declining only by 1895 (Thant Myint-U 2004: 232). 
These litigations could be sorted into two main types. The first one was comprised 
of suits seeking the division among heirs of ancestral private land (bobabaing) that 
had risen in value in many areas – such as the Lower Chindwin (where Monywa 
38. 7,000 in 1889 and over 9,000 in 1890, the majority being for breach of contract and over land. 
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and present-day Yinmabin lie), where recent improvements in irrigation and 
transportation had led to economic growth and where much of the land had 
become classified as privately owned. The second type concerned suits for the 
redemption of land which had been mortgaged. Interestingly enough, these two 
types of land disputes also dominate today in village-level conflicts surrounding 
the Farmland Law 2012, as we will see in Chapter VI. 
While, for the British officers (ibid.: 232), this litigiousness tended to denote that 
Burmese villagers lacked a sense of communal spirit, these disputes in the years 
following annexation of Upper Burma surely underlined the changes happening 
in the social organization of the region. Notably by cancelling most of privileges 
acquired by Burmese officers (once benefiting from the revenue of large tracts of 
land), British rule favored the rise of traders, money-lenders, and other outsiders 
linked to the royal court (ibid.: 234). Actually, former reforms engaged by King 
Mindon – theoretically replacing all prebendal estates and the system of appanages 
with cash revenues and salaries – already favored traders and money-lenders. By 
the early 1880s, “large scale selling and mortgaging of state lands and the growing 
prominence of non-local traders and money-lenders throughout the country-side” 
were already affecting Upper Burma (ibid.: 179).  However, the British pushed the 
reform much further than under Mindon’s rule where the form of the organization 
of power prevented strict control of territories far from Mandalay. 
However, colonial reforms were not uniformly implemented. For example, 
some local hereditary office-holders and their relatives were treated much more 
generously in some places than in others. The myothugyi of Monywa was given 
private ownership of over 3,000 acres. Similarly, along the Lower Chindwin most of 
the large landowners were found to be former or current thugyi (ibid.: 237). Than 
Myint-U summarizes three different types of social change in Upper Burma until 
the 1900s, “based on geographical distance from Mandalay, and the local variant in 
early modern social organization: the area around the capital where hereditary office-
holders had largely disappeared and the economy was the most heavily commercialized 
and outsider dominated; the Salin area, geographically the furthest irrigated area, 
where the gentry had turned into a powerful landowning class; and the poorer middle 
area which had experienced only moderate commercialization and where some local 
gentry had come to benefit” (ibid.: 239-240). Most of the villages surveyed in the Dry 
Zone for this study would fall into the second category in which the gentry turned 
into a powerful landowning class. 
By the 1930s, the problem of let alienation of non-agriculturists was less acute 
in Upper Burma than in Lower Burma. Apart from state land – non-alienable and 
non-transferable – this difference greatly lies in the fact that cultivators “were on 
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the whole more concerned about the loss of land as they had a greater degree of 
sentimental attachment to the land which had often been handed down through many 
generations and therefore were more cautious in their application for and use of land 
mortgage loans” (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 120). This feature of Dry Zone as a long-settled 
area is still an important component in the dynamics of land tenure through these 
days, as we will see. 
 1.5 Impacts of colonization on landlordism
The pre-colonial period did not provide any favorable ground for landlordism. 
Indeed, the dominant rural stratum in Upper Burma from the fourteenth through 
sixteenth centuries was composed of hereditary headmen ruling self-sufficient 
agricultural communities of freemen known as athis. They appear to have exercised 
a proprietary right over all the lands in their jurisdiction, while collecting taxes and 
disposing of military force subject only to sporadic supervision from the royal 
court, since loyalties to the center were often tenuous. Athi land was organized on 
a communal basis and access to such lands had been subject to close headman 
supervision (Lieberman, 1991: 27). Besides, the great availability of land and the 
generally loose control that central power could achieve meant that farmers had 
little reason to pay high rents and were most often able to flee toward the forest 
frontier to find new land to clear and cultivate when necessary. During the Restored 
Toungoo and early Konbaung periods, however, headmen gradually became 
involved in a web of contracts and commercial relations that substantially curtailed 
their economic self-sufficiency. From this period onward, some athi land became 
progressively privatized and private tenures appeared on the frontier outside the 
old communal system. Hence the reform engaged during the Restored Toungoo 
and through the Konbaung dynasties (the last before British annexation) paved the 
rise of a new landowning class in Burma.
“Although headmen in many instances became the largest private landowners, 
the fragmentation of communal holdings removed some cultivators from effective 
headman control, while providing wealthy officials from outside the locality with 
unprecedented access to local land. The crown’s creation of new service lands, and 
their eventual partial privatization, had much the same effect. At the same time the 
expanding involvement of many headmen in agricultural commodity production, 
money-lending, land speculation, and mortgaging – all attested by a proliferation 
of (private commercial) contracts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – 
rendered them more vulnerable to market fluctuations and to pressures from 
wealthy traders and courtiers from whom they themselves sought to obtain credit. 
If wider commercial outlets enriched many headmen, the unprecedented sale and 
mortgaging of local offices showed that risks were also involved.” (Lieberman, 
1991: 27-28)
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Yet, as we already underlined, the British census of 1891 in Upper Burma listed 
only 1.8 per cent of the population as landlords (while 64 per cent were landowning 
cultivators, 26 per cent tenants and 8 per cent agricultural laborers). This picture 
nevertheless varied from one region to another and the introduction of British 
governance – and the quasi abolishment of distinction between crown service and 
non-service – resulted in different trends. Some aristocrats managed to hold on to 
their new estates under colonial rule with then full and recognized rights of private 
property, notably on lands closer to the former capital of Mandalay (Thant Myint-U, 
2004: 236-7). 
However, British rule had a different impact on land tenure and landlordism 
in Upper and Lower Burma, first of all because Lower Burma lacked the historical 
and socio-cultural foundations to reproduce the model of Burmese society that 
existed in Upper Burma. With regards to Lower Burma with which British gained 
the longest acquaintance, administrators tended to consider Burmese as little 
attached to their land. “‘Cultivators in this country,’ writes Mr. Blundell, ‘are not so 
much attached to the occupation, but that they frequently give it up to engage in 
some other which they deem more profitable’” (Furnivall, 1939: 113). For these very 
reasons, British administrators attempted to ‘fix’ cultivators on their lands through 
the different tenure systems explained previously. 
However, in Upper Burma the situation was much different, with customary 
tenure either linking peasants to the land through their overlord (in the case of 
‘bonded’ individuals, kyun) or directly through a system of private property giving 
peasants the right to sell, mortgage or pass it to their heirs (in the case of ‘non-
bonded’ individuals, athis). Land revenue was of importance for the states’ finance, 
and despite the usufruct rights cultivators theoretically benefited from, various 
orders and edicts were issued to confine the cultivator to his land. Besides, the 
lowest segments of Upper Burma’s society had little chance at social mobility so 
that “rather than the peasant controlling the use of his land, the state used the land 
to control the peasant” (Taylor, 2009: 40). In other terms, pre-colonial and colonial 
states’ strategies regarding the necessity to ‘fix’ cultivators on their lands were 
quite similar in substance. Nevertheless, the means of governance and social 
organization were conceived from nearly opposite perspectives. In the pre-colonial 
period social organization (and subsequently governance) was structured along 
vertical relationships within different segments of the society (crownsmen, athis, 
and religious order), resembling patron-client networks. British administration, on 
the contrary, sought to collect land revenues by administrating a body of ‘peasant-
proprietors’ on a geographical, horizontal basis, where the “village headman was 
no longer a leader with popular authority (but) a village administrator responsible for 
police, taxes, public works, and agricultural improvements in his area” (Stanton, 2014: 
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9). To suit appropriate village size – i.e. “to ensure that revenues from these areas 
provided neither too much nor too little remuneration for (the headman)” (ibid.: 9) – 
boundaries were redrawn and some villages displaced or grouped with others. 
Therefore, pre-colonial customary laws and social organization were shaped 
by two major reforms: administrative rules replaced “personal and authoritative 
judgments of traditional Burmese law” (ibid.: 9) and the transformation of a quasi-
exclusive ‘domestic’ agriculture into a commercial, export-oriented one. These 
two reforms, by interacting with each other, would profoundly affect the agrarian 
landscape in Myanmar, and the Delta perhaps primarily, as it became heavily 
dependent on export-oriented paddy cultivation. While patron-client networks 
would not create landlordism in the context of a ‘domestic’ oriented agricultural 
economy, they tended to favor landlordism in the context of a rapid transition to a 
commercial agriculture system defined by ‘eroding’ patron-client relationships (Scott, 
1972) in favor of a territorialized conception of resources and access to resources. 
2.  The post-independence Burmese agrarian society: State  
      policies as a factor of land insecurity (1949 onwards)
U Nu, the first prime minister of independent Burma, sought to overturn the 
colonial legacy to win people’s trust – and outflank his communist rivals39. Given the 
catastrophic tenure situation bequeathed by the British – with a high percentage 
of lands in the hands of absentee landowners, among whom were foreigners 
and especially Chettiars – the new government aimed at taking back control of 
its natural resources and especially agricultural lands. The constitution (1947) 
provided the following provisions regarding land tenure (latter implemented in 
the form of the Land Nationalization Act 1948): 
“(1) The State is the ultimate owner of all lands.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the State shall have the right 
to regulate, alter or abolish land tenures or resume possession of any land and 
distribute the same for collective or co-operative farming or to agricultural tenants. 
(3) There can be no large landholdings on any basis whatsoever. The maximum 
size of private landholding shall, as soon as circumstances permit, be determined 
by law.” (GuB, 1948: 7, quoted in Turnell 2009: 174)
The Land Nationalization Act 1948 (amended in 1953) aimed at taking back land 
owned by non-national owners and landlords (holding more than 50 acres) in order 
to redistribute it to farmers holding surfaces deemed too small to be profitable, to 
39. Brown, 2013: 96. 
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tenants, and to the households the most recently made landless (Brown, 2013: 96). 
This act was poorly provisioned – no compensation scheme was established for 
holders whose land was forcibly retaken – and was implemented only in Syriam 
district. The latter Nationalization Act 1953 would be implemented nationally (and 
included compensation40). However, by 1958, when the government halted the 
implementation of the act, only 17% of all cultivated lands had been nationalized. 
“Assuming most of the 3,557,000 acres eventually nationalized was paddy land, 
this represented about 25 per cent of this category of land” (Taylor, 2009: 280). The 
nationalization process can be considered as a failure given that in 1965, tenants 
were still paying rents to 350,000 landlords, one third of whom were foreigners 
(mostly Indian and Chinese). Besides, some studies suggest that the program 
eventually benefited better-off farmers more than poorer ones. Tenants who had 
been landowners were more likely to be granted land than were previously landless 
laborers, as farmers needed to possess the means to cultivate the land in order to be 
eligible (ibid.: 280, Mya Than, 2001: 10). Let us underline however that it did benefit 
tenants in some places, as in one of the Dry Zone villages under study. Current 
landholders from Khoe Than Village Actually benefited from a convergence of 
circumstances. Indeed, wealthy farmers from the village left to Monywa during the 
civil war, entrusting smaller farmers with their land to work as tenants. However, in 
the midst of the nationalization process, landlordism and tenancy were abolished, 
thus transforming small farmers into middle and large holders. 
From the Land Nationalization Act of 1948 until the new Farmland Law 
of 2012, land use policy followed the rules and regulation as stated in the Land 
Nationalization Act 1953, Tenancy Act and Rules 1964, and Procedures Conferring 
the Rights to Cultivate Land 1964. Under these policies, all land belonged to the 
state but farmers were given land use or tillage rights on their holdings, which 
could not be – at least in theory41 – transferred, mortgaged, or taken in lieu of 
loan repayments. However, land rights were legally inheritable by family members 
who remained farmers and tilled the land by themselves. Tenancy and absentee 
ownership was illegal. 
Despite these ‘socialist’ measures, government policies throughout 
independence and until today would prove a major factor in land accumulation for 
the benefit of wealthier farmers while curbing the socioeconomic differentiation in 
rural Myanmar and even worsening the socioeconomic situation of smallholders 
(under five acres) and landless households, themselves representing the bulk of 
40. Chettiar landlords actually lost most of their capital. The compensation was set through the Nationalization Act 
1953 at “3%, non-negotiable, non-transferable government bonds of little genuine value unless used for investment in 
Burma” (Taylor, 2009: 280). 
41. Mya Than (1987: 64), following up on Pfanner’s study (1962) in Mayin village (Bago Division), found in the year 1980 
that 10 tenants were working land despite the legal ban on tenancy since 1965. 
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cultivators (Myat Thein and Maung Maung Soe, 1998: 21). A few positive outcomes 
came from the short-lived period of democratically elected government (ending in 
1962 with Ne Win’s military coup), including a period of 4 to 6% economic growth, 
as well as new banking and credit institutions among which at least the State 
Agricultural Bank proved quite successful42. However, uprisings and political crises 
shortly after independence clearly undermined the government’s efforts, and 
the implementation of land reform had to stop in 1958-59 due to dissatisfaction 
among the peasantry since the land reform did not benefit the poor small farmers 
as expected. 
“As a result, the socio-politico-economic position in the rural sector was not strong 
as in the colonial days. (…) Technology was almost the same as in pre-war days 
and agriculture production was achieved through land expansion. The system 
benefited mostly the urban and rural bourgeoisie.” (Mya Than, 2001: 10-11)
For the rural population, one of the most palpable consequences of the 
Japanese invasion and the nationalistic post-independence transition was 
probably the departure of the money-lending Chettiar community. Between 
1945 and 1965, the total credit provided by the government amount for around 
900 million Kyats (and probably even less), while the country’s seasonal needs 
were estimated between 100 and 200 million Kyats (Turnell, 2009: 192-193) – 
that is between 2 and 4 billion Kyats over a 20 years’ period. Hence at least 70% 
of farming households43 had to rely on local money-lenders, whose interest rates 
were as high as in the colonial period (between 50% and 60% per year). It was also 
found that already during this period, wealthier farmers (‘credit-worthy’) tended 
to benefit from government credit schemes, often turning the government loans 
into private, high-interest, ones (ibid.: 196). This overall lack of affordable credit for 
smallholders also had repercussions on agricultural practices. The almost complete 
disappearance of broadcasting technique under the colonial rule – replaced by 
transplanting – was revived, as farmers did not have the resources to pay the 
necessary labor for transplanting. Despite the better yields obtained, interest rates 
practiced by money-lenders wiped out any advantage of using the transplanting 
method (ibid.: 194). Despite much agricultural extension efforts provided by INGOs 
in the post-Nargis recovery period, this situation still prevails in the Lower Delta. 
Under the socialist republic – military-led ‘socialist’ – government (1962-
1988), government intervention and controls were introduced to cover almost 
all activities of food grain production, procurement, distribution, milling, storage, 
42. The then State Agricultural Bank was the sole successful institution with almost 99% repayment rates between 
1949 and 1962 (Turnell, 2009: 195). 
43. Turnell 2009: 201. 
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transportation, domestic wholesale, retail trade, etc. The 1974 Constitution 
maintained the state as the ultimate owner of lands, but the slogan of the agrarian 
reform changed from ‘land to the tiller’ to ‘right to cultivate to the tiller’ (Mya Than, 
1984: 741-761). With the change in property rights, food grain growers became 
obligated to sell a fixed quota of their food grains, the ‘Compulsory Delivery Quota’, 
to the government at a fixed price. The socialist government emphasized consumer 
welfare with extensive use of food subsidies, and private marketing was prohibited. 
The government subsidized the sale of rice to consumers and distributed rice 
through the state economic enterprise (SEE) system (Young et al., 1998: 19).  As 
a measure for fostering rice productivity, compulsory procurement of crops was 
practiced from 1964 until 2003. This policy, despite being applied nationally, 
was particularly enforced in the Delta, aiming at restoring the paddy production 
and retransforming the region into the ‘rice bowl of Asia’. Despite this policy, 
production decreased. A widespread sense of crisis forced the government to take 
measures such as the exclusion of rice from marketing liberalization in 1988 and 
the introduction of a summer paddy program, initiated in 1992/93 (see Box 1), for 
boosting rice production (Fujita and Okamoto, 2006: 8). The paddy procurement 
system was revived. 
However, the state’s take was reduced by 2/3 (down to 10-12 baskets per acre 
from 30-40) and surplus paddy could be sold freely on the market. The entry of 
marketing agents (traders and rice millers) was practically free. It is hence more 
appropriate to say that rice was only partly liberalized (ibid.). Lasting until 2003, 
this compulsory procurement policy severely affected farmers’ livelihoods by 
forcing them to sell at lower prices than those set by the market, fixed quota of 
paddy which was calculated based on the cultivated area (12 baskets per acre after 
1988, and double to triple prior to this date), and independently from yields and 
variations due to weather conditions, rodents, and other pests. Upon failure to 
comply with any of these requirements, the land use right would be withdrawn 
from the farmers and the local Authorized Land Committee would re-assign the 
land use right to prioritized candidates who met the set criteria. In practice, farmers 
developed different strategies in order to resist this policy (as will be described in 
Chapters IV.1 and VIII.1.2).
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3.  A brief overview of institutions involved in current land  
      management 
Myanmar’s current land administration is characterized by overlapping laws 
and multiple agencies with similar responsibilities (Shivakumar et al., 2015). The 
General Administration Department (GAD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs plays 
a critical role in subnational governance in Myanmar. It is in charge of managing 
the country public structures, which are hierarchically and geographically defined 
from Union level, down to State/Region, District, Township and Village Tract44 level. 
Land management is part of its historical core function. The GAD is particularly 
responsible for town lands and village lands. The GAD can issue grants, leases, and 
licenses for residential, industrial, and commercial purposes. It also secures the 
acquisition of lands for the public interest, such as for building schools, roads, etc. 
With the 2012 farmland land law, farmland management bodies have also been 
instated at the district, township, and village tract levels. However, the Farmland 
Law did not define the precise roles and responsibilities of Farmland Administrative 
Bodies45 (FABs) at the lower levels (Shivakumar et al., 2015). In theory, its mandate 
is to manage and solve farmland disputes. However, in practice, these bodies act 
as a ‘mailbox’ to refer local land conflicts to the higher administrative levels but do 
not play a significant role in conflict arbitration. The Settlement and Land Records 
Department (SLRD) plays a major role in all levels of non-forestland administration. 
The SLRD was first the Revenue and Survey Department as created by the British to 
map land and tax farmers accordingly. The SLRD has since been renamed DALMS 
(Department of Agricultural Land Management and Statistics), in May 2015. It 
falls under the current Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MOAI), formerly the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (MOALI). It is officially in charge 
of land administration through surveys and records (including the cadastral – 
kwin – maps) and has a central role in the issuance of formal documentation 
concerning land use rights over farmlands. The former Ministry of Environment, 
Conservation and Forestry (MoECAF) – now called Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) since the new NLD government was 
instated, assumes primary responsibility in areas designated as forests. The Forest 
Department is responsible for protecting the land under its jurisdiction from 
encroachment and squatting and ensuring adherence to prescribed land use. 
44. Village tract has been introduced by the British as the lowest minimum unit of administration, with the primary 
objective of levying taxes (see Chapter History III.1.1). It is generally constituted of several villages. 
45. Farmland Administrative Bodies have been formed under the 2012 Farmland Law to provide guidelines for issuance 
of Land Use Certificates (LUCs) for farmland areas and to oversee implementation as well as guiding and supervizing 
in respect of registration and conversion of farmland to other use. FABs operate at each administrative level (Central/
Naypyitaw, region/state, district, township, village tract/Ward).
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       1.  Ayeyarwaddy Delta (Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun  
             townships): a world of water and paddy, and a changing  
             agricultural frontier 
“The Ayeyarwaddy Delta of southern 
Myanmar is a fragile and intricate 
ecosystem of mangrove swamps and 
tidal estuaries. Non saline arable areas are 
limited and becoming scarce due to the 
erosion of riverbanks, saltwater intrusion, 
and increasing soil salinity. Poor water 
control and drainage works contribute 
to periodic flooding and crop losses. Most 
poor households cultivate a single 
crop of traditional monsoon 
paddy. Better-off farmers able to 
grow early maturing, high-yielding varieties of paddy benefit from an additional winter 
crop such as groundnuts or soybeans. In the very few areas where irrigation facilities 
are available, summer paddy is grown. Marginal farm households cannot afford to use 
chemical fertilizer or manure and suffer from declining crop yields. In some townships 
such as Laputta, Bogale and Mawlamyaingyun, it is estimated that more than half of 
the population is landless. Many marginal farmers engage in fishing and crabbing. 
Those who fish typically do not own fishing gear or boats and depend on fish traders 
for such resources. Some households raise pigs, chickens, or ducks. Others crop during 
the slack growing season by borrowing from more well-off farmers; loans are paid back 
through labor or through a portion of paddy crop. The effective interest rate charged 
by fish traders, rice traders and others in these loan arrangements typically amount to 
10 per cent a month.”
This is how a 1999 World Bank report (in Mya Than 2006) depicted the Delta. 
Despite some major changes such as the generalization of summer paddy 
production (see Box 1) – at the expense of pulses – and of the use of fertilizers 
(see Chapter VII.2.1), it could very much fit the present condition of Delta.  The 
climate is tropical humid with annual precipitations of three to four meters per 
year. The large majority of these rains fall during monsoon season (between May 
and October). The dry season (from November to February) is slightly cooler, while 
temperatures soar from March up to the monsoon rains. 
 IV.  Overview of the areas under  
         study: History, policies and land
Figure 3: Location of the studied townships in 
Ayeyarwaddy
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Rising anxieties about rice prices led the government to exclude rice from the 
market liberalization of 1988. After decades of declining agricultural production, 
the government took measures to boost rice production with the introduction of 
the summer paddy program initiated in 1992/93. As described by Fujita46, it was 
“essentially an irrigation development program” with construction of sluice gates, 
draining channels, and farmers’ private investment in water pumps. As an incentive 
to farmers, summer paddy was exempt from the procurement obligation (see Box 
2). 
Myanmar agricultural services also vigorously promoted the cultivation of 
summer paddy varieties. In just three years, the acreage under summer paddy 
countrywide had increased from 0.82 million in 1992/93 to nearly 4 million in 1995/96 
(Myat Thein, 1997), but then followed a very sluggish phase where the declining rice 
price was outstripped by the additional costs of diesel for pump irrigation (Fujita and 
Okamoto, 2006). The authors even state that “it becomes clearly apparent that pulses 
generally yield a higher profit than summer paddy” and conclude that “agricultural 
policies in Myanmar have a strong inclination towards production increases for their own 
sakes while paying rather less attention to farmers’ income and welfare”.
As summer paddy required costs double of those of monsoon and access to farm 
machinery (power tillers, motor pump), the introduction of this cropping pattern may 
have accelerated land exclusion and land accumulation processes, and increased 
disparities in agricultural incomes. This hypothesis is put forward by Myat Thein (1997: 
127-128) who analysed the impact on the introduction of summer paddy in Pya Phone 
district. He provides examples of households accumulating lands:
“(…) There were also those who either obtained land-use rights through purchase 
or through the land distribution program. One farm family, for example, had 23 acres in 
1992/93. This farm family now has 45 acres and is planning to buy 10 more acres in the 
coming year. Another farm family had just 5 acres in 1992/93. Now this family has nearly 
25 acres. 
“On the other hand, there were also farm families who had to sell some or all of their 
land-use rights as they could not afford the cost of cultivating both monsoon and summer 
paddy. For example, one family of three cultivating 10 acres of monsoon paddy before 
1992/1993 now only has 5 acres. As this small family could not afford the cost of cultivating 
10 acres of summer paddy the family sold half of its land-use rights on an understanding, 
rather than forfeiting it (for not cultivating) to the land distribution committee.”
Unfortunately, Myat Thein does not clearly analyse what are the critical factors 
determining who are the losers and the winners. However, our study findings seem to 
indicate that the exclusion process is strongly linked to the ability of mobilizing 
labor or/and the ability to access machinery (tiller, thresher, and, more recently, 
reapers). 
46. Fujita and Okamoto, 2006, Fujita, 2003. 
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Paddy is by far the main crop grown, at both summer and monsoon seasons. In 
other Delta townships, pulse and groundnut are also grown in the dry season. The 
spatial organization of Delta livelihoods is strongly linked to the salinity of water 
resources. During the dry season, salinity levels progressively increase and water 
becomes salty further North (see Figure 4). The possibility of growing summer 
paddy is mainly determined by the availability of irrigation water, and therefore by 
the salinity of surrounding creeks and rivers. 
Figure 5 (on Mawlamyinegyun, and which is valid for Bogale as well) shows the 
predominance of double paddy cropping in the northern areas of the township, 
and of single paddy cropping in the southern areas, and the once abundant but 
now marginal areas of pulses crops. Roughly, a north-south gradient applies, 
confining more or less summer season paddy to the north of Magu and Pa Da Mya 
Gone village tracts in Bogale and from Kywe Chan Kyon La Mu village tract to the 
north in Mawlamyinegyun township (see Figure 3).
In freshwater areas, farmers can farm all year round, while in salt-water areas 
(further south towards the Andaman sea), only rainfed crops in monsoon season are 
possible. In between, there is a gradient with brackish water areas, where summer 
crops are more or less possible, but often with lower yields. Summer paddy crops 
are grown with total reliance on irrigation: water from the rivers and creeks can be 
withdrawn by gravity during high tides or by motor pumps. 
Figure 4: Iso salinity map of Delta (source: unknown)
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 On 2 and 3 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, making landfall in 
Ayeyarwaddy Division, crossing through the Ayeyarwaddy Delta from southwest 
to northeast, and directly hitting the country’s largest city, Yangon. Major damage 
was reported in the affected areas, particularly in the low-lying agricultural Delta 
region where the cyclone’s impact was compounded by a storm surge. Buildings, 
infrastructure, and communications were severely damaged, and flooding was 
widespread. Given the devastation of homes and infrastructure, loss of agricultural 
land, and loss of access to fishing grounds due to persistent flooding and the 
shifting of sands, many people were displaced. The estimated number of people 
affected is as high as 2.4 million. 
The official death toll on the 1st of June 2008 stands at 77,738 with 55,917 
missing. Unofficial estimates are considerably higher (often around 150,000). 
Overall, it is estimated that almost 2 million acres of paddy fields were submerged 
by the cyclone, i.e. 63% of paddy land in a total of 19 townships of the two main 
affected Divisions, plus Bago East and Mon State (FAO, 2008: 13). In Bogale, 51% 
of large ruminants, and in Mawlamyinegyun 70% of draught animals, were killed 
(ibid.: 14, 25). Beyond the direct damages from the cyclone on crop production, the 
salinization of cultivable lands continues to impact agriculture in the region and 
even indefinitely prevented paddy cultivation in some areas – such as in Kyun Hteik 
village tract (Bogale township). 
Figure 5: Land cover map of Mawlamyinegyun township (source: IRRI, 2013)
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In townships such as Laputta, Bogale, and Mawlamyinegyun, it is estimated 
that more than half of the population is landless, with that rate rising as high as 
70% of the households in some village tracts (Dapice, 2009: 5). 
The massive migration waves during the Delta rapid expansion at the British 
colonial period, led Adas (1974:105) to describe the Burma Delta as a plural society, 
with economic actors from various cultural groups (mainly Burmese, European, 
Indians, Chinese) organized into “corporate sections or segments whose boundaries 
demarcate distinct communities and systems of social action”. Nowadays, in the area 
of the study, the population is essentially Bamar, with Karen minorities. The nine 
villages under study are distributed in Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships 
over five different village tracts (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Key information of Delta surveyed villages (source: village statistics)
Township – 
village tract
Village Total 
Popula-
tion
Total 
House-
holds
Mon-
soon  
acres
Sum-
mer 
acres
Land-
less HH
% 
landless
Bogale – 
Magu
Poe 
Laung 
Chaung 
Twin
555 138 315 301 61 44
Bogale – 
Magu
Pay 
Chaung 
Lay
435 105 390 390 69 66
Bogale – 
Magu
Magu 681 166 564 564 91 55
Bogale – 
Mya Thein 
Tan
Aye 
Ywar
326 85 330 150 50 59
Bogale – 
Tha Byu 
Gone
Tha Byu 
Gone
667 150 212 211 96 64
Maw Gyun – 
Kyar Hone
Kyar 
Hone
472 114 449 410 75 66
Maw Gyun – 
Kyet Shar
Pay 
Chaung
274 54 175   46 85
Maw Gyun 
– Pyar 
Mut Shaw 
Chaung
Ah Lel 
Chaung
272 58 157 157 34 59
Maw Gyun – 
Kyar Hone
Tet Tet 
Ku
300 148 523 327 100 68
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Selected villages encompass the agrarian diversity of the north-south salinity 
gradient, as well as represent the diversity of settlements, which follows more or less 
the same pattern: more recent settlements toward the south. Finally, they convey 
the diversity of land statuses – farmlands and cultivated forestlands. Except from Pay 
Chaung in Kyet Shar village tract (Mawlamyinegyun township), all villages include 
lands where two seasons of paddy can be cultivated. Within the same villages, this 
may vary depending on the lands’ proximity to creeks and rivers. For example in Tet 
Tet Ku, inner lands can be cultivated two seasons while those situated by the river 
(hence vulnerable to saline water intrusion) can only be cultivated during monsoon. 
As in other parts of the Delta, paddy cultivation is by far the main source of income 
for local communities. However, in villages that are close to local towns such as Bogale 
and Mawlamyinegyun, gardening activities (betel, flowers, vegetables, banana) 
are also common and procure a significant additional income for the household’s 
livelihoods. Fishing and duck raising (mainly for egg production) are also important 
sources of income in the Delta. Among the nine survey villages, the oldest ones (Tha 
Byu Gone, Aye Ywar, A Lel Chaung) all find their origins with the migration of farmers 
from the Dry Zone (see Chapter III.1.3). This migration already induced in pre-colonial 
times, was boosted under British colonial rule. The history of more recent villages such 
as Pay Chaung or Magu illustrates the north-south agricultural frontier, motivated by 
the need to find new land to cultivate: for newly settled couples, for farmers having lost 
their land at the hands of money-lenders, and even for those trying to escape debts. 
Most recent villages also bear the consequences of post-independence government 
policies to populate areas in the Delta where anti-governmental groups (communist 
groups, Karen armed groups) were operating (see Box 2).
The livelihoods’ sequence in the creation of these settlements follows the same 
pattern: starting with firewood and charcoal exploitation (to supply the expanding 
populations of towns), followed by a systematic clearing of lands that would then 
be transformed into irrigable paddy fields.  The history of the agricultural frontier is 
reflected in the features of villages. In general, the most recent villages (farther south, 
deeper into forestlands) have higher landlessness rates, higher land concentration, 
and more mobility (both in terms of household mobility and in terms of intensity 
of land transfers) than in older settlements where land is more evenly distributed 
and social organization and horizontal linkages between villagers are stronger. 
As a matter of fact, as per the villages’ data, landless households among the nine 
villages under study represent an average 65%47, with higher inequality rates in the 
most recently settled southern villages (eg: 85% of landless in Pay Chaung village).
 
47. See updated figures as per the quantitative study’s findings in Chapter VII showing slightly lower landlessness 
rates. 
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In the agitated period following independence, Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun were 
considered a ‘dark zone’. Local people suffered from the conflicts between the central 
government and anti-government organizations. Since 1962, U Ne Win’s military regime 
aimed to clear the Delta region of rebels, notably by encouraging forest clearing and 
the production of firewood and charcoal. Under the Cooperative Department, groups 
of laborers were dispersed in order to clear forests as in Pay Chaung, one of the villages 
under study. According to interviews, these laborers were the first settlers to work land 
once the forests were cleared some 40 years ago. The unstable situation in the Delta 
had consequences on farmers’ ability to access government credit as well. Indeed, only 
villages free from insurgent activity (Turnell 2009: 197) had the right to establish a village 
bank. Farmers had to pay different ‘taxes’ to each armed group (including government 
forces), in form of paddy, food, etc. The high diversity of rebel organizations gave its name 
to the ‘colored rebels’ (yaun sone tha bon) era. Among the insurgents armed organizations 
were notably the Burma Communist Party (Red flag party), White Soldier rebels, and the 
KNDO (Karen rebels, now known as KNU). In the same period, a considerable number 
of Karen ethnic people found refuge in the Delta (Thawnghmung, 2013: 112), leading 
to the current landscape dominated by Burmese and Karen villages, the former mainly 
involved in paddy cultivation and the latter in both paddy and gardening activities. 
Perceived as a refuge for anti-government rebels and Myanmar’s main rice bowl, 
the government tightly controlled the Delta. The post 1962 policies and particularly 
the ‘Compulsory Delivery Quota’ strongly impacted farmers. In all studied villages48, this 
policy has been an important driver of farmland transfers. In theory, farmers unable 
to supply prescribed paddy quotas risked to have their land confiscated by the let 
allocation committee which had the prerogative to reallocate the land use rights to 
other households recorded on a ‘waiting list’ (tan-si sa-yin”). In practice, according to our 
interviews, it was more common for cultivators to arrange their own informal transfers 
of land use rights before having their lands formally confiscated by the let allocation 
committee. Farmers unable to provide paddy quotas in full, as far as they could 
anticipate, would sell part or all of their lands to another farmer (generally from the 
same village) and then disguise the transfer through the land distribution committee 
involving local SLRD officers and the village tract headman. 
For example, a person owning three acres of paddy land had to procure 36 baskets 
of paddy (12 baskets per acre). The first year, the person procures 25 baskets, remaining 
with a debt to the government of 11 baskets. Fortunately, the government previously 
gave three years to the farmers to fulfil their obligation from the first failure to procure 
the due quota. The second year, the same farmer thus owes 47 baskets (36 for three 
48. Except from Pay Chaung village in which land is all registered as forestland. While they had to deliver paddy 
quotas to the village committee, being in forestland made it so they could quite easily underreport cultivated 
areas. For this reason, to our knowledge none of Pay Chaung household lost land because of this policy. 
BOX 2: BOGALE AND MAWLAMYINEGYUN THROUGH THE ‘COMPULSORY 
DELIVERY QUOTA’
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acres plus the past year’s debt). However, the farmer is only able to procure 30 baskets, 
remaining with 17 baskets as debt. The third year, despite a good harvest, the farmer is 
able to procure only 40 baskets and is left with a debt of 13 baskets to the government. 
Whenever a farmer was not able to fulfil the prescribed quantity of baskets, government 
broker teams would inspect all places in which paddy could potentially be hidden. If 
they found some paddy stored in granaries, it would be confiscated. The farmer in this 
case was sent to jail for some months, in addition to losing his paddy lands. 
For ‘minor’ gaps, cultivators would borrow money or paddy to fill the quota. 
However, the rice market price was higher than the government price, exacerbating 
a farmer’s indebtedness. It is unsurprising that cultivators were sometimes unable to 
repay and lost part of their holdings. This policy also impacted on-going arrangements, 
as in the case of one Aye Ywar villager, ‘U K K’49 who, prior to 1964, mortgaged 13 acres 
in order to cover the cost of his grandmother’s funeral. According to the le pyan ngwe 
pyan practice, land is given to the individual lending money for a certain period. The 
money-lender receives the right to use and benefit from all products of the land until 
the borrower is able to repay the loan (see Chapter VI). Before U K K was able to repay 
the loan, the quota policy had been introduced so he did not even care to take back his 
land. As noted by Myat Thein (1997: 131), prior to the liberalization of the paddy market 
after 1988, farmers had no incentive to cultivate. They even lacked incentives to retrieve 
mortgaged lands due to the prohibitive quota (24 baskets per acre prior to 1988). In 
1971-72, when the free market price of paddy rose, farm laborers were even “better-off 
than small owner-cultivators because agricultural workers were usually paid in kind” (Myat 
Than 2001: 11). Exceptions may have occurred on cultivated forestlands, as recalled by 
one villager of Pay Chaung: eluding the direct control of SLRD, they would underreport 
their cultivated acreage so as to be required to supply less to the government, and 
hence profit more from the parallel market (prior to 1988) or private traders (after 1988).
However, land confiscation and reallocation varied depending on the village tract 
land committee – composed of the village headman and appointed elders – and a given 
farmer’s relationship with the committee. Good relations with the committee provided 
easier access to seized lands – i.e. a better position on the waiting list. Similarly, while the 
farmer described above lost his lands for a debt of 14 baskets, other individuals closer 
to the committee had no or smaller sanctions despite greater debts to the government. 
The waiting lists, theoretically dedicated to landless farmers, actually included large 
landowners. The village tract committee would indeed find justification for transferring 
lands to farmers (rather than the landless), generally based on their greater financial 
and technical capacity to successfully undertake land cultivation. Evidence from the 
qualitative part of the study shows that land transfers through the waiting lists under 
the forced procurement era served mainly land accumulation for the benefit of a narrow 
class of big landholders. 
49. All names of individuals interviewed during the study have been modified in order to protect their 
anonymity. 
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Pay Chaung shows higher land concentrations (63% of farmers own more than 
10 acres) than in older settlements where land is better distributed (Aye Ywar, Ah Lel 
Chaung and Tha Byu Gone).  Hence, a stronger process of land concentration is to be 
found in the south, which is linked with more extensive processes of mobility. This 
can be imputed to late exploitation of these lands, driven by government policies 
such as compulsory rice procurement which affected many small farmers unable 
to absorb the shocks linked to health issues or ‘bad’ harvests (rodent infestations, 
high tides, bad weather, and Cyclone Nargis) or to manage lower yields of paddy in 
the southern parts of the Delta. 
During both colonial and postcolonial times, some issues have remained 
constant in Delta, such as farmers’ indebtedness (see VIII.2.3), and the strong 
presence of the state due to its focus on paddy production. The forced paddy 
procurement system, which was a major burden for Delta farmers has been a key 
driver of exclusion for some and of accumulation for others (see Box 2).
Throughout the previous military governments up to now, the village headman 
(nowadays the village administrator) and the local Settlement and Land Records 
Department (SLRD) officer remained the key stakeholders in land management 
and in defining the ‘losers and winners’ of the implemented policies (see VIII.3). 
All these issues have fueled the progress of the agricultural frontier, as farmers 
unable to repay their loans or to fulfil the procurement quotas generally lost their 
lands and moved south to clear forestlands and formed new settlements. Until 
2014, these lands were still registered as forestlands (see this Chapter 3.2). One 
hypothesis to be explored further in the study is explaining the current differences 
in land distribution between older and recent settlements by their level of social 
organization and horizontal linkages – presumably stronger in older ones, thus 
impacting on the relative power of local authorities (village headman and SLRD 
officer).
2.  Dry Zone (Monywa and Yinmabin townships): a diversified 
and resilient agriculture, in the cradle of Burmese culture 
The Dry Zone50 is characterized by two main features: i) annual precipitations 
are less than 1000 mm51 (40“), and ii) the occurrence of water deficits due to the 
excess of annual evapo-transpiration over annual precipitation. The rainfall pattern 
in the Dry Zone area is bimodal: although the rainfed crop growing season in the 
country is normally determined by monsoon onset in May and its termination in 
50. The Dry Zone is a generic term for the dry areas of the regions of Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay. 
51. The average annual rainfall is of 717 mm and 845 mm in Monywa and Yinmabin respectively. 
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The Monywa and Yinmabin area lies in the cradle of Burmese culture. As per one 
of the local legends, the name of Monywa derived from the name of the tree species52 
which were erected as poles during monarchical era regatta festivals on the Chindwin 
River. During the Bagan and Ava periods of Myanmar dynastic history, Monywa was a 
small village. It became a large and prosperous village in the early Konbaung Period. On 
the other hand, Yinmabin was only a subsidiary village during monarchical times. The 
name of the village was derived from the Yin Ma tree (Chittagong wood tree, Chukrassia 
tabularis). During the period from 1714 to 1752, the monarchical administration was 
weak, the country was in turmoil and villages encountered dacoits, looters, and cattle 
theft (Dr. Yi Yi, 1973). The west bank area of the Chindwin River was bounded by north 
and south Yama streams and was designated as the ninety-nine villages of the Ba Gyi 
Taik. All of them were under the charge of Hsa-Lin-Gyi Headman as appointed by King 
Badon in 1802. British colonial rule in Upper Burma started in 1885-6, 33 years later than 
in Lower Burma. In 1887 during the colonial period the Headquarters of the Deputy 
Commissioner was shifted from Ahlon to Monywa. Thus Monywa developed and grew 
as a district town.
52. Mon Taing/ Mon pin: Lophopetalum wallichii Kurz.
October, this Dry Zone area encounters a dry spell in July (often referred to as ‘July 
drought’) and higher rainfall for better crop growth occurs from August to October. 
The unpredictability of rainfall and frequency of droughts has led local inhabitants to 
increase their resilience by diversifying their crops and sources of incomes through 
livestock raising (cattle, sheep, goats, chicken), weaving, and other off-farm activities.
BOX 3: MONYWA, CRADLE OF BURMESE CULTURE?
Figure 6: Location of studied townships in Sagaing
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Unlike the Delta, the Dry Zone area and the situation of surveyed villages are very 
heterogeneous, and cannot be explained by a single variable. Differences are the 
result of variations in the physical environment, access to water and infrastructure, 
farming systems, proximity to greater towns, etc. The area displays a strong agrarian 
structure based on dry land agriculture – with the exception of prosperous irrigated 
areas near the Chindwin River and various streams. Dry land farming is characterized 
by highly diversified cropping, high risks for rainfed crops (‘normal yields’ are 
achieved with about 30% probability), declining soil fertility and prevailing soil 
erosion on slopes, and fragile soils. Major crops grown are pulses such as pigeon pea, 
chickpea, green gram, lima bean. Also, sesame, sorghum, sunflower, and wheat to a 
lesser extent are commonly grown. Tomato, onions, and chilli are grown as profitable 
cash crops on the most fertile soils. Cotton may also be found. Thanaka and betel 
also provide additional agricultural income. Access to water for irrigation (mainly 
through pumped irrigation systems moving surface water or groundwater) is a 
critical determinant of the options available to farmers, including whether they can 
get secure harvests of monsoon crops or cultivate a second crop in the dry season. 
Table 5: Key information of Dry Zone surveyed villages (village statistics)
Category Aung Chan 
Thar
Zee Phyu 
Pin
Min Zu Si Laung Hnaw Pin
1. Population
Male 505 367 661 922 220
Female 577 376 730 1042 340
Households 218 167 291 372 121
Landowners 116 136 157 160 64
Landless HHs 102 31 134 212 57
Category Gaw Gyi Hledar Khoe Than Nyaung Pin 
Thar
1. Population
Male 326 202
Female 327 212
Households 122 143 250 85
Landowners 53 79 117 45
Landless HHs 69 64 133 40
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Apart from farm activities, weaving is a primary livelihood for daily workers in 
many villages (such as Khoe Than, Hnaw Pin, and Gaw Gyi). Once flourishing around 
Monywa under the socialist government, from 2004 onwards the indigenous weaving 
industry was challenged by more affordable and better quality Chinese blankets, 
resulting in its ultimate collapse around 2008. Workers from the village–based 
BOX 4: GOVERNMENT IRRIGATION PROJECTS, SAGAING REGION
Irrigation development in Dry Zone took place essentially in the 1990s under the 
government’s nation-wide irrigation development program which aimed to boost 
paddy production. The widespread use of groundwater for irrigation in Myanmar began 
in 1989, with pilot trials funded by UNDP and IDA at Monywa. The success of these 
trials resulted in the development of large groundwater projects in Monywa (141 wells 
serving 8,094 ha in the 1980s and 1990s, funded by the World Bank) and the 99 Ponds 
project in Yinmabin (440 wells irrigating 3,300 ha), which draws from artesian wells. 
Department of Water Resources and Utilization (WRUD), Ministry of Agriculture and 
Irrigation, had launched the tank irrigation project in Yinmabin in 1994. The project was 
completed in 1995 and additional tanks were made in 2000, for a total cost of about 80 
million MMK. About 8,200 acres are irrigated presently. Double cropping altogether with 
summer rice amounted to 13,361 acres of total cropping within this 99 tank irrigated 
area (Report of the District Office of WRUD, June 2011, Monywa). 
Governmental efforts to improve access to irrigation in the Dry Zone were principally 
driven by the prospect of enhancing paddy production in this region (Thawnghmung 
2003: 303). The state’s persistent inclination towards paddy and production increases, 
even in areas such as the Dry Zone, was justified by the rationale that food security 
would be obtained by reaching paddy self-sufficiency. It indeed gave too little attention 
to comparative advantages of other crops which could provide more resilience and 
better incomes to farmers. Sticking to the socialist land tenure system, the government 
compelled farmers to grow the mandate crop – paddy – wherever irrigation water was 
made accessible. Cultivation of other staple or cash crops in the designated ‘paddy’ lands 
was prohibited. Even in sandy field plots which were not favorable to paddy, farmers 
were obliged to switch from dry land crops to grow paddy after the irrigation channels 
were constructed beside river banks.
Among the surveyed villages, Zee Hpyu Pin falls under the irrigation project’s 
coverage. However, some villagers such as in Thet Kei Pu reported having lost access 
to prior underground water after the establishment of nearby tanks, which may have 
exhausted their water resource. Examination of the water discharge rate over nearly 
two decades revealed the dwindling flow of water from the artesian wells. Due to the 
decreasing water discharge from the existing wells, the administrative departments of 
Monywa district notified in the early 2010s that no new wells were to be drilled in those 
areas. 
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handloom business started to migrate to Manipura, India border sites. Recently, the 
weaving industry resumed thanks to tourism and the renewed popularity of the 
longyi traditionally woven in the area. Most of the surveyed villages in Yinmabin 
township were founded recently, soon after the imposition of British rule. Some 
households moved out from local densely populated and ‘saturated’ villages and 
settled in new hamlets in Yinmabin’s periphery areas, which were then consolidated 
and established as villages under the Village Act of the colonial government. Some 
settlements also moved due to scarcity of water or landslides. Contrary to the 
Delta, the areas under study in Dry Zone have not been a strategic area for paddy 
production, and as such, farmers have been less affected by government policies, 
both during colonial and postcolonial times. The irrigation development policies that 
formed part of the summer paddy program and the greening projects are probably 
the most important initiatives that have affected farmers.
3.  Land uses 
In Myanmar land tenure is defined in relation to specific land use categories. 
From a legal point of view, there are nine main categories53 of land use: Agricultural 
Land, Garden Land, Grazing Land, Fallow Land and Waste Land, Forestland, Town 
Land, Village Land, Cantonments, and Religious Land. Various laws define the 
extent of the rights the users may enjoy under each category.
From a most practical ‘non-legalist’ picture, the most important land use 
categories as observed in surveyed villages have been defined as follows: 1) village 
lands, 2) forestlands, 3) other types of lands under communal use, 4) farmlands 
(including paddy lands and garden lands). For this latter category, more information 
is provided under Chapter VI and Chapter VIII.2.
 3.1 Village lands
Village lands (ywa myay) fall under ‘Urban and Rural lands’ category. In Delta, 
settlement areas are mainly linearly arranged along the banks of waterways. Behind 
the village areas lay first a fringe of garden lands (u yin) and further inland the paddy 
lands (see Figure 7). In the Dry Zone, settlement areas are more ‘classical’, growing 
from the oldest settlement in a more or less concentric expansion, progressively 
encroaching on farmlands cultivated around the village’s periphery (see Figure 
8). In theory, official transfer of farmland into village land requires approval at the 
Union level for paddy lands and approval at the regional government level for 
other farmland categories. 
53. Actually, if sub-categories are also counted, there are even up to 22 different land use categories. 
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Figure 7: Map of Aye Ywar, a ‘typical’ Delta village
Figure 8: Example of the concentric pattern of village expansion in Dry Zone 
(Zee Phyu Pin village)
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However, in practice, such land use transfers and village lands are never 
registered as such and village settlement areas increase informally with the increase 
of inhabitants, encroaching on farmlands. Therefore, there is no register of, and no 
revenue collection from, such lands. However informally, switching land use from 
farming to housing is requested to the village head. In the Delta, an intermediate 
strategy to extend village land is often to convert adjacent paddy land into garden 
land, plant trees, and build a shelter for animals, before requesting to build a house. 
House compounds can often include additional surrounding space for 
storage, livestock shelters, ponds, latrines, and home gardens. However, the 
poorest households, particularly in the salt-water areas, may often only have a 
very basic shelter, with no adjacent space. Home gardens (ein chan) are two times 
more frequent among farmland owning households (40%) than among landless 
households (21.6%). In the Delta, 39% of respondents have a home garden, 
out of which 70% exclusively produce for home consumption. In the Dry Zone, 
home gardens are less common, notably due to water scarcity. 23.6% of surveyed 
households have a home garden, out of which 87% exclusively produce for food. 
 3.2 Forestlands 
Both the Delta and the Dry Zone have forestlands. In the Delta, the forests 
are mainly natural mangrove forests along water ways. In the studied villages 
of the Dry Zone, forests mainly consist of planted watershed protection forests 
and Eucalyptus plantations in protected forest areas, the latter being the result 
of ‘greening’ projects mostly implemented in the late 1970s and 1980s (for more 
information on Dry Zone greening projects, see Box 5).
In both areas, significant acreage of cultivated land happens to be in areas 
which are officially designated as ‘forestlands’. In the Delta, this is mainly due to 
progressive encroachment into forests by landless people in search of lands along 
the agricultural frontier. In fact, in many ‘southern’ villages in brackish and salt 
water areas (such as Tet Tet Ku and Pay Chaung), a large proportion of cultivated 
lands were still under forestland status. Cultivators pay annual fines to the forest 
department and even have ‘u paing’ registration, but cannot access MADB loans, as 
this requires formal farmland ownership.
In the Dry Zone, forest areas and protected areas have often been demarcated 
in a very top-down manner in areas which were already cultivated and occupied 
by farmers. Indeed, boundaries of protected forest areas and tree plantations 
were extended into cultivated areas. In some cases (e.g. Minzu village), farmers 
were forced to give up their lands, while in other cases farmers are only allowed 
to cultivate these lands by performing alley-cropping between the planted trees. 
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BOX 5: GOVERNMENT GREENING PROJECTS IN THE DRY ZONEBOX 5: GOVERNMENT GREENING PROJECTS IN THE DRY ZON
Land degradation issues in the Dry Zone were identified as early as the 1950s, 
when a Dry Zone rehabilitation project was initiated by the Agriculture and Rural 
Development Corporation (ARDC) with the Forest Department (FD). This comprised 
tree planting on degraded lands. Under the UNDP HDI program, watershed 
management programs were instituted in the 1990s (Community Multi-purpose 
fuelwood woodlots and Watershed Management) to attempt to reduce deforestation 
and related erosion and degradation of land and water resources (Cools, 1995). In 
1995, Myanmar set a Forest Policy objective to increase the area of Reserved Forest 
(RF) and Protected Public Forest (PPF) to 30% of total land area by 2010. In 1994, 
the FD implemented a special ‘Greening Project’ for nine districts of the Dry Zone. In 
1997, the Dry Zone Greening Department (DZGD) was instituted to establish forest 
plantations on degraded land, conserve the remaining natural forests, promote 
fuelwood substitutes, and develop water resources (UNCCD 2005).
The greening policies and the creation of protected forest areas under these 
different greening projects affected farmers’ land use practices in many villages. 
Indeed, grazing, agriculture, and the extraction of fuelwood and rocks are prohibited 
in these areas, some of which were previously cultivated. In addition, because these 
projects were implemented in a top down manner, with little information provided 
to farmers, tensions between authorities and communities emerged. In Hledar, about 
half of the cultivated lands fell into the protected forest area. In Kyauk Kwe, most 
farmlands fell in the protected area. Often, the affected villagers had cultivated these 
lands for a significant amount of time (eg: more than 5 or 10 years) before they were 
designated as protected forestland.
To cope with these greening projects, villagers adopted different strategies, 
including special arrangements with forest authorities. In some cases, the FD allowed 
farmers to continue farming in the protected forest area but restricted expansion of 
farm size. If the land was ever left fallow, the greening project would take the land 
to plant trees. Farmers thus plowed their fields every year to prove the land was 
cultivated and hence prevent land confiscation by the FD. In other cases, farmers were 
allowed to perform alley cropping between the rows of planted trees. This led to a 
new ‘agro-forestry’ system, with Eucalyptus trees combined with crops. It seems that 
the yields gradually declined in these plots. As such, the motto “You can grow crops 
as long as you don’t hurt the Eucalyptus trees” became the consensus between farmers 
and the Dry Zone Greening Project. 
Similar arrangements also occurred on lands which were encroached upon after 
being designated as protected forest areas. Villagers developed new farmland there 
during times of weak governance. Farmlands which were outside of the forest area 
were registered with u’ paing, while those inside were not. But exceptions are found 
with farming households who managed to obtain u’ paing titles for plots which fell 
within protected forest. Yet kwet-pyauk (scattered plots which escaped from cadastral 
mapping) were not included in the registration process.
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A clear indicator of perceived land insecurity is the fact farmers avoid fallows to 
prevent any potential claims from authorities, although fallows could be helpful to 
renew soil fertility and improve land productivity. SLRD staff register these lands as 
u paing. In forest protected areas, local inhabitants may collect fuelwood from the 
areas, despite the official regulation against this practice. 
In the Delta, these major discrepancies between registered farmland and 
forestland areas have been recently addressed by the government. In a nationwide 
initiative announced in early 2013 through a Presidential instruction, it was 
decided that land would be reclassified in order to reflect current realities on the 
ground. The main objective has been to collect accurate village and household data 
on those who have illegally settled in reserved areas and public forests for a certain 
length of years, so a to designate new villages for them. The pre-instructions which 
took effect in April 2013 include key actions such as: i) a permission mechanism by 
which reserved and public forestland areas where groups of villages and houses 
with a number of houses greater than 50 have settled for a long length of years 
are to be reclassified as new villages, ii) conducting allocations and designations of 
land as farmland for the people there. Through this policy, the Forestry Department 
has said that 1,681,667.62 acres have been converted to farmlands. 
In 2014, such lands in the surveyed Delta villages seem to have been regazetted 
from forestland to farmland category, with formal administration transferred from 
the Department of Forestry to the Settlement and Land Records Department. In 
the concerned surveyed villages, forest department officers (forest ranger of Nyi 
Naung forest reserve and the usual fine collector) visited the villages and collected 
data on ownership of plots in July 2014. They also updated the names on fine 
receipts, taking into account land transfers. Following this, SLRD officers visited the 
villages in November 2014 to collect information on landowners and holdings, and 
to collect fees in ways that were not consistent across the villages54.
Although SLRD had promised farmers the delivery of LUCs in 2015, so that 
they would also be able to access 2015 monsoon MADB agricultural loans, the 
process has been slow and farmers had not yet received official documents, nor 
had accessed the loans in July 2015. 
 3.3 Communal lands 
In both the Delta and the Dry Zone, communal grazing lands used to exist 
in the past but have largely been absorbed by village expansion. Only very small 
54. In one of the village, SRLD also checked with adjacent landowners and took pictures of landowners standing in 
their plots. Also the fee collected for the registration was of 5,000 MMK per farmers. In the other village, SRLD only 
listed the landowners and their holdings, but collected 5,000 MMK/acre for the concerned cultivated areas. 
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communal areas remain, such as communal threshing floors. In the Dry Zone, 
other land resources that fall under communal management are the zin ga ma 
myae, which are temporary alluvial areas that are created in river beds through 
the accumulation of alluviums during rainy seasons. They mostly occur along the 
Chindwin River, Yama River (Yinmabin), and Mu River. The alluvial islands appear 
annually during the dry season but their location changes from year to year. These 
fertile lands are excellent for growing counter-season high value vegetables such 
as onion, garlic, chilli, etc. The lands are managed by the village head and village 
elders and more or less equally shared among farming households, including 
the landless, so everyone can produce these highly profitable cash crops during 
Figure 9: Delta and Dry Zone forestlands
Forest on a hill. Natural regeneration of Dry Zone forests.
Delta “forests”?... or forested river banks 
Forested river banks  in a settlement area (and 
a bridge for villagers).            
In southern areas, only a fringe of ‘dani lands’ 
with Nippa palm trees (also collected to 
make roofs)  remains on riversides. Behind, 
the forest has long ago been cleared for 
paddy cultivation, including under official 
‘forestlands’. 
Dry Zone forests
Credit: Brillion Credit: Fayon
Credit: Allaverdian Credit: Allaverdian
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the dry season. The communal arrangements focus on equality in let allocation: 
land division is carefully made by demarcating plots with bamboo poles and 
lands are allotted to applying villagers through a lottery system. Inter-village land 
conflicts may arise, however, when these lands are formed in areas that overlap 
often vaguely defined inter-village or inter-township boundaries. In the surveyed 
villages in the Delta, there are no communal lands. Even riverbanks and their 
resources such as Nipa palm (commonly used for making roofs) and other trees 
fall under the ownership of the adjacent paddy lands or housing compounds. If 
it is not the case, those riverbanks fall under forestlands. However, there are cases 
of village-managed farmlands. For example, in one of the surveyed villages, lands 
that were seized under the forced paddy procurement system are rented out and 
the generated income is used for community investments for the school, the 
monastery, etc.
 3.4 Farmlands
Farmlands in Delta
In Delta, farming systems are highly specialized in paddy. The majority of 
farmlands are paddy lands (le) (97.8% among the total 1,914 acres cultivated in 
the surveyed villages). U yin (‘garden lands’) is a much more limited category (see 
Chapter VII.3) and barely exist in saltwater areas (see Figure 10).
Figure 10: Transect diagrams of Delta villages in fresh water and salt water areas
Source: adapted from Mury, 2010
IV. Overview of the areas under study: History, policies and land
fresh water area
Salt water area
89 
Fi
gu
re
 1
1:
 D
el
ta
 se
as
on
al
 c
al
en
da
r i
n 
2 
se
as
on
s-
pa
dd
y 
ar
ea
s 
IV. Overview of the areas under study: History, policies and land
Tw
o 
se
as
on
 p
ad
dy
O
ne
 s
ea
so
n 
pa
dd
y
Jo
bl
es
s
Jo
bl
es
s
Jo
bl
es
s
Jo
bl
es
s
Jo
bl
es
s
90   
• Garden lands: this category mostly designates alluvial areas which are favorable 
for horticultural cash crops. They are mostly found in freshwater and brackish 
areas and quite rare in saltwater areas. They are also often located near the local 
towns (Bogale, Mawlamyinegyun) where marketing is easier. These have very 
limited acreage but can bring considerable income with cash crops such as betel 
leaves, vegetables, and flowers. Only 8.5% of surveyed households cultivate 
such lands.
• Paddy lands: In freshwater areas and some brackish water areas, these lands have 
been under the double cropping system since the introduction of summer paddy 
in 1992. During monsoon (June to October), all paddy varieties can be grown, 
for grain and seed production. However in summer paddy season (December to 
April), only short cycle and non-photo-periodic varieties can be grown. These are 
mainly high yielding varieties that have been introduced through the agricultural 
extension services provided by MAS, DoA, and various NGOs. The introduction of 
paddy double cropping in the 1990s came at the expense of leguminous plants55 
in the rotation, and has resulted both in a major increase in the use of chemical 
fertilizers and a gradual decline in soil fertility and yields.
• Perennial crops such as banana or other fruit trees or betel vines are cultivated 
by only 10.5% of respondents (17.7% of landowners and 5.7% of landless) in 
Delta. It represents a marginal source of income.
In the Delta, irrigation is only practiced in the summer season, essentially for 
paddy production through private-owned motor pumps withdrawing water from 
the waterways and canals. In the Dry Zone, irrigation may be practiced throughout 
the year, on a wide variety of crops, including paddy and horticultural cash crops. 
55. Which contributed to soil fertility by fixing nitrogen from the atmosphere and through crop residues incorporated 
as a green manure into the soil. 
Paddy fields in Delta are relatively large and 
often prone to flooding due to heavy rains or 
high tides.
Paddy straw is often burnt or throw in rivers 
as cattle is not common.
Credit: Allaverdian Credit: Allaverdian
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Figure 12.1: Delta main farmland uses – paddy lands
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Fertile alluvial soils allow intensive gardening 
for local urban markets.  
Landless or very smallholders generate extra 
income on small plots of lands for small scale 
commercial horticulture.
Figure 12.2: Delta main farmland uses – garden lands
Credit: AllaverdianCredit: Allaverdian
Farmlands in Dry Zone
In the Dry Zone, the main farmland categories are by far ya (dry or non-paddy) 
lands, followed by le (paddy lands) (see Figure 14: Dry Zone major farmland uses).
Paddy lands (le) for heavy clay soils are located in flat lower areas where 
irrigation is possible. Both monsoon and summer paddy are cultivated (or another 
crop in the dry season, such as oilseeds and pulses). Irrigation is required in both 
seasons as rainfall is insufficient. Some paddy lands may be rainfed by monsoon 
(see Figure 12.1). 
Table 6: Paddy cultivation in studied villages in Dry Zone56
Dry Zone paddy 
land crops 
Total  
cultivated 
acres 
% irrigated 
land/total 
land
% of total
cultivators  
Average 
acreage/HH 
Monsoon paddy 410 100% 30% 3.83
Summer paddy 170 100% 22% 2.21
56. Data from quantitative study: 351 respondents who are cultivators out of 598 total respondents. 
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Figure 13: Dry Zone farmers’ cropping calendars, Monywa and Yinmabin townships
Source: Gret Monywa MAFF team (Myat Myat Swe)
Example of a cropping calendar of a farmer in Yinmabin
Cropping calendar of a farmer in Khoe Than, Monywa
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Dry lands (ya) designate open fields, without dikes or bunds, otherwise 
unsuitable for paddy cultivation. With or without access to irrigation, ‘ya’ lands 
cover a more diverse types of soils, from alluvial soils, sandy soils, and rich black 
cotton soils. Ya lands allow for significantly diversified cropping systems. The main 
crops are summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7: Cultivated areas of main Dry Zone crops (ya lands) in study villages57
Dry Zone main 
‘Ya’ land crops
Total 
cultivated 
acres
% irrigated 
land/total 
land
% rainfed 
land/total 
land
% of total 
cultivators
 
Average 
acreage/
HH
Chickpea 618 26% 74% 46% 3.84
Pigeon pea 416 0% 100% 53% 2.25
Sesame 359 4% 96% 37% 2.78
Sorghum 319 0% 100% 53% 1.72
Sunflower 256 5% 95% 23% 3.16
Lima bean 236 0% 100% 44% 1.53
Onion 203 99% 1% 23% 2.57
Tomato 38 93% 7% 19% 0.55
Alluvial lands (kaing-kyung) designate land on riverbanks which are flooded 
during the rainy season but are cropped during the dry seasons. There soils are 
generally very fertile and highly conducive for growing counter-season horticultural 
crops. In the Dry Zone, a key criterion for the value and quality of lands is its level 
of access to irrigation. 
The main source of irrigation is underground water, essentially artesian 
wells (public or private) and tube wells (mainly private-owned). Some of these 
infrastructures have been built with the support of the ministry of agriculture 
(in the 1990s) or the World Bank (in the 1970s) (see Box 4). Most tube wells are 
generally built for individual purposes and require the use of motor pumps. Other 
irrigation sources include diversion of water from perennial water streams and use 
of rainwater harvesting reservoir tanks. As opposed to the Delta, Dry Zone farming 
systems are extremely diversified. Farmers adopt resilience strategies, with plots 
combining different crops, at different planting periods (see Chapter VII.3 and 
Figure 13).
57. Data from quantitative study: 351 respondents who are cultivators out of 598 total respondents 
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14.1 Dry Zone ‘ya’ lands
‘Ya’ land with sesame (under harvest) and 
young sorghum.
14.2 Dry Zone garden lands
Commercial betel leaf garden. Thanaka tree garden. Tomato growing in a 
commercial garden.
Figure 14: Dry Zone major farmland uses
Credit: AllaverdianCredit: Brillion
Credit: Fayon Credit: BrillionCredit: Allaverdian
Credit: BrillionCredit: Brillion
Figure 15: Dry Zone paddy lands
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4.  Delta and Dry Zone households’ demographic and social  
      profile
The ‘average’ 58surveyed household is headed by a 47-year-old Burmese (99.6%) 
male (85.7%) who was born in the same village or village tract (81%) in which he 
now resides. The household comprizes in average 4.33 members. 76% are ‘adults’ 
(14 years old or more)59 with an average age of 29.6 years. 68.3% of households 
have a maximum of one member who received higher education level60, and 14% 
of all members have attained this level of education (62.3% of household members 
have a primary education level).
 4.1 Household life cycle
Data analysis shows that household composition and social profile vary 
mainly according to the household life cycle. Amongst households, the youngest 
and oldest ones have very characterized profiles in both study areas. Household 
size logically varies according to the age of household head (w). Household size 
gradually increases as the household head goes from 20 to 50 years of age (as 
children are born), and decreases after age 50 when children get married or leave. 
As a result, households of more than five members are relatively concentrated in 
those whose head is aged between 40 to 50 years (Table 1 in Annex 1). Among 
this latter age category, 31% of households are composed of five and six members, 
and 37.5% of seven or more members. Only 28 households are singled-membered 
(designated hereafter as ‘single-member household’). These mainly concern 
widows or widowers. Young households are formed when household heads are 
approximately 25 years old and get married. Below 30 years (9.2% of households), 
household heads are only male (except for one case) (Table 2 in Annex 1) and their 
households are composed of two or three members who are not working outside 
the village tract (more than 50%). Between ages 30 and 40, household heads are 
still mainly males (96%), households’ size increases to four members, and inactive 
members are relatively more numerous because there are more young children in 
the household. Adults still barely work outside the village tract and still have no 
social position within the village or village tract. 
The younger the household head is, the less he has a chance to know somebody 
in the Village Tract Farmland Management Committee (16.5% of under-30-year-
olds know somebody in the committee compared with 22.2% for all households). 
And yet, the younger they are, the more frequently household heads have reached 
a high education level (Table 3 in Annex 1), which tends to show that the average 
educational level has increased in the two areas over the two past generations.
58. Throughout the report, the term ‘average’ designates the mean. 
59. Amongst the 4887 individuals, 3707 are 14 years-old or more, 1180 are younger than 14. 
60. Higher education level comprizes high school and university. 
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There are two different types of households headed by ‘elderly’ people (aged 
50 and above):
• One type corresponds to a household headed by a man of 60 or more, who has 
attained a social position within the village or VT, mainly in the administration 
sector61, and who knows somebody in the VTFMC. Their households are 
composed of more than five members (often seven or more) amongst whom 
more than a third has a higher education level. These households are often 
made of three generations. 
• The second type is a household headed by a woman of 50 and more, with 
only one or two members. The household head has a low education level 
(none or primary) and household members rarely accessed higher education. 
Household members are rarely in socially advantageous positions. 
Age structures – in line with household size – are very similar in the two areas. 
It can be noted that the population is a little bit older in Dry Zone with an average 
household head age of 48.5 years against only 45 years in the Delta, and with 
higher rates of household heads above 60 in the Dry Zone and of household heads 
under 30 years in the Delta. This can be linked to the fact that a higher proportion 
of household heads were born outside of their current village tract in the Delta 
than in the Dry Zone (see point below).
 4.2 Migration 
According to the data, permanent in-migration to the studied areas since 1988 
is very limited: 81% of household heads were born in the same Village tract62 and 
an additional 13.6% were born in the same township. Among the 213 in-migrant 
households (whose head was born outside the VT), the great majority (64.3%) is 
found in the Delta, and in particularly in the two most recently-settled villages63 – 
the ones further south and/or in brackish water areas. This characterizes the lasting 
characteristic of the Delta as a frontier area, from north to south. The Dry Zone in 
comparison is much more stable in terms of inter-village mobility, and the rates 
of in-migration tend mostly to reflect village size (with more in-migration to the 
biggest villages of Zee Phyu Pin and Gaw Gyi). 
Amongst the 213 in-migrating households, 28% arrived in the last 10 years. 
Half of them declared that they migrated to get married, a third came to find work. 
Yet, according to qualitative interviews, these two answers cannot be significantly 
61. The term ‘administrative position’ designates positions such as village head, village tract head, village clerk (chief 
assistant), land management committee member, village administration committee member, etc… 
62. There is no important difference between men and women: women household heads are 84% to be born in the 
same VT. 
63. Pay Chaung (22.5%) and Tet Tet Ku (17.8%) 
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distinguished from one another as they generally overlap through the following 
continuum: individuals move for work, then find a mate, and finally decide to settle 
in their spouse’s village. Respondents tend to differentiate their answers in the 
following way: most household heads who migrated more than 10 years ago said 
they did so to get married, while most of those who migrated more recently said 
they did so for work. 
In line with this fact, household heads who settled in the last 50 years migrated 
to get married. But it must be noted that for the households who settled in the 
village a very long time ago (more than 100 years), representatives declared that 
their ‘first coming elder’ migrated in search for work. This corresponds mainly to 
work migration in the Delta. Information concerning these oldest migrations is not 
precise: 60% of informants declared that their elders came from the same township 
and 30% did not know where they came from. 
Current out-migration among households’ members concerns about one 
quarter of households64 (Table 4 in Annex 1). Work migrations increase rapidly 
when household heads reach 40 years old, reach their peak when they are between 
40 and 50 years old, and slowly decrease after. This corresponds to the period when 
households’ members need money to pay for their education, marriage, novitiate, 
etc. and the household has more workforce available. As we will see in Chapter VII 
2, it also corresponds to the period when many households buy land. 
64. 24% of total households have at least one member working outside the VT more than 50% of the year. 
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       1.  Land use rights transfers and papers
 1.1 The ban on land use right transfers
The colonial period had a deep influence on land governance as it established 
the territorial basis for land and population administration, in both the Delta and 
the Dry Zone. This colonial framework has been used since then by the Burmese 
government. The independent government nationalized all land and resources 
with the 1948 Land Nationalization Act. This policy aimed at fighting landlordism 
i.e. to redistribute land held by foreigner and indigenous landlords to the tenants 
who cultivated it. The government then declared itself as the ultimate owner of 
all land and resources. This orientation changed the state’s conception of its role 
regarding resource governance, at least in principle. From a legal point of view, 
farmers became the ‘state’s tenants’. This shift became even more real with the 1962 
military coup and the 1964 Tenancy Act enacted by the Revolutionary Council. From 
1962 onwards, land was legally transferable for the sake of continuing cultivation 
on it. In other words, arable lands left vacant should be (re-) allocated by, and solely 
by, the Village Tract Farmland Management Committees. Accordingly, definitive 
land use transfers such as sales or temporary arrangements (mortgage, rent, 
etc.) were all forbidden by the state, with the only exception being inheritance. 
However, it has been demonstrated in comparative contexts that banning such 
transfers tended to foster a black market for land rather than eliminating it (Lavigne 
Delvigne et al., 2002: 105). In Myanmar as well, it is not surprising to observe that 
transfers of land use rights existed prior to 2012 and were also quite dynamic 
(see infra). Indeed, banning land transfers under the previous governments was 
thought to be consistent with the ‘land to the tiller’ reform pursued in the 1950s, 
supposedly sustaining more equitable access to land for all. However, facing an 
ineffective land reform65, individuals had to respond by ‘recreating’ a land tenure 
framework that would respond to their needs for accessing land, through the 
permanent transfer of land use rights or through ‘derived rights’. While permanent 
transfers essentially cover inheritance and land sales, derived rights cover all the 
procedures in which the rights to cultivate retained by an individual (or family) are 
delegated to a third party on a temporary basis and according to specific rules. 
The main types of ‘derived rights’ encountered in Delta and Dry Zone during this 
study – renting, sharecropping, and mortgage – are described below. We shall see 
hereafter that derived rights are often a starting point for smallholders and the 
landless to get access to land.
65. We may recall here that by 1958, when the government halted the implementation of the Land Nationalization Act, 
only 17% of all cultivated lands had been nationalized. 
V. Transfers of land use rights
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V. Transfers of land use rights
Farmers had to develop different strategies to get around the legal ban on land 
transfers. The multiplicity of ‘papers’ related to land use in Myanmar illustrates quite 
well these strategies and the blurry framework in-between customary norms and 
statutory laws. ‘Papers’ are defined here as all the sorts of written paper documents 
used in land arrangements at the local level. These include farmer booklets (see 
below) and land sale contracts (see Chapter V.3 and Box 12).
Figure 16: Translated extract from a farmer booklet (produced in 2005) collected in 
a village in Dry Zone in 2013
 1.2 Farmer booklets
While the farmer booklet is, with the tax receipt (see Figure 17) another 
document produced by the government for farmland management. While it dates 
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back also to the colonial period, its purpose and composition were redefined 
under socialist-military rule, principally in order to provide a local record to assess 
1) what each farmer must grow on each plot according to government policies, i.e. 
how they can contribute to the procurement system; and 2) what are the family 
livelihood needs, i.e. how the cooperatives can provide for each household (e.g. 
for rice distribution). These farmer booklets had previously defined land use. 
These also defined land tax payments and forced procurement quotas. Finally 
these documents forbade any kind of transfer and thus defined farmers as tenants 
receiving only the ‘authority/right to cultivate the land’ (lei ya-myei lok-paing-hkwin). 
This simple legal framework ruled (in principle) land relations from 1962 to 2012.
 1.3 Tax receipts
Annual tax receipts 
were provided to 
farmers on farmlands by 
the SRLD officers upon 
payment of the land tax 
(which was set to 6 Kyats 
per acre in the British 
times and has never 
been increased since, 
despite inflation). This 
enabled SLRD to match 
holdings with individual 
names. Surprisingly, 
Forest department 
officers provided 
similar tax receipts to 
farmers unofficially 
cultivating farmlands on 
forestlands. Although 
the tax rates were 
considerably higher 
than those of official 
farmlands, it enabled 
farmers to ‘legalize’ their occupation of such lands, as their land use rights and 
transfers on these lands were recognized by local authorities. See as well Figure 16, 
Chapter VI.1.4 and Box 12: Tax receipts: the ultimate ‘proof’ of land use?
V. Transfers of land use rights
Figure 17: Tax receipt
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2.  Inheritance and land fragmentation
Land inheritance (since 198866) concerns more than 43% of landowning 
households in the Delta for an average inherited area of 6.89 acres (among those 
who have inherited lands), and 51% of landowning households in Dry Zone for 
an average inherited area of 6.11 acres (among those who have inherited lands). 
In both areas, the average area inherited per household decreased – by 20% in 
Delta and by 32% in Dry Zone (see Table 8) – which may be explained by land 
fragmentation. It also should be noted that inheritance is not a guarantee for 
permanent landownership, particularly in Delta where 14% of those who inherited 
lands later lost their lands in some way or another. 
Table 8: Land inheritance in Delta and Dry Zone since 1988 
Delta Dry Zone
Inherited 
lands after 
2003
Nb HH 42 59
Average area inherited (acres) 5.86 4.26
% of Land-owning HH 19% 17%
Inherited 
lands from 
88-2003
Nb HH 68 142
Average area inherited (acres) 7.32 6.27
% of Land-owning HH 25% 39%
Inherited 
lands 88 up 
to now
Nb HH 108 187
Average area inherited (acres) 6.89 6.11
% of Land-owning HH 43% 51%
% who have become landless since 14% 3%
 2.1 Customary principles of farm succession (Dry Zone) 
All surveyed villages in the Dry Zone have been established over the last 
century.  All arable lands are occupied. Different patterns of land inheritance exist in 
Monywa and Yinmabin townships. Despite some differences in practices between 
villages, there are many common points:
• Every sibling in a farm family is entitled to inherit parents’ properties. There is 
no gender bias in succession of properties including farmlands. Women can 
inherit farmlands in the same way as men.
• These assets are distinguished in 2 types: ‘inside’ properties (atwin pyis si) – 
66. The survey did not enquire about inheritance before 1988 so the rate of households who inherited lands might be 
higher, particularly in the older age categories. 
V. Transfers of land use rights
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money, gold, gems – and ‘outside’ properties (apyin pyis si) – farmlands, cattle, 
farm tools. The parent’s house and its compound are excluded from both 
groups and are intended to be transferred to the child which has remained 
with the parents until they passed away. 
• Inheritance of assets is guided by the principle of equal distribution among 
siblings. The inheritance equity is balanced between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
property. Those who receive no land may in compensation receive gold or 
money, etc. For lands, the principle of equitable distribution also takes into 
account the soil fertility of the different holdings. When landholdings are too 
small, they are not equally divided among siblings but adjustments are made 
with the other types of assets (money, gold, etc.). This allows an equal sharing 
of inheritance and at the same time helps keep landholdings a viable farm size. 
Draught animals are generally also transferred to those who inherit the lands.
In the Dry Zone’s surveyed villages, parents of the farming households let their 
children access the lands at marriage. Parents may allot some plots of their farm to 
sons or daughters to work as sharecroppers, which then pay one third of the farm’s 
harvest. After parents die, the ownership of the farm is transferred to the son or 
daughter who cultivated it. 
V. Transfers of land use rights
A young couple got married and the parents of the boy gave the couple farmlands 
as inheritance. Three years later, the young husband died. It happened at the time of land 
use registration for Form No. 7. The widow applied for the allotted land to be registered 
in the Form No.7 with her name. The parents of the dead son did not want to transfer 
the land to the widow because they thought that as she was young and attractive, she 
would get married again to another man within a few months. The parents came to SLRD 
to object to the transfer of the entitlement of their land to the widow. The SLRD office 
staff wished to leave the farmland to the widow. But in order to avoid dealing with this 
social issue, the SLRD office said that the case resolution was only within the jurisdiction 
of the civil court. The case was thus referred to the civil court and was not yet solved at 
the time of the study. 
BOX 6: A PROBLEMATIC LAND INHERITANCE CASE FOR A YOUNG WIDOW IN 
MINBU TOWNSHIP (DRY ZONE)
When farmlands are distributed equally among siblings, those who can 
afford to accumulate the plots ‘buy out’ their siblings’ shares. When farmlands are 
distributed in unequal shares among siblings, those who inherited more farmlands 
may purchase the small plots from others. Purchase or sale is not the rule but it is 
possible when the sibling agrees to sell his or her share. Generally, purchase or sale 
of inherited plots is made between siblings because they do not want to sell their 
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parents’ land to non-family members. It is a preference but not a rule as such. When 
farm size is too small to share among siblings, the elder siblings or the wealthier 
siblings may leave their shares to the weaker ones. 
The sibling who gets married before both parents pass away sometimes has 
the opportunity to access farmland through his or her marital partner. In such 
cases, he or she may be less favored to inherit farmland from his/her own parents. 
In that case and especially if the person is a man, his wife will not be satisfied with 
such an arrangement, as bride-price ideally requires some land provided by the 
husband as a basis to establish a new household. In cases where one sibling gets 
married before the parents pass away and if the newlywed couple has no farmland, 
parents from either one or both sides may provide them some plots of farmland as 
part of the marriage arrangement. The provision of farmland in that case remains 
informal, as long as parents are alive; only at their death should the landowner’s 
name be changed in official registers. The newlywed couple may live together 
in one of the parents’ houses and work together with parents and other siblings. 
It does not need to bear food costs, and can save money from the sale of crops 
produced from their farm plots. When they have saved enough money to buy a 
house, they separate from their parents. It may take several years for newlywed 
couples to get enough savings to establish their own home.
Traditionally, succession of parental properties is made on the day of ‘yak le’ (the 
third or fifth day following burial of the last parent), a commemoration ceremony to 
which all relatives come to gather. The elders amongst the relatives usually manage 
the division and distribution of the properties to the siblings. The village chief does 
not interfere in this process. Local authorities (e.g. Village Tract Farmland Management 
Committee) only interfere to mediate in cases of complaints and conflicts (see V.2.3).
V. Transfers of land use rights
U Aung Sein + 
Daw Mi Wun
Ma Htay Thwe
She is a spinster, 
lived with parents 
until their death. 
Inherited house 
and 9 acres
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
9 ACRES
Ma Htay Yin
She inherits  
3 acres +  
7 acres from 
her parents-
in-law 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
10 ACRES
U Htay Maung
3 acres at 
marriage + 
inherits 2 acres + 
buys 5 acres
- - - - - - - - - - - 
10 ACRES
Ma Htay Khin
3 acres at 
marriage + 
inherits 3 acres + 
7 acres from her 
parents-in-law 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
16 ACRES
U Htay Aung
3 acres at 
marriage + 
inherits 2 acres 
+ buys 4 acres
 - - - - - - - - - - - 
9 ACRES
Figure 18: Example of succession in Dry Zone  
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Figure 18 shows that land inheritance can take place in 2 steps: one part of 
the lands may be accessed through informal land arrangements by children before 
the death of the parents, in the event of marriage (especially when no lands are 
accessed via the spouse’s side), and another part will be inherited after death 
of parents. It also shows that lands are equally divided, except for the child who 
stayed with the parents until their death who has special inheritance rights (house 
and more farmlands). Finally, as lands are inherited by both males and females, 
married couples may inherit lands from both sides.
In the majority of villages of the Dry Zone, toddy palm trees have been planted 
on farmlands. In the sharing of lands among heirs, it may occur that some members 
inherit the land but not the toddy trees and vice versa. It leads to the overlap of 
different operational rights (cultivation use right for one, toddy collection right 
for the other) owned by different siblings, over the same plot. Such rights are not 
recognized in the current legal framework, yet they are still socially legitimate 
rights in the eyes of the villagers and are still applied locally.
 2.2 Delta: more unequal inheritance patterns among siblings
In Delta, the same general principles apply regarding inheritance as in the Dry 
Zone. However, qualitative interviews tend to indicate more unequal patterns of 
inheritance in the Delta compared to the Dry Zone, as illustrated in Figure 18 and 
Figure 19. One explanation is that inheritance patterns were disrupted by harmful 
policies such as the state’s compulsory paddy procurement policy. Another factor 
impacting inheritance is the agricultural frontier, which closed recently in Delta. 
Fragmenting family land into small plots had not been a relevant concern given the 
opportunities to clear new lands by moving further south. Lastly, with less historicity 
than in Dry Zone, land patrimony has less value, financially in terms of generational 
investments, and symbolically due to the high mobility characterizing farming 
households in this region.  This lack of ‘patrimonial value’ may also have a positive, 
strategic, counterpart. Indeed, in the highly unstable context for agriculture in the 
post-socialist period in the Delta, land transfers done through inheritance may 
have served to secure beneficial alliances between families, instead of securing 
consolidated (contiguous) areas as Dry Zone households were aiming to. In the 
Delta, transferring land to more distant (geographically and socially) families may 
have served to extend households’ social capital; an asset whose importance we 
already underlined for accessing land. 
Figure 19 illustrates the relatively unequal inheritance patterns in the Delta 
as well as the fact that inheritance may skip a generation, with lands transferred 
to grandchildren. The first family (U Tin Maung and Daw Nyein) cleared 20 acres 
along the agricultural frontier. They transferred 15 acres to their eldest daughter 
V. Transfers of land use rights
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V. Transfers of land use rights
who remained with them until their death. The second child (U Khin Soe) received 
5 acres while the last son was not allocated any land as he had married with Daw 
Khin Hla, who was to inherit 10 acres from her parents. In the last generation 
(children of U Aung Cho and Daw Khin Hla), two children remain landless, while 
one son received all of the parents’ lands and the last son received (5 acres) lands 
from the grandparents U Tin Maung and Daw Nyein.
Figure 19: A case of unequal inheritance in the Delta 
Pionniers: 
20 acres
15 acres
15 acres 5 acres 10 acres
Landless Landless        10 acres 5 acres
U Tin Maung + 
Daw Nyein
Daw Ei Mon U Khin Soe U Khin Soe            +
U Hla Tin + 
Daw Thaie
Daw Khin Hla
Ma Htay Ko Aye Ko Soe GyiMa San San
 2.3 Current issues concerning land inheritance
Impacts of the 2012 land law on inheritance patterns
The impact of the 2012 farmland policy could be seen as a driver for changes 
in land inheritance patterns among siblings. Before the 2012 land law, a sibling 
who was not engaged in farming was not entitled to land inheritance. If he or she 
appealed to inherit land, the Village Tract Farmland Management Committee would 
prioritize siblings who have continued working as farmers. If there was conflict in 
inheritance among siblings, most of those employed in the formal sector (such as 
civil servants) who worked outside the village and could not cultivate their parents’ 
farmland had to surrender their claim to land inheritance. After the 2012 Farmland 
Law enactment, there is no such prohibition and each sibling is entitled to his or 
her land inheritance right. This study took place too early to observe consequences 
of the new Farmland Law. It has been said that traditionally, land given to the 
newlywed couple may fall under the name of the inheriting son or daughter after 
the death of his/her parents. However, the land titling process which took place 
after the 2012 Farmland Law may create some conflicts concerning who, at the 
very moment of the registration, is to be entitled. Finally, under the new land law, 
farming families deploy strategies to increase the loan amounts they can access 
from the MADB, especially for paddy land. Though these loans are based on farm 
size (100,000 MMK/acre for paddy), MADB applies a maximum threshold of 10 acres 
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per farmer. The distribution of Land Use Certificates (Form 7) with the new land 
law thus hastened the fragmentation of familial estates amongst different family 
members. In other words, many pieces of land of 10 (or under) acres have been 
distributed (as a kind of advanced inheritance), so that every single acre of land 
be entitled to MADB loans. Whether this will interfere with more ‘opportunistic’ 
inheritance patterns common in the Delta and/or bring new types of conflicts 
remains to be observed. 
 2.4 Land fragmentation
As seen in previous chapters, land fragmentation is occurring in both regions of 
Dry Zone and Delta. However, the phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the 
Dry Zone where the closing of the agricultural frontier and land saturation occurred 
much earlier. This is confirmed by the decrease of the average area inherited per 
household (see V.2.1), which is greater in the Dry Zone than in the Delta. As such, it 
is an increasing challenge for young households who have inherited smallholdings 
to create viable farms. 
In the Dry Zone, lack of land tenure security is associated with lack of draught 
cattle. It is observed that getting access to farm let alone is not enough for a young 
farmer. An equally important asset is the draught cattle. Better-off farmers prefer to 
have a cow in addition to their pair of draught cattle so that its calves can be one-
by-one assigned to each child as the calf’s caregiver (see Chapter VII.3.1.). Giving 
heirs access to both farmland and draught cattle is convenient and easy for better-
off farmers but it is very difficult for small ones.
3.  Land sales since 1988
As shown in Table 9, land sales (done after 198867) concern more than one 
third of households: 36% of households from the Delta (with an average 9.02 
acres bought among households who have bought lands), and from the Dry 
Zone (with an average 6.05 acres bought among households who have bought 
lands). The average amount of land bought among those who bought land is 
considerably higher in the Delta. Another interesting trend is that throughout the 
two periods (1988-2003 and 2003 to now), the average plot size bought among 
those who bought has increased by 6% in the Delta while it has decreased by 
24% in the Dry Zone. This suggests a land accumulation trend in Delta and a 
land fragmentation trend in Dry Zone. In addition, frequency of land sales among 
landowning households significantly decreased (by 43%) in the Delta in the two 
periods, while it is stable in Dry Zone: this can be explained by the end of the 
67. The survey did not enquire about land sales before 1988. 
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forced paddy procurement policy which was a strong driver of land sales in Delta 
(see below) and land loss (eg: 6% of those who bought lands lost it later and 
became landless).
Table 9: Some figures on land sales in Delta and Dry Zone 
Delta Dry Zone
Bought lands 
after 2003
Nb HH 30 73
Average area bought (acres) 9.03 4.59
% of Land-owning HH 13% 21%
Bought lands 
from 88-
2003
Nb HH 55 72
Average area bought (acres) 8.52 6.04
% of Land-owning HH 24% 20%
Bought lands 
88 up to now
Nb HH 82 128
Average area bought (acres) 9.02 6.02
% of Land-owning HH 36% 36%
% who have become landless since 6% 0%
 3.1 Government policies as a driver of land use rights transfers (Delta)
To summarize what has been explained in Chapter III, much of previous 
Myanmar governments’ efforts focused on controlling paddy production for the 
state’s interests, often against those of farmers. Therefore, Delta villages were much 
more affected than Dry Zone villages by these policies, among which the Compulsory 
Quota policy was probably the main cause of land sales and purchases (despite the 
legal ban on such transfers) conducted in the Delta between 1964 and 2003. In the 
Dry Zone, land sales and purchases were therefore mostly linked to farmers’ own 
economic and household characteristics, rather than being driven by state policies.
In the Delta, the Compulsory Quota Policy (which ceased in 2003) created 
an artificial market. Indeed, most households who were about to lose their land 
because they were unable to provide the due quota to the government would 
try to sell it all or part of it before having it confiscated. The transaction generally 
consisted in finding a better-off farmer ready to buy the right to cultivate the land, 
with the price of the paddy quota due deducted from the land price. In order to get 
around the ban of land use rights transfers, farmers managed with the help of the 
Village Tract Farmland Management Committee (chaired by the appointed village 
tract headman) and the village tract SLRD staff to retroactively put the name of the 
purchaser on the farmers’ waiting list – which in theory was designed to prioritize 
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small scale farmers and landless tenants. This reflects the reality of the procurement 
quota policy’s impacts on the ground: instead of benefiting smalholder farmers 
and tenants in need of lands in the region, the lands given up because of this policy 
were mostly sold by farmers ahead of being lost so they could at least retrieve some 
money for their land. The majority of these lands ended up in the hands of farmers 
financially able to buy them as well as connected enough (to the local authorities) 
to overcome the constraints brought by this policy68. As explained by Taylor (2009: 
352), it seems that during the procurement policy period, farmers who held fewer 
than 16 acres were often forced to buy paddy on the open market in order to meet 
their quota obligation and have food and seeds for themselves. 
“However, for farmers with 16 or more acres of land, there is a surplus left over which 
can be sold at the free market price; the income of these families is significantly 
greater than those of their neighbors. Thus, having access to land is the key to 
wealth in the village” (ibid). 
Interestingly, during the quantitative survey, farmers never opted for the 
answer ‘land lost because of the Compulsory Quota Policy?’, but would rather 
talk of ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ land despite the ban on such transfers until 2012. 
The qualitative study and land ‘trajectories’ however leave no doubt about the 
significant role of the Compulsory Quota Policy in motivating these transfers. 
Moreover, the quantitative study indicates that the sale of land use rights in Delta 
was more active than in Dry Zone (see Chapter VII.6.2).
 3.2 Contracting a land sale before 2012
Villagers have recourse to both verbal and written forms of contracts to sell land 
use rights. Verbal agreements are generally made between close relatives. However, 
and especially after 1988, most transactions were done through written contracts, 
which can take various forms. The contract considered as the most secure may 
directly involve the village administrator as a signing witness. However, it is frequent 
that the village administrator will only be present during the agreement, without 
affixing his signature on the paper. However, whether affixing his signature or not, the 
finality of a land use right sale agreement necessitated changing the name attached 
to a holding (u’ paing). That means changing information in the local SLRD register, 
and that must involve the village administrator as well as the local SLRD staff, and 
those services are not free. First, people are supposed to pay the village administrator 
to acknowledge the transfer, as part of ‘social practice’ (lu-mu-yei”). The validity of 
the transfer, if checked and ensured by the administrator, is ratified by combining 
governmental and local land tenure norms and practices – a form of legal pluralism 
68. Well-connected farmers were generally able to negotiate the quota in quantity and quality with land committees, 
SLRD officers and government millers. 
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Figure 20: Diversity of land sale contracts
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The form of the contract illustrates well the strategy developed by villagers at 
the crossroads between administrative and local levels, to accomplish land transfers 
according to customary rules while navigating around the legal ban on transfers. Most 
contracts indeed gather all the data necessary to set up a legal act: an official form (with 
governmental stamp), dated, where people are named and located, the land situated, 
witnesses’ presence often testified by their signature, and most importantly, where 
the headman affixed stamp and signature. Second, the document directly invokes 
a sense of ‘ownership’ (paing sain-tho) on the land and the transfer (lwe-pyaung’’) of 
these rights to other people. The document is thus fundamentally in contradiction 
with the legal framework. 
However, the purpose of the transfer – to provide land as a means for daily 
subsistence – is here legitimating the transfer by fitting into the only legal justification 
for transferring land: that land must be kept under cultivation. Papers, mediating 
regulations that exist at village and government levels, are thus adapted to solve 
the tension local versus legal. Also, they identify legality as an intermittent rule and 
question the state’s capacity to enforce it.
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(see Box 7). When the transfer’s legitimacy is acknowledged, the two contracting 
parties have to wait for the SLRD agent to come and record the transfer. He too has to 
be paid; the rate is stabilized in some areas and largely variable in others. 
The paper bearing the agreement may vary from plain paper, school book 
pages, or proper contract templates produced by the Ministry of Internal Revenue, 
known as 5 Kyats (or 10 or 25 Kyats) Stamped Contracts. While some contracts are 
carefully designed to secure the land use right transfer despite the legal ban (see 
after), others only put the agreement on paper without even mentioning the area 
or the kwin number (see Figure 20, Table 10 and Table 11).
BOX 7: ANALYSING A CONTRACT’S TERMINOLOGY: PLAYING  
WITH PLURALISM
Interestingly, securing land transfers through contracts written at village 
level involve representatives of domains both legal (SLRD representative, 
administrator) and customary (witnesses, often ‘elders’ – yap-mi’-yap-pha’ – and 
again the headman). In fact, the village headman, nominated until 2011 by the 
military government, acted as the state’s ‘political broker’ at the village level and 
the conveyor of customs within the legal framework. But at the same time, the 
administrator puts himself into illegality by acknowledging transfers banned by 
the government. And for this reason, this headman figure (across all successive 
Burmese governments, including the current one) combines the different forms of 
power (legal and customary) to provide access to and distribute resources at the 
local level, due in most part to his knowledge of the laws and ways to bypass them. 
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For more analysis on the village administrator’s role, see Chapter VIII.3. Let us 
stress that whatever the degree of (in)formality of the sale transaction – with name 
changed in the SLRD records or not, with the administrator signing or not – we did 
not encounter any conflicts related to land sale transactions during the study. Of 
course, it must be said that land sales in studied villages occur mostly within the 
village community or with households from nearby villages. 
 3.3 Is there a ‘land market’?
While we have noted that land use rights were sold and purchased under the 
previous land framework, we can hardly speak of a land market in which land is 
considered a commodity. Naturally, having access to land means having better 
chances in securing a family’s livelihood (see Chapter VII.6), and would also mean 
access to credit (see Chapter VIII.2). However, in the studied areas, which remain 
profoundly rural if not to say remote, land has never – or rarely – been subject 
to speculation. In the villages under study, the main exceptions are for the Delta 
areas close to Bogale or Mawlamyinegyun towns affected by the on-going road 
construction projects. In the Dry Zone, the main exception observed was Khoe 
Than village, for its proximity to Monywa (see Table 10), where the few tracts 
situated along the road to Monywa have recently been coveted by real estate 
projects and gasoline stations. Even in Aye Ywar (Bogale township), where some 
lands are situated by the new road coming from Bogale, the most expensive plots 
(taking into account accessibility, fertility, and irrigation) were priced at a maximum 
of 1,200,000 MMK/acre in 2014. 
Table 10: Examples of land transactions69 recorded in Khoe Tan, village close to 
Monywa town (Dry Zone) 
Year Total area 
(acres)
Price/acre  
(MMK)
Type of  
agreement
1997 0.87 115,000 Sheet from school book, 
one witness involved 
1997 1.11 122,000 10MMK stamp paper 
1998 0.55 127,000 6 MMK stamp paper 
2010-11 1.13 620,000 10 MMK stamped paper; 
2 witness involved 
2013 (after 
Farmland Law) 
2.09 (close to 
Poultry Zone of 
Monywa) 
3,350,000 Contract (in the name 
of land use right for 
watermelon. In reality, 
residential land)
69. The survey measured “current prices”. We have not been able to calculate the ‘constant prices’ prices taking into 
account inflation as no data was found on inflation rates from 1988 to 2003.  
112 
V. Transfers of land use rights
Table 11: Examples of land transactions62 recorded in Pay Chaung, isolated 
village in saltwater area (Delta)
Year Total area 
(acres)
Price/acre  
(MMK)
Type of  
agreement
1988 12 1,000 Verbally 
1997 6 35,000 Contract (village 
administrator as 
witness)
1998 15 50,000 Contract (two villagers 
as witness), done in 
presence of village 
administrator
4.  Land arrangements and ‘derived rights’
 4.1 Different types of agrarian contracts
Four main temporary land arrangements exist for accessing derived rights of 
cultivation: free land loan, rent (in crop or money), sharecropping (thi”- sa”-khja’), 
and mortgage (le-pyan-ngwei-pyan or a-nu-gan-myei). There can be oral and 
written contracts, made between one person which contracts in the concerned 
plot of lands (for free, against cash or in kind payments, or in exchange for a loan) 
and another person who provides and contracts out the lands. 
As observed in Table 12, ‘Contracting in’ households represent 18.5% of Delta 
surveyed households and 9% of Dry Zone households. This is mainly due to the much 
higher frequency of sharecropping arrangements in the Delta (9.6% of all surveyed 
households in Delta access lands with sharecropping arrangements, against only 
1.2% in the Dry Zone). In the Dry Zone, the most common arrangement is ‘free 
loan’, while sharecropping is the predominant arrangement in the Delta. Only 3% 
of the ‘contracting-in’ households cumulate more than one type of arrangements 
(more quantitative data in following pages). As for land sales, the average size of 
lands contracted in for cultivation is almost two times greater in Delta (4.3 acres/
contract) than in Dry Zone. 
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Table 12: Number of households, % of total households contracting in (over 
total households), and average acreage of lands for cultivation by households on 
non-owned lands, in Delta and Dry Zone
Area TOTAL contracted in 
lands
Free loan Rent in Thi”- sa”-kh-
ja’/Share-
cropping in
Mortgage in
Nb 
HH
% Average 
acres
Nb 
HH
% Nb 
HH
% Nb 
HH
% Nb 
HH
%
Dry 
Zone
54 9.0 2.0 22 3.7 15 2.5 7 1.2 11 1.8
Delta 98 18.5 4.3 27 5.1 6 1.1 54 10.2 14 2.6
Total 152 13.5 49 4.3 21 1.9 61 5.4 25 2.2
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Free land loan
Lands may be lent for free for a season. This arrangement is mainly done among 
close relatives and through oral agreement. It is slightly more common in the Delta 
and for summer paddy cultivation, which can be explained by the higher costs 
required to cultivate summer paddy (more inputs, irrigation, and motor pumps, 
etc.). When lacking the financial capacity to put all land under summer paddy, a 
household may lend the remaining land for free to close relatives. 
Thi”- sa”-khja’: sharecropping or rent?
The Burmese term thi”- sa”-khja’ can be ambiguous as it encompasses different 
kind of arrangements, some purely sharecropping ones (i.e. a fixed proportion of 
the harvest is due to the land owner) and others more looking like rent, that is a 
fixed quantity of harvest (independently from the harvested quantity) against the 
right to cultivate the land. We however stick to the Burmese terminology here in 
recounting the diversity of practices covered by this term literally meaning ‘fruit-
eat-lay-down’. Hence, the term essentially reflects a temporary arrangement from 
which payment is made in kind (harvest). 
In some regions (such as the Dry Zone), this term is used for different 
sharecropping arrangements. The fixed rent payment in crop applies predominates 
in the Delta, especially to paddy cultivation. The difference between the two zones 
can be explained by the history of contracting practices between landowners 
and tenants. As to be expected, payment in the form of a fixed amount of crop is 
preferred by contracting out households. Competition among potential tenants 
(which has always been high in the Delta due to the high rate of landlessness) for 
access to lands strengthened the bargaining power of landowners and led to the 
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deterioration of tenancy conditions. The scarcity of available let allows landowners 
to set the rent’s conditions and choose the most beneficial arrangements for them.
The difference between the Delta and the Dry Zone can also be understood 
in terms of agricultural conditions and the risks pertaining to different contexts. 
While paddy cultivation in Delta can be considered relatively secure in terms of 
production (if we omit pests and natural disasters), much of Dry Zone’s agriculture 
(including paddy in the studied area), can be considered highly risky since it 
depends on unpredictable rainfalls and often on non-irrigated lands (which 
constitute the majority of its arable lands). In ‘stable’ conditions – the Delta – those 
accessing land through temporary arrangements are more likely to contract rent-
in-crop arrangements (with a fixed amount of crop), while the higher risk in the Dry 
Zone means most arrangements are done with different sharecropping principles 
(see below).
Sharecropping arrangements are made on a seasonal or annual basis. The 
annual arrangement is preferred in areas where double paddy cropping is possible. 
This agrarian contract is much more common in the Delta and is renewable without 
limit if each of the contract parties wishes and has fulfilled his or her part of the 
contract. In the Delta the in-kind payment can vary from 20 to 30 baskets of paddy 
per acre (and per season)70. If the tenant works with his/her own cattle, the rent is 
around 20 baskets per acre. If the owner provides the tenant with cattle, the rent 
increases to 25 baskets per acre. If the owner wishes to obtain the rent ex ante, he 
will receive only half of it. 
The quantity of baskets due also depends on the relationship between the 
two contractors. Close relatives may set a rate sometimes as low as 15 baskets per 
acre. In some villages, sharecropping arrangements can include additional duties 
for tenants, such as feeding and taking care of the landowners’ buffaloes (in the 
Delta), etc. Most agreements are oral except for large farmers that have several 
tenants which may even use a special register with a list of tenants (this is also 
more common in the Delta). In many cases, access to the entitled MADB loans is 
also transferred to the tenants. 
In the past, it seems that sharecropping contracts were mostly done between 
landowners while they are now more often made between landowners and landless 
tenants, some of whom reside outside of the village. The quantitative survey indicates 
that 73% of sharecropping contracts are made with landless people. 
70. Average yields vary generally from 40 to 100 baskets depending on soil type, season, water salinity, and farming 
practices. The landowners’ take in sharecropping arrangement represents generally around half to one third of total 
production. 
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In 2014, Daw S. was cultivating about 10 acres under a thi”-sa”-khja’ arrangement. 
The land use rights on this land were owned by U M. H., an absentee landowner living 
in Mawlamyinegyun. Daw S. used to give 300 baskets (30 baskets per acre) – of which 
150 baskets were good quality and 150 baskets were low quality paddy – back to U 
M. H., by sending the paddy directly to the miller located in Mawlamyinegyun. They 
did not have any written contract for this arrangement, but needed to sign in U M. H.’s 
record book. When U M. H. passed away in 2014, Daw S. continued the arrangement 
with his relatives and got the opportunity to renegotiate the contract. The rate is still 
fixed at 30 baskets per acre, but the quantity is now divided into 100 baskets of good 
quality paddy and 200 baskets of low quality paddy.
Since Daw S. does not have any direct land use right on land, she is struggling 
to save money and plans to buy land of her own one day. In the meantime, she 
contracted five more acres under mortgage (see Le pyan ngwe pyan below) to a 
relative, for 2,500,000 MMK on a four-year period. These five acres are cultivated by 
her son (who is married and living in a separate household), to whom she will give 100 
baskets of paddy to him as labor cost.
In the Dry Zone, sharecropping is often named after the distributive principle 
organizing the agreement, such as ‘3 measures-1 measure (of crop)’ (thon”–su’-tasu’) 
– which means one third – or ‘eat half’ (tawak-sa”), depending if the arrangement 
delivers a third or half of the harvest to the landlord. In principle, the thon”–su’-
tasu’ arrangement pertains to a situation where someone has use rights to a plot 
of land but is lacking tools or cattle to work it entirely. This person will ask another 
to do all the work and use his own inputs. The person working the land will then 
have freedom to act on it, choosing crops and seed periods, tillage, etc. In the 
‘typical’ case of thon”–su’-tasu’, the one giving out the land cannot intervene in the 
agricultural activity but must be informed. A governing principle of this agreement 
is that nothing apart from seasonal agriculture can be done on the land: the 
one who obtain derived rights on the land cannot grow any perennial crops or 
build anything on the land – except perhaps a shelter to watch fields if it seems 
necessary. The agreement on the duration is not fixed and can be extended by 
mutual agreement. 
The tawak-sa” agreement is most often done between distant relatives. In this 
arrangement, the two contractors share the costs for seeds, plantation, weeding, 
and pesticides, while the one having obtained derived rights on the land should 
contribute all of the labor. This form of sharecropping is viewed by farming 
households as a way to extend their farms.
BOX 8: DESCRIPTION OF MULTIPLE ARRANGEMENTS TO ACCESS  LANDS:  
A CASE OF THI” - SA” - KHJA’ AND MORTGAGE IN BOGALE TOWNSHIP, DELTA
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Le pyan ngwe pyan (‘give back the paddy land, give back the money’):
Le pyan ngwe pyan defines a credit arrangement in which the creditor gets a 
temporary land use right (they can cultivate the lands and dispose of the harvest 
as they wish) against a loan of a fixed cash amount to the landowner, usually 
corresponding to half up to two thirds of the land’s market price. This arrangement 
is for a duration of several years (three years is the most common basis71). It may 
be renewed if the creditor agrees to extend the loan. The amount is to be repaid 
within the fixed period. If not, and in absence of a renegotiation of the arrangement, 
land falls to the hands of the lender. Most arrangements are oral and witnessed by 
adjacent neighbors and the village headman, except when dealing with outsiders 
from the village, in which case written contracts tend to be more common. It is 
mostly used by landowners as an immediate source of cash. It is equally common 
in Delta and Dry Zone (contracting in households are 2.2% of total households).  
Creditors can be landowners seeking to acquire land or landless entrepreneurs, 
who despite being unable to buy land at high prices can invest in temporary land 
use rights. For the landless creditor, the ‘interest’ from this kind of loan derives from 
working the land (now in the creditor’s hands) before the borrowed amount is paid 
back. le pyan ngwe pyan agreements are often done between a small landowner 
in need of liquidity and a landless person in search of land. Tenants under le pyan 
ngwe pyan agreements are often previous landowners who became landless. 
For the landowner creditor (for example in Pay Chaung in the Delta), often 
large landowners bet on the fact that debtors will not be able to repay the loan, 
perceiving these arrangements as an accumulation strategy. The loss of land by 
its original owner seems to be quite rare when the contract was signed between 
relatives or friends, probably due to its sensitivity and social proximity between the 
contractors. However, qualitative interviews also show that mortgage is a recurrent 
factor in land loss, especially when embedded in a more vertical relationship 
between different ‘social classes’: i.e. between larger and smaller landholders (see 
Chapter VIII.1 and VIII.2.4). It is also a source of contestation under the registration 
process started under the new land law.
71. While some contracts last five years, there is the risk that the creditor, working the land under this contract, can 
claim ownership after this period, under the Act 1/64, stipulating that a land cultivated by a tenant for more than five 
years consecutively may go to the tenant. This does not apply to sharecropping arrangements which are generally 
contracted on a seasonal basis. 
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Daw Myint lent 2.5 lakhs to her friend Daw Tin in 2012 and obtained the right to 
use Daw Tin’s two acres since. Daw Tin mortgaged her land to compensate for the loss 
of her crops due to pests in 2012. Her son was still in school at that time and she had to 
pay the registration fees. She was also ill and did not have enough to pay for her health 
expenses. She opted for mortgaging her land rather than seeking informal credit from 
other villagers because she was afraid to take on more debt since local interest rates 
are high – between 10 and 20%.
Initially she agreed with Daw Myint to repay the loan after two years to recover 
her 2 acres but she failed to raise enough capital for it. Daw Myint agreed to then 
extend the contract for an additional year and continue to cultivate the land. Daw 
Tin and her daughter now live on the proceeds from their small store and from their 
wages as laborers during the agricultural season. They also get money regularly from 
the younger son who went to work in a factory in Yangon. They are also thinking about 
breeding a pig to repay their debt and reclaim their land. 
Daw Myint and her husband do not have land, they also work in other farmers’ 
fields as wage laborers. Daw Myint also started, with her sister, a mobile shopping 
activity. They also make meals and soap that they then sell in their village and 
neighboring ones. Daw Myint’s family used to ‘own’ land in the past but it was 
confiscated during the Compulsory Paddy Procurement system. Daw Myint needs 
cash today because she is indebted to her in-laws and waits for Daw Tin’s refund. They 
have not established any written contract, nor requested the presence of a third party 
to testify to their agreements since, as they say: ‘we’re friends, just like sisters so it is 
arranged between us.’
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BOX 9: A CASE OF MORTGAGE IN DELTA, BETWEEN FRIENDS
Rent
Land rents may be seasonal or annual, with cash payment. These arrangements 
are not common in the Delta. In the Dry Zone, most of the contracts are negotiated 
in March/April for early monsoon crops. In the Dry Zone also, land rents with 
Chinese businessmen for watermelon production are common. Contrary to the 
other arrangements, which are mostly contracted directly between households, 
these are made through brokers. Watermelon plantations initiated by Chinese 
investors and meant for the Chinese market have developed in the Dry Zone region 
in areas including Sagaing, Tada Oo, Myithar, Mandalay, Chaung Oo, and the east 
side of Monywa townships. These businessmen have never made direct contact 
with local farmers, but operate through technicians who travel in search of irrigable 
lands. Then, the technicians proceed through a local broker and a Chinese broker 
to rent lands from the farmers through the local village tract chief. Translators from 
northern Shan State may be hired for arranging the deal with local people. 
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Rental periods tend to be five to six months. The rate of compensation for 
the rented land is about 250,000 to 300,000 MMK per acre. Despite the fact that 
it provides significant income to contracting-out farmers, this type of contract 
farming also has negative impacts on both land use (land availability and fertility) 
and labor. These plantations employ intensive production methods, with high 
quantities of fertilizers and pesticides. Farmers who lease their land to Chinese 
businessmen must observe contractual terms: i. Must not grow watermelon, ii. Must 
not visit the farm, iii. Must not use the well, if it was dug, etc. The crops are produced 
in a secretive manner: farmers are not allowed to know what type of fertilizer the 
Chinese businessmen use, and the pesticide labels are burnt after use. Farmers say 
that in the season following the contracted watermelon cycle, they have observed 
degradation of soil quality as well as reduction of yields and increased resistance of 
insects to pesticides. According to some farmers, the intensive use of water in these 
fields also contributes to the drying up of the wells (Brillon, 2015: 56). 
Despite the 
environmental downturns, 
the land rental rate is quite 
attractive for the farmers. 
The role of village chiefs is 
neither clear nor transparent 
but obviously they are 
involved in the process (see 
Chapter VIII.3). As part 
of this contract farming 
scheme, farm laborers are 
employed from the Dry 
Zone through middlemen. 
These middlemen entice 
migrants to come from far off 
villages; they remain on the 
plantations during the whole 
cultivation period of about 4 
months. Rates of 3,000 MMK 
per day for male workers, and 
2500 MMK for female workers are marginally higher than those achieved by local 
farmers. This seems to contribute also to labor shortages that many farmers face in 
the Dry Zone (Brillon, 2015: 55).
This practice needs to be addressed as it is in contradiction with Section 14 
of Farmland Law 2012 prescribing that “the person who has the right to use the 
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Figure 21: Stakeholders involved in ‘Chinese 
watermelon’ rental contracts
1.
2.
3.
5.
Chinese investor
Chinese 
agricultural 
technician
Translator
Local broker
Farmers
Chinese broker
Village chief
Lease land process in 
Chuang Kwa tract, 2009
1. Assign technician to look for suitable irrigable lands in villages
2. Hire translator from Shan State (Chinese-Burmese)
3. Once suitable lands are identified, technician mobilises Chinese broker
4. Request from Chinese broker to local broker for selected fields to rent, 
with help of translator
5. Information and negotiation with farmers for lease agreement
6. Authorisation process for lease agreement
4.
6.
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farmland shall not sell, mortgage, lease, exchange or give on the whole or part of the 
right to use the farmland without permission of the Government to any foreigner or 
any organization in which the foreigner is included.”
 4.2 Qualitative and quantitative analysis on contracting in
Among the total 1,129 surveyed households, 13.5% (152 households) cultivated 
lands that they do not own. As observed in the Table 15 and Table 17, in the Delta, 
the large majority (74.5%) of these households are landless, while it is the opposite 
in the Dry Zone (70.4% are landowners). This suggests that the prevalent strategy 
in the Delta for contracting in is primarily to access farmland, while in the Dry Zone, 
it is to increase the farm size. Almost a third of Delta landless and 11% of Dry Zone 
landowners contract lands in (see Chapter VII.6 and 7). This is confirmed by the 
Table 13 and Table 14. 
Table 13: Distribution of Delta households cultivating land they do not own, 
among categories of landownership categories (area in acres)
HH contracting land in Not contracting lands 
in
Total
Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R
Landless 73 74.5 23.1 243 56.1 76.9 316 59.5 100.0
0.3-2.5 7 7.1 24.1 22 5.1 75.9 29 5.5 100.0
2.5-5 3 3.1 6.5 43 9.9 93.5 46 8.7 100.0
5-10 6 6.1 9.1 60 13.9 90.9 66 12.4 100.0
10-15 6 6.1 14.3 36 8.3 85.7 42 7.9 100.0
>15 3 3.1 9.4 29 6.7 90.6 32 6.0 100.0
Total 98 100.0 18.5 433 100.0 81.5 531 100.0 100.0
 Chi-Square=15.6  dof=5  p=0.008  (very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.171
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Table 14: Distribution of households in Dry Zone cultivating land they do  
not own among categories of landownership categories (area in acres)
Yes No Total
Landless Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R
0.3-2.5 16 29.6 6.5 229 42.1 93.5 245 41.0 100.0
2.5-5 12 22.2 23.5 39 7.2 76.5 51 8.5 100.0
5-10 7 13.0 11.7 53 9.7 88.3 60 10.0 100.0
10-15 15 27.8 11.5 115 21.1 88.5 130 21.7 100.0
>15 3 5.6 5.2 55 10.1 94.8 58 9.7 100.0
Total 1 1.9 1.9 53 9.7 98.1 54 9.0 100.0
54 100.0 9.0 544 100.0 91.0 598 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=17.8  dof=5  p=0.003  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2)  Cramer’s V=0.173
Contracting in, in the Delta: a strategy to access lands for landless households
In the Delta, rent arrangements are seasonal (for summer paddy) and 
sharecropping arrangements are annual. In areas of the Delta where double 
cropping is possible, temporary arrangements (whether free loan, rent) are often 
provided for summer paddy by households72 that do not have enough resources 
to cultivate all the lands they own. This occurs more frequently between relatives 
(mainly with free land loans). Seasonal contracting in is done exclusively by landless 
while annual contracting-in is practiced more or less evenly by both landless and 
landowners. 
In the Delta, these agrarian contracts are four times more frequent (24.1% of 
households) in villages of brackish areas that those of freshwater areas (5.5% of 
households). It is linked to higher landlessness rates as well as to the villages’ past 
history, including the occurrence of quasi-feudal systems such as in Tet Tet Ku with 
an absentee landlord and a class of landless tenants working for him. According 
to the qualitative study, it seems that free land loan is the most common form 
of temporary land arrangement between relatives in the Delta but mainly for 
summer paddy, while sharecropping is preferred for year round arrangements. 
This is supported by the fact that among households owning no land but 
cultivating some through rent arrangement (36 households in total in the Delta) 
most occur in Aye Ywar (15 households – 41.8% of the village’s landless). Aye 
72. Out of 97 households contracting in lands, 56 cultivate both seasons- out of which 22 are landowners, 34 are 
landless, 33 cultivate exclusively during summer season. These latter households are all 100% landless. 8 cultivate only 
in monsoon season.
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Ywar is indeed a long-settled village which developed progressively on calling in 
relatives from the Upper Delta and whose land availability has saturated quickly 
in history. 
As a whole, temporary arrangements in the Delta benefit household owning 
no land at all in the first place (73.5% of households engaged in such arrangements, 
see Table 15). The fact of having access or not to land for ‘landless’ households 
(especially in the Delta) seems to be a major feature in terms of livelihood security 
(as discussed in section V.6 and V.7). Among landowners, those holding less than 
2.5 acres are the first category to contract temporary land use arrangements (34.6% 
of landowners cultivating land they do not own) in the Delta. 
Sharecropping is practiced by 36 landless households in the Delta among whom 
14 live in Tet Tet Ku and 18 live in Magu. Regarding Tet Tet Ku, such arrangements 
are done mostly with an absentee landlord owning 118 acres in Tet Tet Ku kwin 
(while the total acres cultivated under sharecropping in the village amount to only 
163 acres). In Magu, these arrangements are done mostly through summer paddy 
cultivation for households having no means to invest in the cultivation of all their 
land. As confirmed in Table 16, these land arrangements are a way for ‘younger’ 
households (with the age of the household head less than 50) to access lands. 
When household heads reach over 50 years of age, contracting in lands drastically 
drops. It is to be linked with the increased access to lands with the maturity of the 
household: we have already seen previously that many households access lands 
(through inheritance or for other reasons) when they are in their 40s/50s.
Contracting in lands in the Dry zone: a strategy for small landowners to 
expand their farms
A feature common to both the Delta and the Dry Zone is that rent arrangements 
(whether free or paid) are preferably practiced among inhabitants of the same 
village. In the Dry Zone, in contrast with the Delta, a majority of households 
cultivating land they do not own are landowners (70.4%) rather than landless 
households. Among the former, small landowners (less than 2.5 acres) are again 
the main category (34.2%) engaged in temporary land use arrangements (see 
Table 17). 
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Table 15: Share of Delta households (landless or landowner) cultivating land 
they do not own 
Yes No Total
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Landown-
ers
26 26.5 190 43.9 216 40.7
Landless 72 73.5 243 56.1 315 59.3
Total 98 100.0 433 100.0 531 100.0
Chi-Square=9.29  dof=1  p=0.002  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.132
Table 16: Distribution of Delta households cultivating land they do not own by 
household head age category
Age of 
household
 
Contracting in lands 
for cultivation
NO Contract in lands 
for cultivation
Total
Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R
Less than 30 22 22.4 33.8 43 9.9 66.2 65 12.2 100.0
30 to<40 34 34.7 24.3 106 24.5 75.7 140 26.4 100.0
 40 to <50 31 31.6 21.8 111 25.6 78.2 142 26.7 100.0
50 to <60 8 8.2 8.2 89 20.6 91.8 97 18.3 100.0
60 and above 3 3.1 3.4 84 19.4 96.6 87 16.4 100.0
Total 98 100.0 18.5 433 100.0 81.5 531 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=34.2  dof=4  p=0.001  (very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.254
Table 17: Share of Dry Zone households (landless or landowner) cultivating land 
they do not own
Yes No Total
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Landown-
ers
38 70.4 315 57.9 353 59.0
Landless 16 29.6 229 42.1 245 41.0
Total 54 100.0 544 100.0 598 100.0
Chi-Square=2.68  dof=1  p=0.097  (very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.067
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As seen above, sharecropping is not widely practiced in the surveyed villages 
with only five arrangements in Zee Phyu Pin and two others in Gaw Gyi. In direct 
contrast with what has been observed in the Delta, it seems that in the Dry Zone 
those households engaged in sharecropping are often relatives. Sharecropping 
is practiced between parents and their relatives, either for children to work some 
land before they get married and receive their share of land through inheritance 
or to supplement land for newly created households. In the former case, children 
generally contribute one third of the crop produced to their parents. Among more 
distant relatives, the practice of ‘tawak-sa”’ is common: the landowner contributes 
the land and the sharecropper contributes the labor while all other farm inputs are 
shared equally, as is the harvest yield. In Khoe Than for example (20 households 
renting-in land among a total of 37) the rent fee is estimated at 400,000 MMK per 
acre for growing early monsoon crops. In that case, the landowner has to bear the 
responsibility to plow the land. In case the landowner did not plow the land, rent is 
decreased to 300,000 MMK. 
Key findings of household strategies for contracting in lands 
The prevalent strategy in the Delta for contracting in is primarily to access 
farmland, while in Dry Zone, it is to increase farm size. Although it is difficult 
to draw overall conclusions on land arrangement trends as each village has its 
own specificities in this regard, it still appears that in both the Dry Zone and the 
Delta villages that where land productivity is the highest, such arrangements 
are less frequent. In addition, in the Dry Zone, temporary land arrangements 
are more frequent in villages where landlessness rates are low and where 
average landholding sizes are the smallest. This clearly indicates the important 
role of temporary arrangements for accessing farmland areas large enough 
to be economically viable, especially during the transition period for young 
adults of working age who still lack capacity either to buy or receive a plot 
through inheritance.
According to qualitative surveys in the Delta, about 10% of landless households 
in Aye Ywar and Pay Chaung (despite being much different ecologically) managed to 
obtain derived land use rights (whether through mortgage or rent/sharecropping) 
upon which they later managed to secure permanent access to land. 
 4.3 Making numbers meaningful: how discrepancies between in and out  
     temporary arrangements shed light on an unsecure land tenure framework
In both areas where the main social and administrative unit is the village, 
the first striking result is the extraordinarily low rate of landowners temporarily 
contracting out land to others, compared to the number of households working 
land they do not own through such arrangements. As shown in Table 18 and 
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Table 19, only 70 owners declared that they contracted land to others against 156 
households declaring that they accessing land through temporary arrangements.
Table 18: Numerical gaps between households contracting in and  
contracting out lands 
Contract in Contract out
Nb HH % over total HH Nb HH % over total HH
Delta 98 18.5% 22 4.1%
Dry Zone 54 9.0% 50 8.4%
Total 152 13.5% 72 6.4%
Table 19: Number of households engaged in different types of temporary land 
arrangements (in and out) in Delta and Dry Zone 
Mortgage Sharecropping Rent Total
In Out In Out In Out In Out
Delta 14 3 51 17 36 2 98 22
Dry 
Zone
11 7 7 5 37 38 54 50
Total 25 10 58 22 73 40 152 72
In the Delta, 4.1% of households rent out, while 18.5% rent in. In the Dry Zone, 
9% rent in while 8.4% rent out.  Higher number of renting out in Dry Zone is due 
to Chinese investors (who are not part of the surveyed households). If we take 
into account this particular point, there are similar discrepancies in the Dry Zone 
and the Delta – the number of contracting out households are much less than 
contracting in households. Scrutinizing in and out temporary arrangements at 
the village level confirms this (i.e. the villages reporting high number of rent-out 
contracts are not those reporting higher rates of renting in land). The first plausible 
explanation that arises is that one landowner may contract out lands to more than 
one household. Yet, the figures on surface areas subject to contracting out and 
contracting in also reflect the same discrepancies. The second possible explanation 
is that contracting out landowners do not live in the surveyed villages (and thus 
have not been surveyed). These could concern absentee landowners. This is indeed 
the case in Tet Tet Ku village where 118 acres of land are owned by an absentee 
landowner living in Mawlamyinegyun. Yet, the other studied villages do not 
have absentee landowners. It could also be ‘normal’ households cultivating land 
owned by individuals from other non-surveyed villages. However, the contrary 
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should be true as well, hence generally balancing the rate of in and out temporary 
arrangements. Finally, these discrepancies are too consistent through villages and 
the two zones to be solely attributed to possible survey biases. 
One hypothesis therefore proposed is that landowners tend to underreport 
land actually worked by others through temporary arrangements. This hypothesis 
relies on the fact that they might not have considered land arrangements with their 
children – prior to inheritance – as contracting out while their children may report 
the lands as contracted in. A second hypothesis concerns the insecure framework 
under which these arrangements have been contracted. On the one hand, until 
the Farmland Law 2012, such arrangements were illegal – despite being widely 
practiced. On the other, such temporary arrangements became a site of conflict 
during the land registration process73. In fact, landowners interviewed for this study 
in the middle of the titling process may have logically only reported arrangements 
they felt ‘secure’ about, notably those done with contracts or done with ‘reliable’ 
individuals. This is the case for example about Dry Zone landowners renting their 
lands to Chinese investors, which is done with contracts signed with the village 
tract administrator most of the time. The smaller gap in out arrangements in Dry 
Zone would also confirm this hypothesis given that villages in this region have 
been longer settled and are more stable than in Delta, hence providing a locally 
more secure tenure framework. 
 4.4 Quantitative analysis on contracting out
Bearing in mind that landowners tended to underreport temporary 
arrangements to have their land (or part of it) cultivated by others, characteristics 
of such arrangements may remain valid. 
Table 20: Summary data on contract out households for Delta and Dry Zone
Households that contract out lands
Nb HH % over Landowning 
HH
Average acreage
Delta 22 10.2% 6.31
Dry Zone 50 14.2% 3.44
As seen above, households accessing land through temporary arrangements 
are mostly ‘younger’ households (whether they are landless or already holding 
some land) working rented land while waiting for the opportunity to access more 
73.  Some tenants claimed ownership on land they had worked since a long time or reversely former owner attempted 
to reclaim land lost through such arrangements, principally mortgage (see Chapter V.4). 
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stable land arrangements. For landowners contracting land to others, it is the 
contrary, as shown in Annex 2, Table 1: households whose head is aged more than 
60 are the most frequent (18.2%) to practice such arrangements.
Given the fact that women headed households are overrepresented in the age 
classes over 50 years old, the fact of contracting land out is logically linked to the 
fact of being a female headed household (see Annex 2, Table 2). The frequency 
of contracting out lands is double for female household heads, compared to male 
household heads across all age groups. This is also consistent with the fact that 
such households generally lack the workforce to cultivate land by themselves. 
More information on this issue is to be found in Chapter VII.2.5). There is also a 
link between landholding size and the share of land cultivated by the household 
itself. The more land people have, the less they cultivate themselves, as a general 
tendency (see Annex 2, Table 3). 
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VI. The new land framework: impact, issues and land disputes
 VI.   The new land framework: impact,  
         issues and land disputes
A new Farmland Law came into force on 31st August 2012 under the 
administration of President Thein Sein, shortly followed by a ‘Vacant, Fallow and 
Virgin lands management law’. Both were designed with a view to developing 
business opportunities and the country’s economy through the improved 
utilization of these lands. These two laws represent the most substantial change to 
the legal framework for land since the early 1960s. 
The key principles are the following: 1) the state remains the ultimate owner of 
all land and the government can nationalize lands if it deems it necessary. Farmers 
have land tenure rights for cultivation granted by Land Use Certificates (LUC), but 
only in accordance with the government’s prescriptions; 2) the concept of private 
ownership – of land use rights – is officially reintroduced: land use rights can now 
be sold, mortgaged, and inherited; 3) a Central Farmland Management Body is in 
charge of ensuring compliance with the new regulations and can transfer or revoke 
the right to work farmland, and provide land evaluation for various purposes. 
The research fieldwork was executed during the land registration process and 
as such the team was able to witness the speediness of its implementation in the 
field and the dynamics it created. The study team had the opportunity to observe 
single SLRD officers undertaking the huge task of registering lands within a whole 
village tract, with a very tight time frame and much political pressure to achieve 
their targets.  The 2012 Farmland Law is an important step toward a redefinition 
of agrarian policies. It aims at delivering transferable land use certificates (LUC) 
to introduce and secure private property through a state-based system of 
holding records. The government body in charge of this process, the Farmland 
Administration Bodies (FAB), largely relies on local actors in order to implement 
the reform. 
In terms of how this process was executed, farmers had to wait for the SLRD 
agent to come to their villages to collect the ticket claim of 500 MMK for each holding 
(however, as for the payment required to actually get the LUC, many discrepancies 
have been noted, see next point). Once this is done, the SLRD sends several forms 
(105, 107) filled with farmer land claims and village headman ratifications to the FAB 
in Nay Pyi Taw. This administrative process is done under close SLRD scrutiny for the 
areas mapped and updated. There are much more difficulties when an update is 
necessary and harmonization between current use and state categories (e.g. when 
forestlands are cultivated). Village Tract Farmland Management Committees were 
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created at the village level in order to regulate the land titling process, i.e. clarifying 
claims and resolving conflicts (on this point, see below).
1.  The hasty land registration process
The delivery of land use certificates has been done extremely quickly, relying on 
the existing SLRD records without conducting updated surveys of plot boundaries. 
Indeed, the verification process for land titling is based on the (i) cadastral map, (ii) 
receipt of the land revenue collection, and (iii) the list of the farmers’ owner book 
called Document 2.
 1.1 Disparities in LUC delivery rates
The quantitative survey was conducted from August to early November 2014. 
The data indicates that while in the Dry Zone almost 80% of landowners got a Land 
Use Certificate (LUC, also called Form 7), only 71% received it in the Delta. This 
difference is due to the fact that there are more lands cultivated under forestland 
status (which are not eligible for an LUC) in the Delta (464.8 acres for 34 households) 
than in the Dry Zone (46.2 acres for 10 households). 
Regarding the households owning farmlands officially registered as such, 
the LUC delivery rate is thus 96.4% in the Delta (with variations between villages 
from 91 to 100% of villagers attaining LUC). The higher overall LUC delivery rate 
in the Delta, compared to the Dry Zone, reveals stronger state intervention in the 
Delta and greater coverage by the SLRD (which is linked, as has been mentioned 
throughout the report, to the important focus that was given to paddy in various 
policies – from the procurement quotas to the MADB agri loans…). 
The LUC delivery rates (to farmland owners) have been much lower in some 
villages of the Dry Zone (22% in Hledar and 77.6% in Gaw Gyi). The main problem 
(which occurred in both villages) was the loss of the cadastral maps, mainly due to 
improper handover of documents from SRLD out-going staff to new ones. Without 
the maps, the township SLRD office could not verify the existence of the farmers’ 
holdings (u’ paing) on the ground. After several months of repeated requests from 
the farmers, the SLRD finally came to the village and attempted to survey all the 
farm boundaries. However, the task was not completed and the SLRD staff have not 
returned since. The same thing is true for Gaw Gyi village. 
Excluding these problematic villages, the quasi totality of farmland owners 
(97.4%) declared to have received the LUC in the Dry Zone. For both Dry Zone 
and Delta villagers, and excluding these two problematic village cases, 96.8% of 
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farmland owners confirm having received an LUC, leaving a mysterious 3.2% of 
farmland owners affirming they have not received an LUC, which most probably 
reveals potential exclusion and lack of social capital or underlying disputes. This 
is confirmed by the fact that the large majority of these cases concern very small 
landowners (less than 3 acres), none of whom provided answers to the survey 
questionnaire concerning their opinion on the land registration. Furthermore, 
we must also take into account survey bias which is particularly strong on issues 
concerning land disputes: some households might have confirmed having received 
the LUC even though they did not actually receive it, so as to conceal dispute claims.
 1.2 Top down process and exclusion of the smallest farming households
By all means, the land registration was implemented quite hastily and in a 
very top down manner, as the quantitative survey figures demonstrate: among 
the households which have received an LUC, only one third confirmed to have 
themselves applied to land registration, less than half (42.5%) said that a public 
list (Form 2) was posted in the village, and only 37.6% were aware of who were 
members of their Village Tract Farmland Management Committee. There was little 
or no farmer participation in most cases. In some Dry Zone villages, newly issued 
LUC had already arrived since the first week of the program in the village head’s 
house but no farmer came to collect his/her title.
One issue remaining, as always in Myanmar, is the two-tier administrative 
process in which those who are able to pay actually had their plot measured and 
received their LUC before those who did not pay. We already noted that the let 
allocation process is not known and ‘represented’ by different households in the 
same way, according to the farmland holdings they own. It also varies according 
to the area of land they own. Amongst landowners, smallholders more frequently 
declared that they don’t know if the land registration process had started or 
not, while large ones more frequently declared it had started. Amongst the 153 
landowners who voluntarily applied for registration, large holders more frequently 
applied than the smaller ones. This is explained by their stronger interest in formal 
registration, their financial capacities, and also to their closer relationships with 
authorities, including the local Land Management Committee members (see 
Chapter VIII.3).
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The local SRLD version
There are 10 standardized Forms by which farmers could start applying to the 
SLRD until Form 7 is granted. Form 1, available from the village tract (VT) office, 
is completed and submitted through the Village Tract Farmland Management 
Committee (VTFMC) to the township SLRD. The township SLRD staff lists the applicants 
in Form 2 and post the list at the village General Administration Department office, 
calling for potential counter-claims within 30 days from any who object to any of the 
applicants. After those 30 days, the SLRD township staff scrutinize the eligibility of 
the applicants for the land title registration with respect to the set criteria included in 
section 6 of the Farmland Law. After verifying the validity of the applicant information 
in Form 3 through 6, the case is submitted to the District Farmland Management 
Committee and is finally approved. Township Committee then issues the Form 7 to 
respective farmers. The whole process theoretically takes 65 days from application to 
the issuance of certificate.
The village head’s version 
In one of the villages under study (Delta), the land registration process was first 
described by the headman as follows: After organizing the VTFMC, the village tract 
leader, with the help of village headmen (‘100 household leaders’), called all the farmers in 
the village to come to register their farmland holdings with their annual land tax receipts 
(see box below). These papers mention the name of the owner, the holding number, the plot 
number, and the area of the used land in acres. After collecting these data, the SLRD officer 
came to the village to measure the concerned land plot areas. He documented the land 
profile by drawing a map and asking the farmers working on adjacent plots to witness and 
provide their approval. After finishing the measuring process, the VTFMC disclosed a list of 
landholdings and their respective holders in the village. The list was publicly displayed on 
a board in the village public space so that anyone could object to a land use holder or to 
a holding’s area. Any objection of the displayed land titles could be raised within 30 days.”
The villagers’ version 
In the same village, another version of the process was given by farmers. First, 
farmers complained about the money they had to pay to SLRD staff – 1,500 to 5,000 
MMK per acre depending on their ‘proximity’ with the latter. If failing to pay, their turn 
was postponed and measuring was not done carefully. The larger the u’ paing area, the 
more money one had to pay. In the SLRD officers’ defense, the daily 1,500 MMK travel 
allowance they receive is barely enough to cover the travel expenses from one village 
to another, pay the extra food charges, and compensate them for the hard work 
they undertook. Hence, these expenses had to be shouldered by the villages. And 
depending on who would pay for these expenses (the village head alone or all the 
villagers contributing a little), delivery rates between villagers may differ as Burmese 
culture invites guests to honor their hosts and vice versa…
BOX 10: DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCESS AMONG 
STAKEHOLDERS 
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 1.3 Errors in LUCs and objections 
The quality of the titles received – in terms of consistency between actual 
landholders and those receiving the titles, and in terms of registered surface area 
– remains an issue. Indeed, giving the very tight time frame imparted to perform 
this vast operation (and under much 
pressure from the central level), SLRD 
officers did not have time to survey 
and re-measure all field plots, nor 
to check all kwin boundaries, nor to 
take note of all changing conditions. 
In many cases, they used old maps 
which were surveyed and drawn in 
the colonial times (around 1889, 1890) 
and updated in the 1960s. They copied 
the individual u’ paing plots from these 
old maps and put that information in 
the Form 105 (defining the u’ paing on 
the cadastral map).  SLRD staff in most 
places actually worked relentlessly to 
reach their targets and the shortcuts 
described in the process were taken 
only so they could try to attain 
Figure 23: Land use certificate (LUC), commonly called ‘Form 7’
Figure 22: Form 105 (attached to Form 7)
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the target. Many errors in designating the holder’s name and field plots’ area and 
shape have to be expected. Though the mission achieved its political objective, it 
remains incomplete at the technical level, and a series of follow up adjustments and 
corrections would be much needed. Among other cases, in Zhi Phyu Pin village of 
Yinmabin township, SLRD issued the Form 7 to two different farmers for the same 
farm plot of u’ paing. In some cases, Form 7 was granted to the wrong person.
In similar rates in both Delta and Dry Zone, an average 7% of farmland owning 
households (excluding cultivated forestland ‘owners’) have contested some points 
of the LUC. Land objections are twice more frequent in households which have 
not received the LUCs. The qualitative survey indicates through many case studies 
that there are actually more cases of contestation, but the fact that they were not 
identified as such is due again to the survey bias, which is particularly strong on 
issues concerning land disputes. It is too early, and the question remains sensitive, 
to be able to say how much the discrepancies between LUCs and actual holdings 
are affecting the regions under study. However, farmers have already complained 
that through the LUC process they lost in some cases more than three acres. 
Inequities emerging within the land titling process were also recorded in other 
non-surveyed areas of the Delta, with farmers complaining of losing up to 70% of 
the landholdings in some cases through the process. Hence, overlooking the titling 
process – which is easily done given the pace of land reform insisted upon by the 
current government, and notably the great attention paid to the National Land Use 
Policy – may prove to undermine the whole reform process and may represent a 
potential source of conflict if nothing is done to redress the discrepancies. 
 1.4 The land registration process on the ground
From one village to the next, descriptions of the land registration process 
differ greatly. From interviews and observations, modalities of the land registration 
process – whether villagers had to pay the SLRD or not, whether plots were 
actually measured or not, the time the process took – seemed to depend much 
upon the commitment of the SLRD staff in charge, his relationship with the village 
administrator and other influential individuals, as well as the degree of interest 
vested by the state in the village – i.e. pretty low in remote villages of the Dry Zone 
such as Hledar where the cadastral map has been lost, and pretty high in Delta 
villages producing double season paddy. Disparities were also observed in the 
same village (see Box 11) depending on whether the owner could afford paying 
several thousands of MMK to the SLRD in order to have his plot properly measured.
In the prescribed process, SLRD with the Village Tract Farmland Management 
Committee (VTFMC) members shall verify the land claim by consulting the 
neighboring farm plot users. However, in many villages (especially in the Dry 
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The tax receipt, like the farmer booklet (see Chapter V.1.2) dates back to colonial times. 
While it once contained a great amount of information, nowadays tax receipts in their 
simplest form contain: the kwin’’ number (basic territorial division); the u’ paing number 
(holding); the kind of land; its size; the tax amount; the ‘name of the person cultivating 
the land’; its village and village tract location. Hence, along with settlement surveys, 
cadastral mapping, and issuance of tax receipts mainly aimed at affirming the state’s 
territorial control and categorizing agricultural land in two dimensions – quality and size 
– for its benefit. To do so, the Revenue and Survey Department (later renamed the Survey 
and Land Record Department – SLRD) frames the territory in order to make it legible and 
assessable. In most cases, the tax receipt is nowadays perceived as somewhat useless 
by farmers, as the tax amount was fixed decades ago and given inflation does not 
constitute anything but a nominal sum. The document – which links farmers and SLRD – 
became a simple follow-up register. The production of this document was monopolized 
by the SLRD as a database to match holdings with individual names where kwin’’ and 
u’ paing were settled. However, tax receipts found some special significance during the 
2012 land titling process, and have been often used by farmers to prove their seniority 
as users of landholdings (u’ paing) in case of a dispute between two (or more) potential 
landholders. However, in the absence of other types of documents, many having been 
lost in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis, the legitimacy of such papers is questionable, 
especially when many interviews indicate the possibility to bribe an SLRD agent to issue 
new ‘fake old’ tax receipts. 
BOX 11: TAX RECEIPTS: THE ULTIMATE “PROOF” OF LAND USE?
Zone), the SLRD and VTFMC members relied on the village administrator alone 
and avoided going to the field. Further, even if the village administrator himself 
cared to go to the fields, he alone could not have the knowledge about who owns 
land use rights on which parcel of which land. In the old days, village elders or 
chief always accompanied the SLRD surveyor in the field examination for revenue 
assessment and they knew pretty well the owner of each parcel. But given that 
there has been no field examination for revenue assessment for several years, a 
visit at this particular moment by the village administrator would not have allowed 
him to garner with any assurance the true facts on the ground. 
As we have seen, long before 2012 there had been transfers of farm plots 
among farmers in most villages. In many instances, farmers did not approach the 
SLRD surveyor in order to change the name on registers, so as to avoid extra cost. In 
other cases, the SLRD surveyor may have not changed the name of the titleholder, 
even though he would be aware of the transfer and names of the parties involved. 
Hence, at the time of land registration in 2012, Form 7 was granted to the former 
owner. The new one then had to rush to the SLRD officer and give extra payment to 
change the name of the title holder. 
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 1.5 Gender and land registration
Being a woman or a man headed household doesn’t impact on Form 7 allocation, 
indicating that land registration has been done systematically and with no visible 
gender discrimination of household heads.  For the LUC, lands are systematically 
registered under the husband’s name for couple-headed households. Even though 
the LUC designates an individual holder, the land use rights are clearly perceived 
as held collectively by the household (particularly both spouses). For example, 
the qualitative survey has not identified any cases of husband’s selling off land 
without the wife’s consent. However, the fact that the final LUC (Form 7) is only 
in the name of the husband may raise problems upon a couple’s separation or 
divorce. Although each case may be quite different, depending on the context, the 
reasons of separation, and the social pressure imposed by relatives and villagers, 
women are undeniably more at risk of losing access to lands than men in divorce/
separation cases. As mentioned in Chapter V.2, inheritance of land from parents 
to children in Burmese society in the surveyed low land areas is not problematic 
with regard to gender. There can be more discreet forms of discrimination, which 
nevertheless remain marginal (see Chapter V.2.3).This may be exacerbated in 
critical times such as the recent land registration period, as seen in Chapter V.2.3. 
At least one conflict was recorded with a young widow regarding the titling of land 
her household received at her marriage from the husband’s parents; as the husband 
died, his parents are contesting the land registration that was done in the name of 
their widowed daughter-in-law. Before delivery of Form 7, all the family member 
names and their respective relations to the household head are recorded officially. 
Indeed, all names of each farm household family members are recorded in Form 
No. 1, the first form submitted to SLRD to obtain the LUC. Besides, all documents 
of Form 7 issued to the farmers are recorded and summarized in Form No. 5 which 
takes record of all names of the family member for each Form 7 issued. 
It has to be underlined here that the MADB’s credit scheme that provides loans 
for a maximum 10 acres (see Chapter VIII.2.2) has an unintentional consequence 
on gender and registration. This is because when farmers own land use rights on 
more than 10 acres, those would often register 10 acres in their own name and the 
remaining amount in their wife’s name at the moment of the registration, so as to 
access loans for more than 10 acres which is the official threshold. More information 
on gender and land can be found in Chapter VII.2.5. 
2.  Land Use Certificates: new opportunities or more problems to come?
 2.1 New opportunities, for whom?
LUCs as collateral
A positive point of LUCs, as perceived by farmers, is that they allow farmers to 
be able to mortgage land, instead of using the more traditional pawning system 
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(le pyan ngwe pyan), where the full land use right is given to the money-lender for 
a determined period, leaving the farmer with a debt and less (or no) land to work. 
With LUCs, farmers can borrow money, using land as a collateral, and at the same 
time continue working and enjoying the fructus of the mortgaged land.  
But, in reality, the conditions of the land use disposal rights will not legally allow 
farmers to capitalize on this new ‘right’. Indeed, the law stipulates that mortgages 
can only be done with government banks or authorized banks. Yet, existing formal 
credit providers – even the government banks (MABD, MFIs…) in those areas do 
not use land as collateral and farmers have no access to such banks. But this may 
be a rising practice of money-lenders. Mortgage foreclosures in these cases may be 
concealed and formalized in the form of land sales. 
Formalization of land use rights transfers
Each farmland management level (from village tract, township, district, regional 
up to Union), can be involved in the scrutinizing process concerning the change of 
name of the u’ paing’s holder that results from transfers such as inheritance, sale, 
mortgage closure, gift, etc. The time and costs required to formalize land transfers 
and land use changes, as per the procedures defined by the Farmland Law, exceed 
the means of smallholder farmers. They only seem fit for larger farms and bigger 
transactions where administrative economies of scale are found to pursue the legal 
process.
“Administering land and its uses mainly falls under the purview of three ministries 
— Ministry of Home Affairs/GAD, MoAI/SLRD, and MoECAF/ Forest Department (FD). 
These administrators are also responsible for protecting the land under their jurisdiction 
from encroachment and squatting and ensuring adherence to prescribed land use. Any 
transfer of tenancy rights (all farmers being tenants) and any request for change in land 
use must be initiated at the village tract or ward level and must go through successive tiers 
in the structure to be eventually endorsed/approved at the state level, after going through 
factual verification by the SLRD branch at the township and district levels. The township-
level GAD branch is responsible for processing such applications. Thus, land-rights transfer 
or land-use change is a lengthy process, requiring considerable time and frequent visits to 
various offices.”
Source: Shivakumar Srinivas and U Saw Hlaing, 2015: 8
BOX 12: MINISTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR LAND ADMINISTRATION 
VI. The new land framework: impact, issues and land disputes
136 
What should be the proper community-level decision making processes in land 
use planning and land administration? What are the strengths and weaknesses 
of communities in dealing with such land issues that also can support state level 
mandates? Addressing these questions could help identify the ways and means for 
community capacity building in land use management. 
As a whole, the lack of institutional representation and the very limited 
capacity of the farmland management body at the village tract level (all requests 
have to go through the township, district, and region/state level) represent a 
serious limitation to the new law’s implementation. Though farmers now have the 
possibility to legally register land transfers, some transfers might very well remain 
informal (as in the times where land transfers were illegal) if the administrative 
processes remain as complex as they currently are. If this is the case, land records 
will be outdated within a few years. Legal restrictions may become an instrument 
for locally powerful individuals. In practical terms, farmers engage with the Village 
Tract Farmland Management Committee, and its Village Administrator as the 
Chairman, with all issues concerning land use disposal rights. The village chief may 
abuse of his powers at the expense of farmers, particularly the most vulnerable 
ones. The farmland administration processes would need to be simplified so as 
to become both accessible and affordable for smallholders, to strengthen the 
land tenure security of smallholder farmers, and avoid creating legal gaps that 
authorities may take advantage of for corrupt practices.
 2.2 The continued issue of restrictions over land use rights
Before the land reform of 2012, the Tenancy Act (1963) already vested the 
state with the mandate to prescribe which types of crops should be grown on 
agricultural lands, and in case of breaches to such conditions, gave the state the 
freedom to confiscate the land from farmers. Unfortunately, the 2012 Farmland Law 
did not resolve this issue of restrictions concerning land use rights. As observed 
in Figure 23, many of the conditions mentioned in Form 7 are inadequate and 
will probably create power imbalances and corruption from village leaders and 
village tract authorities towards ‘non-compliant’ farmers. They will also generate 
land insecurity. In addition, some of the conditions are inapplicable in terms of 
transactions costs (e.g. high costs to submit crop change requests up to the Union 
level), further increasing opportunities for corrupt practices.
The new Farmland Law, section 12, specifies that the permission for change 
from seasonal crops to perennial crops needs to be requested up to the Union 
level, through the township, district, region/state levels for Scrutinizing by the 
different land management committees. The present Farmland Law clearly restricts 
the farmer for the disposal right in his/her farmlands. For failure to comply with 
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conditions as prescribed in Section 12 and repeated failure to follow Section 19 
of the Farmland Law as directed by the farmland management committee, the 
convicted farmers could be punished with fines and imprisonment from six months 
minimum to two years maximum (Section 35). 
The former restrictions on land use rights actually remain, highlighting the 
contradiction between the progressive opening of the land tenure framework, and 
the broadening of land use rights, and the government’s enduring focus on paddy 
– the staple crop constituting Myanmar’s national identity – and its tendency to 
control land use for paddy production. 
This is a serious constraint, undermining farmers’ capacity to make decisions 
and to choose the most suitable crops according to the economical context 
(market prices, household’s cash flow), environmental conditions (weather, access 
to irrigation), and household situation (availability of labor). This is particularly 
important for the Dry Zone (where agricultural production options are wider) but 
is relevant for everywhere in Myanmar. While land prices tend to increase, prices 
of most Dry Zone key seasonal crops (except from high value cash crops such as 
onions, whose price nonetheless is highly variable) have been falling year after year. 
Assuming that a farming household wants to grow thanakha (Limonia acidissima) 
trees in a plot which initially produced sorghum, peas, or sesame, it has to apply 
for permission following the protocol stated above. It is interesting to observe 
that there is a perceived sense of land tenure insecurity about this issue. Indeed, 
in the quantitative survey, very few farmers have declared growing thanaka crops 
while the field observation and the qualitative survey clearly indicates that it is a 
very common crop in the Dry Zone. No farmers are applying for such permission 
for ‘growing perennial crops’. Particularly with recurrent droughts there are clear 
advantages of thanaka in terms of resilience, income generation, limited labor, and 
water and input requirements; an increasing number of farmers are growing these 
trees. In this regard and beyond the example of thanaka, it is urgent that farmers be 
given full disposal rights on the choice of crops. They are the most suited to make 
the best decisions to enhance their livelihoods and land productivity. 
Another issue is how contracts with foreigners are structured. In the current 
context of massive Chinese investments particularly in watermelon production in 
the Dry Zone, the impossibility for farmers to change to perennial crops pushes 
them to contract their lands for attractive rents when they face decreasing crop 
prices, but under highly restrictive conditions dictated by the Chinese investors 
(see rents in V.4.). This is also an issue that may generate land tenure insecurity and 
abuse of powers (see below).  
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 2.3 What improvements brought by the LUCs?
Discussions about the virtues and downsides of formalizing land rights have 
taken place since the 1990s, with a great variety of views on the question. In the 
case of Myanmar, the strong political drive for private landownership and the 
systematic land titling of farmlands (eight million LUCs titles delivered) throughout 
the country in a very short time frame can be explained by the government’s will 
to show to the international community some concrete outcomes of the country’s 
opening and modernization process.
Figure 24: Translation of contents of Form 7 (LUC) and conditions of land use rights
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The first question may then be: are LUCs improving land tenure security in the 
case of potential land grabbing? As related previously in this report, farmers in 
Burmese lowlands were not totally lacking papers formalizing their rights. Among 
the two main documents normally held by the farmers were the farmer booklet, 
and the Form 105, which is still attached to the LUC and sets the plot’s boundaries, 
plot number, kwin, type of land use, and the holder’s name. We also saw that in 
absence of one or the other, tax receipts could be used to legitimate a right of a user 
to a defined plot. Yet despite having these documents, farmers have always been 
under threat of arbitrary land confiscations by the state throughout the previous 
regimes – whether it was in the name of national projects of public interest or more 
often for the interests of the powerful elites (for pure speculation or business). In 
that sense, LUCs do not seem to provide more security than the already existing 
documents. The source of land insecurity was not the lack of documents but rather 
the absence of rule of law to pre-empt or address potential abuses of power.  
In addition, though land titling may aim to strengthen land security, it actually 
generates vulnerabilities for those who do not get access to land titles. It is what 
Hirsch defines as a central conundrum (Hirsch, 2011:15): 
“(While) most farmers and other landholders are pleased to obtain formal title over 
plots of land that they hold individually under more weakly demarcated and state 
recognized arrangements, the process of land titling in some areas can weaken 
security in others and can entrench, sharpen and exacerbate existing inequalities 
in access to land.”
The issuance of land titles may be of more interest in upland areas where 
many agricultural lands are not registered as such. The problem remains that in 
many upland areas land tenure follows customary principles, not recognized by 
the 2012 land law74 (Ewers Anderson 2015, GRET, forthcoming). Moreover, shifting 
cultivation, while  still practiced in many parts of the country, is not recognized by 
the government. Finally, LUCs are not designed to be applied collectively, while 
in upland areas it is frequent to find communal lands or collective management 
of land use, such as in Chin, for example. There is however one context where 
the deliverance of LUCs could improve farmers’ land tenure security: for the 
agricultural lands which are still classified as forestlands. We indeed saw that some 
farmers in Delta (Pay Chaung and part of Tet Tet Ku village) were farming on land 
still under the jurisdiction of the Forest Department. As such, their land tenure is 
insecure as the Department could reclaim such lands, notably under the provision 
74. The National Land Use Policy approved early 2016 finally takes into account the concept of ‘customary tenure’ and 
mentions its recognition. However, much is still needed to put in place in order to protect customary land tenure in 
upland areas from a legal point of view.
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of the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Management Law – yet this did not happen in the 
villages under study. Following the registration process, a presidential instruction 
for the reclassification of lands was enacted. Part of forestland cultivated in Delta 
was degazetted into farmlands and acknowledged as arable land by the Central 
Farmland Management Body. Following this decision, SLRD staffs came to measure 
farmers’ plots in Tet Tet Ku and Pay Chaung, although at the time of writing this 
report, farmers did not receive yet LUCs. It seems the degazetting process of 
cultivated forestlands to farmlands has suffered some institutional complications 
and remained stuck. 
Then, what do the new land law and LUCs provide, compared to the previous 
framework? We have observed that restrictions on land use rights are still in 
force, and that the possibility to access credit by using the LUC as collateral is too 
restricted to benefit small landholders. 
The main addition brought by the new land framework is to finally acknowledge 
long-existing practices of land transactions, since farmers can now legally sell, 
rent, or pawn their land use rights. However, land transactions before 2012 were 
admittedly illegal yet formalized in many ways as we have seen: through contracts, 
involving witnesses, and even with the support of state representatives such as the 
village administrator and SLRD staff. Now that these transactions are legal, they 
still need to be formalized through procedures which – we saw – are lengthy and 
costly. These procedures are thus not applied, meaning that the same ‘black market’ 
practices apply and the whole land registration will be outdated within a few years.
As summarized in a document by the ‘Land Tenure and Development’ Technical 
Committee75 (2015: 33) on the formalization of land rights, “written titles can help 
secure tenure if: 
• the formalization procedure makes sense in relation to the reality of land rights, 
responds effectively to the problems encountered by different land users, and 
enables the State to recognize their legitimate rights or authenticate their 
agreements;
• the formalization procedure is accessible and effective, and is part of an 
institutional environment that is sufficiently interconnected and reliable to deal 
effectively with the plurality of norms and authorities; 
• land information is kept up to date, so that people benefit from using the legal 
mechanisms, and the institutions responsible for administering rights fulfil their 
responsibilities.”
75. Forum for multi-disciplinary debate and sharing among researchers, decision markets, civil society stakeholders 
and operators of the land sector, under the auspices of the French Cooperation. 
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Concerning Burmese lowland areas, LUCs match in some aspects the reality 
of tenure and land rights – especially through the legalization of land transactions 
– while it does not necessarily answer farmers’ problems – e.g. access to credit, 
freedom to choose the specific use of land. As for upland areas, the reality of land 
tenure practiced in these regions is for the most part out of reach of the current 
land framework (in regard, for instance, recognition of communal lands).
When it comes to the formalization of land transactions under the current 
framework, it is too early to show significant evidence deriving from the updating 
of LUCs. However, the points above all indicate that cadastral maps may soon be 
out of date, as is the case in Cambodia where the cost of procedures is deterring 
farmers from undertaking the process of changing names in land records (Diepart 
and Sem, 2015: 56).
Another important stance adopted by the Myanmar government is that, like 
Thailand and Cambodia before, it decided not to redistribute land before titling, 
thereby crystallizing existing inequalities between landholders and the landless, 
who are particularly numerous in Burmese lowlands (see Chapter VII.7). 
Finally, another rationale for formalizing land rights through written titles is 
that it should help reduce conflicts and resolve land disputes. The main issue is that 
land disputes are often the result of the plurality of norms regulating land transfers, 
especially a set of stacked laws76 creating “gaps in institutional frameworks that are 
unable (or unwilling) to accommodate this plurality” (‘Land Tenure and Development’ 
Technical Committee 2015:35). In that sense, the new land framework is one more 
law stacked on the others, and we should see in the following sections that the 
land registration process revived many conflicts, while the capacity of conflict 
resolution bodies seems very limited.
76. Siu Sue Mark, 2015. The concept of stacked laws was defined by Roquas (2002).
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3.  Land use disputes under the 2012 land reform
Myanmar’s successive regimes’ land policies have resulted in creating ‘stacked 
laws’, with multiple layers of laws existing simultaneously, creating conflicts and 
many legal contradictions. As such, conflicts can merely be the result of those 
pluralisms and contradictions, rather than an absence of rule. The context is made 
even more complex by decades of abusive power and intrusive agricultural and 
land policies. 
They have left significant scars and grievances and provide ground to new 
claims and collective contestations over past abuses of power and actions perceived 
as unjust and/or illegitimate (see section below 3.2). Finally, this is all aggravated 
by the fact that in the past decades, at the local level, land governance has been 
highly concentrated in the hands of government appointed village headmen, who 
were acting as political brokers77 between government and villagers (see VIII.3). 
In the absence of checks and balances, corruption practices have prevailed at the 
expense of the weakest. The section thus explores how the recent land registration 
process revived different conflicts and grudges, and presents some challenges 
faced in conflict resolution (see 3.3).
 3.1 The result of legal pluralism and stacked laws
There is a stabilized set of customary norms concerning property transfer 
inside the family and for extrafamilial arrangements. For instance, conflicts about 
inheritance (a-mwey) can express a number of tensions, including: the fact that 
every child may not be able to enjoy an equal share of parents’ property, how 
properties are classified, the actual state of family relationships, and children’s lives 
(for example concerning the degree of involvement in supporting parents and the 
associated share of inheritance for that labor). 
Conflicts regarding extrafamilial agreements often emerge from the plurality 
of norms and stacked laws. For instance, if one rents a piece of land for more than 
5 years following a customary form of land arrangement, he or she may be legally 
entitled to claim that land according to government rules (Act 64/1). In other 
words, the context of stacked laws can facilitate appropriation claims against 
fluid and practical local norms. Conflicts that have reached the jurisdiction of a 
village headman can express the strategic use of a diverse set of norms (local and 
governmental) in actual situations. 
In a village’s everyday life, a myriad of conflicts take place and they are voiced in 
different places – inside a house, at the ten households’ leader’s house, at yap-mi’-
77. Bierschenk et al., 2000.
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yap-pha’s, and at village headman’s house, and nowadays during a land committee 
meeting. Bigger cases can involve institutions outside the village like courts or the 
township chairman. Thus they enter more formal processes for conflict resolution.
Le pyan ngwe pyan (mortgage) used to be the main cause of land disputes at village 
level (i.e. outside of confiscation cases by the state or cronies). The land registration 
process (LUC) perceived as an opportunity to renegotiate land use rights, has 
revived such claims. A land dispute which has been occurring in a village of 
Monywa township (Dry Zone) during this study illustrates well the situation found 
in many parts of Myanmar lowlands (see Box 15).
 3.2 Land reforms and the creation of a new arena: the case of Tet Tet Ku plowing 
contestation
The political and land reform frameworks offered a space for new stakeholders 
in the land tenure arena. It provided the opportunity for farmers to collectively 
express their resentment over past abuses and draw attention to unresolved 
land issues. Indeed, on the ground, the farmers still find it difficult to write proper 
objections letters and to be informed on the objection procedure in order to get 
these objections validated. Besides, as reported by some farmers, ‘the VTLMC did 
not want to accept objection letters, they just wanted to finish the registration 
process quickly and successfully’. This is where the new stakeholders intervened. 
The enactment of the 2012 land law led to many political actions in the Delta 
involving local civil society organization and farmers, including protests for those who 
perceived the law would only benefit wealthier individuals. Many activists also gave 
speeches to farmers about the new 2012 Farmland Law. Several associations, such as 
the Myanmar Farmers Development Party (Taung Thu Lei Tha Mar Toe Tet Yay Party in 
Myanmar), Farmer Network Association (Taung Thu Lei Tha Mar Kun Yet in Myanmar), 
but also political parties such as local NLD branches in the Delta, for example, acted 
in order to stand with the ‘oppressed farmers’ and ‘speak for the farmers’ rights’. 
Through these actions, many former landholders (now generally landless) 
became more aware of the new land law and, above all, received support to claim 
their ‘right’ to land and perceived the opportunity to renegotiate the land use 
rights they had lost. Yet, as underlined earlier, the ‘rights’ to objecting to others’ 
land claims under the 2012 land law remain ill-defined. Among the contesting 
stakeholders were farmers who lost their land during the forced procurement 
period, whose lands were confiscated under the military government; those who 
had lands grabbed for government projects without any compensation; and finally 
also some who had lost their lands through land mortgages and le pyan ngwe pyan. 
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The case originated a decade ago. Eleven farmers from the village tract 
transferred at different times78 one plot of their lands to U WT living in D. K. B. village. 
The agreement was similar each time: le pyan nge pyan. 
The loan amount is usually about half of the land’s market price. In this case, the 
agreements were formalized with contracts signed by each party and the village tract 
headman. Loan amounts were rated according to the current land prices at transfer 
time. As land prices rose, the farmers wanted to get back their holding by repaying 
their debt to U WT. But the latter refused and claimed the lands as his own because 
he had been cultivating them for more than five years. Indeed, one of the agrarian 
reforms implemented during the military-socialist era was to ‘give back’ the land to the 
tiller (rather than the original clearer of the land). 
One of the rules enacted by the government in 1964 (Act 1/64) was that the 
person who cultivates a piece of land for five years consecutively for the benefit of an 
absentee landholder becomes the one who has the ‘authority to cultivate the land’ (lei 
ya-myei lok-paing-hkwin)79. U WT asked the SLRD agent to change the name of the u’ 
paing holdings in question but the latter did not accede to this request and U WT only 
received a new farmer booklet granting the temporary use right. The farmers then 
went to the village headman to complain about the situation but the latter did not 
accede to solve the case and referred it to the village tract headman who had signed 
the agreement. 
At the same time, rumours spread that contracts might have been falsified by U 
WT and signed by the village tract headman. The farmers could not rely on the village 
tract headman, accused of forgery, and who also refused to solve the case. 
Furthermore, the contracts had not been renewed since the first agreements. 
After these first complaints, U WT gave back plots to six out of eleven farmers – 
holdings of the poorest quality – and kept the five more productive plots. The five 
remaining farmers expected the successive headmen to handle the case but no one 
did until the new Farmland Law of 2012 was enacted. Indeed, one former headman, 
three terms of office ago, is directly involved in the case; the headman after him has 
an uncle involved in the case; the headman succeeding him did not last long; and 
the current headman has just been nominated. Two years ago, the five farmers called 
upon the township chairman but he, again, referred the case to the village tract 
headman arguing that the village tract headman was the one who knew the case 
well. In 2013, the implementation of the Farmland Law has opened an opportunity for 
the farmers to claim their land by applying for a LUC. Because five holdings are double 
claimed, the case entered a new process for its resolution. The SLRD who delivers the 
LUC asked the current headman and the newly created VTFMC to solve the case. But 
on the ground, it is the village tract headman who has to solve the conflict first.
78. The agreements took place along two cropping seasons. 
79. However, to our knowledge no mention is made in legal texts about the 5 years. 
BOX 13: LAND DISPUTE CASE STUDY WITH LE PYAN NGE PYAN ARRANGEMENTS 
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Plowing protests (Hton Tone Tike Pwe)
In May 2013, a movement of landless farmers emerged in Tet Tet Ku village 
(Mawlamyinegyun township). Those landless farmers, being led by the new 
stakeholders described above, forcedly plowed in the paddy fields which they had 
owned in the past, now held by a landlord living in the main town of the township. 
In early 2013, farmers heard about plowing protests happening in the other places 
in the Delta. As their interest rose, they went to seek the support of local farmers 
associations and political parties. The latter indeed encouraged them to conduct 
the plowing protests, and guaranteed their help in case problems occurred. With 
the help of these organizations, seven villagers, five men and two women, young 
and old, organized a plowing protest. They had lost their lands because of the 
forced paddy procurement policy and through mortgage (le pyan ngwe pyan). They 
first sent notice letters to the village tract headman and the township police station 
to inform them about the protest and to specify the date and location of the paddy 
fields they would plow. Informed about the issue, a descendant of the landlord 
came to the village to negotiate with the villagers. He proposed to give them half 
of the paddy lands that they had owned in the past, with a legal transfer in their 
name. All the villagers were urged to go to Mawlamyinegyun town to sign before 
a lawyer. The villagers did go to Mawlamyinegyun town after a few days, but came 
back to Tet Tet Ku as soon as they arrived in Mawlamyinegyun. They feared the 
landlord was trying to trick them. Hence, the farmers proceeded with their plan. 
On the seventh of June 2013, a group of villagers under the banner of 
the Myanmar Social Development Network used power tillers to start to plow 
the landlord’s fields – fields that were then being used by other tenant farmers 
under rent. A crowd of the villagers accompanied by many other villagers who 
were associated or familiar with the actors marched to the targeted paddy fields. 
The plowing contestation was video recorded and documented. The first day, 
the village tract headman came and warned the people to stop plowing and to 
return to their homes. He also said to the people in the paddy fields that if they 
continued, all would be sued by law and sentenced to jail. Nevertheless, the 
farmers continued to plow quite happily. The next day, farmers continued to plow, 
hoping the authorities would come and finally decide their case. But no one came. 
With growing concerns, they nevertheless started to sow, investing in 22 baskets 
of paddy seeds. As the days passed, the fields slowly turned green, and the farmers 
felt satisfied. But fifteen days after they had planted the paddy, a group of men 
commanded by the landlord came to the paddy fields destroyed all the crops. 
Police came after and all farmers involved in the case were summoned to go to the 
Mawlamyinegyun Police station with a court order. After the case hearing at the 
court, the seven farmers were sentenced to jail for two months. They were accused 
of destroying private property (Act No.427) and trespassing on private area (Act 
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No. 447). They were sent to the Myaung Mya Jail. At the prison, they met with many 
farmers who had been sentenced to jail in similar ways. They hoped they would get 
support from both political and civil societies, yet they were told by the supporting 
associations that “they could continue the plowing protest once released.” Nobody 
in Tet Tet Ku resumed the plowing protests in 2014. The lack of clear directives to 
decide on such land disputes, the weak bargaining power of local associations, and 
the general uncertainty in which villagers live the reform once again threatens to 
undermine the potential positive outcomes of the reform.
 3.3 The limited capacities of local institutions in conflict resolution
The problem remains that the formal institutions (SLRD, VTLMC) operating 
locally in the Delta and the Dry Zone are not in the position to effectively adjudicate 
land disputes. In other words, it is either not their mandate (SRLD), or their members 
(VTLMC) do not want to take the responsibility of resolving land conflicts under a 
new legal framework that doesn’t provide conflict resolution mechanisms for such 
cases. Hence, in most case, VTLMCs generally refer to the village tract headman or 
to the township LMC. Yet, the latter functions more like a mailbox, forwarding the 
dispute cases to the district level committee with its appraisal note. 
The district committee has more scope in the decision making process, though, 
to our knowledge of the surveyed villages, no dispute cases have yet been resolved 
at the time of this report’s writing. According to our observations on the ground, 
no objecting household has got its land back. Despite the law’s lack of clarity for 
objection cases such as those linked to forced procurement, it seems more or less 
defined in the collective psyche that ‘the most recent owner is the legitimate one’ 
(see Chapter VI.4).
Local newly created bodies are not yet able to resolve the contradictions 
brought by a complex legal framework. The new land law and the land titling 
process also created space to contest some land transfers (especially le pyan ngwe 
pyan, but also sales and inheritance transfers) creating disputes within families and 
among siblings. And as a matter of fact, le pyan ngwe pyan generally stopped in 
2013 (only 1.6% of the landowners surveyed mortgaged some lands, while 2.2% 
of the total population cultivates mortgaged lands), most farmers fearing that, by 
engaging in mortgage, their land would be claimed by their creditor taking the 
opportunity of land registration to obtain a LUC for the holdings they pawned.
In the absence of checks and balances, corrupt practices prevail in conflict 
resolution processes, at the expense of the weakest. When the dispute settlement 
is done by the village tract headman (even through the VTLMC), decisions are often 
done for the benefit of wealthier individuals – for instance the creditors in the le 
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pyan ngwe pyan arrangement. The qualitative survey has also provided ample 
number of cases where dispute arbitration decisions are done towards the ‘highest 
bidder’ (meaning the one who provides the largest bribe). This generates a lack of 
trust within the community towards the village headman and the VTLMC.
In addition, the social capital at village level has often been crippled in the past 
decades (see Chapter VIII.3). Most local community leaders are not neutral as they 
have been involved as village tract/village headmen or in one way or another in 
the local land committees that have existed through history. Religious authorities 
do not play an important role in resolving land disputes and in general informal 
institutions lack capacity to deal with land conflicts. This is particularly true in the 
Delta, which is characterized by more mobility, strong patron-client relationships, 
and weak horizontal links, even among households of the same ‘class’. In addition, 
there are stronger competing claims between farmers, tenants, and the landless. 
It impacts on intra-village and intra-familial land disputes occurring under the 
land registration process. Finally, one key issue is the independence of conflict 
resolution mechanisms.
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This chapter draws on the findings from the quantitative study made on a 
sample of 1,129 households, analysed and explained in the light of qualitative 
information gathered during the two first phases of the research. The main objective 
of this section is to describe and analyse household livelihoods, and their links with 
production factors (land, capital, labor, livestock), and other key demographic and 
basic social characteristics. Details can be found in Annex 1.
1.  Landownership in Dry Zone and Delta
Landlessness is initially defined here in a wide sense, as the fact of owning 
no lands. Such ‘landless’ include both households that access lands through 
temporary arrangements and those who are not engaged in any farming or farm 
labor activities. The percentage of landless households (households that do not 
own any agricultural land) is considerably higher in the Delta (59.5%) compared 
to the Dry Zone (41%). A specific discussion in section VII.7 will shed light on the 
different types of landless.
Considering only landowners, the distribution of land (in terms of the statistical 
distribution of the size of respective ‘landholdings’) is quite similar in the two areas. 
If simplified into two classes (above and under five acres), the Dry Zone shows a 
relative concentration of large landholdings with 70% of owners having more than 
five acres versus only 62% in the Delta. However, the average landholding size 
(among farmland owners) is slightly smaller in Dry Zone (8.73 acres per household 
for a total of 3083 acres in the survey sample) than in Delta area (8.9 acres per 
household for a total of 1915 acres in the survey sample). However the largest 
landholding recorded in the Dry Zone is 65 acres, while in the Delta, the largest 
landholdings reaches 110 acres for the biggest (and this does not take into account 
the hundreds of acres owned by an absentee landowner of Mawlamyinegyun, 
whose land is partly cultivated in tenancy by Tet Tet Ku and Pay Chaung villagers). 
Finally, if taking into account the whole population (landowners and landless 
households), landholding sizes are on average much bigger in the Dry Zone with 
5.2 acres per household versus in the Delta, with 3.6 acres per household. 
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Figure 25: Distribution of landownership and landholding size among households 
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Figure 26: Distribution of farmland holding sizes among land owning households 
in Dry Zone and Delta
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Total owned acreage 1915 3083
Total nb of landowners 215 353
% of landowners over total HH 40.5% 59%
Average landholding/HH  (acres) 8.9 8.7
Table 21: Distribution of owned acreages and number of landowners in Delta  
and Dry Zone 
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 1.1 Historical roots of landlessness 
The important difference in landlessness rates between the Delta and the Dry 
Zone can be first explained by their different agrarian histories. The Dry Zone is the 
cradle of Burmese society, with long established villages (except from Hledar) and 
stronger social organization, which made the impact of colonial rule and further 
governmental policies less intense than in the Delta. The Delta, as we already saw, 
was mainly developed through British colonization and as the country’s main rice 
bowl received greater ‘interest’ from post-independence national governments. 
Hence, it has been more significantly impacted by predatory policies such as the 
‘Compulsory Quota Delivery’. Besides, land concentration in the hands of money-
lenders (whether alien or indigenous) under colonial rule happened to a lesser 
extent in the Dry Zone, for the reasons that many lands classified as ‘private’ (as 
opposed to ‘crown’, in the pre-colonial categorization system) were for generations 
cultivated within the same family, and hence cultivators already gave greater 
‘sentimental value’ to their land (Siok Hwa 1965a: 120), representing generations 
of investment in, and knowledge of, the lands. This is contrary to the Delta 
where moving toward the south to find new lands remained the main strategy 
of cultivators – whether for fleeing debts, seeking more fertile lands, establishing 
a new household – until the closing of the ‘rice frontier’. Hence these cultivators 
developing limited bonds with their agricultural holdings. These trajectories also 
explain the slightly smaller average surfaces held by cultivators in the Dry Zone 
where, in the absence of a land frontier, land fragmentation along generations 
(through inheritance) is more acute than in Delta (ibid: 116). 
It is interesting to note the – somewhat logical – relationship between 
increasing landholdings sizes and the higher proportion of landless households, 
as larger tracts of land necessitate more farm labor and logically exclude a greater 
share of households from having access to land. Also, the fact that fertile lands 
are generally occupied earlier than others – here again a logical process – is a 
common feature shared by both the Dry Zone and the Delta. Yet, in the Dry Zone, 
the less fertile lands have been occupied most recently, by households which 
now have small holding sizes, due to the unavailability of lands. These lands were 
cleared last as they required much greater labor to be prepared for cultivation. 
The situation observed in Delta is different: less fertile lands are more frequent 
for large landholdings, due to the fact that land was still available in the southern 
frontier and that water salinity (resulting from lands at lower elevations) implies to 
cultivate larger surfaces in order to be economically viable (as only one crop per 
year is possible). 
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 1.2 Major disparities among villages in each area
Differences can be observed among villages within each zone as well. This 
example highlights the complexity and intertwinement of the different factors 
determining land access, agro ecological conditions and the importance of power 
relations at the local level. The importance of differences between regions but also 
among villages in the same region shows that large scale surveys and uniform 
‘one size fits all’ solutions on land tenure bear risks as they are not able to address 
effectively the local and context-specific problems. 
Dry Zone: diversity of village contexts
In the Dry Zone, there is a strong variability regarding landlessness rates 
between villages. While Hledar and Zee Phyu Pin present a very low landlessness 
rate (only 16.8%), Khoe Tan and Gaw Gyi have a much higher one (60.6%). Here 
again, this variability is partly due to historical events. As seen earlier80, Khoe Than 
farmers in the post-independence period benefited from the land nationalization 
process in retrieving large tracts of lands they were working as tenants in the midst 
of the civil war. As mentioned above in the history chapter, the nationalization 
process generally did not benefit all farmers and even less to the landless, as lands 
were mainly distributed to better-off farmers who had ‘the capacity to invest and 
cultivate’. This explains the higher rate of large landowners (over 15 acres) in Khoe 
Than village81, and the more limited access to land for others. In addition, together 
with Gaw Gyi, these two villages revived the activity of weaving which – after 
collapsing in the 1960s due to Chinese competition and the unsecure context of 
the civil war – became again a primary source of income for landless households 
in the villages. Zee Phyu Pin is a more ‘typical’ Dry Zone village, where lands have 
been cultivated since the pre-colonization period and registered as bobapaing and 
dama-u-gya lands – that is private land transferred from generation to generation. 
As a consequence, land being fully occupied – the last virgin lands were turned into 
farmland about 40 years ago – and fragmented along generations, smallholdings 
occupy a larger share in the village’s cultivated lands. Smaller surfaces hence need 
fewer farm laborers, while the few landless households in the village provide year-
round labor for larger landholders. In contrast, Hledar is a quite recently settled 
village (founded in 1938 according to the villagers) created toward the end of the 
British rule. The primary livelihood of villagers at the time of the village settlement 
was woodcutting and manufacturing wood slippers. Only later did the villagers 
start cultivating land to the east of the village, and progressively transformed 
the hill slopes into arable lands by constructing stonewalls across the waterways 
(kyauk-loke) in order to collect alluvial soil during rainy season. These new alluvial 
farmlands are quite small, yet very fertile, allowing high crop yields and cultivation 
80. See chapter II.2. 
81. In Khoe Tan, landowners holding more than 15 acres represent more than 25% of land-owning households. 
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of high value vegetable crops. Many households cultivate these lands with very 
intensive manner (much labor invested to cultivate small areas and productivity 
per acre is high). This explains the smaller average lands holding size (five acres) 
in this village. In addition, off-farm work opportunities being scarce in this remote 
village, there is no significant in-migration apart from those marrying an individual 
from Hledar.
Delta: access to lands, big men, and intra-village dynamics of exclusion and 
accumulation.
Table 22 sheds light on the fact that there are important differences in terms 
of power structures and resource distribution among villages, including within the 
same region and township. This leads to significant differences at different levels, 
including in terms of resource and land distribution. 
For example in the Delta, on one hand, we may observe villages which still have 
quasi-feudal systems such as Tet Tet Ku with an absentee landlord and a class of 
landless tenants working for him. In the case of Pay Chaung, the strong disparities 
are mainly explained by the presence of a ‘big man’ who has accumulated lands 
and now owns more than 110 acres in a village where most households are very 
poor landless fishermen/laborers. In these two cases, landlessness rates and the 
standard deviation in landholding size are high. In contrast, villages such as Magu, 
Tha Byu Gone, and Aye Ywar, which have not been marked by such powerful actors, 
resources are more evenly distributed among households and landlessness rates 
lower.
Table 22: Land tenure disparities among Delta villages
 Villages Average 
landholding size/
HH (including 
landless=0)
Standard deviation 
in landholding 
size (including 
landless=0)
% Landless/total 
HH
Aye Ywar 3.48 6.6 55
Magu 3.70 5.1 54
Pay Chaung 4.47 16.4 80
Tha Byu Gone 2.93 5.0 55
Tet Tet Ku 3.90 9.3 66
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2.  Other key differentiation factors in access to farmlands
In this section, we will shed light on the main factors affecting landownership 
and landholding sizes, other than the historical background and social contexts of 
villages that have been presented above.
 2.1 Age and the household life cycle
The household life cycle is recognized to be one of the major factors of change 
for households. In many agrarian societies, access to land is linked to the age, size, 
and needs of households. Landless households are represented in all age classes 
and their share in the class progressively decreases from young household heads 
to old ones for both Delta and Dry Zone (see Figure 27).
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Figure 27: Landlessness rates among household head age categories in Delta and 
Dry Zone 
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Landlessness rates are of 80% in the Delta and 61.5% in the Dry Zone among 
households with household heads under age 30, and only 40% in the Delta and 
27% in the Dry Zone among household heads above age 60. Landlessness rates 
sharply decrease for households with household heads around age 40. This can 
be explained mainly by inheritance of farmlands following death of parents or 
spouse’s parents.
 Indeed, in both the Delta and the Dry Zone, the average acreage of owned 
farmland gradually increases with household head age. The logic of land 
accumulation with increasing household head age exists in both areas. Yet it 
is stronger in the Dry Zone: there is indeed more variation in landholding size 
between age categories: Dry Zone landowners of under age 30 own less than four 
acres in average while those over 50 own almost 12 acres. In the Delta, the variation 
154 
in average per age category is less significant (six acres for the youngest; almost 
10 acres for those over 40). Landholding fragmentation is affecting the younger 
households.
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Figure 28: Two tables showing average landholding size among household 
head age categories in Delta and Dry Zone
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However, Figure 28 demonstrates that among farmland owners, there is a 
inflection point at age 50 where average landholding size stabilizes at around 10 
acres in the Delta, and at 12 acres in the Dry Zone. In the Delta, it even decreases, 
suggesting that parts of lands are transferred to children before death more 
frequently there than in the Dry Zone. The second graphic in Figure 28 represents 
both landless and landowners. Average land acreage increases steadily in the Dry 
Zone, suggesting that many landless households access lands at around age 40 
to 50, while such access to land seems much more limited in Delta for those age 
classes, with a breaking point at age 40-50, where average farm holding size tends 
to stabilize at an average of 5.2 acres. 
Access to land does not have the same meaning for households at different 
stages of their life cycle. Indeed, the qualitative survey reveals that for a household 
head aged around 40 or 50, landlessness is often rather a permanent form of land 
exclusion, while it can be only a temporary state for younger ones (see Figure 
27). Households are able to acquire land (mainly by inheritance and purchase) as 
they get older. In addition, young households are also more prone to migrate, if 
necessary, or to link with other labor market opportunities. 
It is important to keep in mind also that the context is changing. Land is 
getting relatively scarcer with time (under demographic pressure and the closing 
of agricultural frontier) and that this may increase the difficulty for current young 
households to access land, compared to the young ones of the past decades. 
This may increase the disparities between young and old households. Data also 
indicates that households tend to keep control on their lands as they grow older, 
which means that inheritance may occur relatively late (around 40-50) which is 
coherent with collected data. It also must be said that land scarcity may increase 
the age of inheritance.
 2.2 Household size and link with landholding size
A family’s active labor force is a critical factor in determining a household’s 
agricultural livelihoods. In the Dry Zone, there is a strongly significant statistical 
link between owned farm size and number of active members within the 
household, while this trend does not appear for the Delta. This may be explained 
by the fact that Dry Zone farms depend essentially on the family’s own labor for 
most agricultural operations, while in the Delta, farms use laborers much more 
consistently. Unfortunately, this remains only a hypothesis as the quantitative data 
missed out about the household members’ labor contribution on their own farms.
Table 23: Dry Zone labor force in households and owned farmland size
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Owned 
farmland 
(acres)
Nb 
HH
% Nb 
HH
% Nb 
HH
% Nb 
HH
% Nb 
HH
% Nb 
HH
%
landless 42 17.1 107 43.7 48 19.6 35 14.3 13 5.3 245 100.0
0.3-2.5 3 5.9 31 60.8 10 19.6 5 9.8 2 3.9 51 100.0
2.5-5 9 15.0 21 35.0 16 26.7 8 13.3 6 10.0 60 100.0
5-10 8 6.2 40 30.8 40 30.8 21 16.2 21 16.2 130 100.0
10-15 2 3.4 15 25.9 14 24.1 11 19.0 16 27.6 58 100.0
>15 4 7.4 7 13.0 14 25.9 16 29.6 13 24.1 54 100.0
Total 68 11.4 221 37.0 142 23.7 96 16.1 71 11.9 598 100.0
Chi-Square=85.2  dof=20  p=0.001  (very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.189
 2.3 Landlessness and recent migration
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It appears that recent migration is driven by landlessness, particularly in the 
Delta. Indeed, landlessness rates are higher among households whose household 
head was born in another village tract than the one of current residence82. This 
tendency is exaggerated in the Delta where 32% of the landless are newcomers 
while only 16.7% of landowners are newcomers. 73.7% of household heads born 
outside the VT, against 54.6 % of household heads born within the VT are landless 
(see Table 5 in Annex 1). This clearly confirms the relative attraction of the young 
work force (who lack access to land) to seek lands or/and labor opportunities in the 
Delta, which in turn increases the pressure on land.
Among the Dry Zone landowning households with heads born outside the VT, 
a significant proportion (67%) have settled more than 20 years ago. Such significant 
statistical links have not been found in the Delta. However among landowners of 
the two categories, there are no significant differences in terms of landholding 
sizes, neither in the Delta nor in the Dry Zone. 
On the contrary, out migrations are not apparently linked to households’ 
landholding sizes. The frequency of household members working outside VT more 
than 50% of the year is similar among landless (24.8%) and landowners (23.4%), 
and is not significantly affected by the size of landholding. However, qualitative 
interviews indicate two different strategies for smallholders (less than three 
acres) and landless on the one hand, and medium scale and large scale holders 
on the other. For the first category, finding work outside the VT is generally a 
strategy to cope with lack of available lands and the low diversity of off-farm work 
82. The village tract is a grouping of adjacent villages. It constitutes the lowest unit in state administration. 
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opportunities which are not directly related to the cultivation of land; while for 
larger landholders, out-migration is not a function of exclusion but rather linked 
to higher opportunity costs in cities, in a context of land fragmentation83. This 
strategy is facilitated by a higher level of education and by subsequent better jobs 
opportunities. It represents a combined strategy not to divide land and to give an 
opportunity for some of the children to quit agriculture. 
 2.4 Access to land and social position84
Unsurprisingly, data analysis also shows that there is a statistical link between 
landholding size and social position within the village. The two basic indicators 
available in the database (‘knowing somebody in the VTFMC’ and ‘having a 
position within the village’85) are strongly linked to each other and each of them 
is statistically linked with household head age and landholding area. For instance, 
50% of households having at least one member occupying an administrative 
position in the village own more than 10 acres, which is true for only 33% of the 
whole population. The statistical significance is the greatest in the lowest and 
highest landholding size categories of landowners. 
Having an administrative position is of greater impact than having a social 
unofficial activity (SOR – see previous footnote ). On the contrary, households 
having at least one member being an NGO informant are poorly represented in 
households with landholdings above 10 acres, probably because NGOs avoid 
working with the richest and vice versa. 
In conclusion, as age increases, households tend to have more access 
to land, to be more secure, and to access better social position within the 
village and village tracts. But the context is changing and these trends might 
not continue in the same fashion. We note the existence of young landless 
migrating from outside the village tract of their birth, indicating that land 
access and land accumulation along the life cycle in this area will probably be 
more difficult in the coming years given the increasing pressure on lands. 
 2.5 Gender, access to land and land security
Women represent 51% (2,492 individuals) amongst the total 4,887 individuals 
83.  If in theory all siblings receive the same share of inheritance, practice proves that some are often favored above 
others notably for the reason that dividing land equally would lead to surfaces too small for viable farms. 
84. Social position is defined here with a restricted scope. In the survey, social position was defined by having family 
members in key official administrative positions and a role in key social affairs.   
85. Position/status within the village corresponds to 3 categories: ‘administrative position’ gathers village head (ya-
eim-hmu) and VT administrators, village clerk (chief assistant), members of land committee, members of village 
administration committee; ‘NGO informant/community mobilizer, etc.; ‘Social Organizations and Religious activities 
(SOR)’ comprizes leaders of young men and women groups, cooks for village events (ok tha-gyi), active religious donors 
(phaya taka”). 
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of the surveyed sample, consistent with the national score of 51.7% of women 
recorded in the 2014 national census (2014 census results). Whatever the age 
of the household head and household size, the proportion of women within 
the household does not change significantly. In contrast, being headed by a 
woman is linked with household head age and household size. In the survey 
sample, women only represent 14% of household head. Frequency of women 
as household head decreases with the household’s size: 75% of households of 
one member are headed by a woman, while only 35% of households of two 
members are women-headed. Frequency of women as household head increases 
with household head age: they are 30% for household heads aged more than 60 
which is twice as frequent as the whole household head population average86. In 
accordance with that, women household heads are older than men: their average 
age is 57.7 years while men are only 45 years in average. In summary, women 
household heads are old and lead a small household. As already mentioned, this 
type of household is very different from households headed by old men, which 
are larger and composed of well-educated people, having social position within 
village. 
There are differences in the respective relationships between household head 
sex and landlessness in the Delta and the Dry Zone. Indeed, in the Delta, the gender 
of household heads has limited statistical link with landlessness or landownership. 
In contrast, the figures in the Dry Zone (Table 25) reveal a significant difference 
in the frequency of female household heads: the rate is almost two times higher 
in landless households. In addition, there is a significantly higher proportion of 
women household heads in the Dry Zone (18%) compared to the Delta (10%). 
Actually, women headed households in the Delta tend to remarry more often 
than in the Dry Zone. This can again be explained by the more dynamic nature of 
Delta communities – with more mobile men between villages – while in Dry Zone 
opportunities to remarry are fewer. These facts relate to the different socioeconomic 
organization between the two zones (pioneer and mobile in Delta, long-settled 
and more sedentary in Dry Zone). 
 
86. This can be explained at least partly by the fact that women generally have a longer life-expectancy than men.
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Table 24: Delta statistical relationship between household head sex and 
landownership 
Male HHH Female HHH Total
Nb 
HH
% 
Column
% 
Row
Nb 
HH
% 
Column
% 
Row
Nb 
HH
% 
Column
% 
Row
Land
owner
188 39.4 87.4 27 50.9 12.6 215 40.6 100.0
Landless 289 60.6 91.7 26 49.1 8.3 315 59.4 100.0
Total 477 100.0 90.0 53 100.0 10.0 530 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=2,20  dof=1  p=0,134  (Not significant)  Cramer’s V=0,064
Table 25: Dry Zone statistical relationship between household head sex and 
landownership
Male HHH Female HHH Total
Nb 
HH
% 
Column
% 
Row
Nb 
HH
% 
Column
% 
Row
Nb 
HH
% 
Column
% 
Row
Land
owners
304 62.0 86.1 49 45.4 13.9 353 59.0 100.0
Landless 186 38.0 75.9 59 54.6 24.1 245 41.0 100.0
Total 490 100.0 81.9 108 100.0 18.1 598 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=9,47  dof=1  p=0,002  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0,126
As per evidence of the qualitative study (see Chapter VI.1.5), inheritance in the 
studied Myanmar lowlands favors men and women equally. Inheritance is generally 
more a matter of available lands, opportunities to get access to land through 
marriage (if the spouse can bring some land into the newly established household), 
and the willingness and capacity of the children to pursue or undertake agricultural 
work.  For landowners with less than five acres, there is also no statistical difference 
between male and female household heads in term of access to land. However, 
the proportion of male household heads having large holdings (above 10 acres) is 
significantly higher (35%) than for women household heads (20%). 
As a consequence of being underrepresented in households owning larger 
holdings, women household heads are proportionally more represented in 
medium size holdings category (5-10 acres). There is effectively a ceiling (maximum 
holding size) at around 10 acres, above which women-headed households rarely 
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go beyond. However, such figures have limited meaning without qualitative 
analysis of the situation. Indeed, women headed households are overrepresented 
in the upper age class (above 50 years), due partly to the fact that men die earlier 
than women, and partly because women who lost their husband (whether being a 
widow or divorced) often do not remarry. 
In addition, the qualitative study shows that woman-headed households which 
are lacking the workforce of their husband – but also, as stated by some of them, 
‘lacking the capacity to manage their land87’ – generally transfer the land to their 
children either permanently (hence changing the landholding registration name) 
or temporarily through land arrangements (such as free loans, sharecropping, 
or rental) before transferring it for good. As such, large landholdings are often 
dismantled for children to access land when women become household heads as 
they get older and lose their husbands. In this case, they will still remain in the 
household production and consumption units. 
To conclude, reflection on gender and land is particularly tricky, due to the 
fact that women form an integral part of the household by completing different 
functions – including making decisions on resource and income utilization – even 
when they are not the official household head. Due to the fact that land inheritance 
patterns are quite equal in terms of gender equity, there are little significant 
differences between men and women access to land. Yet, there remain some key 
differences, summarized as follows: 
• A significant part of these women household heads are elderly and widowed, 
living either alone or with one or two other household members living with 
them. 
• Women household heads seem unable to access more than 10 acres. This is 
often because they cannot mobilize an adequate labor force after the death 
of spouses. 
• Women household heads are still vulnerable as they are not socially influential 
and have weaker relationships with authorities. 
• Due to the facts above and labor constraints, women headed household may 
transfer their lands to their children earlier than male-headed households. 
 
87. The qualitative study indicates that the ‘lack of capacity to manage the farm’ stated by women household heads is 
not only a labor issue. It is also strongly linked to their reduced ‘access’ to authorities. 
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There are no major land insecurity issues linked to gender. For example, 
the study has not observed any cases of land sales without wives’ consent, nor 
cases of widows being dispossessed by their children. However, as described 
previously (see chapter VI.1.5 and V.2.3) the study has observed one conflict 
between a young widow and her parents-in law over the registration of land 
use rights of farmland plots donated by the husband’s parent at marriage. In 
addition, upon a couple’s separation and divorce, the sharing of lands does not 
follow systematic rules to allocate lands to both spouses. Although each case 
may be quite different depending on the context, reasons of separation, and the 
social pressure imposed by relatives and villagers, women may often be at risk of 
losing lands in such cases.
3.  Farming capital and household labor
This section will examine farm capital (other than land) such as livestock, 
equipment, and access to credit and how this capital links with land access and 
livelihoods.
 3.1 Livestock
The majority of households in both Delta (63.5%) and Dry Zone (68.1%) 
areas practice animal husbandry. Livestock has the following main functions: to 
generate income, to use as a saving asset, to provide a safety net. Consumption is 
a more marginal use, and only for small animals. The number of ruminant livestock 
(cattle, sheep, and goats) and the frequency of ruminant livestock ownership is 
much higher in the Dry Zone compared to the Delta. One important explanation 
is that cyclone Nargis decimated the majority of animals and deeply changed use 
practices of draught animals such as buffaloes88. Compared to Dry Zone, pigs are 
twice as common in the Delta and ducks are extremely common. These animals 
are indeed quite compatible with rice farming as they feed on crop residues such 
as rice bran and broken rice. 
This may also be an impact of Nargis, as the disappearance of cattle gradually 
led households to raise other types of livestock to ensure savings and safety 
net functions. The greater importance of livestock in the Dry Zone must also be 
correlated to the higher agricultural risks linked to this region’s farming conditions 
which necessitates reliance on livestock to increase resilience.
88. 51% of large ruminants, and in Mawlamyinegyun 70% of draught animals (FAO 2008). 
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Pig raising is most often a very small scale 
activity.
Duck raising in Delta.
Goat “herding” in Dry Zone.   Duck “herding” in Delta paddy lands and 
marshes.
Figure 29.1: Pictures of key livestock in Delta and Dry Zone
Credit: Muyar Aye Credit: Muyar Aye
Credit: MasseCredit: Fayon
Cattle and bullock carts are essential assets of 
Dry Zone farms.
Plowing with buffalo became less  
common after the mass introduction of power 
tillers after cyclone Nargis.
Credit: Fayon Credit: Allaverdian
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In Dry Zone, livestock feed is precious so farmers 
grow fodder and collect weeds to feed animals. 
In Delta, paddy straw is very often unused. 
Credit: Fayon Credit: Allaverdian
Figure 29.2: Pictures of livestock feed in Delta and Dry Zone
Looking at the Dry Zone data on livestock ownership and trend lines for each 
type of livestock, two main patterns are highlighted: 1) some animals (pigs, chicken, 
and to a lesser extent small ruminants) are used as complementary sources of 
income for landless and small landowners, while cattle is used for building the farm’s 
capital and patrimony. Small livestock such as pigs, goats, sheep, and chickens are 
found among all different landholding categories, including landless. It thus appears 
to be an income generating activity that is compatible with landlessness. However, 
small livestock such a pigs and chicken are mostly owned by small landowners. There 
seems to be a breaking point at around five acres, at which point farmers can afford 
to invest in cattle and hence substitute away from small livestock.
Indeed, cattle ownership and the number of cattle owned (generally between 
one to five) is very strongly linked with landownership and landholding size. The 
very significant link between the age of the household head and cattle ownership 
confirms that this needs to be understood as linked to the household’s ‘life cycle’. 
It can also be explained by increased agricultural needs for animal draught power, 
in line with landholding size. For example, in the Dry Zone, a typical landowning 
farming household head usually assigns a young calf to each of his children: each 
child starts taking care of his/her assigned calf and both ‘grow up’ together. When 
the child takes independence from the household, he/she may leave with the 
assigned cattle, which provides a good start of his/her farming life. Interestingly, 
lack of land tenure security is often perceived as associated with lack of cattle, 
and cattle and their carts are seen as integral components of the farming system. 
Carts are critical tools in Dry Zone used for the transport of people, water, inputs, 
harvests, and animal fodder. 
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Table 26: Animal husbandry in Dry Zone and Delta 
Dry Zone Delta
Total Nb Average per HH Total Nb Average per HH
Ducks 24 0.0 9817 18.5
Chicken 2160 3.6 1783 3.4
Pigs 175 0.3 309 0.6
Goats 264 0.4 17 0.0
Sheep 677 1.1 0 0.0
Cattle 1060 1.8 237 0.4
Figure 30: Frequency of livestock ownership among different landholding 
categories (in Dry Zone)
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Landless   2.5<5 acre    10<15 acres
Chicken
Pig
Goat and sheep
Cattle
Similar trends on cattle exist in the Delta, but with cyclone Nargis, draught 
animals such as buffaloes have rapidly been replaced by power tillers. This process 
was accelerated through the massive aid provided by emergency and post-recovery 
operations. This has eroded the symbolic importance of cattle in Delta. Pigs and 
chicken are raised in similar frequency by all categories of cultivators, including the 
landless. They are raised at very small scale, feeding on food scraps, and are essentially 
a savings device and a way to diversify sources of protein. Duck breeding (mainly for 
eggs) however is mostly a commercial activity, based on intensive breeding practices. 
It is practiced twice more frequently by landowners than by landless, as it requires 
large quantities of paddy crop residues. In addition, the size of duck herds tends to 
increase with landholding size89. However, unlike cattle, there is no ‘life cycle’ effect 
89. 29.4% of small landowners (less than 3 acres) have 1 to 30 ducks. 14.3% of medium landowners (3 to 9 acres) have 
30 to 110 ducks while large landowners (17.7%) tend to own more than 110 ducks. 
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and no significant links with the age of the household head.  As seen in the tables 
1 and 2 in Annex 3, better-off households are more frequently involved in animal 
husbandry activities compared to those of the lowest income category, suggesting 
the important role of livestock breeding in generating incomes and in mobilizing 
savings. In all income categories, the majority of households (in similar proportions 
– average is 67%) do not earn more than 10,000 MMK from livestock, confirming 
again that the main function of livestock is savings/constitution of capital. 69.5% of 
landless peasants earn less than 10,000 MMK out of livestock. This suggests that for 
the landless, livestock mainly plays a role as a saving asset or as a ‘safety net’ (in case 
of health problems, funerals, etc). 
Small landowners (less than three acres) are the most frequent category to earn 
1 to 3.5 lakhs from livestock per year. Indeed, their very limited landholding size 
requires them to supplement agriculture activities with substantial livestock income 
generating activities. For the higher wealth categories (total annual income (TI) over 
1.5 million), 18% earn more than 3.5 lakhs out of livestock (against 5% of the lower 
incomes categories with a total annual income under 1.5 million). This is mainly due 
to their higher investment capacities to purchase large quantities of animals and to 
engage in more intensive livestock-breeding systems.  However, in contrast to Delta, 
Dry Zone where farms of over 15 acres are less inclined that other landholding size 
categories to generate income from livestock (see Table 3 and Table 4 in Annex 3). 
There is no significant link between women household heads and ownership 
of different types of livestock. 
Figure 31: Frequency of livestock ownership among different landholding 
categories (in Delta)
70 %
53%
35%
18%
0%
Landless   2.5<5 acre    10<15 acres
Chicken
Duck 
Pig
Cattle
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 3.2 Farm equipment
As seen in Table 27, farm equipment in the Delta is intrinsically linked with 
paddy production, and is dominated by machines such as power tillers and 
threshers. Unsurprisingly, larger landowners own these machines more frequently. 
The vast majority of landowners with holdings bigger than 15 acres own their own 
machines. Between five to 10 acres, only one third own such machines,  ownership 
becomes extremely rare among smaller landholding categories; instead, these 
farmers have to rent machines from the owners after the latter have tilled their 
own lands. Farming can become particular challenging in this situation, as delays 
in tilling due to unavailability of power tillers can affect crop yields. 
Paddy land preparation is mostly done 
through power tillers in Delta.
Engine pump used for irrigation. Paddy thresher.
In Delta, reapers have been recently introduced 
for harvests. Combined harvesters are emerging 
in the Delta but still very rare in study areas.
Figure 32: Farm equipment 
Credit: Muyar Aye Credit: Masse
Credit: Masse Credit: Phyo Htet Wai
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Table 27: Frequency of ownership of farm equipment among landholding size 
categories in Delta 
Power tiller Threshing 
machine
Water pump total HH
0.3-<2.5 acres 3.4% 3.4% 0.0% 29
2.5-<5 acres 6.5% 4.3% 8.7% 46
5-<10 acres 31.8% 33.3% 19.7% 66
10-<15 acres 54.8% 45.2% 40.5% 42
>=15 acres 90.6% 59.4% 71.9% 32
Table 28: Frequency of ownership of farm equipment among land holding  
size categories in Dry Zone
Water 
pump
Cart Fodder 
chopping 
machine
Power tiller Total Nb HH
0.3-<2.5 acres 19.6% 27.5% 3.9% 2.0% 51
2.5-<5 acres 20.0% 58.3% 1.7% 0.0% 60
5-<10 acres 33.1% 83.1% 12.3% 5.4% 130
10-<15 acres 41.4% 91.4% 13.8% 15.5% 58
>=15 acres 57.4% 100.0% 57.4% 51.9% 54
 3.3 Agricultural credit
As observed in the table below, agricultural credit is taken by the vast majority 
of landowners in Delta (from 82.8% of those with the smallest holdings up to 
90.6% for the largest), as well by 11.4% of landless (who access small lands under 
temporary arrangements). In the Dry Zone, credit is much more unequally accessed, 
varying from 37.3% of the smallest holdings up to 93.1% among landowners with 
the largest holdings, while only 2.4% of landless attain credit for agriculture. In 
the Delta, this is essentially due to the higher credit needs generated by paddy 
production, the stronger presence of government-subsidized agricultural loans 
(MADB) and the larger loan size (100,000 MMK per acre of paddy lands) aiming at 
supporting paddy production. In the Dry Zone, MADB loans also exist but amounts 
Farm equipment ownership is more unequal in the Dry Zone: it does not 
necessarily reflect the investment capacity but the fact of owning irrigated lands 
or not. However, carts are an integral part of farms, particularly over farms of over 
5 acres.
168 
are much smaller for non-paddy crops, which can explain why farmers may be 
less interested in facing the red tape and challenges linked to the MADB loan 
application procedures.
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Table 29: Frequency of households taking loans for agriculture among 
landholding categories in the Delta and the Dry Zone
Delta Dry Zone
Loans for 
agriculture
No loans for 
agriculture
Loans for 
agriculture
No loans for 
agriculture
Nb HH % L Nb HH % L Nb HH % L Nb HH % L
Landless 36 11.4% 280 88.6% 6 2.4% 239 97.6%
0.3-<2.5 
acres
24 82.8% 5 17.2% 19 37.3% 32 62.7%
2.5-<5 acres 39 84.8% 7 15.2% 37 61.7% 23 38.3%
5-<10 acres 59 89.4% 7 10.6% 108 83.1% 22 16.9%
10-<15 acres 38 90.5% 4 9.5% 54 93.1% 4 6.9%
>=15 acres 29 90.6% 3 9.4% 44 81.5% 10 18.5%
total 225 42.4% 306 57.6% 268 44.8% 330 55.2%
A specific sub-section is dedicated to credit in section VIII analysing the MADB 
loans, other formal and informal credit services, loan amounts, number of loans, 
main sources of credit, and main reasons for borrowing.
 3.4 Labor
The majority of Delta and Dry Zone farming households (over 80%) must 
employ agricultural labor to work on their farms (Table 30). In the Delta, labor is 
essential for paddy field preparation, transplanting, and harvesting. There is a very 
significant statistical link between hired labor with those who cultivate more than 
three acres, while those who cultivate less than three acres work with their own 
family labor (Table 31). In the Dry Zone there is a very significant statistical link 
between hired labor for those who cultivate more than six acres of lands, while 
those who cultivate less than three acres than to work with their own family labor 
(Table 32). 
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Table 30: Recourse to hired farm labor among households with farming 
activities
Delta Dry Zone
Nb HH % C Nb HH % C
Hire labor 244 82.7% 279 79.5%
No labor 51 17.3% 72 20.5%
total 295 100% 351 100%
Table 31: Recourse to farm labor and its association with cultivated land area in 
Delta
Hire farm labor Don’t hire farm labor Total
Cultivated 
area ( acres)
Nb HH %R Nb HH %R Nb HH %R
under 3 36 57.1 27 42.9 63 100.0
3 < 6 70 94.6 4 5.4 74 100.0
6 < 11 74 100.0 74 100.0
11 and over 57 100.0 57 100.0
Total 237 88.4 31 11.6 268 100.0
Chi-Square=80.2  dof=3  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.547
Table 32: Recourse to farm labor and relation with cultivated land area in Dry 
Zone
Hire farm labor Don’t hire farm labor Total
Cultivated 
area ( acres)
Nb HH %R Nb HH %R Nb HH %R
under 3 47 67.1 23 32.9 70 100.0
3 < 6 69 69.7 30 30.3 99 100.0
6 < 11 84 84.0 16 16.0 100 100.0
11 and over 83 95.4 4 4.6 87 100.0
Total 283 79.5 73 20.5 356 100.0
Chi-Square=27.1  dof=3  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.276
170 
4.  Farming systems and agricultural income
In both zones, there is a significant relation between owning more than 12 acres 
and having agriculture as the main source of income. This suggests that with smaller 
landholdings, households need complementary sources of income or that they 
invest less in agriculture since they have other sources of income (see Chapter V.6.4 
for an in-depth discussion on multi-activity). There is an obvious and very significant 
link between the income from agriculture and the area owned: most households 
farm the land they own and none of the farm categories are subsistence-oriented, 
despite the fact they also provide much food for self-consumption. In fact, in both 
areas, farms are clearly market-oriented, even for the smallest landholdings. 
 4.1 The Delta farming systems: high level of specialization in paddy 
Delta’s agriculture is highly specialized in paddy: 97.8% of cultivated lands are 
paddy lands and 96.2% of those who have access to agricultural lands (ownership 
or temporary contracts)90 are engaged in paddy cultivation. However, 8.5% of Delta 
households practice small scale commercial gardening (betel, vegetable, flowers, 
etc.), without any statistically significant differences according to landownership 
and landholding size. It is mainly practiced as a secondary source of income. 100% 
of ‘commercial gardeners’ who own land have no income from farm wage labor. 
For the landless commercial growers, these are actually not genuine ‘landless’ since 
they cultivate intensively on very small surfaces on their own garden plots around 
their houses. These do not access lands through temporary land arrangements.
 
90. 277 over 288 households having access to land : 205 over 215 landowners, 72 over 73 landless cultivators.
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Table 33: Delta paddy crops: average area per household and frequency of 
crops
Delta Double cropping areas
*267 respondents: paddy 
cultivators in non-salt water 
areas
 Single cropping areas
*12 respondents: paddy 
cultivators in salt water areas
(Pay Chaung village only)
Average Area /
HH (acres)
% of paddy 
cultivators 
from this area
Average Area /
HH (acres)
% of paddy 
cultivators 
from this area
Monsoon paddy 7.94/HH
(total 1810 
acres)
85.4% 25.08 100%
Summer paddy 5.87/HH
(total 1526 
acres)
97.4% 0 0%
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In the Delta, the quantitative survey (Table 33) indicates that summer paddy 
is practiced by a higher rate of paddy cultivators (97.4% of paddy cultivators of 
areas where summer cultivation is possible) than monsoon paddy. The difference 
in household count (32) matches with the number of landless that contract in 
lands exclusively for summer paddy. The average cultivated area per household is 
considerably smaller than in monsoon season. Even within landowners (putting 
aside the landless that contract lands exclusively for summer cropping), the same 
trend is found (9.2 acres in monsoon, against 6.82 acres in summer). Monsoon paddy 
has much lower requirements in terms of inputs. Currently, the common monsoon 
varieties (for instance, the varietal bay gyar lay) have much higher prices91 than the 
short cycle summer varieties, despite lower yields. Monsoon paddy has higher labor 
requirements (stick transplanting, hand-transplanting) and higher risks in terms of 
harvest loss due to climatic and flooding accidents. Summer paddy produces higher 
yields but generates greater input costs (fertilizers, herbicides). Detailed profit and 
91. Bay Gyar Lay variety is very appreciated by Myanmar consumers. As a consequence, with the stable and growing 
internal market, farmers have benefited from the steady increase of its price in the last years (in 2016, up to 10,000 
MMK/basket), while short cycle summer varieties are often more for export market such as China and have suffered 
more from market price fluctuations. 
Figure 33: Paddy transplanting represents a peak period for farm labor needs
Credit: Allaverdian
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Table 34: Average paddy yields in Delta different agroecological zones
Monsoon Paddy Summer Paddy
Yield (baskets)/
acre
Respondants Yield (baskets)/
acre
Respondants
Saltwater area 66.5 12
Brackish area 43.6 170 64.4 199
Freshwater 
area
45.3 58 96 61
Table 35: Basic data on paddy yields and prices for main varieties in the Delta
Variety Main 
season
Price(mmk) /bsk in 2014-15 Price (mmk)/bsk in 2015-
16
Dec-14 May-15 Jul-15 Dec-
15
May-16 Jul-16
Bar Gyar Lay Monsoon 5,500 6,790 7,600 6,500   8,800 
Khun Ni Monsoon 5,200 5,825 7,300 6,200   8,500 
Nan Karr Monsoon 3,800 4,200 4,150 3,800   4,100 
Htee Htut Yin Summer   3,880 4,080   4,000 4,600 
Variety Main season Average price Average yield 
(baskets) /acre
Average 
Productivity/
acre in MMK
Bar Gyar Lay Monsoon           7,038                  55 387,090 
Khun Ni Monsoon           6,605                  70 462,350 
Nan Karr Monsoon           4,010                  70 280,700 
Htee Htut Yin Summer           4,140                100 414,000 
Source: Gret Bogale 
See Annex 4: Farm gate paddy prices at Bogale-Mawlamyinegyun area – for 
4 different varieties (2012-2014) Annex 5: Profit and loss statement of paddy 
production (monsoon and summer) in Delta
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loss analysis in 2014 on paddy crops led to the conclusion that monsoon paddy is 
more profitable than summer paddy cultivators from this area 92. Moreover, all in all, 
landowners will prefer to cultivate a greater part of their lands during the monsoon 
and a smaller surface in summer, the latter tactic enabling temporary access to the 
uncultivated lands for their landless relatives.
92. Strong links with the chosen paddy variety since there are significant prices differences between varieties 
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Table 36: Key information on average cultivated acreage and yields in Delta 
brackish and fresh water areas where double cropping is possible
Double crop 
areas
Monsoon paddy
Average cultivated 
acreage/HH (among 
those who access 
lands)
Average yield 
(baskets/acre)
Average yield 
(ton/acre)
Nb of 
respondents
Landless 6.50 43.04 0.90 37
0.3 < 2.5 1.88 54.02 1.13 26
2.5 < 5 3.68 45.07 0.94 41
5 < 10 acres 6.35 46.28 0.97 58
10 < 15 acres 10.89 42.21 0.88 37
> = 15 acres 20.66 42.83 0.89 29
Double crop 
areas
Summer paddy
Average cultivated 
acreage/HH (among 
those who access 
lands
Average yield 
(baskets/acre)
Average 
yield (ton/
acre)
Nb of 
respondents
Landless 3.23 57.56 1.20 69
0.3 < 2.5 1.89 72.31 1.51 28
2.5 < 5 3.48 70.26 1.47 41
5 < 10 acres 5.60 71.65 1.49 59
10 < 15 acres 10.17 70.18 1.46 36
> = 15 acres 14.88 80.87 1.69 28
174 
Land productivity in the Delta
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Figure 34: Average yield per acre (baskets) according to farmland holding classes in 
Delta areas where double cropping is possible 
In the Delta, land productivity is quite simple to assess as farming systems are 
specialized in paddy. It is thus essentially assessed here through the yields per acre.
The main factor affecting land productivity in the Delta is linked to 
agro-ecological conditions and water salinity. As it can be noted in Table 34, 
monsoon paddy yields are, surprisingly, highest in salt water areas where farmers 
can only produce 1 cycle per year. This can be explained by this land’s better soil 
fertility (due to long fallow period where buffaloes graze on lands). It may also be 
assumed that more care is provided to crops as it is the only paddy production 
season and labor is available (as there are high landless rates in these areas). 
However, in summer, such land produces the opposite outcome. While summer 
paddy is impossible to cultivate in saltwater areas, yields in brackish areas are 
considerably lower than in freshwater areas (64.4 baskets/acre against 96 baskets/
acre). This can be explained for the most part by the low quality of the irrigation 
water and the slight salinity, both of which affect paddy yields.
As observed in Figure 34 and Table 36, there are no major differences in 
productivity and yields in the Delta according to farmland holding size. However, 
we can observe two different trends for monsoon paddy and summer paddy. For 
monsoon, yields are quite constant for different landholding classes with higher 
yields among smaller landholdings, while for summer paddy, there is a trend with 
highest yields among the largest landholdings (of over 15 acres) and the lowest 
yields for the landless who access lands. This landless sub-category concerns those 
who access lands under temporary arrangements. 
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This is logical as summer paddy requires important input costs that larger 
farmers can afford more easily. In addition to the investment constraints, the lower 
yields can be explained by the fact the lands which are ‘contracted’ out to others 
are those of least interest (in terms of fertility, proximity to the village, etc.) for the 
landowners. Finally, almost half of the landless who access land through temporary 
arrangements cultivate only in the summer season and not year round. As such, 
these landless invest less in fertilization as they will not benefit from the fertilizers’ 
residue effects over the monsoon season, thus impacting yields.
 4.2 Dry Zone: a diversified and resilient agriculture
The quantitative survey results indicate a strong link between the increase in sizes 
of land owned, agricultural incomes, and level of crop diversity. This is to be linked 
with the households’ main source of income being agriculture. This is an interesting 
finding as it contradicts the trend in the global context towards specialization and 
larger landholdings. This highlights the specificity of the Dry Zone in terms of farmers’ 
resilience and risk management strategies. 43% of Dry Zone farmers cultivate at least 
four crops in ya lands, in addition to potential paddy crops. Farmers adopt resilience 
strategies, with plots combining different crops, at different planting periods, and 
using crop associations and relay crops93.
Irrigation forms part of farmers’ strategy to increase resilience and to diversify 
types of crops and cropping patterns and timing. 52% of surveyed landowning 
households have access to irrigation. 8.7% cultivate less than one acre94 of irrigated 
lands, 14% cultivate between one to four acres of irrigated land while 8.2 % farmers 
cultivate more than four acres of irrigated lands. Households are not specialized 
in irrigation. Indeed, among households with irrigation, households tend to have 
both irrigated lands and rainfed lands, and this in similar proportions. 
93. Relay cropping is the fact of cultivated different crops on the same plot of lands. The second crop is planted (eg 
sorghum) even before the first crop (eg sesame) is harvested. 
94. The mentioned acreage is a sum of acres cultivated for each season in the whole year. 
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Table 37: Acreage and number of cultivating households per season – Dry Zone
Ya land 
cultivation
Total 
cultivated 
acreage
Nb of 
cultivating 
HH
Average 
acreage/
HH
Main crops grown
Summer 253.1 69 3.7 Irrigated sesame. marginal for 
pigeon pea, sorghum, sunflower
Winter 981.2 197 5.0 Onion, chickpea. More marginally: 
sesame
Monsoon 1450.6 298 4.9 Lima beans, pigeon pea, sorghum, 
sunflower,  sesame, tomato
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In the Dry Zone, the crops that generate the most income appear to be onion, 
followed by tomato, and far below come pulses such as chickpea and pigeon 
pea (see Table 38). More marginal crops such as wheat and cotton seem also to 
generate substantial income on good soils. Oil crops such as sesame and sunflower 
seem, on the contrary, to be much less profitable, due to current low market prices. 
Table 38: Average income95 per acre (for sale) for main Dry Zone crops
Crops Average income (from sale) per acre (MMK)
Chickpea 116,140
Pigeon pea 129,314
Sesame 64,704
Sorghum 34,165
Sunflower 23,559
Lima bean 88,808
Onion 1,315,198
Tomato 824,197
Wheat 132,575
Green gram 106,596
Cotton 162,094
High value crops such as onion are much more frequently produced by larger 
and diversified farmers (owning over nine acres). Tomato cropping is more specific 
to smaller farmers (owning less than six acres). Those who cultivate one to three 
crops only are more frequently very small paddy cultivators (less than three 
acres). Other minor crops include wheat, groundnut, green gram, maize, chilli, etc. 
Perennial crops such as sugar palm trees (24.7% of households), cotton (around 
12% of households, for an average 1.35 acre), and thanaka trees96 can also be 
found. Other fast-growing tree species are grown as natural fences around fields 
and house compounds, and used for fuel wood. 
95. It is to be noted that this is just an indication for 2014. Some crops such as onions and vegetables, and export pulses 
are particularly prone to high price variations with strong impacts on household incomes. 
96. However the actual surfaces cultivated with perennial crops, especially trees such as thanakha, are most probably 
underreported as most farmers are cultivating on lands designated for seasonal crops, a change that theoretically 
should be approved at the Union Level. In practice, most farmers don’t go through this time and money consuming 
process (see Chapter VII.3.1), hence growing perennial crops ‘illegally’. 
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Figure 35: Dry Zone land productivity (MMK/acre) according to farmland holding 
classes 
600000
450000
300000
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0%
Landless                2.5-<5                   10-<15 acres
Table 39: Dry Zone key information on average cultivated acreage and land 
productivity
Average cultivated 
acreage/HH (acres)
Average 
income(MMK)/acre
Nb respondents
Landless 1.32 569,773 16
0.3-<2.5 1.87 298,511 51
2.5-<5 3.37 233,158 60
5-<10 acres 6.35 190,590 130
10-<15 acres 10.65 234,330 58
>=15 acres 21.89 197,641 54
The main crops grown in the Dry Zone are cash crops (pigeon pea, chickpea, 
sesame, sunflower, onion, etc). As the crop diversity in Dry Zone farms is very high, 
and because self-consumption represents only a limited share of the total yield, 
land productivity will be calculated here over the value of the sold crops97.
97. For the Dry Zone, land productivity has thus been calculated by dividing total agricultural profit by the number 
of cultivated acres. The profit has been calculated from the income from sales and by deducting all production costs 
(labor, inputs, machinery rent). For the quantitative survey, some questions had to be simplified. The depreciation 
of farming equipment and the costs of agricultural loans (interest rates…) has not been integrated in the costs. 
Furthermore, it unfortunately does not take into account the value of what has been consumed by the household, but 
this remains marginal for non-paddy crops. 
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As observed in Table 39 and Figure 35, land productivity in Dry Zone is highest 
among those who cultivate less than two acres. This corresponds to the landless 
class which cultivates 1.32 acres in average among those who access land through 
temporary arrangements – this does not include those landless who do not cultivate 
and the 0.3-2.5 acres landholding class which cultivate 1.87 acres on average). In such 
cases, cultivators work their lands more intensively when they can access irrigation. 
In addition, the particularly high land productivity among landless is here explained 
by the fact that a significant proportion cultivate high value-added crops such as 
onion. Land productivity in the Dry Zone varies greatly between villages according 
to two main factors: access to irrigation and fertility of soils.
 4.3 Comparing land productivity in Delta and Dry Zone
It is a bit tricky to compare land productivity between the two regions because 
of significant inter-regional and intra-regional (among villages within the region) 
variations. In addition, as mentioned above, for the Dry Zone, the majority of 
crops are cash crops, so land productivity has thus been calculated by dividing 
total agricultural profit per acre. In the Delta, in order to take into account the 
significant proportion of agricultural production which is not sold but dedicated 
to self consumption, land productivity is calculated by assessing average paddy 
yields per acre.  In the Delta, the productivity of paddy lands is overall higher than 
in Dry Zone, as can be observed in Table 40. It is mainly be explained by better 
water access conditions. Income from paddy cultivation is also higher in Delta due 
to higher prices of Delta varieties. 
Table 40: Average paddy yields in Delta and Dry Zone
Delta Dry Zone
Paddy Yield (baskets)/
acre
Respondents Yield (baskets)/
acre
Respondents
Monsoon 47.1 240 45.2 107
Summer/ 
pre-monsoon
71.6 261 55.3 77
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In terms of comparison between the two zones, it is interesting to note that in 
the Delta, lands with very low productivity rates (under one lakh/acre) account only 
for 1.5% of households (four out of 259 Delta farming households) while in the Dry 
Zone, such lands account for almost 36% of households (122 out of 340 Dry Zone 
farming households). This trend may be even stronger since the land productivity 
calculation here does not take into account the part of production which is for 
family self-consumption (higher for the Delta). Yet, such figures should not be 
misinterpreted – economic conditions are not unequivocally better in the Delta. 
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Table 41: Percentage of households with members engaged in agricultural 
labor per landholdings categories and per area
Landholding Delta HH engaged in farm labor Dry Zone HH  engaged 
in farm labor
Nb HH %  of HH Nb HH % of HH
Landless 209 66.1% 122 49.8%
<3 acres 17 54.8% 30 50.8%
3-6 acres 7 11.1% 39 41.1%
6-9 acres 4 9.5% 26 34.2%
9-12 acres 1 2.9% 9 22.0%
12-15 acres 1 8.3% 3 10.7%
> 15 acres 0.0% 4 7.4%
Total 239 45% 233 39%
Chi-Square=42.3  dof=5  p=0.001  (very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.282
This is because paddy cultivation necessitates greater investments than do most 
seasonal crops grown on ya lands: farmers in the Delta generally manage greater 
amounts of money than in Dry Zone, a situation leading also to more financial risks, 
especially in relation to loan repayment (see Chapter IX.2.1). 
The study has not been able to demonstrate any significant correlation between 
family labor (meaning the number of household members providing labor on their 
own farm) and land productivity. This is not necessarily a finding and may be attributed 
to the survey design issues. In addition, the quality of survey responses concerning 
agricultural labor is not sufficient for the proper analysis of labor productivity.
180 
VII. Land tenure and livelihood security
5.  Income diversification
 5.1 On-farm wage labor
41.8% of Dry Zone and Delta households have at least one member earning 
some income as an agricultural laborer. This proportion is slightly lower in the 
Delta (45%) than in the Dry Zone (39%). Among these agricultural laborers, 87.4% 
are landless in the Delta against 52.4% in the Dry Zone. Table 41 shows that in 
the Delta, working as a farm laborer is very specific to the landless and very small 
landowners (less than three acres) while in the Dry Zone this activity is more evenly 
practiced (see 5.3 below on off-farm activities). Even among households with larger 
landholdings (6 acres-15 acres), 26.2% of them have family members engaged as 
agricultural laborers, against 6.7% in the Delta. 
This trend is also reflected in the level of specialization of households engaged 
in agricultural labor: the rate of active members engaged in agricultural labor in 
households is higher in the Delta than in the Dry Zone (see Table 1 in Annex 6). In 
the Delta, 43.4% of landless households and 32.3% of very small landowners (under 
three acres) are specialized with more than 75% of their active members engaged 
in agricultural labor. In the Dry Zone, though, landless are less specialized in farm 
labor. Agricultural labor is an additional – but not primary – source of income for 
many types of households in the Dry Zone, while in the Delta, it is restricted to the 
lower income categories as part of the most important sources of income.  This 
is due to the fact that a considerable part of Dry Zone ‘landless’ households are 
not engaged in farming but in off-farm activities that are more profitable than 
agricultural labor (see 5.3 below on off-farm activities). 
Labor arrangements
In Delta, by far the most common form of labor arrangements are ‘task-
specific’ arrangements: laborers are paid in cash for specific operations (plowing, 
transplanting, harvesting) over one area unit (kwat – 1.25 acres) and not per day. 
Larger farmers (especially in salt-water areas) also take on seasonal labor contracts, 
mostly with in-kind paddy payments. However, 58.6% of Delta households combine 
labor arrangements with daily contracts. In the Dry Zone, 97.4% of households 
that provide agricultural labor are engaged in daily contracts (daily work, for daily 
payment in cash). In the Delta, only 11.7% of laborers are organized in ‘labor groups’ 
for which group leaders make arrangements and negotiate directly with farmers 
that need labor, against 40.8% in the Dry Zone (see Table 42).
The above figures reflect the two different situations between the Delta and 
the Dry Zone in terms of labor organization between landowners and laborers 
as well as in terms of social organization. It underlines the greater horizontal ties 
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between landowners and land laborers in the Dry Zone, often from the same 
family, while in the Delta vertical ties dominate landowner-laborer relationships, 
dividing the social landscape of Delta villages into two quite distinct categories – 
“lethama”/“baukthama” – i.e. the latter being mainly landless households. 
Table 42: Labor arrangements among households providing agricultural labor
HH with farm labor 
income
Daily basis Task- basis or 
seasonal basis
Details
Delta 24.30% 90.0% Monsoon and 
summer seasons 
for paddy
Dry Zone 97.40% 0.90% Year round for ya 
land crops, winter 
season for onion
These vertical ties translate into individual relationships between a landowner 
and a few laborers, and hence laborers here, contrary to the Dry Zone, tend less 
often to be organized in groups. In the Dry Zone, farm opportunities are more 
spread out throughout the year than in the Delta – explained by associated 
crop diversification strategies – hence the greater need for farm laborers to be 
organized in groups. The seasonal calendar’s variability in the same village also 
gives more incentives to laborers to ask payments to be done on a daily basis while, 
in the meantime, they have more bargaining power given the lack of workforce 
available in villages (due to lower rates of landless households and greater income 
opportunities in other sectors). In contrast, in Delta, landowners prefer contracting 
work on a task-basis as laborers have lesser bargaining power. However, labor 
shortage are recurrent in Delta, driving farmers to propose better conditions for 
laborers (free meals, advance wage payment…). 
Table 43: Average income per household and per area for farm-work
Delta (239 HH) Dry Zone (233 HH)
Average income per household that 
provide agricultural labor (MMK)
  287,667 385,008
Average nb of persons engaged in farm 
labor in the HH
  1.90       1.52 
Average yearly income per farm laborer 
(MMK)
147,961    260,671
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As a result, the average income per household from agricultural labor (see 
Table 43) is 34% higher in the Dry Zone than in the Delta, despite fewer household 
members engaged in farm labor (1.9 person/household in the Delta against 1.52 
person/household in the Dry Zone). This seems to indicate that on average, Dry Zone 
laborers may work more time as farm laborers than in the Delta. In the Delta, paddy 
cultivation necessitates a greater labor force concentrated over short periods (land 
preparation, weeding, harvesting), while in the Dry Zone farm labor tasks are more 
diversified over the year and require less intensive labor at specific defined periods. 
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As seen in Table 42, 97.4% of farm labor in the Dry Zone is done as daily wage 
work. The daily salary can vary from 1,500 to 3,000 MMK/day from village to village, 
depending on specific peak period premiums, different tasks, and with the laborer’s 
sex. Depending on the village, wages can be 30% lower for women than for men.
 5.2 Fishing: an essential Delta activity 
Fishing is pursued by more than 58% of landless and 30% of landowners. 
Interestingly, this is no significant link between practicing fishing and farm-size 
(Table 44). It is practiced in relatively similar frequency by different land owning 
categories, from 38% for the smallest category (0.3-3 acres) down to 22% for the 
largest (over 15 acres). These statistics confirm that fishing is a complementary 
activity for farming households, enabling them to mobilize their labor force 
during the slack season. However, there is a very significant link with the age of 
the household head. Indeed, among landowners, fishing is more frequent among 
those under age 40. (see Table 2 in Annex 6) 
Table 44: Relation between practicing fishing and landownership in Delta
Fishing No fishing Total
Landholdings
(acres)
Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R
landless 183 73.8 57.9 133 47.0 42.1 316 59.5 100.0
0.3-2.5 11 4.4 37.9 18 6.4 62.1 29 5.5 100.0
2.5-5 11 4.4 23.9 35 12.4 76.1 46 8.7 100.0
5-10 23 9.3 34.8 43 15.2 65.2 66 12.4 100.0
10-15 13 5.2 31.0 29 10.2 69.0 42 7.9 100.0
>15 7 2.8 21.9 25 8.8 78.1 32 6.0 100.0
Total 248 100.0 46.7 283 100.0 53.3 531 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=42.3  dof=5  p=0.001  (very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.282
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In the Delta, laws of supply and demand for farm labor98 can vary greatly from one 
village to another. To illustrate the different factors impacting supply and demand, 
let us take the example of two different villages in terms of agro-ecological zoning 
and labor: Aye Ywar (brackish waters, two seasons of paddy, 55% landless households) 
and Pay Chaung (salt water, one season paddy only, 80% landless households). In Aye 
Ywar, almost all farm laborers find employment in the village during the two seasons 
of paddy, while in Pay Chaung, half of them have to go find work in other villagers. 
Different factors impacting supply and demand for farm labor can be identified. 
In Pay Chaung, harvesting can be performed for a longer period, between December 
and February. In Aye Ywar, monsoon paddy has to be harvested over a shorter period 
(November-December), so that in late December land can be used again as soon as 
possible to launch the summer paddy season. Landowners therefore calculate their 
labor needs, taking into account the fact that all their lands must be harvested within 
a very short period, more or less simultaneously. The calculation of labor needs in 
Aye Ywar is based on the ratio ‘one laborer per three acres’, while in Pay Chaung the 
ratio is closer to ‘one laborer per six acres’. This calculation also varies with the seasons. 
While one seasonal worker and five daily workers are enough to work about 20 acres 
of monsoon paddy, summer paddy will mobilize one seasonal worker and 10 daily 
workers for the same surface. 
In Pay Chaung, landowners can hire a small team of workers over several weeks 
or months and harvest one plot after the other. The presence of rice stores in most 
Pay Chaung landowners’ houses also facilitates the spread of the harvesting period, 
while the fear of rains push Aye Ywar’s farmers to harvest as soon as possible to avoid 
losing the paddy in the fields before it is sold. However in Aye Ywar, laborers are only 
employed for a short time – the average area per farmer being relatively small, daily 
laborers or those working on a kwat pyat basis may end their assignment within a 
week or two. They must therefore frequently change employers, in their village or 
others. By contrast, in Pay Chaung laborers are employed for relatively long periods. 
The two biggest Pay Chaung’s landowners even employ 30 laborers permanently.
98. “On-farm labor: supply and demand in Delta” adapted from Laurie Bellevillaire’s master thesis, 2014.
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BOX 14: ON-FARM LABOR: SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN DELTA
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A fisher with a push net. A child after school collects eel traps in paddy 
field.
A fisher installing crab traps in the river. Fishing nets of varied sizes are commonly 
used.
Figure 36: The high diversity of technologies used for fishing in Delta, an 
adaptation to the varied species fished and scale of fishing
Credit: Muyar AyeCredit: Allaverdian
Credit: Allaverdian Credit: Allaverdian
As can be observed in Table 3 in Annex 6, 79% of households of the category 
which generates the highest incomes from fishing (over 3.65 laks) are landless 
households. As a matter of fact, farmers who lost their land have then turned to 
fishing or to other non-farm activities to ensure better living conditions to their 
offspring. In Pay Chaung, Daw TN who lives mainly from fishing (as do all her 
brothers and sisters) explains: “At the time of our parents, lands were not worth much 
and there were quotas on harvests for farmers. Our parents preferred to be fishermen 
but today agriculture is much more profitable than fishing so if I could, I’d be a farmer”. 
Land owning households practice fishing, but for 70% of them the income they 
earn is in general marginal (less than 70,000 MMK). It is thus mostly for their own 
consumption. 64.6% of those earning over 350,000 MMK from fishing own a boat.
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 5.3 Off-farm activities
Off-farm activities here exclude all activities of the primary sector99: agriculture, 
farm wage labor, livestock breeding, and fishing activities. The survey has 
considered three types of off-farm income: 1) self-employed off-farm income, 2) 
employee/wage off-farm income, 3) other off-farm income such as pension, tool 
renting, compensations, etc.
99. The primary sector of the economy regroups all activities making direct use of natural resources. 
Table 45: Distribution of households in each zone per type of off-farm activity
Delta Dry Zone
Nb of HH % of HH 
over total 
HH surveyed  
(531)
Nb of HH % of HH 
over total 
HH surveyed 
(598)
All off-Farm activities 188 35.4% 298 49.8%
Self-employed off 
farm activities
126 23.7% 148 24.7%
Employed off-farm 
activities
46 8.7% 187 31.3%
Other type of 
income (pension, 
compensation, etc.)
29 5.5% 10 1.7%
Self employement through small grocery 
shops
Weaving in Dry Zone is an important source of 
self-employed and employed labor
Figure 37: Off-farm activities
Credit: Masse Credit: Fayon
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Off-farm activities are widely practiced in both areas but more common in the 
Dry Zone: it concerns half of Dry Zone households, against only one third of Delta 
households (see Table 45). Furthermore, average yearly incomes from off-farm 
activities in the Dry Zone are 35% higher than in the Delta. (6.4 lakhs in the Delta 
against 9.9 lakhs in the Dry Zone).
In the Dry Zone, self-employment in off-farm activities essentially concerns 
weaving (Table 4 in Annex 6), while in the Delta, the most common self-employed 
off-farm activities are small businesses such as small grocery shops, money-lending, 
paddy trade, etc. 
While self-employed activities have a similar frequency in both the Delta and 
the Dry Zone (around 24%), employed off-farm activities are three times more 
common in the Dry Zone (31.3% of all households) than in the Delta (8.7%). Among 
the main sectors offering employed/wage off-farm work are weaving (especially 
Khoe Than and Gaw Gyi villages) and construction work for villages closer to 
Monywa and Yinmabin towns (Gaw Gyi, Zee Phyu Pin). Indeed, almost one quarter 
(23.7%) of surveyed households in the Dry Zone are engaged in construction wage 
labor (Table 5 in Annex 6). 
In addition, off-farm activities in the Delta are practiced by all income-
categories in similar proportions, from 28% of households among the lowest 
income category, up to 39% for the higher income category (see Table 6 in Annex 
6). These are engaged mainly for additional income, rather than as ‘full time’ jobs. 
This is in line with the fact that average income from off-farm activities in the Delta 
is 35% less than in Dry Zone (6.4 laks in Delta against 9.9 laks in Dry Zone) and that 
the rate of households declaring off-farm activities as first source of income is much 
higher in Dry Zone (123 households, 42% of households declaring having off farm 
work activities), compared to Delta (27 households, 14% of households declaring 
off-farm activities). Out of these 123 households individuals from the Dry Zone, the 
two thirds declare ‘off-farm worker’ as main source of income (not small business, 
nor trade) mostly pursue construction and weaving works in villages nearer to 
towns (where average off-farm income is from 7.5 to 8.5 lakhs MMK). The large 
majority of these households have no lands and have no agricultural nor animal 
husbandry activities. In the Dry Zone, off-farm activities are thus more frequently 
practiced in a specialized manner and as full time jobs. In the Dry Zone, there is a 
very significant link between the level of income from off-farm activities and the 
total household income (see Table 8 in Annex 6). 
The survey analysis for the Dry Zone shows that every village has its own 
characteristics regarding off-farm activities. For example weaving dominates 
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off-farm activities in Khoe Than and Gaw Gyi, while households involved in 
construction work are more often found in Zee Phyu Pin and Gaw Gyi, given these 
villages’ proximity with the towns of Yinmabin and Monywa.  
6.  Discussion: Land distribution, access and livelihood strategies 
 6.1 Categorizing farmers
Following the thorough methodological process described in Annex 8 based 
on Factorial Analysis of Correspondences (FAC) of the selected quantitative data, 
land-owning households have been categorized as follows: 
• ‘capitalized farmers’ having direct land use rights on surfaces above 10 acres 
and characterized by their ownership of all necessary assets for agricultural 
production (cattle, power-tillers, water-pumps, carts). Their incomes come 
mainly and often totally from agriculture100, exceeding two million Kyats per year. 
• ‘Agri-specialized small farmers’, owning between five and 10 acres. Their 
incomes come mainly from farm activities, first through the cultivation of their 
own lands, but also from other primary sector activities (animal husbandry, 
daily farm-work…). They generally do not own agricultural assets and therefore 
rely on arrangements with capitalized family farmers for these.
• ‘multi-active small farmers’, composed of households which have land use 
rights on small surfaces (less than five acres) and whose incomes come mainly 
from other activities, whether from daily farm work, animal husbandry or small 
businesses such as village grocery shops. Those are therefore highly multi-
active and their profit from agriculture arrives generally in second position.
Despite the fundamental differences in agricultural practices, environmental 
conditions (notably access to water), and livelihood opportunities between the 
Delta and the Dry Zone, it still seemed relevant to operate the same FAC but 
specifically for each zone, in order to verify if the groups did not hide different 
strategies related to local conditions. The distinction has been made as well with 
the idea of reflecting the earlier enunciated hypothesis that the Dry Zone, as a 
historical settlement, features greater socioeconomic stability and horizontal ties 
between and among stakeholders (landowners, agricultural workers, for example) 
than the Delta which, as a recently closed land front, presents most of the features 
of a ‘frontier society’ (Boutry 2013) characterized by vertical relationships and 
greater socioeconomic insecurity for most layers of the society; and explore the 
consequences of such different socioeconomic conditions on livelihood security. 
100. Order of income among the following options: agriculture/cultivation, fishing, livestock, farm work, off-farm 
employed work, off-farm self employed work, remittances. 
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Doing so, the three groups still appear in both Delta and Dry Zone villages, but 
the livelihood strategies of each type of groups differ quite drastically from one 
area to the other. Interestingly, those whose strategies don’t vary much from one 
zone to the other are the ‘capitalized farmers’, despite the very different agricultural 
practices found between the two zones.
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Table 46: Summary of key criteria of Delta farm typology
Average 
landholding 
size (acres)
Average 
age 
of HH 
head
% of 
HH 
who 
own 
power 
tiller
Primary source of income (%of HH)
Cultivation Live-
stock
Farm 
labor/ 
fishing
Off 
farm
Capitalized 
farmers
14.6 62 62 96.7% 0.0% 0.0% 3.3%
Agri-
specialized 
small 
farmers
4.1 14.8 14.8 78.4% 0.0% 5.7% 15.9%
Multi-
active small 
farmers
5.8 19.4 19.4 2.8% 44.4% 36.2% 16.6%
Delta farmers’ typology
Delta farmers       Dry Zone farmers
Farm-specialised  
small farmers
40.70%
Capitalised 
farmers 42.60%
Multi-active 
small farmers 
16.70%
Farm-specialised  
small farmers
36.30%
Capitalised 
farmers 32.20%
Multi-active small 
farmers 31.40%
Figure 38: Distribution of main categories of farmers in Delta and Dry Zone
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Table 47: Delta distribution of different farmers categories (%) according to land 
area owned (in acres)
multi-active 
small farmers
capitalized 
farmers
Agri-specialized 
small farmers
Total
Average 
land 
holding 
size (acres)
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Under 2.5 15 41.7 1 1.1 13 14.9 29 13.5
2.5 to < 5 4 11.1 1 1.1 41 47.1 46 21.4
5 to < 10 8 22.2 25 27.2 33 37.9 66 30.7
10 to <15 7 19.4 35 38.0 42 19.5
15 and 
over
2 5.6 30 32.6 32 14.9
Total 36 100.0 92 100.0 87 100.0 215 100.0
Chi-Square=144.7  dof=8  p=0.001  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 1)  Cramer’s V=0.58
In the Delta, capitalized farmers present the following characteristics:
• More than 70% of households cultivate more than 10 acres in monsoon paddy 
and 58.5% cultivate more than 10 acres of dry-season paddy. 
• 92% of this category’s households earn more than two million Kyats a year 
from crops. 
• They own agricultural assets (power tiller, thresher, motor pump, etc.).
The Agri-specialized small farmers are characterized by:
• 85% owning between 2.5 and 10 acres of arable lands.  
• 85% don’t own farming assets needed for paddy cultivation. 
• However, 83% of households say they rely on cultivation as their main income. 
The multi-active small farmers main features are that:
• Cultivation incomes come in the 2nd position (in its contribution to total 
household income). Doing many activities is thus this category’s key criterion.
• Over 60% own less than five acres. 
• 44.4% of them report getting their main income from animal husbandry (mostly 
duck and pig breeding and 30.6% of them as farm laborers). 16.6% may also 
have off-farm activities such as small grocery shop, etc. as their main income.
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• The fact that most of them (86.1%) place incomes from crops in second position 
suggests that land access for agriculture, although not profitable enough to 
supply all their needs, represents a form of security for their livelihoods – this 
is confirmed by a clear distinction between landless households who have 
access to lands and other landless households (see section 7). 
Note that in the Delta, none of these categories is correlated to a particular age 
group.
Dry Zone farmers’ typology
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Like in the Delta, Dry Zone capitalized farmers are above all characterized by the 
following:
• Owning more than 10 acres: 30.7% of households own between 10 and 15 
acres and often more than 15 acres (45.6%). 
• Owning key agricultural assets (cattle and carts101). 
• The majority (56.8% in the Dry Zone) earn more than 2,000,000 Kyat per year 
from cultivation and 32.4% earn between 500,000 and 2,000,000 Kyats per year.
101. Only 37% of capitalized farmers report owning a power-tiller. As a matter of fact, the Dry Zone is less mechanized 
than the Delta, notably because of the nature of ya lands that are more suitable to work with cattle while the power-
tiller is mostly used on irrigated paddy lands. 52.6% of them also report owning a motor pump, hence having access 
to irrigated cultivation, which makes a great difference in the Dry Zone in terms of the productivity and value of crops 
that can grow.
Table 48: Summary of key criteria of Dry Zone farm typology
Average 
landholding 
size (acres)
Average 
age 
of HH 
head
% of 
HH 
who 
own 
power 
tiller
Primary source of income (%of HH)
Cultivation Live-
stock
Farm 
labor/ 
fishing
Off 
farm
Capitalised 
farmers
55 15.9 91.2 89.5% 1.8% 0.0% 8.7%
Farm-
specialised 
small 
farmers
51 6.3 82.8 87.5% 2.3% 1.6% 8.6%
Multi-
active small 
farmers
45 4.2 48.6 11.7% 17.1% 27.0% 44.2%
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Table 49: Dry Zone distribution of different farmers’ categories (%) according to 
land area owned (in acres)
capitalised 
farmers
multi-active 
small farmers 
farm-specialised 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Average 
land 
holding 
size (acres)
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Under 2.5 1 0.9 46 41.4 4 3.1 51 14.4
2.5 to < 5 4 3.5 25 22.5 31 24.2 60 17.0
5 to < 10 22 19.3 30 27.0 78 60.9 130 36.8
10 to <15 35 30.7 9 8.1 14 10.9 58 16.4
15 and 
over
52 45.6 1 0.9 1 0.8 54 15.3
Total 114 100.0 111 100.0 128 100.0 353 100.0
Chi-Square=254.9  dof=8  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.601
Agri-specialized small farmers are characterized by:
• Agriculture as a main source of income for the household. 
• Owning less than 10 acres (60% between five and 10 acres and 27.3% below 
five acres.
• Their income from agriculture is between 500,000 and 2,000,000 Kyat per year 
for 47.4% of them and between 100,000 and 500,000 Kyats per year for 40.7% 
of them. 
Multi-active small farmers in the Dry Zone have similar features as those in Delta:
• Regarding landholding categories they present similar distribution patterns 
as in the Delta. While most of them own less than five acres (66%), 35% own 
between five and 10 acres. 
• The ranking of profit they get from their different activities is a little different 
from Delta multi-active small farmers, yet here again most of them don’t get 
their main income from cultivation (88.7%). For 56% of them, cultivation comes 
in second position, and in 3rd position for 19% of the category’s households. 
Given the more unpredictable nature of Dry Zone agriculture, it seems logical 
that it brings less security to these households involved in multiple activities 
than for the multi-active small farmers of the Delta.  
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Table 50: Distribution of the different farmer categories in age groups (age of 
the household head) in Dry Zone 
capitalised 
farmers 
multi-active 
small farmers 
farm-specialised 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Age of 
household 
head
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
< 40 14 12.3 42 37.8 29 22.7 85 24.1
40 ≤ x < 50 27 23.7 35 31.5 35 27.3 97 27.5
50 ≤ x < 60 34 29.8 13 11.7 22 17.2 69 19.5
≥ 60 39 34.2 21 18.9 42 32.8 102 28.9
Total 114 100.0 111 100.0 128 100.0 353 100.0
Chi-Square=32.3  dof=6  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.214
• Diversification of activities includes on-farm wage labor as a main source 
of incomes (for 27% of this category’s households), off-farm wage labor 
(18%), animal husbandry (principally goats) for 17% of them, weaving, and 
other activities (such as small businesses). The greater off-farm employment 
opportunities available in the Dry Zone villages studied explains the higher 
diversity of activities practiced by multi-active small farmers, compared to the 
Delta. 44.2% of Dry Zone multi-active small farmers have an off-farm activity 
(excluding farm work and livestock) as their main source of income. 
Finally, contrary to the Delta, there are statistical links between age of 
household head and these categories (see Table 50). There is a positive correlation 
between being a capitalized farmers household head and being aged more than 
50, while multi-active small farmers households are more likely to be headed by a 
person aged less than 40 years old. Agri-specialized small farmers households are 
not linked to a particular age group. 
 6.2  Land access
Delta Agri-specialized small farmers inherited more in surfaces (1.2 acres/
household) than multi-active small farmers (0.8 acres/household) before 2003, 
while after 2003 their average inherited land size are quite similar (0.8 against 0.9 
acres/household for Agri-specialized small farmers and multi-active small farmers 
respectively). On the other hand, multi-active small farmers bought significantly 
more lands over the two periods (in average 2.5 acres/household) than Agri-
specialized small farmers (in average 1 acre/household). 
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Figure 39: Bar chart representing land acquisition modalities (inheritance, 
purchase) for different types of farmers in Delta and Dry Zone
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Delta: Average distribution of inherited and purchased lands from 1988 to 
2014 among different types of farmers
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Dry Zone: Average distribution of inherited and purchased lands from 1988 to 
2014 among different types of farmers
Agri-specialized small farmers’ lands have mainly been inherited (50% of 
lands owned have been inherited, against 30% for the other categories) – with 
a slow decrease after 2003. Delta multi-active small farmers and Agri-specialized 
small farmers inherited and bought land at a lesser rate than average for the 
whole landowners’ population. Capitalized farmers hence ‘monopolized’ access 
to resources both in terms of livelihood reproduction through inheritance and in 
terms of accumulation through the two periods. 
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Table 51: Average area (in acres) acquired through inheritance and purchase  
for each category of farmers before and after 2003
1988-2003 2003-2014 Total 1988-2014 
Owned 
land
Inherited 
88-2008
Bought 
88-2003
Inherited 
after 
2003
Bought 
after 
2003
TOT 
Inherited
TOT 
Bought
Delta Total Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Capitalized 
F (92)
14.6 3.0 3.4 1.5 2.2 4.5 5.6
Specialized 
SF (88)
4.1 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.3 2.0 1.2
Multi 
active SF 
(36)
5.8 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.7 2.5
0.0 0.0
Owned 
land
Inherited 
88-2008
Bought 
88-2003
Inherited 
after 
2003
Bought 
after 
2003
TOT 
Inherited
TOT 
Bought
Dry Zone Total Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Average 
/all
Capitalized 
F (114)
15.9 4.7 2.5 1.1 2.1 5.7 4.6
Specialized 
SF (126)
6.3 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.7 1.1
Multi 
active SF 
(111)
4.2 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.9 1.0
In the Dry Zone, multi-active small farmers and Agri-specialized small farmers 
inherited and purchased lands in similar amounts although multi-active small 
farmers inherited in greater proportion (57% of households) than the two other 
categories. Given that Agri-specialized small farmers own overall larger surfaces 
than multi-active small farmers and that, on the other hand, multi-active small 
farmers inherited more recently (23% of households inherited after 2003 against 
13-15% for the other categories), it suggests that the latter is a category of younger 
households yet to have sufficient financial capacity to buy land. This fact is confirmed 
by the positive correlation between multi-active small farmers households and the 
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Table 52: Proportion of households for each categories of farmers concerned by 
land inheritance and sales
Inherited 
88-2003 
Bought 
88-2003 
Inherited 
after 2003 
Bought 
after 2003 
TOT 
Inherited 
TOT 
Bought 
Delta % of HH % of HH % of HH % of HH % of HH % of HH
Capitalized 
F (92)
29% 25% 17% 18% 47% 40%
Specialized 
SF (88)
23% 19% 22% 9% 43% 28%
Multi active 
SF (36)
19% 31% 17% 11% 33% 42%
Inherited 
88-2008 
Bought 
88-2003 
Inherited 
after 2003 
Bought 
after 2003 
TOT 
Inherited 
TOT 
Bought 
Dry Zone % of HH % of HH % of HH % of HH % of HH % of HH
Capitalized 
F (114)
46% 25% 15% 32% 47% 48%
Specialized 
SF (126)
31% 16% 13% 14% 41% 30%
Multi active 
SF (111)
38% 16% 23% 17% 57% 31%
age of the households’ heads, overrepresented in the 30 to 40 years-old category 
(while capitalized family farmers households’ heads are correlated to the 50 to 60 
years-old category). The greater frequency of access to an inherited plot for the 
multi-active small farmers category may indicate that access to land – even a small 
surface – in that case provides security to invest and diversify into other livelihoods. 
The difference between capitalized farmers in the two zones and other 
categories regarding acreage of inherited and purchased lands is striking. 
Households belonging to the capitalized farmers category inherited and bought 
more lands (larger surfaces) than the average ones, in both zones. However, 
the different socioeconomic context in each zone impacts on the way these 
households accessed land. In the Delta, throughout both periods capitalized 
farmers bought larger surfaces than they inherited. It is likely these capitalized 
farmers profited from the market created in the period between 1988 and 2003 
by the ‘Compulsory Quota Policy’. However, as mentioned above, the quantitative 
survey does not provide reliable data regarding the true impact of this policy on 
land transfers. Buying hence constitutes the main access to land for this category 
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– a trend increasing after 2003. Capitalized farmers in the Dry Zone accessed 
lands primarily through inheritance before 2003 and continued to acquire 
land through purchase after 2003 in higher amounts and frequency than other 
categories, though purchased acreages (2.5 acres/household before 2003 vs 2.1 
acres/household after 2003) are similar over the two periods. It seems a body of 
capitalized farmers constituted by older families transferred their land patrimony 
over generations by channeling land and associated resources (notably cattle) 
to maintain their dominance. This supports the positive correlation observed 
between increasing landholding surfaces, increasing age of the household head, 
and the number of associated cattle.
 6.3 Farmers strategies and socioeconomic mobility
Multi-activity in the Delta: the resource of the poor?
As briefly underlined when describing the different categories of farmers 
in the two zones, none of the three categories in the Delta is correlated to one 
particular age group regarding the age of the household head. Hence, it is difficult 
to underline any patrimonial reproduction strategy, unlike the Dry Zone farmers. 
This tends to support the pioneer dimension of Delta society where the effect of 
life-cycle capitalization and inheritance is less prevalent than in the Dry Zone.  
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Table 53: Distribution of Delta farmers’ categories per size of the household 
House
hold size
Capitalised 
family farmers 
Multi-active 
farmers 
Farm-specialised 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
< 3 ind. 20 21.7 13 36.1 41 46.6 74 34.3
4 ind 22 23.9 9 25.0 19 21.6 50 23.1
> 5 50 54.3 14 38.9 28 31.8 92 42.6
Total 92 100.0 36 100.0 88 100.0 216 100.0
Chi-Square=13.8  dof=4  p=0.008  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.179
In the Delta, the Agri-specialized small farmer and capitalized family farmer 
categories are, however, correlated to different sizes of the household. Agri-
specialized small farmers are mainly composed (31.8%) of three-individual 
households, while being also overrepresented in the category of single-individual 
households (see Table 53). Capitalized family farmers are mainly represented in the 
category of households made of five to six individuals (40.2%). Multi-active small 
farmers are found without much distinction in all categories of household size. 
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The sole relationship to the size of the household without any relationship 
with the age of the household head suggests that access to land and relative 
landholdings sizes determine in great part the range of profit for each category. 
Indeed, there is a linearly positive relationship between total incomes and the 
average holding sizes characterizing each category, with multi-active small farmers 
being significantly correlated to the lowest incomes category, Agri-specialized 
small farmers households being correlated to the two intermediate incomes 
categories, and finally capitalized family farmers households being correlated to 
the highest incomes category (see Table 54). 
The share of profit from agriculture arrives in first position both for capitalized 
family farmers and Agri-specialized small farmers (respectively for 96.7% and 
78.4% of households in each of these categories). The share of profit obtained 
from agricultural labor arrives in first position for almost a third of multi-active 
small farmers (30.6%), while only 4.5% of Agri-specialized small farmers put it in 
second position (none in first position), and none of the capitalized family farmers 
even consider it as a source of profit. Animal husbandry is positively correlated as 
being the first source of profit for multi-active small farmers (44% of household), 
the second source of profit for Agri-specialized small farmers and the third source 
for capitalized family farmers. The share of incomes obtained from livestock is 
thus negatively correlated to the size of landholdings. Indeed, while 70% of Delta 
households practice animal husbandry, multi-active small farmers are characterized 
by larger scale duck breeding activities, with 25% of them owning more than 
110 ducks (compared to an average 10.6%). Pig breeding is another important 
livelihood activity for 75% of multi-active small farmers against an average 51.6% 
among the three categories.
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Table 54: Correlation between Delta farmers’ categories and total incomes (TI)
Total Income 
(MMK)
Capitalised 
family farmers 
Multi-active 
farmers 
Farm-specialised 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
< 1.5 
millions
2 2.2 15 41.7 35 39.8 52 24.1
1.5 to 3 
millions
6 6.5 11 30.6 48 54.5 65 30.1
>3 
millions
84 91.3 10 27.8 5 5.7 99 45.8
Total 92 100.0 36 100.0 88 100.0 216 100.0
Chi-Square=141.5  dof=4  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.572
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All three categories practice fishing, however multi-active small farmers are 
the most involved in this activity (50% of households). Only an extremely low 
proportion of multi-active small farmers and Agri-specialized small farmers declare 
fishing to be their main source of profit. Actually, the only significant correlation 
appears with multi-active small farmers declaring fishing as their third source of 
profit (19.4% of households). Qualitative interviews show that small landholders 
cannot easily invest in large scale fishing equipment, and on the other hand, the 
fishing seasonal calendar conflicts with the agricultural one (especially during 
harvests, between December and until February in Pay Chaung). A great majority 
of all categories (92.6% in average) do not consider off-farm work as a source of 
profit. Small business initiatives (small shops, groceries) are mainly a source of profit 
for Agri-specialized small farmers and capitalized family farmers, yet only for very 
small proportions of households in these categories (only around 9% in average). 
This first overview of on-farm activities suggests that on-farm diversification 
of incomes is related to landholding sizes, i.e. the greater the size the lesser 
diversification is necessary. Off-farm activities (non-primary sector related) also 
show similar trends. 
The analysis of income diversification in on-farm and off-farm activities helps 
to underline two important points. Firstly, as already stated, multi-activity tends to 
decrease with the increase in landholding sizes. Hence, multi-activity is mostly a 
strategy for small farms, especially regarding on-farm activities (agricultural labor, 
animal husbandry). In addition, off-farm activities (off-farm employed work, small 
business) are far from being an important source of profit for any of the categories. 
However, the fact that only Agri-specialized small farmers households declare (yet 
for only 7% of them) getting their main profit from small business points to the fact 
that accessing income diversification through non-farm activities is also a matter of 
resources, with multi-active small farmers being unable to invest in such activities. 
These findings tend to show that in the Delta, access to land is the main factor 
distinguishing poorer from better-off farmers, and marks a difference with the Dry 
Zone where income diversification (whether on- or off-farm) is also a key factor in 
securing farmers’ livelihoods. To conclude on Delta farmers’ strategies in terms of 
livelihoods’ security, 93.5% of capitalized farmers declare they have enough rice for 
the household’s consumption all-year round, while only 25% of multi-active and 
Agri-specialized small farmers households can say the same. 
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Despite the fact that the percentage of households being food insecure is 
the same in both multi-active and Agri-specialized categories, statistical analysis 
correlates Agri-specialized small farmers to the fact of being food insecure (see 
Table 55). The food consumption score reinforces the difference between multi-
active and Agri-specialized small farmers (Table 56). Multi-active small farmers are 
characterized (at 72.2%) by the fact of being in the highest rank of food diversity 
while Agri-specialized small farmers are at 51.1% in the middle bracket. 
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Table 55: Correlation between Delta farmers categories and the fact of lacking 
rice (Food Insecure) or not
Capitalized 
family farmers 
 
Multi-active 
farmers 
 
Agri-specialized 
small farmers 
 
Total 
 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Food 
Insecure
6 6.5 9 25.0 22 25.0 37 17.1
Food 
Secure
86 93.5 27 75.0 66 75.0 179 82.9
Total 92 100.0 36 100.0 88 100.0 216 100.0
Chi-Square=12.7  dof=2  p=0.002  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.243
Table 56: Food consumption score* for each farmers category in Delta
Capitalized 
family farmers 
Multi-active 
farmers 
Agri-specialized 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Less than 
42
36 39.1 10 27.8 46 52.3 92 42.6
More than 
42
56 60.9 26 72.2 42 47.7 124 57.4
Total 92 100.0 36 100.0 88 100.0 216 100.0
Chi-Square=7.05  dof=2  p=0.029  (Significant)  Cramer’s V=0.181 
* Calculated on the consumption’s frequency of different food items over the week 
preceding the survey.
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Dry Zone patrimonial reproduction strategies
In the Dry Zone, multi-active households are generally young and small, while 
capitalized family farmers households are on the contrary older and bigger. This 
suggests that in the Dry Zone young households who haven’t fully inherited land 
yet work only small pieces of lands acquired through marriage, such as the bride-
price and/or lands transferred early to the newly married couple by the family in 
order to make a living. We may recall here the fact that Dry Zone farmers aim at 
accumulating at least one cattle for each of their children to assist the children 
when the time comes for them to start their own farm (see V.2). Then young multi-
active households would work the land, work others’ land as employed workers102, 
do some animal husbandry as an income generating activity103, and engage in 
other activities such as small businesses and factory work in towns. If successful 
and/or after inheriting the totality of their lands from the parents, they may be 
able to accumulate more lands and work fully as farmers, i.e. gradually becoming 
‘capitalized farmers’.
The buying capacity of capitalized farm households is linked as well 
to diversification of income generating activities. Indeed, capitalized farm 
households, like multi-active small farm ones, are positively correlated to the fact 
of having at least one member involved in off-farm work104 and 11.4% of them put 
‘small business’ as the second main source of profit (note that 10.8% of multi-active 
small farmers households put ‘small business’ as their first source of income). This 
shared characteristic between capitalized family farmers and multi-active small 
farmers tends to reinforce the link between these two categories, that at least part 
of multi-active small farmers are on the way to become capitalized family farmers 
ones. Along the same lines, this trajectory from multi-active to capitalized family 
farmers households implies breeding livestock is an income generating activity for 
the former while it becomes capital – i.e. cattle – for the latter. Finally, multi-active 
small farmers households are, among the three categories, those most involved in 
temporary arrangements to cultivate others’ land105. Such arrangements are often 
done within their family106, suggesting again that newly settled households (rather 
102. Multi-active micro farmers are overrepresented in the category of households engaged in off-farm activities (45% 
of them against an average 30.9% of households involved in off-farm activities for all categories). 
103. While multi-active micro farmers households are less frequently involved in animal husbandry than capitalized 
family farmers or multi-active micro farmers households, they are nonetheless positively correlated with the 
highest income category (over 350,000 MMK/year for 17% of them) compared to the 2 other categories of farming 
households. 
104. 37.7% of capitalized family farmers households and 45% of multi-active micro farmers households have at least 
one member involved in off-farm work, against an average 30.9% for all three categories. 
105. 16.2% (18 households) of the multi-active micro farmers are involved in temporary arrangements, against an 
average 10.8% for all three categories. 
106. This trend of inter-familial arrangements is mostly underlined through the qualitative study. The quantitative 
study design could not allow us to discriminate between familial and external arrangements on land use rights. 
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multi-active small farmers) will work part of familial land (from capitalized family 
farmers households) under these arrangements (whether renting or sharecropping) 
before getting definitive land use rights on these lands. It may serve to underline 
that access to land is a dynamic process and that the categories defined for the 
purpose of these discussions have to be considered cautiously, having in mind that 
this quantitative survey is a snapshot of possibly transitory states of land tenure 
and livelihoods.
Agri-specialized small farmers’ strategies are more difficult to analyse than the 
two other categories. As seen above, they are mostly characterized by the fact of 
getting their primary source of income from agriculture, and the majority does not 
get access to large land sizes107. They are also not considered capitalized because 
they generally own only a limited number of cattle (between one and three mainly) 
and do not possess other equipment such as a power tiller (97% of households 
don’t own one, contrary to capitalized family farmers, 32.5% of whom own one). 
Agri-specialized small farmers don’t grow any valuable cash crop, except for 
tomato. Half of the households live in Hledar (see Chapter V.2.1) and cultivate on 
small land plots established over temporary streams by retaining alluvial soils with 
embankments. Apart from these lands (once again quite small in size), it seems 
that the Agri-specialized small farmers category is characterized by having access 
only to low quality ya lands that do not allow cultivation of high value cash crops. 
Finally, what characterizes them the most, contrary of the other two categories, 
is the fact they are almost exclusively doing agriculture, and nothing else. Finally, 
looking at modalities of accessing land, we saw that a lower rate of Agri-specialized 
small farmers inherited land than did multi-active small farmers, yet those who 
inherited acquired larger sized plots through inheritance. This may constitute a 
fundamental difference, as access to a small plot of land though inheritance at the 
beginning of the household’s life cycle seems to provide more financial capacity to 
invest in other livelihoods activities. Conversely, the lack of land for a newly settled 
household may hinder investment capacity of farmers. Therefore, it underlines the 
reciprocal relationship between access to land and investment capacity and the 
role of off-farm livelihoods for increasing on-farm production (investing in cash 
crops). 
Multi-activity and income diversification: the ‘real’ security in Dry Zone?
As underlined above, multi-activity in the Dry Zone is not the privilege of multi-
active small farmers but also concerns capitalized farmers households. This is actually 
something that distinguishes these two categories from the Agri-specialized small 
farmers one.  Nevertheless, the same strategies are not for everybody. For instance, 
it appears that multi-active small farmers are significantly correlated to the fact of 
107. 80% of Agri-specialized small farmers households cultivate between 2.5 and 10 acres. 
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having at least one member working outside the township. Agri-specialized small 
farmers, however, are more likely not to migrate and migration has no significant 
link with the capitalized farmers category. It suggests that migration is a strategy 
in itself especially for multi-active small farm households. 25% of capitalized family 
farmers also have a member migrating for work. This again reinforces the link put 
forward between younger multi-active small farmers heading in their lifetime to 
become capitalized family farmers. It indicates that when individuals do not yet 
have access to land – young individuals from capitalized farmers and multi-active 
small farmers households – are more likely to look for employment around and 
abroad before reinvesting earnings from this labor locally (and if possible, in land 
resources). On the other hand, Agri-specialized small farmers are correlated to 
the fact of having no members working outside the region or country (Table 57), 
suggesting that this category of farmers is caught in an almost exclusive agriculture-
based livelihood with few options for additional incomes apart from daily farm 
labor. Given the small frequency of inheritance and their low capacity to buy land, 
we may even consider the hypothesis that households – barely able to reproduce 
themselves especially in the absence of a land front and an increasing land 
fragmentation over time – are fuelling the growing body of landless households. 
When looking at incomes (see Table 58), Dry Zone multi-active small farmers 
are correlated to two different brackets: 29.7% of households are earning less than 
750,000 MMK a year, while 41.4% of households are situated in the 1,500,000 to 
3,000,000 MMK bracket. 
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Table 57: Frequency of households having at least one member working 
outside the township among the 3 farmer categories (Dry Zone) 
Capitalized 
family farmers 
Multi-active 
farmers 
Agri-specialized 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
None 85 74.6 74 66.7 107 83.6 266 75.4
1 or more 29 25.4 37 33.3 21 16.4 87 24.6
Total 114 100.0 111 100.0 128 100.0 353 100.0
Chi-Square=9.23  dof=2  p=0.01  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.162
Multi-active small farmers households in the upper category of incomes are 
in majority households with four persons108 and more (39.1% between five and six 
108. 32.6% of the 46 households earning between 1.5 and 3 million MMK a year. 
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persons, 13% with six to 12 individuals). A greater number of working individuals 
in the household are likely to make significant contributions to yearly incomes 
compared to the other multi-active households. Nonetheless, it also suggests 
a kind of ‘specialization’ in multi-activity, as these households are generally long 
established within the village tract109 and a great proportion (74%) is more than 
40 years old110. It means that these households are already well-established ones, 
which ‘specialized’ in multi-activity and specific economic niches (itinerant trading 
of items between villages, weaving, work in town, etc.), at least while not having 
access to larger tracts of land. The part of the Multi-active small farming households 
represented in the lower income category are younger and smaller. This is likely 
that part of these households will become Capitalized farmers in later stage of their 
life cycle, a fact reinforced by the shared propensity for multi-activity in these two 
categories. 
In the Dry Zone, the distribution of non-farm incomes among the three 
categories follows a ‘U’ shape described in Niehof (2004: 326, referring to Ellis 2000) 
regarding the significance of diversification for rural households. Here the non-
farm income share is relatively high for small farmers – for instance our multi-active 
category – and for larger farm-sizes (our capitalized family farmers) while it declines 
in the middle-income farm size – the Agri-specialized small farmers described in this 
chapter.  According to Niehof, this “situation occurs in rural areas where the poor are 
landless, the better-off have access to land from which they derive most of their income, 
109. 91.3% of these 46 households’ heads were born within the village tract. 
110. Against an average 62.2% for the multi-active micro farmers category in Dry Zone. 
VII. Land tenure and livelihood security
Table 58: Total incomes (in MMK) of the different farm categories (Dry Zone)
Total income 
(MMK)
Capitalized 
family farmers 
Multi-active 
farmers 
Agri-specialized 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
< 750,000 1 0.9 33 29.7 50 39.1 84 23.8
0.75 to  
< 1,5 millions
6 5.3 28 25.2 50 39.1 84 23.8
1,5 to  
< 3 millions
33 28.9 46 41.4 27 21.1 106 30.0
3 millions and 
more
74 64.9 4 3.6 1 0.8 79 22.4
Total 114 100.0 111 100.0 128 100.0 353 100.0
Chi-Square=213.0  dof=6  p=0.001  (very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.549
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and the rich are large landowners with different sources of income” (ibid.: 326). The 
same study by Ellis (2000), proposed two other patterns regarding the relationship 
between income diversification and poverty. The first one is a linear negative 
relationship where the share of non-farm incomes decreases with the landholding 
size. This pattern is observed in many parts of Asia and Latin America where access 
to agricultural land is the main factor distinguishing poor and rich households. The 
inverse relationship is found in rural Africa where livestock and human capital are 
the key resources differentiating the poor from the better-off households. Hence, 
as far as Dry Zone farmers are concerned, it is possible to draw on these three 
patterns to emphasize both access to land and access to livestock and human 
capital as key resources differentiating better-off and poorer households, while 
neither one nor the other are enough as a sole resource to secure a household’s 
livelihood. Apart from incomes (to which we saw that multi-active small farmers 
were correlated partly in the lowest and partly in the 2nd highest categories), the 
fact of lacking rice (for the household’s consumption) at least once in the year can 
be considered as a good indicator of their financial status and security. Looking at 
this variable, it appears that multi-active small farmers are characterized neither 
by the fact of being ‘food secure’ or ‘food insecure’ (see Table 59). However, Agri-
specialized small farmers – the category relying mostly on agricultural incomes – 
are linked to the fact of being ‘food insecure’. On the other hand, capitalized family 
farmers are significantly correlated to the fact of being ‘food secure’, with 98.2% of 
the households. 
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Table 59: Distribution of households declaring lacking rice at least once in the 
year, among the 3 farmers categories (Dry Zone)
Capitalised 
family farmers 
Multi-active 
farmers 
Farm-specialised 
small farmers 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Not 
enough 
rice
2 1.8 17 15.3 22 17.2 41 11.6
Enough 
rice
112 98.2 94 84.7 106 82.8 312 88.4
Total 114 100.0 111 100.0 128 100.0 353 100.0
Chi-Square=16.1  dof=2  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.214
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 6.4 Discussion on the two zones
When comparing Delta and Dry Zone farmers’ livelihood strategies and security, 
we may emphasize two features on which can be drawn different oppositions 
between the two areas. The first differentiating factor lies in the different histories 
of these two areas. As seen in Chapter IV, most Dry Zone villages under study have 
been developed from the pre-colonial Burmese monarchies through colonial times. 
These villages have been developed over a long time-span, based on customary 
social organization such as the pre-colonial divide between land owning individuals 
and their servants-tenants (kyun). Without denying the impacts of colonial rule on 
the Dry Zone (e.g. the restructuring of village-based administration), such villages 
nevertheless have a stronger capacity for ‘resilience’ regarding their own social 
organization in comparison with newly created ones. One remarkably significant 
observation is the existence of greater horizontal ties within each stratum of the 
society (large landowners, agricultural laborers, off-farm workers), which supplements 
the existence of vertical ties between landowners with their laborers, for example. 
In the Delta, on the other hand, for recent villages that were studied here, 
British colonial rule was much more than a disruption; it was a foundational act. 
Pushed by the opening of a new land front in the Delta, hundreds of thousands 
of Burmese migrants coming from the Dry Zone and other Upper Burma regions 
came to clear new lands, continuously extending cultivated areas toward the south. 
Not only were new villages composed of people coming from different areas and 
of different ‘backgrounds’ (yet most of them were royal servants or freemen), but 
they were constantly being re-modeled by households moving with the land front, 
others coming in to settle, etc. As a consequence, in most Delta villages vertical ties 
(or patron-client relationships) long dominated social organization at the expense 
of horizontal ones. The different histories of the two areas translate into – as far 
as livelihoods and land tenure are concerned – a greater economic differentiation 
among Dry Zone villages, coming with stronger reproduction mechanisms. In 
other words, Dry Zone landowners as a whole have higher probability of remaining 
land-owning households through generations, which is also true for landless 
laborers and other socioeconomic categories, who also have a higher probability 
of remaining within their own category. Hence, from the landowners’ perspective 
it can be translated as greater livelihoods’ security, while poorer strata of the 
population lack access to land as capitalized farmers capture most resources as 
they work to reproduce their own livelihoods. 
Conversely, in the Delta, socioeconomic mobility is higher and often operated 
along patronal ties. The patron-client relationship is based in great part on the 
access patrons get over two main kinds of resources: capital (land and financial 
capital) and social resources (through strategic relationships with people having 
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control over direct resources and over the local political landscape) (Geffray 
1996: 156). Such relationships are even more salient when access to extra-village 
resources (markets, but also authorities) are difficult, which is a central characteristic 
of Delta villages compared to the Dry Zone where roads allow greater mobility111. 
This organization is well illustrated by the importance of being connected with 
administrative authorities to be able to accumulate lands. While such relationship 
based on social capital cannot be measured easily through quantitative 
surveys, qualitative interviews show well this relationship (see Chapter VII.4.1). 
Yet, the relationship between different classes of landholdings and having a 
household member knowing somebody from local administrative bodies (village 
administrator, clerk, VTFMC) can support this assertion. In the Dry Zone, as seen 
in Table 60, the fact of knowing somebody from local administrative bodies is 
significantly correlated with the fact of having more than 10 acres of arable land 
(and conversely for landless households who are generally not connected). 
This is somewhat logical in an agrarian society, as larger landowners are generally 
able to access positions within integrating administrative bodies. Interestingly, in 
the Delta both households owning between zero and five acres and those owning 
more than 10 acres are significantly correlated with the fact of having one member 
in local administrative bodies (Table 61). This tends to show that access to social 
capital in Delta is important in accessing land but does not guarantee alone land 
accumulation, again underlining the greater socioeconomic mobility characterizing 
this region. This gives a sense of the preponderance of social capital in getting access 
to land, as it is not only related to the landholdings’ surfaces. 
111. In the Delta this also creates a differential between villages closer to Bogale (Aye Ywar for example) and more 
remote ones (such as Pay Chaung). 
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Table 60: Relationship with landholdings (acres) and the fact of having a 
household member in local administrative bodies in Dry Zone
Landless 0-5 5-10 > 10 Total 
Nb 
HH
%C Nb 
HH
%C Nb 
HH
%C Nb 
HH
%C Nb 
HH
%C
None 235 95.9 100 96.2 123 91.8 95 82.6 553 92.5
One & 
more
10 4.1 4 3.8 11 8.2 20 17.4 45 7.5
Total 245 100.0 104 100.0 134 100.0 115 100.0 598 100.0
Chi-Square=22.4  dof=3  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.193
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We must add here that the situation observed in Delta, evincing features of 
a pioneer society (which was the case in the 19th and early 20th centuries), may 
also be linked to the impact of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. Apart from the huge 
human death toll and the salinization of lands, most of all it inflicted a huge loss 
of capital (both financial and cattle) for all categories of households. Therefore, 
Cyclone Nargis probably affected the life cycle and the ‘typical’ trajectories of Delta 
households (which would gradually increase their livelihood security as household 
heads got older).
The second set of oppositions between farmers’ livelihood strategies in the 
Dry Zone and in the Delta relates to the different agricultural characteristics of the 
two areas. The fact that Delta villages are almost exclusively centered on paddy 
cultivation and that in the Dry Zone agriculture is much more diversified has 
different consequences. First, from a historical and political perspective, it greatly 
influenced the past governments’ policies and their impact locally. To summarize 
what has been explained in Chapter IV, much of previous Myanmar governments’ 
efforts focused on controlling paddy production for the state’s interests, often 
against farmers’ ones. Therefore, Delta villages were much more affected than 
in Dry Zone by these policies, among which the Compulsory Quota policy was 
probably the main vector of land sales and purchases (despite the legal ban on 
such transfers) executed in the Delta between 1964 and 2003. In the Dry Zone, 
this Compulsory Quota policy, despite being applied also to pulses, was somehow 
not profitable enough to justify policy enforcement. In the Dry Zone, most land 
sales and purchases were therefore linked to farmers’ own economic and familial 
characteristics, rather than driven by state policies. 
The major difference in agricultural practices has also a direct impact on the 
level of specialization farmers must engage. Paddy cultivation necessitates more 
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Table 61: Relationship with landholdings (acres) and the fact of knowing  
persons from local administrative bodies in Delta
Landless 0-5 5-10 > 10 Total 
Nb 
HH
%C Nb 
HH
%C Nb 
HH
%C Nb 
HH
%C Nb 
HH
%C
None 304 96.5 69 85.2 57 90.5 58 80.6 488 91.9
One & 
more
11 3.5 12 14.8 6 9.5 14 19.4 43 8.1
Total 315 100.0 81 100.0 63 100.0 72 100.0 531 100.0
Chi-Square=26.5  dof=3  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.223
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investments than most of other crops (with exception of onion in the Dry Zone). 
For smallholders, such investments are hard to mobilize, even with the support of 
the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank’s (MADB) low-interest loans, notably 
due to the untimely schedule on which these loans are delivered (see Chapter 
IX.2.2). This explains at least partly that 40.3% of landowners in the Delta rely on 
private loans against only 21.8% in the Dry Zone. The greater investments needed 
for paddy cultivation are integrated in the MADB loans’ policy which provides 
100,000MMK per acre up to ten acres for paddy cultivation, while ya crops are 
supported by a 20,000MMK loan per acre (up to ten acres as well). While more than 
60% of Delta farmers borrowed (all loans aggregated) more than 600,000MMK per 
year, 84% of Dry Zone farmers borrow less than 600,000MMK per year, with 33% 
only borrowing between 150 to 300,000MMK per year. Though the extent of profits 
made over paddy and other crops could not be precisely compared between the 
two zones through the quantitative study, some indicators show that as a whole 
Dry Zone farmers are more food secure than Delta farmers. As per Table 62, the 
rate of households having enough rice throughout the whole year is higher for 
Dry Zone (88.4%) than in the Delta (82.9%). The fact of having to borrow money 
for health expenses (an acknowledged cause of indebtedness and vulnerability 
throughout Myanmar112) shows the same opposition (Table 63). 
We must also elaborate on an a priori contradicting result: comparing 
landowners in the Dry Zone and the Delta having to borrow money in order to buy 
food significantly points at Dry Zone landowners as resorting to food related loans. 
However, with paddy as the staple food of lowlands Myanmar, paddy producers 
can keep part of their production for their own consumption, while few farmers 
produce paddy in the Dry Zone. On the other hand, more detailed scrutiny on Dry 
112. See for example Inn Kynn Khaing et al., 2015. 
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Table 62: Share of landowners declaring having (or not) enough rice  
throughout the year for their own consumption in Delta and Dry Zone
Delta Dry Zone Total 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Not 
enough 
rice
37 17.1 41 11.6 78 13.7
Enough 
rice
179 82.9 312 88.4 491 86.3
Total 216 100.0 353 100.0 569 100.0
Chi-Square=3.45  dof=2  p=0.176  Cramer’s V=0.078
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Table 63: Share of landowners having to borrow (or not) money for health 
purposes in Delta and Dry Zone
Delta Dry Zone Total 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Borrowing 
for health
67 32.8 54 19.1 121 24.9
Not 
borrowing 
for health
137 67.2 228 80.9 365 75.1
Total 204 100.0 282 100.0 486 100.0
Chi-Square=11.1  dof=1  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.151
Zone villages shows that the village of Hledar is in great part causing this effect with 
63% of landowners in this village reporting contracting loans for food expenses. 
This high rate is linked with the general poorer status of landowners in this village, 
where lands are of worse quality than in other villagers and where a great part of 
landowners are relying on small scale tomato cultivation, which is profitable yet 
quite limited in terms of surfaces and very localized in time. 
Hence, paddy production, and particularly double paddy cropping requires 
farmers to ‘specialize’ in agriculture113 notably due to its greater labor requirements 
and greater investments demanded. Farmers thus have to manage time and 
greater flows of money, having to move between different loan sources (MADB, 
private money-lenders) which brings greater risks of becoming over-indebted 
in case of crop failure. Ya crops necessitate on the contrary fewer investments, 
hence contain fewer risks in case of crop failure. However, due to weather’s 
unpredictability, we have seen that incomes’ diversification, notably in off-farm 
sectors but also by capitalizing on cattle, is a much-needed safety net for Dry Zone 
farmers independently from the surfaces they hold. 
7.  Who are the rural landless households? Discussing the  
      concepts of landlessness and ‘land-exclusion’
Rural landless households are defined here as those households who do not 
have permanent land use rights on farmland. This definition however encompasses 
a wide range of socioeconomic situations, from potential traders, business owners, 
113. This is true for Delta and Dry Zone. In Dry Zone, among the 77 households practicing double paddy cropping, 73 
have no other activities. 
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to daily farm laborers. While all these households are technically ‘farmlandless’ 
households, not all are engaged in farm work or may be seeking to become farmers. 
Moreover, we already looked quickly into the fact that landlessness (as defined 
here) does not mean the same thing for younger and older households, since the 
share of landless households decreases regularly with the age of the household’s 
head see section VII 2.1). This relationship at least shows that frequency of access 
to land increases with the age of the household (i.e. through inheritance and 
accumulation of financial and social capitals).
Before trying to categorize rural landless households, a first look at incomes 
generated by these households helps underline their diversity. As shown in Table 
64, 74.3% of landless households (among both zones) are in the two lowest income 
categories, while 61.4% of landowners are situated in the two highest income 
brackets. Hence, it seems at first sight that rural landlessness means economic 
vulnerability for the great majority. Yet, disaggregating between the two zones, it 
appears that rural landless households’ economic situation is quite different in the 
Delta and the Dry Zone. In the Dry Zone, landless households are overrepresented 
in the intermediate upper income category (1.5 million to three million MMK per 
year): 26.1% of Dry Zone landless are against 14.9% among Delta landless. On the 
other hand, in the Delta, 46.3% of landless households are in the lowest income 
category, and only 28% among Dry Zone landless households (Table 65).
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Table 64: Distribution of landowning and landless households according to 
annual total incomes in Delta and Dry Zone
Total income 
(MMK) 
Landowners 
 
Landless 
 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
TI <750,000 95 16.7 215 38.4 310 27.5
TI 750,000 to 
1,500,000
125 22.0 201 35.9 326 28.9
TI 1,500,000 
to 3,000,000
171 30.1 111 19.8 282 25.0
TI 
>3,000,000
178 31.3 33 5.9 211 18.7
Total 569 100.0 560 100.0 1,129 100.0
Chi-Square=176.5  dof=3  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.395
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Table 65: Distribution of landless households per annual total incomes and  
per area in Delta and Dry Zone
Total income 
(MMK) 
Delta 
 
Dry Zone 
 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
TI <750,000 146 46.3 69 28.2 215 38.4
TI 750,000 to 
1,500,000
108 34.3 93 38.0 201 35.9
TI 1,500,000 to 
3,000,000
47 14.9 64 26.1 111 19.8
TI >3,000,000 14 4.4 19 7.8 33 5.9
Total 315 100.0 245 100.0 560 100.0
Chi-Square=23.7  dof=3  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.206
Figure 40 shows that Delta landless much more frequently access lands 
through temporary arrangements (27% against only 6% in the Dry Zone). Delta 
landless are also much more dependent on on-farm activities and the primary 
sector (90% of Delta households against only 56% in Dry Zone).  These differences 
have to be linked with the greater diversity and greater wealth opportunities of 
income generating activities accessible by rural landless households in the Dry 
Zone compared to the Delta (see section VII.5 on income diversification), as well as 
greater labor mobility. When doing Factorial Analysis of Components (see Annex 
8 for the details), two groups can be distinguished based on their respective zone 
(Delta and Dry Zone) and associated activities (respectively fishing and weaving) 
on the one hand, and on the other a third group emerges based on the fact of 
accessing paddy lands under temporary arrangements. This third group is closely 
associated with the fact of breeding a large number of ducks (above 110 animals). 
Based on these two factors, it is logical that these farmers are mostly found in Delta. 
It is noteworthy that the ‘Delta landless’ group is closely associated with the 
fact of being involved in on-farm wage labor and the ‘Dry Zone landless’ group with 
the fact of being involved in off-farm wage labor. This supports the idea developed 
when discussing farmers’ livelihood strategies, that multi-activity in Delta is 
principally confined to on-farm livelihoods’ diversification while in Dry Zone more 
employment opportunities are available in the off-farm sector. 
Therefore, it already tends to confirm the assertion made earlier that in the 
Delta, more than in the Dry Zone, access to land is a highly differentiating factor 
among households, an idea which is explored further below. 
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Figure 40: Delta and Dry Zone landless’ involvement in the primary sector
Delta landless    
No Agri, No LS, 
No FW, 19%
LS only, 4%
LS & FW,  
No Agri, 18%
Agri only, 7%
Agri & LS, No FW, 7%
Agri & LS & FW, 7%
FW & Agri, No LS, 6%
FW only, 32%
Agri only, 3%
No Agri, No 
LS, No FW, 
44%
LS only, 9%
Agri & LS & FW, 2%
FW & Agri, No LS 1%
FW only, 28%
LS & FW, No Agri, 12%
Taking into account fishing, only 10% of 
landless have no primary sector income
27% access farmland
44% with no primary sector 
income
6% access farmland
Dry Zone landless
Agri: agriculture/cultivation, FW: on-farm hired labor work, LS: livestock breeding
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 7.1 Landlessness in the Delta
Following a FAC specific to the Delta (see Annex 8), landless households are 
distributed into three groups:
• The first one is highly characterized by households having access to temporary 
land use rights (hereafter ‘Farming Landless’), representing 72 households 
(among which 71 practice agriculture);
• The second one is mainly composed of on-farm wage laborers and fishermen 
(hereafter ‘Farm laborer and Fishing Landless’), representing 148 households; 
• The third one is mainly composed of off-farm wage laborers and households 
having small businesses (grocery shops mainly), hereafter called ‘Off-Farm 
landless’, composed of 95 households. 
In order to unpack landless 
households’ trajectories and 
strategies, a first look at the 
different age brackets of 
household heads in these three 
groups shows that Farming 
Landless households are 
generally headed by younger 
individuals (25% of them are 
under 30 years old while only
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Farming  
landless, 
23%
Off-farm  
landless, 
30%
On-farm 
fishing 
landless 47% 
 Figure 41: Distribution of different types  
of landless in Delta114
 
114. We observe a slight variation with the graphic above (Figure 30) – 23% of Farming Landless against 27% of 
landless accessing land through arrangements – due to the fact that some of landless households accessing land fall 
in the two other categories (Off-Farm and On-Farm fishing Landless). 
16.5% in the whole Delta landless 
population are headed by young 
household heads), Farm laborer 
and Fishing Landless are in average headed by slightly older individuals (37.2% 
of them are in the 30 to 40 years old category) and finally, Off-Farm landless are in 
average headed by older individuals (46.3% are aged more than 50). 
Temporary land use arrangements for landless: securing permanent access 
to land?
If we stick to the idea that at least part of landless households seek to become 
farmers with permanent land use rights (a somewhat logical ambition in any 
agrarian society), the relationship between each landless category and their 
respective age bracket is unlikely to point to a lifetime livelihood trajectory leading 
young Farming Landless households to become Farm laborer and Fishing Landless 
and then Off-Farm landless. It rather points at young Farming Landless households 
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on the eve of becoming farmers, most probably through inheritance as we have 
already seen that children inherit when they are in their 40s/50s. 
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Table 66: Distribution of Delta landless households in each category according 
to the age of the household head
Farming 
Landless 
On-Farm 
Fishing Landless
Off-Farm 
landless 
Total 
 
Age Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
< 30 18 25.0 24 16.2 10 10.5 52 16.5
30 to < 
40
28 38.9 55 37.2 18 18.9 101 32.1
40 to < 
50
15 20.8 38 25.7 23 24.2 76 24.1
50 to < 
60
9 12.5 21 14.2 21 22.1 51 16.2
≥ 60 2 2.8 10 6.8 23 24.2 35 11.1
Total 72 100.0 148 100.0 95 100.0 315 100.0
Chi-Square=37.7  dof=8  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.245
Looking closer at Farming Landless, 32 households are renting land from 
others and 36 households are cultivating land under sharecropping arrangements. 
Interestingly, the 32 households renting land only cultivate summer paddy, through 
free arrangements. As per qualitative interviews, these free arrangements are made 
among relatives. By contrast, 32 out of the 36 landless households cultivating land 
under sharecropping arrangements are doing so over the two seasons of paddy. 
Once again, as per qualitative interviews, although sharecropping arrangements 
are also widespread among families (such as in the case of parents temporarily 
giving lands under sharecropping to their children, before the latter receive them 
on a permanent basis, through inheritance), sharecropping arrangements are also 
done among ‘strangers’ – as in the case of Tet Tet Ku (14 out of the 36) which are 
contracted with an absentee landowner. Among the 36 households involved in 
sharecropping, 17 are cultivating more than five acres. 
Renting arrangements concern only small surfaces (mainly under three acres) 
of summer paddy. In the case of renting out land for summer paddy, qualitative 
interviews rather point at landowners lacking the financial capacity to put all their 
lands under cultivation – which is much more expensive than for monsoon paddy 
– and therefore providing the opportunity to close landless households (whether 
being relatives or inscribed into their client networks) to work a plot of land as 
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an additional source of income. Therefore, among the group of Farming Landless 
households, about one-third of them (the familial sharecropping agreements) may 
be considered as potentially securing land use rights over the land they cultivate 
through inheritance in a latter stage.  Returning to the three landless households 
categories, a comparison in terms of annual incomes shows the following trend: 
farming landless and Off-Farm landless are well distributed among the three 
incomes categories (see below), yet are correlated to the upper class of incomes 
(> 1.5 million MMK/year); Farm laborer and Fishing Landless are hardly found in 
the upper class of incomes and rather are statistically correlated to the lowest one 
(< 750,000 MMK/year). 
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Table 67: Distribution of Delta landless categories per total annual incomes
Total income 
(MMK)
Farming 
Landless 
On-Farm 
Fishing Landless
Off-Farm 
landless 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
TI 
<750,000
26 36.1 87 58.8 33 34.7 146 46.3
TI 0.75 to 
1.5 millions
19 26.4 59 39.9 30 31.6 108 34.3
> 1.5 
millions
27 37.5 2 1.4 32 33.7 61 19.4
Total 72 100 148 100 95 100 315 100.0
Chi-Square=59.3  dof=4  p=0.001  (very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.307
The fact that a quarter of landless farming households report they are able 
to save money would support the idea that accessing land through temporary 
arrangements may be a strategy to later purchase permanent land use rights. 
Looking at Delta landowners who bought land after 2003 (29 households), 12 
households (41%) did so between the ages of 30 and 40, once again supporting 
the idea that older households purchase land after having accumulated enough 
money. Finally, this category is also statistically correlated to the fact of declaring 
livestock as a main source of profit (which is the case for 16.7% of landless farming 
households).
The landless farming household category reminds us of the multi-active small 
farmers in the Dry Zone discussed above, who diversify their agricultural incomes 
(relatively low as they generally own small plots) through animal husbandry to 
constitute financial capital as part of their patrimonial reproduction strategy. This 
constitutes one more indicator of the fact that landless households contracting 
216 
temporary land use arrangements in the Delta are heading toward the status of 
farmers. As we have seen in the previous discussion of Delta farmers, socioeconomic 
mobility remains high and land tenure security low, especially for those owning 
small surfaces (under 10 acres). 
An attempt to disaggregate ‘land-excluded’ and ‘non-farm’ landless 
households
Motivated by the desire to attain a more precise picture of landless households’ 
diversity, and also trying to better characterize processes of exclusion over access 
to land resources, an overview of the two remaining categories may help this 
endeavor.
As explained above, Off-Farm landless household heads are correlated with 
the fact of being aged more than 50. The share of older households suggests a 
kind of specialization in off-farm work, with 21% of households putting off-
farm employed work derived profits in first position in terms of contribution to 
the household income and 13% small-business derived profits as main source 
of household income. Note that fishing is not an activity characterizing this 
category compared to on-farmlandless fishers, though 17% of Off-Farm landless 
declare fishing as their main source of profit. For these Off-Farm landless fishing 
households, total incomes suggest these households are composed of full-
time fishermen rather than seasonal – small scale – ones (by contrast with farm 
laborer/fishing landless). One last characteristic is that 35.8% of these households 
benefit from migrant remittances, which is significantly higher than the average 
(18.7%) of Delta landless households. Given that people migrating for work are 
generally younger individuals, and on the other hand the average age of an Off-
Farm landless household head is greater than for other categories, we can make 
the hypothesis that young individuals from these households are more likely to 
look for work outside the local sphere (and most probably in urban areas). Based 
on these observations, we may even say that landlessness for this category is not 
(anymore) a default state while waiting for the opportunity to access land, but is 
(or has become) a strategy to reduce their dependence on land for their livelihood. 
Finally, the farm laborer/fishing landless category (aspiring to become farmers 
as well – see Chapter V.4), who represent almost half of Delta landless households, 
may be the most affected by local exclusion processes regarding land access, on 
which they however highly depend as on-farm wage laborers. Fishing arrives in first 
position for 37.8% of them (and in second position for 28.4%) but on-farm wage 
labor is their primary source of income with 42.1% of them declaring this activity as 
their first source of profit, and 31.1% as their second main source of profit. 
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Therefore, when talking about landlessness in the Delta, we could tentatively 
conclude that about one half of rural landless households are in need of attaining 
access to farmlands in order to secure their livelihood. This is somewhat confirmed 
by Farm laborer/fishing landless households being the sole category linked (even if 
with little statistical significance) with the fact of lacking rice at least once over the 
year (44.6% compared to an average 39% for Delta landless households).
Yet, considering the age-effect already observed on the ratio landless/
landowners, we could go further discussing an ‘appropriate’ definition of landlessness 
in the Delta, with regard to the need to access farmland. It has been said that being 
aged 40 to 50 years old was a critical point in households’ agricultural trajectories, 
marking the time of inheritance. Figures in section VII 2.1 well illustrates this point: 
the proportion of landless households decreases continuously with older household 
head age categories, and stabilizes for the 40-50 year age category. Based on this 
and above analysis of Delta landless households, we could propose the following 
calculations (while bearing in mind that such lifetime trajectories may change over 
the next generations, a point discussed in VII.2.1).
As explained above, about half (148 households) of the total 315 households 
may be considered here as ‘genuine’ agrarian landless. Besides, the ratio landless/
landowners in the Delta shows that landless households decrease by 27% between 
the 30 to 40  years old and the 40 to 50 years old  categories. Therefore, we could 
consider that about a third of the landless households surveyed in Delta (that is 
20% of the total 531 surveyed households) have no prospect of accessing land 
through their lifetimes.
Of course, this is only an attempt to disaggregate the different categories 
of landless households in Delta and we are well aware of the limitations of such 
extrapolations based on past agricultural trajectories that may not necessarily 
remain the same over time (see Section 7.3 on this point). Besides, it does not take 
into account local discrepancies – e.g., in villages such as Pay Chaung or Tet Tet Ku 
the ‘genuine landless’ proportion is much higher than in Aye Ywar or Thabyugon 
for example. 
 7.2 Landlessness in Dry Zone
In order to situate landlessness in the Dry Zone against landlessness in the 
Delta, we must underline the fact that in the Dry Zone only 6.5% of the landless 
households cultivate land under temporary arrangements, which is considerably 
lower than the 23% of Delta landless households involved in such arrangements. 
Hence, the fact of cultivating others’ land could not be used as a differentiating 
factor. On the other hand, given the greater opportunities for income diversification 
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in the Dry Zone, the FAC performed on landless households took mainly into 
account the different on-farm and off-farm activities and their rating in terms of 
profit sources (see Annex 8). Based on this FAC, Dry Zone landless households have 
been disaggregated into 3 groups: 
• The first one, which includes 51 households, is characterized by being almost 
exclusively composed of on-farm wage laborers (94% of these households), 
an activity from which they get their main source of income (72.5% of these 
households). They are hereafter called ‘Farm Laborer Landless’.
• The second one, made of 74 households, is characterized by being actively 
involved in livestock breeding (93% of these households), including cattle 
(46%). Livestock breeding represents the first source of income for almost 34% 
of households. Nonetheless, 55% of these households also practice on-farm 
wage labor – yet this activity is ranked first source of income for only 9.5% of 
these households – and 90% have some members involved in off-farm wage 
labor (36.5% of households in the category report this activity as their main 
source of profit). For these reasons, they are hereafter called ‘Multi-Active 
Landless’. 
• Finally, a third group of 120 households is characterized by being mainly 
involved in off-farm activities115 (99% of these households) and are statistically 
correlated with the fact of not being involved in on-farm wage labor (only 27.5% 
have members doing on-farm wage labor) from which 64% of households 
are getting their main source of income. They are hereafter called ‘Off-Farm 
landless’. 
Given there is a statistical correlation between these categories and neither 
the age of the household head nor the average age of the household members, it 
is impossible to discuss possible lifetime trajectories, as done for Dry Zone farmers 
and Delta landless households. Therefore, we should discuss these categories mainly 
in terms of livelihood security, specialization, and in comparison with Delta landless 
households. 
A genuine Off-Farm landless category?
Interestingly enough, while the bulk of Delta landless households fall in the 
most vulnerable category, so-called on-farmlandless fishers, in the Dry Zone most 
landless households (49%) fall in the Off-Farm landless one (i.e. non agrarian).  As its 
name indicates, these Off-Farm landless households are characterized by performing 
mostly (almost exclusively) off-farm livelihood activities. In order to reinforce their off-
farm specialization, we can notice that very few (19 households) are involved in home 
gardening, even fewer (only three households) in animal husbandry, none possess 
115. Here defined as excluding animal husbandry as well. 
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cattle, while only 33 households 
count members involved in on-
farm wage labor. 
As a matter of fact, these 
landless households have put a 
great distance from agricultural 
livelihoods. In this regard, Off-
Farm landless household heads 
are significantly correlated with 
being more literate (see Table 
68). Indeed, government staff 
(teachers, administrative staff) are 
present. Furthermore, they show a 
stronger interest in investing in education for their family members, as seen in Table 
69. The link with the Off-Farm landless category and the percentage of household 
members reaching higher education is even more significant, as almost 52% of 
households are composed of three or fewer individuals. Such correlation cannot 
be found in any other categorization (whether on farmers or landless in both 
zones). Hence, marking a difference with the Delta, the Dry Zone seems to feature 
a significant number (at least half of all landless households) of genuine Off-Farm 
landless households, who have little concern or interest in agrarian livelihoods. This 
supports the idea that access to land-based resources is less important in shaping 
Dry Zone communities’ livelihoods than in the Delta. This may also be the result of a 
higher degree of land fragmentation compared to the Delta, and less socioeconomic 
mobility for landless households (between off-farm and agrarian livelihoods) leading 
a fringe of Dry Zone society to connect with more ‘urban’ livelihoods.
Agrarian landless: strength in numbers?
Among the three categories introduced above, two can be characterized by 
the total yearly incomes they generate. Quite in line with what has been underlined 
for Dry Zone farmers, it seems that multi-activity (both on-farm and off-farm) is also 
profiting landless households. Indeed, the multi-active landless are significantly 
correlated with earning more than 1.5 millions MMK/year (Table 70). Yet, before 
concluding too hastily of the existence of a livelihood-secure, agrarian landless 
category, we must first notice that such important incomes are consistent with the 
over-representation of these households in larger families. Indeed, the multi-active 
landless are quite significantly correlated with households counting more than 
five individuals (which is the case for 42% of households, compared to an average 
28.6% among all Dry Zone landless). 
Performing a quick analysis on the relationship between households’ size and 
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Table 68: Household heads’ level of education in the different landless 
categories in the Dry Zone
Farm Laborer 
Landless 
Multi-Active 
Landless
Off-Farm 
landless 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
A: Primary 
and under
46 90.2 70 94.6 97 80.8 213 86.9
B: Middle 
school 
and more
5 9.8 4 5.4 23 19.2 32 13.1
Total 51 100.0 74 100.0 120 100.0 245 100.0
Chi-Square=8.24  dof=2  p=0.016  (Significant)  Cramer’s V=0.183
Table 69: Share of household’s members attending higher education per 
landless categories in the Dry Zone
Farm Laborer 
Landless 
Multi-Active 
Landless
Off-Farm 
landless 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Less than 
one third
47 92.2 63 85.1 89 74.2 199 81.2
One third 
and more
4 7.8 11 14.9 31 25.8 46 18.8
Total 51 100.0 74 100.0 120 100.0 245 100.0
Chi-Square=8.66  dof=2  p=0.013  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.188
the fact of lacking rice or not at least once in the year shows that 68% of landless 
households (all categories included) with four individuals and more are lacking 
rice once in the year, against only 51% for households counting three or fewer 
individuals.  However, with regard to the livelihood security indicators available for 
this study, there is little evidence suggesting multi-active landless are more or less 
secure than farm laborer landless households. 
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Given that Off-Farm landless households have been clearly established as a 
non-agrarian category, and in absence of relationship between multi-active and 
farm laborer landless categories and the age of the household, we may consider 
that these two agrarian categories constitute a reservoir of rural landless who, as 
they grow older, will either become farmers or remain landless (whether agrarian 
or off-farm ones). Indeed, as explained in the beginning of this discussion on 
landlessness, the share of landless households decreases with the age of the 
household.  Taking into account the age-effect on the landlessness rate, and 
the difficulty to distinguish among households from the two agrarian landless 
categories between who are heading towards farmer status and who may remain 
landless, we may propose the following interpretation:
Much like in Delta, if we exclude the off-farm landless category from agrarian 
landless households, it leads to about half of the landless households (120 out of 
245) being in need of farmlands.
The landless/landowner ratio in the Dry Zone shows that landless households 
decrease by 31% between the 30-40 years old to the 40-50 years old category 
(see Figure 26). Here again, we could project that one third of the total landless 
(that is about 14% of the total surveyed households) are at risk of perpetually 
being in economically vulnerable situations due to exclusion from land-based 
resources.
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Table 70: Distribution of Dry Zone landless households per categories and total 
yearly incomes
Total income 
(MMK)
Farm Laborer 
Landless 
Multi-Active 
Landless
Off-Farm 
landless 
 
Total 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
TI <750,000 23 45.1 7 9.5 39 32.5 69 28.2
TI 0.75 to 
1.5 millions
23 45.1 24 32.4 46 38.3 93 38.0
> 1.5 
millions
5 9.8 43 58.1 35 29.2 83 33.9
Total 51 100.0 74 100.0 120 100.0 245 100.0
Chi-Square=38.8  dof=4  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.281
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 7.3 A changing agrarian landscape? 
While we presented a ‘genuine’ category of non-agrarian landless in Dry 
Zone, the existence of such category in the Delta is far less obvious. Together 
with qualitative interviews, the quantitative study suggests that Dry Zone Off-
Farm landless households are definitively not relying anymore on agricultural 
livelihoods. In the Delta, the same category rather points at households in the 
process of putting some distance between themselves and agrarian livelihoods, 
that is adopting non-agricultural activities and especially migrating to other 
places in search of new income opportunities. Although the quantitative study 
could not cover the full extent of migrations, qualitative interviews indicate that 
resorting to remittances from family members who work in urban wage jobs 
(principally in Yangon) is an increasing trend, one that intensified after Nargis 
as confirmed also by Thiesmeyer (2012:7). Besides, the quantitative study shows 
that the overall proportion of households reporting benefiting from remittances 
is higher in Delta (17%) than in Dry Zone (11.5%). 
The second fact is that in the Delta, remittances are received essentially by 
landless and smallest land-owning (less than 2.5 acres) households. In the Dry 
Zone, it is the opposite and the highest frequency of those receiving remittances 
are found in the larger landownership categories: 5 to 10 acres (17.7% of 
households ) and 10-15 acres (15.5% of households). Therefore, this all indicates 
that migrations in the Dry Zone are a farmers’ strategy to improve their financial 
capital to be reinvested locally (though not necessarily in farm livelihoods, 
but also children’s education, etc.), while in the Delta migrations tend to drive 
landless households outside the Delta’s agrarian sphere. Even in the absence 
of figures relating to households definitely leaving the region, studies dealing 
with Yangon peri-urban growth show that the majority of households settling 
in townships such as Hlaing Tha Yar come from the Ayeyarwaddy Delta (Boutry, 
forthcoming). 
Government policies on paddy had a great impact of land trajectories for 
Delta households. However, the differences observed between Off-Farm landless 
in the two zones suggest other impacting factors. First, the devastating effects 
of Cyclone Nargis on southern Delta townships surely come into play. Indeed, 
much infrastructure and assets but also savings (cash, seeds, and crops) were 
destroyed, land often standing as the only remaining asset (though some tracts 
of lands disappeared with the cyclone and increasing salinity affected others, 
especially in the most southern part of the Delta). Following this reasoning, any 
genuine Off-Farm landless category would have been greatly affected.  The recent 
disappearance of the land frontier in the Delta may also be affecting the landless 
situation. Indeed, new land was still available to be put under cultivation no less 
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than 20 years ago. Hence, geographical mobility remained high, especially for 
households having no access to land in their former place. In the Dry Zone, where 
the land frontier disappeared long ago in most villages, demographic pressure 
and land fragmentation over generations implies a greater necessity for part of 
the population to opt for non-agrarian livelihoods.  
Reflecting on the last point, it is highly probable that land fragmentation will 
curb the trend observed in increasing land access along with increasing age of the 
household, particularly for the Dry Zone. For the Delta, the lift of predatory policies 
such as the compulsory procurement of paddy to the government (stopped in 
2003), will probably mean greater land tenure security for farming households. We 
could even expect Delta households following life-cycles closer to the Dry Zone 
in coming generations, with also a smaller rate of landless households than in the 
past, while in the Dry Zone landless households would proportionally increase. 
Figure 43 shows that the deviation between landless/landowners’ ratio among 
the two zones is, interestingly, decreasing with the age of households, meaning 
that access to land over time increases in greater proportion for Delta households 
than for Dry Zone ones. This may be explained by the higher frequency and larger 
plot areas purchased in the Delta after 2003 compared to the Dry Zone, here again 
suggesting less demographic pressure on land resources in the Delta than in the 
Dry Zone. 
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Figure 43: Ratio of landless households/landowners’ households according to the 
age of household head, in each zone and deviation between the two zones
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We have essentially spoken in this section about access to land but it is also 
useful to reflect on the proportion of landless who used to own land and have lost 
such access to land. In the Delta, an average of 9% of surveyed landless households 
had accessed landownership (through clearing, buying, inheritance, etc.) between 
1988 and 2014, three times more than in the Dry Zone. The following section will 
further explore exclusion processes. 
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In Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in Southeast Asia116, the authors 
provide an innovative, practical, and useful framework for understanding the 
profound transformations affecting land use and social relations around land since 
the 1980s, by focusing on the notion of ‘exclusion’, arguing “that all land use and 
access requires exclusion of some kind” (Hall et al., 2011: 4). 
Exclusion is not a random process, nor does it occur on a level playing field. 
It is structured by power relations. Across rural Southeast Asia and elsewhere, 
exclusion from land can be understood in terms of the interaction between 
regulation, force, the market and legitimation… Regulation, often but not 
exclusively associated with the state and legal instruments, sets the rules 
regarding access to land and conditions of use. Force excludes by violence 
or the threat of violence, and is brought to bear by both state and non-state 
actors. The market is a power of exclusion as it limits access through price and 
through the creation of incentives to lay more individualized claims to land. 
Legitimation establishes the moral basis for exclusive claims, and indeed 
for entrenching regulation, the market and force as politically and socially 
acceptable bases for exclusion. 
(Hall et al. 2011: 4)
All these forces may operate at different scales – from local and village-based, 
to national and global – and the way land exclusion processes are effected may be 
the result of these powers interacting between different scales as well. To illustrate 
this point, the Myanmar government’s Compulsory Procurement of Paddy policy is 
surely a matter of policy designed at the national level – where the state’s discourse 
on national autonomy in paddy production triggers powers of legitimation and 
regulation – while the different ways it impacted landholders is more the result 
of village-based power relationships: how legitimation and market forces operate 
through socioeconomic relationships explains the dispossession of one farmer for 
the benefit of another in the name of the same policy; or how force is employed by 
local authorities either to maneuver around the policy so as to benefit one farmer 
or on the contrary to enforce the policy. Legitimation also operated in the land 
reallocation procedures at the village level. Indeed, as mentioned previously, the 
lands seized from undutiful farmers would most often be allocated to better-off 
farmers rather than to smaller or landless farmers in the village. Such decisions were 
116. 2011, Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch and Tania Murray Li. 
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justified by the narrative that the lands would be more productive – and hence the 
nation would benefit more – if cultivated by farmers who had the capacity to invest.
In this section, we go back to the research hypothesis, that is that high rates of 
landlessness observed in Burmese lowlands (between 40% and 70% of the rural 
population117) cannot be solely attributed to the dimension of large scale land 
grabs and evictions as often brought to the foreground by most reports dealing 
with land issues in Myanmar. As a matter of fact, none of the studied villages was 
impacted by land grabbing, yet landlessness rates are high. This problematic leads 
us to the dimension of village-based intimate exclusion, that is exclusion as the 
result of agrarian class formation, face-to-face relationships between villagers, 
and more largely the processes through which social intimates – neighbors and 
kin – exclude each other from access to agricultural land. To bring up these issues, 
we proceed by analysing first how ‘class division’ between large landholders and 
landless or smallholders shapes exclusion at the village level. The second entry 
point is access to credit – that is how the power of ‘market’ (yet highly connected to 
regulation and force) shapes exclusion at the village level. We conclude this part by 
analysing more particularly the role of the headman in land management in history 
and through the reform, as a particularly important stakeholder at the village level, 
concentrating most of the powers at work in exclusion processes: regulation, force, 
market and legitimation.
1.  Village-based class division and exclusion
 1.1 Dry Zone: intimate exclusion through power of legitimation 
Land exclusion – both in the ways in which already-existing access to land is 
maintained by the exclusion of other potential users and the ways in which people 
who lack access are prevented from getting it – is found in Dry Zone villages. 
Because of villagers’ greater social and economic stability – as opposed to mobility 
– the issue is often a matter of how people legitimize their exclusive claims on 
land, and how class divisions find support in this legitimation, and vice versa. 
Forms of marriage endogamous to class – individuals from landless households 
marrying landless, large landholders marrying within the same class – are part of 
this legitimacy of exclusive claims. The rationale from this legitimation is largely 
supported by the dama-u-gya practice – that is, rights acquired through clearing 
and cultivating any vacant land transforms it into the property of the cultivator. 
Since in the Dry Zone the agricultural frontier closed much earlier than in the 
117. Compared to most of surrounding Southeast Asian countries . In Cambodia, landless farmers now make up 28% 
of the rural population (Phann et al., 2015) while in Vietnam, landlessness rates among rural households are estimated 
at 12%. (Mellac and Castellanet, 2015). 
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Delta, retaining legitimate claims to land by pioneer families increasingly became a 
matter of excluding others seeking access to land, especially when inheritance and 
demographic growth led to land fragmentation. The strategies developed to retain 
access to sustainable landholdings – the bigger the better – even involve exclusion 
processes within the same family. As such, the following case of ‘U Shwe’, a villager 
from Gaw Gyi (Monywa township), is informative. 
U Shwe inherited 15 acres from his parents, who had a family of 6 children. Two of 
them passed away very early. Among his remaining three siblings, two are unmarried 
women who have lived together with him since they were young. His elder brother 
who had no children also got 15 acres and handed over those lands to U Shwe. U 
Shwe’s wife inherited 10 acres from her parents. Hence he came to hold 40 acres of 
land. 
U Shwe has six sons and three daughters. The eldest is 49 years old and the 
youngest is 23 years old. Four of them are married and left the parents’ household. 
U Shwe lives together with two sons and two daughters who remain unmarried. All 
except two have graduated from University. Only two sons and two daughters pursue 
farming, succeeding to their parents, and the others are serving as government 
employees and private school teachers. 
BOX 15: RETAINING ACCESS TO LAND OVER GENERATIONS
The case of U Shwe illustrates well the intra-class endogamy found in Dry 
Zone villages. While he inherited 15 acres from his parents, he married someone 
who could also bring in significant holdings (as his wife brought 10 more to the 
household’s landholding.) Second, the effort developed by U Shwe and his wife to 
offer a proper education to his children underlines another kind of strategy: even 
with 40 acres as a whole, dividing those equally among nine children would mean 
the end of the family’s belonging to a ‘large landholder’ class.
 This issue is then addressed by keeping only four children in farming livelihoods 
while the others are provided with an ‘equivalent’ high status – and livelihood 
security – as government employees and school teachers. This may not hide 
attempts of socioeconomic mobility by other individuals in Dry Zone villages. The 
present study also recorded many successful cases of individuals who managed 
to access land and climb the socioeconomic ladder. However, the following case, 
recorded in Si Laung village (Yinmabin township), illustrates well the difficulties 
faced by those undertaking this ascent. 
The case of U Thein’s family exemplifies the difficulties faced by landless and small 
scale farming families to retain access to land and eventually try to expand their 
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U Thein was formerly a porter working in a broker house in Monywa. He lived in 
the outskirts of Monywa and saved money to buy a small house. Since his parents, 
living in Si Laung village, had eight children, U Thein’s share of inheritance from the 
parents was only one acre of farmland. U Thein nevertheless wished to be a farmer, so 
he went to Monywa and worked hard to save money and later on sold his house and 
went back to Si Laung. With his savings, U Thein bought farmlands.
U Thein cultivated 13 acres with his wife. They have four children. In the family 
farm succession cycle, the parents allocated two acres to the elder son, three acres to 
Maung Gyi and two acres to Maung Nge (twin brothers). The daughter is unmarried, 
living together with the parents and cultivates the parents’ farmland together with 
them. 
The elder son married a woman who inherited four acres from her parents. 
He raised a young calf before he departed from the parents’ house. After marriage, 
the parents-in-law gave an additional cattle, so the couple could cultivate their 
farm independently with a pair of cattle. They purchased afterwards four acres and 
recovered some virgin land by their own effort not far away from their village. 
Maung Gyi got married but his wife received no land in inheritance, and as the 
family was poor, it had to sell off two acres of farmland. The father, U Thein gave them 
another acre. They had no cattle and could not cultivate the land properly. Maung Gyi 
finally sold all the land to buy a herd of goats. The couple now lives on goat breeding. 
Maung Nge also married a woman who received no land in inheritance. They 
cleared virgin land to make a field of half an acre near a nearby mountain. They 
bought an additional acre and they now have a total of 3.5 acres. Their livelihood 
is just subsistence-based. His sister helps the family in cultivation. They pooled the 
farmlands to work together and share the farm’s produce.
farm holdings. It also provides a mirror image of how capitalized family farmers 
exclude others from accessing land by capturing both legitimation (or social 
regulation) – land is kept among this class through endogamy and inheritance – 
and market powers – as capitalized farmers they are the one able to buy more land, 
and also able to invest in production tools, etc. Farmers in Dry Zone villages who 
lack both the benefits of inheritance and capitalizing (and purchasing) power, find 
it difficult to access and retain land.  When talking about the power of market here, 
we must keep in mind that it is also highly linked with access to social capital. 
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BOX 16: THE STRUGGLE OF A SMALL-SCALE FARMING FAMILY TO  
MAINTAIN ACCESS TO LAND
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As rightly underlined by the authors of Powers of Exclusion, “there is often a 
‘market price’ for the bribe that will induce guards to look the other way as fishers use 
an off-limits breach, or the pay-off that will convince a city council to rezone a piece 
of land for conversion” (Hall et al. 2011: 18). But in many cases having the money 
may not be enough without knowing the right authorities to bribe, and this relies 
on the individual’s social capital. In some instances, this social capital cum market 
power may act counter to or together with legitimation depending on the scale 
where these apply. Before unpacking this idea, we should go through the following 
land dispute case. 
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A pair of siblings moved from one of the villages under study to Mandalay, leaving 
the farmland they had received in inheritance to remaining villagers for continued 
cultivation. About 20 years went by.
At the time of land registration (2013), the villagers who were cultivating the 
land were seeking to apply for Form 7. The Mandalay-based absentee landowners 
protested against this action. The Village Tract Farmland Management Committee 
wanted to assign the land to the villagers currently cultivating the land. But due 
to continued objection, the case was sent up to the township administrator. The 
absentee landowners paid a large sum of money to the authority and were finally 
granted Form 7. 
BOX 17: LEGITIMATION VS. MARKET? CONTRADICTING CLAIMS OVER LAND
This land dispute shows that the market force in this situation – i.e. the price 
to bribe a government officer – goes against village-based legitimation of access 
to land by operating at a higher level, the township. The point made here is that 
the socioeconomic structuration of Dry Zone villages often gives more weight to 
‘customary’ norms of legitimation than other types of powers when operating at 
the village level – so that other powers may be applied at higher levels to overcome 
these norms. This contrasts Dry Zone from Delta villages, where exclusion through 
legitimate claims is often minimized at the profit of individuals with greater social 
capital, playing with the powers of force, market, and regulations. To support this 
idea, the qualitative study indicates that while in the Dry Zone, village founders 
often retained their access to land, in the Delta, pioneers often lost their access, 
leading them either to move to other areas or to become landless households. 
 1.2 Delta: intimate exclusion through force and market
In the Delta, village-based norms of legitimation are weak compared to the 
Dry Zone, and this surely has to do with the high socioeconomic mobility which 
operated through the development of the region’s agricultural frontier into the rice 
bowl of Myanmar. We could say conversely that impacts of government policies 
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U Kyaw Lin was a member of his village administration (Ya Wa Ta) in 1995 for 
three and a half years. From 2006 to 2010, he served also as village tract leader for 
four years. Since then, he has not been involved in village administration affairs. After 
getting married in 1992, he worked as a boat manager and paddy broker for eight 
years. Since 1996, U Kyaw Lin gradually acquired lands and currently owns 30 acres. 
During the land registration process, the land tenure rights over 28 of these 30 acres 
were contested by four different persons. Below are the details of the lands U Kyaw Lin 
gradually acquired:
The first 10 acres: U Kyaw Lin first acquired 10 acres from Daw Shwe, another 
villager. Daw Shwe and her daughters together used to cultivate these 10 acres. In 
1995, Daw Shwe and her family couldn’t provide the forced procurement paddy 
baskets to government for 10 acres. So the next cultivation season, the village tract 
land committee put her lands on the waiting list. The two daughters of Daw Shwe 
requested to the land committee to transfer the confiscated 10 acres back to them 
in their name, instead of transferring the lands to other villagers. One of the two 
daughters, Daw Tin living with her mother, then got the permission to work five of the 
10 seized acres under her name. The other daughter, Daw Khin received the remaining 
five acres under the name of her husband, himself the brother of U Kyaw Lin. In 1997, 
were less mitigated by local social norms than in the Dry Zone. Yet, both the way 
individuals put to work the powers of force and market to get access to land, and 
the way they play with these policies, have to do mostly with intimate exclusion.
Here we may recall the fact that according to our analysis in Chapter VII.6.3, 
capitalized-family farmers in the Delta are more characterized by their purchasing 
power than the opportunity they got from inheriting land. On the other hand, we 
also stressed that much of the land market in the Delta was linked to the Compulsory 
Paddy Procurement policy and that one’s capacity to access this market was 
much a matter of having connections with relevant men of power and authority. 
The study case below is very enlightening in this regard. Farmers adopted many 
coping strategies when they were unable to fulfil the paddy quotas. Among other 
strategies to avoid prison and totally losing their lands, farmers would ask a better-
off farmer to pay the needed quota of paddy baskets on their behalf. In return, the 
better-off farmer would receive the land use rights on the plot of land and keep the 
farmer working as a casual laborer or as a sharecropper. However, it is not a rule. One 
landlord would strategically avoid having the same farmer continuously cultivating 
his former paddy field as the landlord feared the former landowner would one day 
claim back his lands. On the contrary, this landlord preferred distributing derived 
land use rights (such as sharecropping) to other farmers, preferably farmers which 
had recently migrated from other villages.
VIII. Landlessness as a result of intimate exclusion
BOX 18: STUDY CASES: LAND ACCUMULATION AND CONTESTED  
RIGHTS IN DELTA
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Daw Tin couldn’t deliver the 60 baskets due to the government, so the five acres were 
transferred to another villager. The latter sold his lands to U Kyaw Lin for the price of 
20,000 MMK/acre. At that time, as farmers were not allowed to sell, buy, or mortgage 
lands, the two parties did not make any official contract. To overcome the legal ban 
on land transfers, the seller officially handed over the five acres to the village tract 
leader (part of the village tract land committee) with the pretext of his not being able 
to cultivate them. Then the village tract leader transferred the lands to U Kyaw Lin. U 
Kyaw Lin’s brother and his wife cultivated their five acres for two years. 
After two years, in 1997 they couldn’t transfer the due paddy to the government. 
U Kyaw Lin then transferred on their behalf the due 60 baskets of paddy to the 
government. In addition, the brother was already indebted to U Kyaw Lin for 10,000 
Kyats, 40 baskets of seeds, and renting charges for one buffalo (30 baskets of paddy). 
As he was unable to repay his debts, the brother agreed to transfer his land to U Kyaw 
Lin. 
Under the recent land registration process, Daw Tin contested the five acres first 
transferred to another villager and then sold to U Kyaw Lin. However, the other sister 
Daw Khin didn’t want to contest the five acres transferred to U Kyaw Lin, being his 
sister-in-law. As a result, Daw Tin ultimately objected to the transfer of the land rights 
of the 10 acres previously held by her mother, but which are now held by U Kyaw Lin.
+ 5 acres: In 1992, U Ngwe bought five acres from U Htun. Two years later, U Ngwe 
obtained a bad paddy harvest (only 40 baskets for five acres!) due to a serious pest 
infestation. U Htun, the former owner, had informed U Ngwe that he wanted to buy 
those five acres back, in case U Ngwe would need to sell them. U Htun however lacked 
the financial capacity to do so. U Ngwe finally sold those five acres to U Kyaw Lin for 
10,000 Kyat/acre. Yet, under the recent land registration process, U Htun has contested 
the land tenure rights of these five acres, now in the hands of U Kyaw Lin. 
+ 7 acres: In 1991, U Maung accessed seven acres from Daw Hla, by way of the 
‘paddy procurement’ waiting list. In 1994, as he was unable to transfer the due paddy 
to the government, U Maung had to sell his lands to U Kyaw Lin. After selling his lands, 
U Maung decided to migrate to another village to cultivate 50 acres under the status 
of forestlands. Under the land registration process, Daw Hla contests the land tenure 
rights of the seven acres now owned by U Kyaw Lin. 
+ 6 acres: In 1998, U Kyaw Lin bought six acres from U Than at 20,000 Kyats/acre. 
The previous owners of those six acres were the parents-in-law of U Than. U Sinn, 
brother-in-law of U Than, did not consent at that time to sell his parent’s lands to U 
Kyaw Lin. Therefore, under the land registration process, U Sinn contested the land 
tenure rights of these six acres of U Kyaw Lin’s, arguing that those lands should have 
been part of his inheritance. 
+ the last 2 acres: U Kyaw Lin finally bought two acres from Daw Moe after 2003 
(when the forced paddy procurement system had already ended). Those two acres 
are free from objection. Currently U Kyaw Lin still cultivates the 30 acres, although 
according to the 2012 land law, he is not allowed to do so for the 28 contested acres.
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Many details of the story have obviously been lost, concealed and too 
‘indirectly’ expressed. But this case study sheds light on the collective dimension 
of land contestation. Indeed, the multiple contestations against the same person 
(who was previously a village administrator) not only reveal a series of unjust 
household situations but also a collective contestation against persons who 
might have abused of their power in the past. This power, which at first glance 
seems to be the ability to pay the price of land – including the price of the paddy 
procurement  quota – is not so much related to market as it is to the individual’s 
power to exert force. It is not a coincidence that U Kyaw Lin acquired his first 10 
acres through the compulsory procurement system at a time when he was part of 
the village administration. Being in such a position, he could capture the effects 
of the paddy procurement to the state for his own benefit and at the expense 
of other farmers who found themselves excluded. The power operating here 
is partly regulation – the state policy – but much more the claim made by force 
(even if implicit) by the village authorities.  Finally, the multiple contestations also 
highlight that the land registration process is clearly perceived as an opportunity 
to renegotiate rights over lands, even for lands that were lost during the forced 
paddy procurement system decades ago. Locally produced social norms offer a 
rationale for legitimation of claims over land, and the way legitimation operates 
is above all subjected to the powers of force and market put in place through the 
successive government policies. 
2.  Credit, indebtedness, and intimate exclusion
Access to finance is crucial for farmers because of the farm investment needs 
and the seasonal expenses necessary to undertake agricultural work (inputs, labor, 
equipment...). Yet, access to affordable and adapted financial services remains a 
constraint for farmers. Our assumptions are that the lack of appropriate credit 
systems has been a key driver in intimate exclusion in the Myanmar lowlands 
and that the power relations involved with access to credit have been critical in 
this process. These power relations exist at different levels and call on the four 
dimensions of regulation, force, the market, and legitimation. (Hall et al., 2011). 
A first dimension in which power relations concerning rural credit emerge is in 
the issue of access to the government’s agricultural loans. Access to credit is, in part, 
a matter of markets: credit has a price, and people who can pay the price can access 
credit. But what we find, in practice, is that the price of credit is not determined 
by market powers alone. It is mediated by access to powerful individuals – village 
authorities – who can enhance access for some actors, and exclude others through 
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their exclusive knowledge of regulations. The MADB village tract representative is 
key in this process. Social relations and the capacity to pay bribes are essential in 
determining wider and timely access to the MADB loans.
A second dimension involves the power relations between money-lenders 
(who are often farmers themselves) and other borrowing farmers. As mentioned 
above, the case of the Delta is particularly relevant, as money-lending practices are 
built upon strong patron-client relationships. These relations include an element 
of force, as clients are coerced to mortgage their land and suffer foreclosure, or be 
compelled to sell land to cover loans (see part 2.4).
A third dimension which will not be developed here (due to insufficient 
information at this stage) is the emergence of interventions of larger market actors 
such as town-based rice millers or agri-input companies which are offering new 
forms of arrangements (such as indirect contract farming arrangements) to farmers 
via brokers at village level. This generates a new domain of power relations. 
 2.1 Credit and dispossession, a historical constant: the example of the Delta
The link between indebtedness and dispossession is not a new phenomenon 
in Myanmar. As briefly explained above, British colonial economic policies focusing 
on surplus production for exporting rice had a deep impact on Delta society. These 
policies were responsible for “systematically (undermining) the comprehensiveness 
of exchange and the relative bargaining position of peasant clients – particularly in 
lowland areas most affected by colonial administration and market agriculture” (Scott, 
1972: 7). In order to achieve this surplus production, farmers had to rely on credit 
for investing, a phenomenon which brought with it the rise of the money-lending 
class of Indian Chettiars (from the south part of the Indian continent) which rapidly 
became the main provider of capital to Burmese cultivators. The imposition of 
British land-title laws enabled farmers to pledge land as collateral, and although 
the Chettiars had no interest in agricultural lands, they insisted on taking land as 
collateral.
With the closing of the agricultural frontier, the degradation of production 
conditions, and the incapacity of the administration to adopt measures to address 
these issues, an agricultural crisis emerged in the first decades of the 1900s. It was 
dramatically aggravated by the Great Depression and consequent crash of paddy 
prices, which led a massive number of farmers to insolvency (Adas, 1974b). It finally 
contributed to massive mortgage closures and land accumulation in the hands 
of an absentee landowner class that lived in the main towns instead of villages, 
developing high dependency relationships with tenants or sharecroppers. While 
most of these Chettiars returned to India following the independence of the 
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country, a few remained and even managed to reconstitute large holdings through 
the post independence period, as in Tet Tet Ku (see Chapter IV.2). 
Despite the Land Nationalization Act promulgated in 1953 (accompanied by 
a redistribution of lands to small farmers), the dependency of farmers on money-
lenders was also reinforced by government policies – especially compulsory rice 
procurement – combined to ensure a surplus production to supply governmental 
staffs, the army, and the urban masses. Provoking high indebtedness patterns, it led 
again to the concentration of landownership into the hands of few individuals as 
we saw in the first part of this chapter (1.2). We may also recall that this pattern was 
reinforced by village headmen acting as enforcers, who either directly benefited 
by this exclusion process and attained land, or who accessed indirect – financial – 
benefits by authorizing some persons to access land while excluding others. 
 2.2 MADB, credit and indebtedness
Background information on MABD
In 1973, rural credit institutions (village banks) were dismantled in favor of a 
state-led ‘advance purchase’ system. The compulsory crop procurement was the 
vehicle of credit distribution. As such, the state provided advance payments on 
the paddy quotas to be provided by farmers. Although no interest was charged 
on the advance payments, the scheme represented a significant financial burden 
for farmers due to the low purchase prices set by the state, the fact that only part 
of the quota’s value was paid to farmers, and the important share collected by the 
state on the production.
The MADB was created in 1990 and replaced the Myanmar Agricultural Bank 
(MAB). It became the main source of short term and seasonal loans for agriculture. 
The re-emergence of MADB was linked with the reduction by two thirds of the 
state’s take in the compulsory paddy procurement in 1989 (from 30-40 baskets 
per acre, down to 10 to 12 baskets). According to the MADB law (1990), the aim 
of MADB is “to effectively support development of agricultural, livestock and rural 
socioeconomic enterprises in the country by providing banking services”. As such, with 
11,200 village banks, it was given a wide mandate to provide bank loans to state-
owned agriculture and livestock organizations, co-operatives, private persons 
and entrepreneurs in simple procedures. However, due to insufficient capital, 
it only provides seasonal loans to farmers. In 1993, the government closed the 
village banks, leaving only township branch banks. Since then, MADB’s outreach 
is very limited. Farmers must travel to the town or rely on the MABD village tract 
representatives who are not employed professionals but appointed villagers. 
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In 2012/2013, the MADB disbursed Kyat 557,846 million in agricultural loans to 
2.26 million of farmers (average loan per farmer Kyat 246,835). 30% of the total loan 
amount was for the Ayeyarwaddy region, and nearly 90% of the total loan amount 
disbursed was for paddy, in line with the government’s historical fixation on this 
crop. It has 220 branch banks all over the country and nearly 3,000 staff118. 
MADB loans have very low interest rates (0.42% to 0.45%/month) compared 
to other formal and informal credit operators. Loan duration is of 4 to 7 months 
according to the season. Two seasonal disbursements take place per year in the 
studied regions.
• Only official farmland owners are eligible for the MADB loans. The loan amount 
is based on landownership:
• 100,000 MMK per acre of paddy lands, up to 10 acres (maximum loan size of 1 
million MMK)
• 20,000 MMK per acre of ya lands, up to 10 acres (maximum loan size of 200,000 
MMK). It is planned to increase to 50,000 MMK/acre in 2015. 
Constraints of MABD credit at village level
Currently, according to this study’s quantitative survey, MADB provides loans 
to 84.5% of surveyed landholders: 79.3% in the Delta, 88.3 % in the Dry Zone. The 
lower rate in the Delta is explained by the fact that two out of the five sample 
villages of the quantitative survey are settlements in ‘forestlands’ and therefore 
farmers are not eligible to MADB loans on such lands.
In the Delta, paddy farmers usually take loans from village money-lenders 
with high interest rates, ranging from 5% to 15% per month depending on the 
relationship between borrowers and money-lenders119. Even the formal credit 
sector (through MFIs) provides much higher interest rates (ranging from 2 to 
5% per month as the price may include additional ‘fees’ and costs). For these 
reasons, we must acknowledge the government’s initiative to provide loans to all 
landowners at very low rates through the MADB as representing a real effort to 
finance agriculture. However, loan management process between the township 
MADB branches and farmers suffers many shortcomings. 
The first – already mentioned – weakness of the governmental credit scheme is 
the inadequate time frame in which MADB loans are disbursed to the farmers. It is 
not adapted to farmers’ cash flow constraints and cropping calendars. For monsoon 
118. MADB country report 2013. 
119. Desperate loans (mostly contracted by the most vulnerable for the family’s daily food needs) can even go up to 
20% per day. 
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paddy, farmers in the Delta need to invest before or in the beginning of the monsoon 
period (last week of May, early June) to prepare the land cultivation for paddy. But 
MADB cannot manage to disburse the loans in time for all the farmers, notably 
because of lack of human resources. Hence, farmers usually take loans from village-
based private money-lenders with high interest rates to make the necessary urgent 
farm expenses. As soon as they receive the MADB loan, usually between late June 
and August for monsoon paddy, they repay their debts to the private money-lenders. 
At that time, a very small amount of money is left in the farmers’ hands. MADB loans 
have to be repaid in March of the next year. When the due date is passed, farmers are 
fined. MADB loans can be obtained two times a year in the Delta (i.e. for monsoon and 
summer paddy seasons). Summer planting season loans can be taken in December 
and should be repaid in May of the next year. Some farmers settle partially their 
monsoon loan (at least one third to two thirds) with the money from summer loan in 
December. While this issue seems to be just an administrative failure – late payment – 
it actually feeds into a market process (more expensive credit) and ends up enriching 
a category of landholders – the money-lenders – who themselves access large MADB 
loans and wield coercive market powers. 
The second issue for the farmers regarding access to the MADB loans relates 
to the disbursement’s conditions. As no collateral is pledged, farmers have to 
form Self Help Groups (SHG – Wynn Gyee Choke Sa Nint in Burmese) composed of 
ten individuals. If one farmer among the SHG fails to repay his credit in time, the 
remaining nine farmers are responsible for reimbursing the loan. In case they fail 
to do so, they cannot get a loan from the bank the following year120. This generally 
results in a late payment of the loan in the next year. Thankfully, MABD rules 
changed in 2015: if one fails to repay in time, the others are not penalized. The late 
payer is given until March of the following year to repay. If he/she fails at that time, 
the other group members must repay the loan. 
Finally, as in many cases regarding the law in general (in addition to the land 
policy framework), farmers have very limited (if not nonexistent) knowledge 
of de jure processes. For this reason, they remain dependent on local powerful 
individuals (village head, village clerk, for example), and the MADB’s village tract 
representative. While the principle is that the MADB representative is elected by 
the local authorities (including the village tract headman, the 100 households 
leaders, and the elders) to represent the interests of the farmers and the bank, he 
is often appointed directly by the village tract headman. Indeed, the position is 
potentially lucrative and therefore envied. One of the MADB representative’s tasks 
is to help the farmers fill the forms for obtaining the loan. 
120.  In 2012, this group size was reduced to 5 farmers but in 2015, it was reinstated back to 10 members. Repayment 
conditions and sanctions toward default groups are currently being revised by MADB to allow more flexibility. 
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This first process already includes an element of corruption: farmers who pay 
to obtain the representative’s ‘help’ will receive the loan before those who cannot 
afford to bribe. In addition, as the representative is the only individual to link the 
township MADB with farmers at the village level, he is the focal person of the 
township MADB network of farmers, money-lenders, and brokers.  For example, 
while the MADB provides loans of 1 lakh121 per acre up to a maximum of 10 acres 
per farmer, the MADB representative helps farmers owning more than 10 acres 
to artificially divide their holdings into different individual properties (generally 
distributed to the farmer’s close family, wife, and children). This may have created 
distortions in the land registration process as well, with holdings artificially divided 
in the name of family members. 
Another key role of the MADB representative is to ensure timely loan 
repayment. However, as explained above, most small and Agri-specialized small 
farmers (generally under 10 acres in the Delta) cannot avoid taking high interest 
rate loans from local money-lenders to compensate for the late disbursement of 
the MADB loans. Hence, part of the MADB loan is used in order to repay the high 
interest private loans. Consequently, and when coupled with unexpected low 
production rates (due to bad weather, rodents, pests), farmers may be unable to 
repay the MADB loan. In order not to be fined by the bank for the late payment, 
farmers either have to borrow money from private money-lenders (around 10% 
interest rate/month) or to seek the MADB representative’s help. The latter finds 
arrangements with private money-lenders on big amounts of money with smaller 
interest rates (7%/month) to repay the bank in time. According to our interviews, 
in 2013, loans in one village of Mawlamyinegyun township borrowed from the 
MADB representative summed up to 40 million Kyats. ‘Logically’, part of the interest 
goes back to the MADB representative. Therefore, the money made available by 
the MADB at small interest finally benefits farmers little, as it is injected in a high 
interest rate loan system, hardly improving the farmers’ financial situation (if not 
worsening it) but benefiting mostly the same wealthier local individuals. The powers 
at play in this process combine various factors, and at different stages of the loan 
cycle. One which concerns the whole loan cycle relates to regulation and the loan 
modalities (such as timing of disbursements and repayment, procedures and rules 
in loan application, the official role given to the MADB representative) which – we 
have seen above – favor the better-off farmers. In addition, the market also plays 
a crucial role, at different moments of the loan cycle. First, at the loan application 
stage: although there is no difference in market prices (the official MADB loan 
interest rates are the same for all households), the payment of bribes to the MADB 
representative to have priority access to the loans operates as a differentiation 
factor. Market and regulation are interlinked in the name of legitimation: it is moral 
121. One lakh equals 100,000 MMK.
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and even a question of honor to be a good borrower, and to repay loans in time. 
Indeed, late loan disbursements (due to the incapacity to provide incentives in 
order to access MADB loans first) fuels the risks of non-compliance to MADB loan 
conditions (such as untimely repayment over the previous season’s loans). 
This fuels a market of informal high interest loans, which benefits some 
households who managed to access the MADB loans and act as informal money-
lenders. Force also enters the picture in case of repayment problems, where the 
village headman and the police may be requested to play a role to put pressure 
upon the defaulter to pay back.
 2.3 Delta: a stronger dependency on loans 
The data below come from the quantitative survey of 1,129 households. Below, 
the term ‘loan’ may refer to both informal and formal loans. Over the total surveyed 
population, 65.7% of households have declared taking loans in the last 12 months. 
This rate is slightly higher in Delta (69.5%) than in Dry Zone (62.4%).
The majority (65%) of borrowers are landholders (having direct access rights), 
suggesting both that agriculture production requires credit and that landowners 
have better access to credit. This is confirmed also by the fact that loan amounts are 
correlated with landholding size, particularly in the Dry Zone.
In the Delta, frequency of loans is similar among landholding size categories 
with little variation, while there are very significant differences and links in the 
Dry Zone: only half of farmers owning less than 2.5 acres take loans. Frequency of 
borrowing gradually increases with landholding sizes, up to a maximum of 93% 
among farmers owning 10 to 15 acres. Beyond 15 acres, the loan frequency among 
households decreases. 
In both study areas, there is a very significant link as well between loan amounts 
and total household income.
The frequency of loans taken in Delta is much higher for both landowners and 
landless. 
• 94% of landowning households take loans in the Delta, against 80% in the Dry 
Zone. This can be explained by the fact that Delta landowners are mostly paddy 
growers. As such, they have more financing needs, since paddy requires more 
investment than most ya land crops, and they must manage tight time schedules 
for double cropping, which generates significant cash flow constraints. 
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• 53% of the Delta landless take loans, against 37% in the Dry Zone. This can 
be explained by the stronger cash flow constraints linked to Delta landless 
livelihoods (mainly dependent of season farm labor and fishing), by the patron 
client relationships between landless laborers and farmers (for whom landless 
work) which facilitates access to credit, and finally by the presence of MFIs/
NGOs which provide credit services.
Table 71: Frequency of borrowing of landowners and landless in Delta and 
 Dry Zone122
Landowners 
 
LOAN No LOAN Total
Nb. HH % Nb. HH % Nb. HH
Delta 203 94.4 12 5.6 215
Dry Zone 282 79.9 71 20.1 353
Total 485 85.4 83 14.6 568
Landless 
LOAN No LOAN Total
Nb. % Nb. HH % Nb.
Delta 166 52.5 150 47.5 316
Dry Zone 91 37.1 154 62.9 245
Total 257 45.8 304 54.2 561
Among the Delta landless who take no loans, the majority (57%) are from the 
poorest income category (less than 750,000 per year). Frequency of borrowing 
increases with the household income. In the Dry Zone, landowners who do not 
take loans (71 households) are mostly non-paddy farmers who own all key farm 
equipment assets (cart, pump, cattle…) and a motorcycle. A significant proportion 
(almost half, 31 households) also own less than three acres. As Dry Zone landless are 
more diverse according to specific villages conditions, it is difficult to characterize 
those who do not take loans.  
122. All tables presented in this part are drawn from the quantitative study of this research. 
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Table 72: Dry Zone landowners households contracting loans (formal and 
informal) with regard to landholding sizes
 
LOAN No LOAN Total 
Nb. % % Nb. % % Nb. % %
0.3-2.5 27 9.6 52.9 24 33.8 47.1 51 14.4 100.0
2.5-5 43 15.2 71.7 17 23.9 28.3 60 17.0 100.0
5-10 113 40.1 86.9 17 23.9 13.1 130 36.8 100.0
10-15 54 19.1 93.1 4 5.6 6.9 58 16.4 100.0
>15 45 16.0 83.3 9 12.7 16.7 54 15.3 100.0
Total 282 100.0 79.9 71 100.0 20.1 353 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=36.3  dof=4  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.321
Table 73: Distribution of households contracting loans per loans’ amount and 
total annual incomes (TI) in Dry Zone and Delta
Total 
income 
(MMK) 
Loan< 
150,000 
 
Loan 
150,000 to 
300,000 
Loan 
300,000 to 
600,000 
Loan> 
600,000 
 
Total 
 
 
TI <750,000 69 47 27 7 150
TI 750,000 
to 
1,500,000
51 81 60 18 210
TI 1,500,000 
to 3,000,000
38 34 65 66 203
TI 
>3,000,000
15 25 33 106 179
Total 173 187 185 197 742
Chi-Square=222.4  dof=9  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.316
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Loans amounts and number of loans 
The following data are to be taken carefully, as bias may have been significant 
due to the sensitive nature of indebtedness. 
Over households taking loans, 65% have declared taking one single loan, 30% 
two loans, 5% three or more loans, without major differences between the Delta 
and the Dry Zone. However, borrowed amounts are much higher in the Delta for 
both landowners and landless (700,000 MMK in average – 9.6 lakhs for landowners, 
3 lakhs for landless) than in the Dry Zone (300,000 MMK in average – 3.6 lakhs for 
landowners, 1.6 lakhs for landless) – which can be attributed to the high number of 
paddy loans in the Delta. 
Landless households’ indebtedness has to be linked with the greater frequency 
of landless cultivators in the Delta (27% of landless) than in the Dry Zone (only 
6%). For the Delta landless, borrowing is more frequent (63%) among those 
who practice farming, and there is a very significant link with the highest loan 
amounts and the fact of cultivating non owned lands. Indeed, 71% of landless 
who borrow more than six lakhs (21 households), have access to lands through 
temporary arrangements, suggesting that MADB loans are transferred under such 
arrangements to the tenants (as seen in Chapter V.2). 
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Table 74: Distribution of Dry Zone households per loans’ amounts and 
landholding sizes
Landholding 
(acres) 
Non 
réponse 
L< 150,000 
 
L 150,000 
to 300,000 
L 300,000 
to 600,000 
L> 600,000 
 
Total 
 
0.3-2.5 24 14 5 6 2 51
2.5-5 17 12 22 7 2 60
5-10 17 23 44 37 9 130
10-15 4 5 9 22 18 58
>15 9 1 13 17 14 54
Total 71 55 93 89 45 353
Chi-Square=102.7  dof=16  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.27
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The main sources of credit:
Table 75 shows that in the Delta the main sources of credit for landowners 
are MADB (79% of borrowers), followed by money-lenders (42%) and NGOs/MFIs 
(33%). Other sources of credit, even from relatives, are extremely marginal.
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Table 75:  Delta: Main sources of credit (both formal and informal) for 
landowning and landless borrowers in Delta
Overall borrowers 
 
Landowners 
borrowers 
Landless borrowers 
 
Delta credit 
sources 
Nb HH % of HH Nb HH % of HH Nb HH % of HH
MADB 165 45% 161 79% 4 2%
Cooperative Bank 1 0%   0% 1 1%
Relatives 12 3% 3 1% 9 5%
NGO/MFI 141 38% 68 33% 73 44%
Brokers/millers 3 1% 2 1% 1 1%
Local money-
lenders
191 52% 86 42% 105 63%
Total 369   203   166  
For landless households, money-lenders are the most frequent sources of 
loans (63% of borrowers) followed by NGO/MFIs (44%), then relatives (5% only). 
Other sources of credit are extremely marginal. In the Dry Zone, the main sources of 
credit for landowners are: MABD (88% of borrowers, 9% more than in the Delta123), 
followed by money-lenders (27%), cooperative loans (23%), and relatives (15%). For 
landless households, the main sources of credit are money-lenders (42%), followed 
by relatives (28%), NGOs (14%), and cooperative loans (12%). Surprisingly, 8% have 
declared taking MADB loans, a fact that unfortunately cannot be explained by the 
study (see Table 76).
Overall, in terms of coverage and number of borrowers, money-lenders appear 
to be the main loan providers in the Delta (52% of borrowers), followed by MABD 
(45%) and MFIs/NGOs (38%). In the Dry Zone, MADB is the main provider, followed 
by money-lenders (32%), cooperative banks (21%), and relatives (18%). For Delta 
and Dry Zone landowners, MADB and money-lenders both rate as the main sources 
of credit, while for the landless, money-lenders are the main source of credit. This 
123. As mentioned before, this difference is due to the fact that some farmers in Delta own forestlands that are not 
eligible to MADB loans. 
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shows once again the challenges faced by the credit sector to address the needs 
of this population. The quantitative survey cannot estimate the volume of credit 
provided by these different providers to evaluate their ranking but, for the Delta, 
MADB is clearly the main provider for landowners in terms of loan amount. 
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Table 76: Dry Zone’s main sources of credit (formal and informal) for borrowers
Overall borrowers 
 
Landowners 
borrowers 
Landless borrowers 
 
Delta credit 
sources 
Nb HH % of HH Nb HH % of HH Nb HH % of HH
MADB 256 69% 249 88% 7 8%
Cooperative Bank 78 21% 66 23% 12 13%
Relatives 69 18% 41 15% 28 31%
NGO/MFI 15 4% 2 1% 13 14%
Brokers/millers 1 0% 1 0%   0%
Local money-
lenders
119 32% 77 27% 42 46%
total* 373 100% 282 100% 91 100%
There are important differences between the Dry Zone and the Delta. The 
recourse to money-lenders is much more frequent in the Delta (52% of Delta 
borrowers versus 32% of Dry Zone borrowers) while the frequency of borrowers 
taking loans from relatives is also much higher in Dry Zone. These findings confirm 
the already mentioned trend of stronger vertical links in Delta (patron/client, 
money-lender/borrower) and the stronger horizontal links in Dry Zone (more 
‘solidarity’ among relatives). 
In addition, the penetration rate of other credit services provided (NGOs and 
MFIs) in the Dry Zone (4% of borrowers) is much lower than in the Delta (38% of 
borrowers), where NGOs and large MFIs are more represented and have provided 
financial services in many villages for a longer time. This may have led Dry Zone 
villagers to turn to cooperative loans to compensate the needs.
The main reasons for borrowing 
Overall, the most frequent reasons for taking loans for landowners in Delta 
and Dry Zone are the same: agriculture comes first (45%), followed by purchase of 
food (21%), the need to cover health costs (12%), and education costs (11%) (see 
Table 77 and Table 78).  Loans for the purchase of equipment and social events 
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are significantly more frequent in the Delta in both landless and landowning 
categories. As such, these reasons seem secondary compared to other urgent 
needs and suggest that Delta households take loans more ‘systematically’ (as part 
of the stronger patron-client system) and not necessarily for serious emergency 
cases. 
Among landowners, the reason for taking loans for agriculture, loan repayment, 
health, or education costs have similar frequency between the two areas. Major 
differences are in frequency of taking loans for purchase of food, which is almost 
double in the Dry Zone (26%) than in the Delta (14%). This may be explained by the 
lower food self-sufficiency of Dry Zone farmers and thus higher expenditures for 
food (compared to Delta farmers who can often provide most of the paddy for the 
household’s consumption needs). 
Among the landless, the main reasons for taking loans are for buying food 
(39%), purchase of equipment (21%), and also agriculture (17%), which corresponds 
to those who have derived access rights to land. Here again, loans for buying food 
is more frequent in the Dry Zone (50% of the loans versus 33% in the Delta.). Loan 
repayment, health, or education costs have similar frequency between the two 
areas.  
The major differences between landless and landowners are logical: frequency 
of purchase of food is twice more frequent for the landless (39% against 21% 
of landowners), while loans for agriculture are much less frequent among the 
landless. Another difference is the much higher frequency of loans for purchase 
of equipment among the landless. It may be assumed that the equipment may 
be bought for income generating purchases, but the qualitative survey indicates 
that this category can also include secondary items such as mobile phones which 
are needed in the case of migration. Another important difference is the fact that 
taking loans for health costs is extremely low (1%) among landless compared 
to landowners (12%). This shows that access to credit is a burden on one hand 
(because of inappropriate credit systems) but a ‘privilege’ on the other, as landless 
households are generally not considered as soluble by private money-lenders for 
loans covering high medical treatment’s costs, or only at very high interest rates 
(above 20% per month). 
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Table 77: Purpose of contracting loans (formal and informal) among Delta 
households 
Total Landowners Landless  
Loan purpose Nb HH % of 
loans
Nb HH % of 
loans
Nb HH % of 
loans
Pay back a loan 23 4% 14 4% 9 5%
Buy food 110 21% 45 14% 65 33%
Agriculture 165 32% 136 42% 29 15%
Education 60 12% 34 11% 26 13%
Health 49 10% 48 15% 1 1%
Social Event 32 6% 17 5% 14 7%
Buy equipment 78 15% 27 8% 51 26%
Total Nb of loans 516 100% 320 100% 196 100%
Table 78: Purpose of contracting loans (formal and informal) among Dry Zone 
households
Total Landowners Landless  
Loan purpose Nb HH % of 
loans
Nb HH % of 
loans
Nb HH % of 
loans
Pay back a loan 19 4% 13 3% 6 6%
Buy food 162 31% 112 26% 51 50%
Agriculture 221 42% 200 47% 21 20%
Education 55 10% 46 11% 9 9%
Health 45 8% 41 10% 3 3%
Social Event 5 1% 4 1% 1 1%
Buy equipment 20 4% 9 2% 11 10%
Total Nb of loans 527 100% 425 100% 102 100%
 2.4  Land exclusion due to indebtedness
In both areas, 5.1% (Delta) and 5.4% (Dry Zone) of surveyed households 
claim having lost lands due to indebtedness, either by mortgage foreclosure, or 
by selling their lands to urgently repay loans. Although those rates are similar 
between the two regions, Table 79 indicates that indebtedness is a stronger driver 
of complete land exclusion in the Delta than in the Dry Zone. Indeed, in the Delta, a 
large proportion (63%) of these households have become landless while in the Dry 
Zone, the majority (87.5%) are still landowners. 
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In 2010, UK who lives in Aye Ywar took six acres from Daw H in mortgage for 
the sum of 700,000 MMK, initially for a four-year period. Daw H needed that money 
for redeeming the previous MADB loan (300,000MMK in total at 50,000MMK/ acre) of 
monsoon paddy and other expenses. 
In 2013, after four years, Daw H could not afford to reimburse UK. They subsequently 
negotiated the sale of land use rights over two of the acres, at 450,000MMK/acre. UK 
paid 200,000MMK to Daw H: the total for the two acres less the mortgage amount. The 
agreement was made in front of the SLRD village tract officer. 
Before contracting this mortgage, UK already had some experience lending 
money and foreclosing on land. In 2002, UK lent 70,000MMK to another villager, with 
a 50% interest rate on one paddy season, plus 35 paddy baskets. This villager needed 
the borrowed money and paddy baskets to pay back a government loan and fulfil the 
compulsory paddy procurement. After four years, this villager could not afford to pay 
back the loan to UK, so the agreement was to transfer over two acres of his land to UK. 
As a whole, UK now owns land use rights, titled under Form 7, for 15 acres 
(including those from Daw H). In the midst of the titling process, Daw H tried to apply 
for LUC on all six of her former acres. However, the SLRD officer only issued the LUC 
for four acres, as he was aware of the mortgage issue, as well as a close friend of UK.
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The fact that in the Delta most money-lenders are large landholders makes 
credit a major factor of exclusion (see box below). Along this process, large 
landholders are able to accumulate even greater land plots, as seen in Chapter 
VIII.7.3. 
Table 79: Landlessness among those who lost lands due to indebtedness in 
Delta and Dry Zone
Delta Dry Zone 
Nb HH %C %R Nb HH %C %R
Still landowners 10 37.0 26.3 28 87.5 73.7
Became landless 17 63.0 81.0 4 12.5 19.0
Total 27 100.0 45.8 32 100.0 54.2
Chi-Square=14.1  dof=1  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.489
BOX 19: GOVERNMENTAL LOANS, MORTGAGE, AND EXCLUSION  
(AYE YWAR, DELTA)
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3.  The village headman, cornerstone of exclusion processes?
Credit may appear to be a market matter, but as demonstrated in the sections 
above, it is underpinned by regulation, legitimation, and force. In all these 
dimensions, the village tract headman plays a crucial role. Under the current 
framework, the village administrator has taken on a new, informal power: the 
privilege of nominating the MADB representative. This extends his connectedness 
to the main source of credit available for farmers (and especially paddy cultivators 
– see Chapters VIII.2.2 and 2.3).
Indeed, since the British colonial times (whether we call this character 
thugyi or village tract administrator), the village tract administrator stands 
as the last state’s representative at the local level. Furthermore, in many 
places and especially in the Delta, the following observation made by Myat 
Than about a village in Bago region in 1980, first studied by Pfanner (1962), 
could be taken almost word for word as reflecting our findings in the study: 
“Mayin (village) has borne witness to three consecutive governments since 1960. 
(…) Although the administration system has changed three times, the leadership 
representing the village elite has not changed significantly. The president of the 
village (People’s Council) in 1978 was the son of the former headman and the 
president of the People’s Council in 1980 was his cousin. The leaders live in relatively 
better houses, possess better education, have contact with township leaders and 
they are able to devote time to village affairs by often traveling to town to attend 
meetings.” (Mya Than, 1987: 80-81)
Indeed, after five consecutive governments, among the villages studied in 
both the Dry Zone and the Delta, most of village headmen are sons or cousins of 
the previous ones, and that their ‘connectedness’ remains much the same. 
 3.1 The village headman in pre-2012 land management
While the village headman’s history and the continuity of the village headman 
should be traced back to the colonial rule (as we already have seen in previous 
chapters), we mainly refer here to 1988 onward, which witnessed the creation 
of Village Councils (Law and Order Restoration Council and later Peace and 
Development Councils), whose chair at the village level – i.e. the village headman – 
acted as the most local representative of the state. It was also under this period that 
the General Administration Department (GAD), with which the village headman 
has a close relationship, was created, with only few changes through different 
governments, including the current NLD one (Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Arnold, 2014: 
11). Nevertheless, as just highlighted, village leadership presented more or less the 
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same features from long before and after 1988. In the SPDC period (1997-2010), 
three main institutions were responsible of the implementation of agricultural 
policies at the village level (adapted from Thawnghmung, 2003: 303-304). 
• The township People Development Council (PDC): the most powerful body, 
appointed with military staff, which directly supervized the civilian village 
PDCs’ chairman. 
• The Myanmar Agricultural Services (MAS), a department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Irrigation: theoretically responsible of providing extension 
services through subsidized agricultural inputs, it served mostly as a policy-
implementing body (for example defining the quota to be sold to the 
government for townships and villages).
• SLRD: another department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, SLRD 
officers’ main duties are collecting agricultural statistics, assessing land revenue 
and land rent, registering deeds, and dealing with other land administration 
duties.
• The Irrigation Department: the responsibilities of this department grew 
especially after 1990 and the introduction of the summer paddy policy, 
supported by various irrigation programs, notably in the Dry Zone.
• The Myanmar Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (MADB): serving as an 
instrument for rural savings and loan disbursement
Although each of these departments had extension workers to supervize their 
different tasks at the village level, those staffs would actually delegate most of 
their responsibilities to the village tract headman, from whom they would record 
only the information needed to report to their superiors (ibid: 312). On the other 
hand, the headman, who was not receiving any salary at that time, besides being 
involved in his full-time livelihood as a farmer, would bear the burden of receiving 
agricultural extension workers, providing them with lunch, etc. This peculiar 
situation, as the state’s political broker, laid the ground for some headmen (yet not 
all) to find all possible ways of taking advantage of their position: 
“Village chairmen may earn money from imposing fines on law breakers, charging 
fees on land contracts, and on visitors’ registration. He may supplement his income 
by taking bribes from his villagers in return for covering up their activities that 
are considered illegal from the central authorities (one example would be under-
reporting cultivated acres when it comes to selling the procurement quota). He 
could also recover his expenses by passing on the costs to his villagers. He may also 
get subsidized consumer products or agricultural implements and inputs with the 
permission of the township ruling authorities. (Ibid: 309) 
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Hence, village headmen – still 
depending on their own personality 
– could be tempted to take full 
advantage of their position, not only 
to earn revenues, but also to get 
access to local resources, including 
land – as seen in the case of one 
village headman who managed 
to accumulate large tracts of land 
through the procurement policy 
(Chapter VIII.4.1). This power can 
be explained by the central role of 
the village headman in organizing 
land management: by liaizing with 
the different departments, and by 
transforming informal practices (such 
as land transfers as seen in VIII.1.3) 
into formal ones (such as changing 
the name in SLRD’s registers) through different arrangements. This central role is 
illustrated in the figure below. The village head played a role in supporting the 
enforcement of the paddy procurement. In the event of farmers unable to fulfil the 
required quotas, the village head as chair of the village tract land committee would 
facilitate land sales, disguised in the form of let allocations to persons under the 
‘waiting list’.  
 3.2 The village headman in the midst of land reform
Through the constitutional reform of 2008, tasks and responsibilities of the 
village tract headman (now officially called the village tract administrator) suffered 
little changes. It even seems that his central position has been reinforced, yet with 
a few changes regarding his status. Indeed, technically the village headman is still 
not a government employee, as he receives only subsidies from the Ministry of 
Home affairs through GAD (Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Arnold, 2014: 34). 
On the other hand, “village tract administrators are the anchor of the GAD’s 
vertical role in public administration, and they effectively act as an extension of the 
GAD’s township administrator, who supervizes them” (Ibid: 34). Yet, the same feeling 
of being ‘caught in the middle’ of the state administration on the one hand, and 
local legitimacy on the other, may remain even blurrier since GAD village tract 
clerks (direct employees of the GAD who can putatively ascend the administrative 
scale) act as the secretary of non-employed-village tract administrators. 
Figure 44: Roles (informal in green, official 
in orange) of village headman in land 
management under procurement policy
Acknowle
dging 
land tran
sfers
Negotiating  
procurement 
quotas
Selling to  
government 
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village land 
committee
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Finally, the headman is the chairperson of all village tract committees (Ibid: 34). 
Among those committees, the Village Tract Farmland Management Body (VLMB) 
created after releasing the new Farmland Law 2012, is in charge of regulating 
land use, land transfers, registration, land use rights and related conflicts, and 
Scrutinizing requests for changing from prescribed crops to another, among other 
responsibilities (see insert below). In other words, the VLMB is in now in charge of 
all farmland management related matters. 
Hence, when it comes to the most visible impact on local land reform, that is 
the titling process and the issuance of Land Use Certificates (LUCs), the role of the 
headman is even further enhanced. Indeed, as seen earlier, the headman had a 
crucial role in facilitating transfers of land use rights at a time when these transfers 
(apart from inheritance) were illegal. The headman was the main stakeholder 
linking village-based land tenure with relevant authorities, especially the SLRD. We 
have seen that such arrangements generated a lot of conflicts through the land 
registration process. 
Yet, as shown in Figure 45, those supposed to record and redress land conflicts 
(notably arising from ‘informal-legal’ land arrangements) and those involved at the 
origins of those conflicts are the same people, namely the village tract administrator, 
the GAD clerk, and the SLRD staff. By trying to overcome challenges brought by land 
and agricultural policies, village headmen would provide convenient arrangements 
to the farmers (with the caveat that the headman had to have his interest served 
in such arrangements as well), 
but these would often turn 
against farmers at one point 
(Thawnghmung, 2003: 311).
What is problematic is that 
the same story continues today. 
For instance, when it comes to 
farmland rental agreements 
done with Chinese investors in 
the Dry Zone, interviews show 
that the headman is often 
acting as an agent to negotiate 
the rental agreements, and 
legitimizing these transfers in 
the eyes of the community. Yet, 
the new land law states that “A 
person who has the permission 
Figure 45: Continuity: the role of the Village 
Headman under the new land framework,  
against historical background
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Composition
1. Ward/Village Tract Administrator  Chairperson
2. Ward/Village Tract  Clerk Secretary
3. Settlement and Land Record Department  Clerk Member
4. Elected farmer representative  Member
5. Elected influential elders yat-mi-yat-pha  representative Member
Roles and Responsibilities:
1. Recommendation and application of land use right to the Township Settlement 
and Land Record Department within 30 days after acceptance;
2. Farmland sale, mortgage, rent, exchange and transfer has to be contracted with 
the evidence of village farmland management body;
3. Recording of users who have received land use rights permission and save the 
documents of land use right registration form (Form-11);
4. Monitor land use right users to follow the rules of land use rights and submission 
of reports to Township Farmland Management Body to take action;
5. Investigate and decision making of land disputes;
6. Supervise to follow the decision of Farmland Management Body decision making 
during farmland dispute;
7. Supervise not to transfer the land from land use right users to foreigners or 
foreign organizations and if found out, submit the case to Township Farmland 
Management Body for taking action;
8. Filtering and submission of cases which applied to change seasonal crops to 
perennial crops;
9. Filtering and submission of cases which applied to use farmland for other 
purposes;
10. Manage not to destroy pastures and common land;
11. Submission of cases of virgin land which is closest to the village to the Township 
Farmland Management Body;
12. Investigation and coordination of virgin land dispute with Farmland Management 
Body; and
13. Implement the activities assigned by Central, Nay Pyi Taw Council, State/Region, 
District and Township Farmland Management Body.
* Reproduced from Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Arnold, 2014:52
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BOX 20: COMPOSITION AND TASKS OF THE WARD/VILLAGE TRACT  
FARMLAND MANAGEMENT BODY *
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of right for farming should not sold, pawn, lease, exchange or donate his/her land to 
any foreigner or organization involving foreigner(s) without the permission of the State/
region Government”. The proposed land rental prices are high and farmers are quite 
tempted by such an easy source of income. Once again, village tract headmen, by 
finding arrangements for the ‘sake’ of farmers’ livelihoods (power of legitimation), 
and for the sake of their own economic interest as brokers (power of market) put 
the farmers in direct threat of being prosecuted for not complying with the law. 
The same principle applies for village tract administrators closing their eyes on 
land use changes from seasonal to perennial crops (for Thanakha trees in Dry Zone 
for instance), another infringement to the new land law. 
 3.3 Linking the different dimensions of exclusion
We may conclude this chapter by showing how, under the new land law, village 
tract administrators are more than ever installed at the crossroads of the ‘powers 
of exclusion’. 
In conclusion, local land issues show that whatever the reforms may be 
promulgated (even as part of a democratization effort), few changes will happen in 
practice without greater attention to local governance. It is critical for the reforms 
to be effectively implemented on the ground. The figure of the headman is central 
in acting as an interface between customary and statutory systems – but also in 
using his privileges to provide access to lands through his networks rather than in 
a fair manner. 
Furthermore, the involvement of the same members of the village elite (i.e. 
elders known as lugyi and yet-mi-yet-pha) in committees directly challenges the 
adequacy of government structures put in place to administrate – including but 
not limited to – land issues. Indeed, such committees created to support President 
Thein Sein’s ‘people-centered development’124, are merely deferring to the 
authority of the village leader, the GAD clerk, or the SLRD officer, pointing to the 
administrative irrelevance of formal state structures, regardless of the government 
in power.
In short, if the government is genuinely seeking change and aiming at 
improving land governance and land tenure security, it should address this critical 
issue of local governance. The power of the headman would need to be regulated 
through mechanisms allowing checks and balances. 
Accountability to citizens by authorities in charge of land administration is 
not a spontaneous process. Impact at the local level will remain a critical issue if 
124. U Thein Sein, 26 December 2012. Speech in Nay Pyi Taw.
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concrete mechanisms for transparency and accountability of the actors who will be 
in charge of translating the legal framework into practices on the ground are not 
clearly defined in the new legal framework. Such measures would not only protect 
the least politically represented stakeholders, but would provide fertile ground for 
restoring citizens’ faith in the state on the ground.
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        1.   A century and a half of uprooting Burmese agrarian society… 
          for its own interest?
Since the annexation of Lower Burma by the British in 1852, the reforms that 
affected Burmese agrarian society seem to share a common rationale: helping 
farmers shift from tenancy to ownership. This seems paradoxical as at the beginning 
of British administration of the country, the 1891 census recorded that the bulk of 
the population was already landowning cultivators (64%), with only 1% landlords, 
26% tenants, and 8% landless agricultural laborers. Indeed, in the pre-colonial 
period, the dominant rural stratum in Upper Burma was composed of hereditary 
headmen who appear to have exercised a proprietary right over all the lands in 
their jurisdiction and who ruled self-sufficient agricultural communities of freemen 
known as athis. Land was organized on a communal basis and access to such lands 
had been subject to close headman supervision (Lieberman 1991: 27). Whether 
freemen or bondsmen (working on royal or religious land), farmers were in fact 
highly integrated in a relationship to local patrons (headmen, crown officers) that 
would ensure their protection both in social and economic terms. 
And so, in contrast to the putative British goal, the last 150 years has actually 
been about undoing patron-client ties for diverse reasons, the first and foremost 
being systemizing the collection of taxes for the state on an individual basis. What 
was long established as hereditary rights on land through the concept of dama-
u-gya was interpreted and transformed into individual claims on land, and land 
turned into a commodity (or at least something that can be used as a collateral 
for loans), beginning with the British-introduced ryotwari system125. The country’s 
administrative division into village tracts marked the rise of the village headman 
who became a local elite backed by the colonial administration. The integration of 
rice production into international markets and its subsequent monetization and 
value chain integration contributed to a fragmentation of former comprehensive 
patron-client relationships. As a whole, the social value of being an agriculturist 
faded at the profit of the economical one, with landlords and money-lenders 
overturning legitimate headmen and patrons. As a result, by 1930 one third of the 
total cultivated land had fallen into the hands of non-agriculturists and one quarter 
held by absentee non-agriculturists. 
125. An individual based system where revenue settlement was fixed directly with individuals. 
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The 1948 nationalization act and subsequent policies (Land Nationalization 
Act 1953; Tenancy Act and Rules 1964) aimed at reversing this situation to create a 
body of peasant-proprietors rather than tenants. But the Burmese agrarian society 
had already been uprooted from its sociocultural framework126, and the closing of 
the agrarian frontier (the most fertile land being already cleared and cultivated) 
together with the 1930s Great Depression had left many peasants without the 
financial capacity to undertake cultivation and cope with occasional crisis (pests, 
weather). Not only was the redistribution of land under the Land Nationalization 
Act poorly implemented (with only 17% of all cultivated lands nationalized), but 
harmful policies such as the compulsory procurement of a fixed quota of harvested 
crop – particularly paddy – (at a fixed price) also weakened small and middle 
farmers (under 16 acres for paddy cultivation) while benefiting bigger ones. In the 
studied villages, tenancy is actually low: an average 16% of landless households of 
both zones work land through temporary arrangements, amounting to 13.5% of 
total farming households (households with permanent land use rights and landless 
working land through temporary arrangements). More worrisome, however, is 
the average rate of landless households: it reaches almost 50% among the two 
zones (with rates as high as 80% in Pay Chaung village, Kyet Shar village tract of the 
southern Delta). In 150 years, if we draw on the British census of 1891, the body of 
landless laborers jumped from 8% to 50% of the total population127. 
In 2012, the new Land Law, a reform “in the interest of the entire people”128, came 
to sanction the pre-existing system based on individual land rights by distributing 
Land Use Certificates (LUCs) and legalize transfers of land use rights. This reform 
did not much change the on-the-ground reality of land tenure and land dynamics, 
since farmers did not wait for formal reform to sell, rent, or mortgage their land 
(despite the legal ban on such transfers prior to 2012). LUCs are supposedly 
bringing more security by legalizing these transfers, yet many practical barriers 
remain, notably when it comes to divide an LUC over a plot of land into two or 
more pieces. But most of all, the precariousness of land tenure in Burmese lowlands 
lies in the system itself rather than the modalities of its implementation. 
From the misconception of the British regarding the organization of Burmese 
agrarian society, to Burmese governance whose “policies (were) inclined toward 
production increase for their own sakes while paying rather less attention to farmers’ 
income and welfare” (Fujita and Okamoto 2006), the common point is the top-down 
126. Dry Zone farmers better resisted the impact of such change thanks to a greater historical depth than the Delta 
society that was principally developed through the British colonization. 
127. 46% nation-wide according to LIFT (2012). However this takes into account ethnic upland areas under customary 
land tenure where landlessness is much lower (and sometimes nonexistent) than in Burmese lowlands. 
128. According to a speech by Vice President Dr Sai Mauk Kham (2011-2015) introducing the land reform in May 
2012. 
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nature of reforms caring about production over welfare.. It is striking to read that 
intra-village land conflicts after the advent of British rule were of two main types: 
the division of land among heirs and redemption of mortgaged land (Than Myint-U 
2004: 232)… In 2014, following distribution of LUCs, conflicts observed during this 
study were of the same nature. Although the division of land through inheritance 
did not bring that many issues under the 2012 reform, previous arrangements 
on land use rights that were often done on an oral basis were challenged by 
formalization. The distribution of LUCs indeed rekindled old conflicts (such as land 
transfers forced by farmers’ incapacity to deliver the compulsory quota of crop 
to the government) and created new ones (notably between parties involved in 
mortgage arrangements). In other words, both British and 2012 reforms brought 
into light the complexity of formalizing – allegedly in order to secure – land tenure 
with top-down policies, especially when little is done to understand local realities. 
In fact, one may question the actual contribution of LUCs to land security. Farmers 
in Burmese lowlands were not lacking documents formalizing their claims. Yet, 
farmers have always been at threat of arbitrary land confiscations by the state. In that 
sense, LUCs do not seem to provide more security than the previous documents. 
However, it will surely lead to more insecurity to the farmers who have not received 
LUCs. Hence the very purpose of this study: to provide a better understanding of 
land dynamics at the local level and propose, on this basis, a new reading of issues 
faced by agrarian households (farmers and landless) in these days of reform. 
2.  Land access and livelihoods’ security: does the problem lie in 
       land tenure?
As explained above, Burmese agrarian society sustained a radical change 
through 150 years of ‘battle against tenancy’ that ultimately produced a large 
body of landless households (46% nationally129; 62% among Delta studied villages, 
41% in Dry Zone villages). Tenancy is often considered a precarious state of land 
tenure, to which permanent individual ownership, and later on land titles, are 
often opposed as the paramount of land tenure security. However, Lavigne-Delville 
(2006) warns us against confusing land tenure security and private ownership, or 
against thinking that the nature of the rights (e.g. formal or informal, permanent 
or temporary) defines land security. Land tenure security means that legitimately 
held rights on land cannot be questioned without a sound rationale and proper 
conflict resolution mechanism. If this definition is accepted, then land tenure 
precariousness land tenure precariousness relates to whether households having 
claims on land have fear that those rights will not be sustained in the long term. 
Based on this, what does the current study tell us?
129. LIFT 2012. 
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 2.1 Access to land and livelihoods security: a different relationship in Delta  
and Dry Zone
In both the Delta and the Dry Zone, agriculture and access to land are a crucial 
part of most rural livelihoods. However the study reveals that strategies and 
trajectories over land access are different between the two areas.
Building on the discussions in Chapter VII.6 and VII.7, the overall picture tends 
to show that access to land in the Delta is a basic requirement to secure households’ 
livelihoods. This is well illustrated, on the one hand, by those households having 
permanent land use rights on small surfaces (less than 10 acres and more often 
between 2.5 and 5 acres) that do not rely on agriculture for their primary income 
but for whom land acts as capital (and a guarantee in the perspective of contracting 
loans) enabling them to diversify, notably into animal husbandry. On the other, there 
is a clear distinction in terms of incomes and savings between landless farming 
households (27% of surveyed landless households in the Delta) accessing land 
through temporary arrangements and the rest of landless households. In other 
words, access to land, even through temporary arrangements (sharecropping, rent) is 
a way to foster mobility towards the upper stairs of the Delta’s socioeconomic ladder.
In the Dry Zone, socioeconomic mobility is much rarer, with those in the well-
established farming households category owning large surfaces (over 10 acres) 
when reaching the age of 40 to 50 years old – although the study indicates that 
they start their agricultural trajectory with small holdings (around 5 acres) that 
they expand with capital derived from income diversification (notably in off-farm 
activities). The most vulnerable are those struggling to make the best out of low 
quality lands (less fertile, no access to irrigation). Interestingly, landless households 
accessing farmlands through temporary arrangements represent only 6% of the 
total surveyed landless households (against 27% in Delta). 
This first shows that the situation regarding access to land and livelihoods 
security in the two areas is not the same. In the Delta, temporary arrangements (a 
form of tenancy) are an important way to secure later access to permanent land 
use rights130. Besides, the study also tells that farmers not able to cultivate their 
entire paddy lands in summer contract closely-linked landless households to work 
part of their land. Hence in the case of the Delta, temporary arrangements that are 
often considered ‘insecure’ are actually an important component of an agricultural 
trajectory towards access to permanent land use and in a wider sense to livelihoods 
security. In the Dry Zone, the situation tends to support the fact that access to 
permanent land use rights is a sine qua non condition to secure land access. Yet, the 
quality of land is a major factor in terms of livelihoods security. 
130. This is especially true for landless households working land under familial sharecropping arrangements. 
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Therefore, in all cases, the land tenure framework seems to be effective in 
securing one’s land use rights, even derived rights (temporary arrangements), at 
least at the village level (and for intra-village arrangements). Land tenure insecurity 
over the past 60 years mostly pertains to other fields than land tenure itself. In 
the Delta, the continuous control exerted by the government on rice production, 
accompanied by predatory policies such as compulsory rice procurement, created 
a highly unstable situation in terms of tenure. A great part of the land market was 
created by smallholders opting to sell their land when they anticipated foreclosure 
due to the fact they were unable to procure the fixed quota of rice. According to 
the quantitative survey, an average 9% of current landless households once had 
access to permanent land use rights that they lost over the last 25 years in the 
Delta, against 3% in the Dry Zone. The Dry Zone seems to suffer from livelihoods’ 
insecurity with causes that are not related to land tenure insecurity. Indeed, the high 
unpredictability of rainfalls leads farmers to diversify while ‘bidding on weather’ (ya 
thi u thu laung kasa) notably thanks to intercropping and relay cropping: such that 
in the case of expected rainfalls, high value cash-crops bring extra incomes, while 
part of their land devoted to lower-value yet resistant crops such as sesame or 
sorghum guarantee a minimum income and/or contribution to self-consumption 
needs from their land. The low availability of fertile lands and uneven access to 
irrigation – and where irrigation is available, poor maintenance of systems and over-
exploitation of available water sources dominates – contribute to undermining the 
potential of the region’s agriculture. On the other hand, demographic pressure in 
the absence of an agricultural frontier seems to be leading to land fragmentation 
and shrinking landholdings. 
 2.2 The need for deeper reforms for improved access to land?
If land use rights – in lowland areas at least – are considered secure under the 
current land framework, then land access is probably the main cause of concern for 
many households. Discussion in Chapter VII.6 reveals a struggle between different 
socioeconomic classes for accessing and retaining access to land. Exclusion 
processes among the two zones are again different. In the Dry Zone, stronger 
social organization implies that farmers have long developed strategies to keep 
and reproduce their socioeconomic situations, including intra-class marriages, 
differential inheritance patterns directed at reducing land fragmentation131, and 
the tendency to secure non-farm livelihoods for part of their children. In the Delta, 
the capacity to access and accumulate land mostly pertains to the households’ 
connectedness with authorities (village tract headman, Farmland Management 
Committee, or SLRD officer) although socioeconomic mobility (the capacity to 
make one’s path to permanent land use right ownership and to, conversely, lose 
131. Inheritance involves a differential distribution among siblings of the families’ capital between agricultural and 
non-agricultural assets, rather than an equitable repartition of land between heirs (see Chapter VIII.1.1). 
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such ownership) is overall higher than in the Dry Zone, a fact reinforced by a past 
of predatory policies. However, not all agricultural landless households are in a 
precarious livelihoods situation, and not all are necessarily excluded from accessing 
land. According to the analysis and with the precautions stated in Chapter VII.7, 
we may consider that about 27% of total households surveyed in the Delta need 
to access agricultural land, against 18% in the Dry Zone. These figures take into 
account the households’ life trajectory (the fact that currently young landless 
households may access land later132) and that not all landless households rely on 
on-farm work for securing their livelihoods. 
Yet, how to provide land for those households excluded from accessing 
agricultural land? The current reform already provides for the restitution of land 
unjustly confiscated under previous governments. However, the redistribution 
process itself is proving cumbersome, since confiscated land is often currently 
being cultivated by other farmers who have made contracts with current 
landholders. Indeed, several transactions may have happened between the first 
case of confiscation and current land users, so determining the rightful owner or 
beneficiary would necessarily be difficult and conflict-ridden without a broader 
and robust compensation scheme. Providing landless households with vacant 
lands classified under VFV is an option, theoretically. However, in the Delta, those 
are generally areas with less productive lands (deep water paddy areas, salt 
water in dry season, prone to flooding, etc.) and their actual vacancy may also be 
questionable in many cases: in other words, what appears on a map as VFV in reality 
is land on which people are currently living and working. Therefore, an agrarian 
reform including that places a ceiling on agricultural holdings determined for each 
land type and associated potential productivity may be the only way to even the 
situation regarding land access. However, this seems unlikely to be feasible without 
building strong public consensus on wealth redistribution and without reforming 
land governance institutions down to the village level. 
3.  Improving the current land reform
In regards to Myanmar’s lowland areas133, the current Farmland Law (enacted 
in 2012) comes with two major changes which are, on the one hand, the right to 
sell, exchange, mortgage, and lease the land and, on the other, the provision of – 
supposedly – updated Land Use Certificates (LUCs). The rationale underlying this 
reform is thus deeply grounded in the perceived necessity to formalize land use 
rights under an individual property framework so as to secure individual land use 
132. See this chapter, part 5.3. 
133. The current Farmland 
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1. The formalization procedure matches with the reality of land rights,   
2. Responds effectively to the problems and needs encountered by different land 
users, 
3. Enables the state to recognize land users’ legitimate rights or authenticate their 
agreements, 
4. The formalization procedure is accessible and effective, 
5. Is part of an institutional environment that is sufficiently interconnected and 
reliable to deal effectively with the plurality of norms and authorities,
6. Land information is kept up to date, so that people benefit from using the legal 
mechanisms, 
7. And the institutions responsible for administering rights fulfil their responsibilities.
Source: ‘Land Tenure and Development’ Technical Committee (2015: 33)
rights. To support the reform’s implementation, different administrative bodies 
have been put in place in order to regulate the land titling process, i.e. by clarifying 
claims and resolving conflicts. Although the overall idea of securing land use rights is 
highly welcomed, many shortfalls lie in the process, beginning with the very idea of 
formalizing. Many debates at international level already long taken place surrounding 
the idea that land tenure security can and must be secured through the formalization 
of land use rights. In this regards, a very well-grounded study warns us against 
the fact that “there is no mechanical link between formalizing land rights, security of 
tenure, economic development and social peace” (‘Land Tenure and Development’ 
Technical Committee, 2015: 12). In addition, if land tenure is to be secured through 
formalization of land use rights, then some key principles should be followed:
Written titles can help secure tenure if: 
KEY PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND FORMALISATION OF LAND RIGHTS 
Bearing these principles in mind, discussion and recommendations are provided 
below for improving the current land reform.
 3.1 A formalization process adapted to the reality of land rights
Approximately nine million LUCs were delivered throughout Myanmar within a 
very short time frame. This pace of implementation was only made possible because 
the land registration was done based on existing land administration documents 
such as land tax receipts, farmers’ booklets, Form 105, and cadastral maps which 
were not necessarily updated. The haste of the process led to some breaches in the 
procedure and very limited field surveying and verification. Consistency between 
actual landholders and those receiving the titles, and registered surface areas 
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remains an issue. In addition, the study shows that papers are often less important 
than the legitimacy acquired by the testifying local ‘authorities’ (headman, elders, 
and sometimes only relatives or neighbors of the same village). Arrangements 
made at the local level, according to a proto-customary land tenure system (where 
local arrangements with local representatives of the authority significantly bypass 
the legal system), generally run smoothly. 
Most conflicts happen due to individuals who take advantage of the existing 
discrepancies between the law and local, informal practices for their own benefit134. 
This is well illustrated by the LUC issuance process, which, performed hastily, 
created a new arena for people to revive old grudges created by past policies, but 
also gave room for many intra-village conflicts. Conflicts arose notably over local 
arrangements (le pyan ngwe pyan for example) caught in the middle of ‘stacked’ 
contradicting laws: LUCs now legalize temporary arrangements (such as mortgage 
or sharecropping) although Act 64/1 still provides a cultivator with a claim on land if 
the latter has been working that land for more than five consecutive years. As shown 
throughout this report, land transfers were already actively taking place despite the 
legal ban under the previous land framework. That said, the LUCs issuance process, 
which proved particularly challenging to implement within the set time frame, 
may be considered as a snapshot of an on-going process of land consolidation and 
fragmentation processes. Although the current law states that any changes in the 
status of a land use right, such as when it is encumbered with debt, transferred, 
or inherited, must be properly registered, evidences on the ground indicate that 
the cadastral maps may be already greatly outdated. Access to land administration 
bodies in charge of formalizing land use rights transfers are not accessible for 
most farmers who, besides, have a very limited knowledge of the legal framework. 
 Recommendations
One general and essential recommendation is to conduct a review 
of existing laws in order to identify contradictions potentially weakening 
security of land use rights in order to produce a comprehensive and 
consistent land framework. This review should not only be a desk based 
legal review but should include fieldwork to compare with the actual 
practices on the ground. This would then enable to provide the insights to 
formulate an umbrella land law. 
More specifically on land administration issues, it is proposed to:
• Conduct a review of the 2012 land registration process in order to 
identify gaps and prioritize how those gaps will be addressed so that 
public confidence can be improved.
134. See for example the case of ‘Chinese watermelon’ rental contracts, arranged by the village administrator but 
putting farmers directly in illegality (see VI.3.1). 
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• Accessible and affordable deed registration procedures need to be 
set in place in order to record land transfers and update land records 
properly. This means simplifying modalities for registering land 
use rights transfers. A single administration body accessible at the 
village level should endorse the process of registering land use rights 
transfers, land use rights subdivision and consolidation, and land use 
change, with a set process and non-prohibitive fees. 
• A land taxation system (including annual tax, transfer tax, betterment 
tax135) is probably the most efficient way to secure land rights, have 
updated registers, and reduce speculation while raising revenue to 
sustain sound land administration services. 
• Capacity building of government institutions that are involved with 
land at local levels (DALMS, DoF/MONREC and GAD) is also necessary 
so as to improve their understanding of land-related laws.
• Provide farmers with knowledge and clear messages (rights and duties) 
about the Farmland Law. Land registration needs to be accompanied 
with legal awareness information campaigns in order to improve 
communities’ understanding of land laws and related procedures.
• Set a clear procedure for subdivision (and consolidation) of land use 
rights.
 3.2 Mapping and zoning: reflecting land use practices on the ground
There are many discrepancies between the actual use of lands and their official 
classification under the legal land categories. Much cultivated land in lowland areas 
– not to mention upland taungya and shifting cultivation areas – remains classified 
as other land uses, often as forestland or fallow, vacant, and virgin (VFV) land. In 
many cases, this is not due to recent illegal encroachment. In the case of the Delta, 
non-registered farmlands were cleared along the agricultural front at latest 10 to 
20 years ago and are currently cultivated by long-established farmers. In the case 
of the Dry Zone, greening projects led to classifying previously cultivated lands as 
forestlands. In both cases, farmers have often managed to maintain their use rights 
informally through various arrangements. 
135. Annual tax on land could be defined so as to discourage speculation, while not being a burden for smallholders. 
However, it still needs to be an amount sufficient enough to encourage previous owners to declare their transfers so 
to avoid paying the taxes. Annual taxes on farmland are still derived from the British colonial framework with a set 6 
MMK/acre tax. In many instances, GAD clerks prefer to pay tax themselves rather than bearing the cost of traveling to 
collect taxes. Transfer tax for permanent transfers (inheritance, sale) is to be small so as to encourage people to register 
their deeds. Finally, betterment tax is a tax on the added value from the sale of lands would need to be relatively high. 
This would help to mobilize revenue from speculative actions. 
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The previous government launched a nationwide initiative announced in early 
2013 through a Presidential instruction to reclassify land in order to reflect current 
realities on the ground. The main objective has been to collect accurate data of 
villages and households that have settled and occupied reserved and public forest 
areas for a certain length of years and designating them as new villages. Through this 
policy, the forestry department has said that 1,681,667 acres have been converted 
into farmland. Despite these announced measures, concerned farmers have not 
received LUCs yet and many households in the Delta and the Dry Zone still cultivate 
land classified under forests and are therefore facing land tenure insecurity. The 
lack of coordination between the different institutions in charge of, respectively, 
farmlands, forestlands, and vacant, virgin, and fallow lands is evidently part of the 
issue. This issue highlights the need to move from a system in which each government 
agency is perceived as the ‘owner’ of respective land categories to a custodianship 
model in which there would be a single land-agency for administration of lands136. 
 Recommendations
• Establish a clear mechanism for reclassifying areas of land to match 
with their actual uses and protect existing land tenure claims of rural 
farmers. 
• Explore options for a nationwide system of land classification/zoning 
based on participatory land use planning at national, state/regional, 
district, and township levels, and more importantly at the Ward/village 
tract level. 
• Explore the option of establishing a single land agency for the 
administration of lands so as to reduce duplication and to improve 
efficiency of land administration and management.
 
 3.3 Empowering land users through full disposal rights 
As shown throughout the report, there are several discrepancies between 
farmers’ needs, their practices, and the legal restrictions on land use. In many 
cases, these discrepancies hinder farm productivity and farmers’ resilience to 
shocks. The former restrictions on land use rights actually remain, highlighting the 
contradiction between the progressive opening of the land tenure framework and 
the broadening of land use rights, on one hand, and the government’s enduring 
focus on paddy – the staple crop constituting Myanmar’s national identity – and its 
tendency to control land use for paddy production, on the other. 
As such, crop choice is still highly hindered in Myanmar by the current 
Farmland Law, constraining farmers’ disposal land use rights. Some of the 
prescriptions on land use mentioned in the LUC (Form 7) are inadequate and 
136. This does not exclude the involvement of concerned line ministries in land use related issues. 
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lead farmers to unenthusiastically but deliberately ‘break the law’. For example, 
while many Dry Zone smallholders are highly interested to diversify with 
drought resistant cash crops such as Thanaka trees, they must officially request 
authorization to central level for planting perennials on ya and paddy lands, as 
per the law. In addition, restrictions on fallow periods137 are not always relevant. 
For example, in the Dry Zone, improved fallow systems with multi-purpose trees 
could help increase soil fertility and agriculture productivity while delivering 
other benefits (soil and water conservation, production of fire wood, income 
generation through commercial species etc.). If farmers follow these legal 
restrictions they negatively impact their livelihoods; but if they violate them, 
opportunities for corruption and abuse of power from village leaders and village 
tract authorities towards the ‘incompliant’ farmers emerge. In addition, some 
of the adherence conditions are prohibitive in terms of transactions costs (such 
as the high costs attending the requirement to submit crop change requests to 
Union level), further increasing opportunities for corrupt practices. Finally, the 
sanctions for non-compliance of these restrictions may generate land insecurity 
as some (fines, prison sentences) are excessive and can even result in loss of lands. 
 Recommendations
• It is urgent that farmers be given full disposal rights on the choice of 
crops, including for perennial crops. They are the most suited to make 
optimal decisions to enhance their livelihoods and land productivity, 
and respond to market dynamics.
• Extend the land use categories over which tenure can be secured by 
simplifying the land use classification system and integrating into the 
farmland category uses such as agroforestry and aquaculture. 
• Ensure accessibility and affordability of legal procedures through 
simplified and decentralized processes for changing land use, in case 
some restrictions do remain in place. 
• Review sanctions in case of non-compliance of restrictions of land use 
such that they do not result in livelihood insecurity.
 3.4 Land conflict resolution
Land tenure security requires the provision of effective conflict resolution 
mechanisms. However, during the past decades, land governance has been highly 
concentrated in the hands of village tract headmen, who were acting as political 
brokers138 between government and villagers. In the absence of checks and 
balances, corrupt practices have prevailed at the expenses of the weakest. The study 
provided ample number of cases where dispute arbitration decisions were done 
137. In the latest Farmland Law mentions that ‘land shall not be fallow without a sound reason’. 
138. Bierschenk et al., 2000. 
IX. Conclusions and recommendations
265 
in favor of the ‘highest bidder’ in terms of bribes. The involvement of traditional 
village elites (i.e. the village tract headman, GAD clerks, village tract SLRD officers, 
elders known as lugyi and yet-mi-yet-pha) in Village Tract Farmland Management 
Committees directly questions the adequacy of government structures put in place 
to administrate – for instance, but not only – land issues. The multiplicity of legal 
and customary systems that dominated land tenure in the lowlands over the past 
50 years is also a consequence of the wider distrust of villagers towards the state 
and its predatory policies. It created a conducive ground for defying legal justice 
and, taking advantage of the opportunity of the recent change in governance, for 
seeking social justice: in similar rates in both the Delta and the Dry Zone, an average 
of 7% of farmland owning households (excluding cultivated forestland ‘owners’) 
have contested some points of the LUC. Land objections are twice more frequent 
in households which have not received the LUCs. The qualitative survey’s many 
case studies indicate that there are actually more cases, but the low report rate 
in the quantitative survey is due again to a particularly strong survey bias against 
reporting issues concerning land disputes.
The impact of the state on local elites, incentivizing them or threatening 
them to effectively become state’s brokers, generates a lack of trust within the 
community towards the village tract administrator and the diverse forms of local 
land committees that have existed through time. In addition, the social capital at 
the village level has often been crippled in the past decades. Most local community 
leaders are not neutral as they have been involved as village tract/village headmen 
or in one way or another in the different local land committees that have existed 
through history. Informal institutions lack capacity to deal with land conflicts. This 
is particularly strong in the Delta, which is characterized by more mobility, strong 
patron-client relationships and weak horizontal links, even among households 
of the same ‘class’. In addition, there are strong competing claims between 
farmers, tenants, and landless households in the Delta.  Finally, there is a lack of 
independent conflict resolution mechanisms. These are particularly needed in the 
case of conflicts pitting powerful actors against the socially marginalized. When 
reviewing the experience of the first ‘Parliamentary Land Investigation Commission 
in relation to confiscation of farmland and other land’ (created under President 
Thein Sein) and observing the current ‘Review committees on confiscated land and 
other lands’ (newly formed under the NLD government), one can conclude that 
both attempts face the same governance shortfalls: at the lower level bodies at 
village tract and township levels, members are the same stakeholders who have 
concentrated power over land and natural resources in the past. 
To address this, the National Land Use Policy (NLUP) proposes relevant 
actions such as establishing independent monitoring bodies with participation 
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of all stakeholders, and appointing monitors that have no direct interest, to 
observe settlement of land disputes. It also proposes to establish an independent 
tripartite arbitration process to settle land disputes, comprised of government 
departments, organizations, farmers, and the private sector. In order to improve 
access to justice, it proposed to allow civil society to provide legal aid and acquire 
necessary information for use in land disputes. It also mentions establishing 
clear procedural processes to improve easy access to, and use of, independent 
arbitration tribunals, courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms by farmers 
and other land users. However, the Commission for the Assessment of Legal 
Affairs and Special Issues wrote a memo in November 2016 to the President Office 
suggesting some elements of the NLUP to be deleted, notably provisions for 
new special courts and independent arbitration mechanisms for land disputes139. 
 Recommendations
• The government needs to enact a close review of the Farmland 
Management Body – particularly its village tract level representation 
– in order to address its very limited capacity in resolving intra-
villages conflicts.
• Maintain and promote the establishment of independent monitoring 
bodies with participation of all stakeholders, and by appointing 
monitors that have no direct interest, to observe settlement 
of land disputes. Sound processes for selection of community 
representatives need to be defined as part of this.  
• Promote conflict resolution mechanisms which are able to take into 
account lands’ history and trajectories.
• Implement concrete mechanisms for transparency and 
accountability of the actors in charge of translating the legal 
framework into practice on the ground.
• Promote legal awareness capacity building at local level, both for 
communities and authorities.
 3.5 LUCs: individualized (and gendered) vs. familial land management
Although ‘individual property’ (u’ paing) was set as the dominant framework 
for administrating land in lowlands since the time of the British, individualization of 
land management did not necessarily accompany this framework. The often-used 
term of bobapaing myay (ancestral land) covers a trans-generational and familial 
dimension of managing land. Yet under the current titling process, relationship 
to land management may undergo some changes. In the first place, while the 
139. Extract from unofficial translation: “In part (6) it is mentioned to form special courts and use of independent tripartite 
arbitration process for land dispute resolution. The land use rights and tenure have been managed and resolved by 
respective departments and the landownership and heritage have been resolved by the court. Therefore, these special courts 
and independent tripartite arbitration processes should not be included.”
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new land law is gender-neutral, distribution of land titles is based on household 
heads – who are generally male. As noted in Shivakumar Srinivas and U Saw Hlaing 
(2015: 36), “little information was provided to women on the option of joint titling 
(registering land parcels collectively under the names of husbands and wives)”. Beyond 
gender issues in failing to provide women equitable access to land use rights, it 
poses the question of the appropriateness of entrusting LUCs to one individual 
for land that is in most cases managed by the household. As shown in this study, 
decisions regarding land use are made at least by the leading couple, and often in 
consultation with children. 
The fact that LUCs were provided as the only legitimate document to prove 
one’s land use rights already creates discrepancies between official land registers 
and the reality of land use on the ground. This process could even entail deeper 
changes in terms of land management. One indication is the fact that LUCs 
must be presented for obtaining loans from the government Agricultural Bank 
(MADB) and that loans are provided for a maximum of 10 acres. To bypass this 
limitation, many families divided their land at the time of titling into 10-acre 
holdings amongst different members of the household, often children. As these 
are intra-familial arrangements, in most cases the land is still worked by the 
household – as long as the children are not married and continue to live within 
their parents. In that case, the registered number of farming households (a 
list kept by village tract administrators), which is based on the number of LUCs 
within the village tract, is inflated compared to the reality. This obviously creates 
an issue for ground-based policymaking or development projects, as the figures 
on the number of farming households in village tracts are becoming unreliable140. 
 Recommendations
• Encourage women’s representation in land administration bodies.
• Provide gender sensitive information and sharing places about the 
current land framework.
• Centralize information in the hands of a single land administration 
body at the village tract level and consolidate lists to reduce 
discrepancies between LUCs and farming households.
• Measures should be taken to reduce vulnerability of women in case 
of divorce or separation or death of the husband, something that can 
be accomplished whether through joint registration of spouses on 
LUCs or through other complementary laws relating to family and 
social protection issues.
140. As an example, GRET Myanmar recently undertook a quantitative study on land dynamics in lowlands and faced 
the situation where the reported number of farming households obtained at the village tract level (for sampling 
purpose) was largely inflated compared to the actual situation on the ground.
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4.  Building a conducive context for securing agricultural  
      livelihoods
Livelihoods’ security for farmers means the ability to reproduce (and 
possibly improve) their livelihoods while meeting basic household’s needs (food, 
potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, community 
participation, and social integration). It also means the ability to cope with and 
recover from stress and shocks. Apart from a conducive legal framework, already 
discussed above, securing agricultural livelihoods depends on many other factors 
(i.e. on those not directly linked to the land tenure framework). 
Policies to support agriculture and rural livelihoods in a broader sense need a 
comprehensive cross-sectoral approach that obviously goes far beyond the land 
question. Transport and water management infrastructure, rural finance, access to 
markets, research, agricultural education and extension services, and structuring 
of farmers’ organizations are crucial issues to address. In addition, further strategic 
thinking is needed to formulate consistent trade policies on agricultural products. 
It is still missing from the latest draft of the Agricultural development strategy 
despite this being a powerful lever on markets and prices.
 4.1 Improving access to institutional credit schemes
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, indebtedness is still a strong driver 
of land exclusion. 5.1% of Delta and 5.4% of Dry Zone households surveyed claim 
having lost lands due to indebtedness, either by mortgage closure, or by selling 
their lands to urgently repay loans. The reality of exclusion because of indebtedness 
may be even higher, since quantitative studies can only provide limited information 
on such a complex, and sensitive, issue (see Chapter VIII.2). 
Whether in the Delta or the Dry Zone, access to credit is available through a 
great diversity of stakeholders. While the MADB’s loan scheme seems to be the most 
effective at the moment in terms of coverage and interest rates (which are much 
lower than those proposed by any other stakeholder), the low quality of services 
(inadequate loan amounts and timing of disbursements and repayments), limited 
human resource capacity, and issues in relaying MADB policies at the village level 
(see Chapter VIII.2) hinder much of its potential benefits. Loan amounts are too low 
for non-paddy lands. Untimely disbursement of loans often requires farmers to fill 
the gap between the period of investment and the time of delivery by relying on 
private, high interest, loans. 
Further, the MADB scheme’s effectiveness is hampered by weak regulations 
and power struggles at the village level. Indeed, MADB village tract representatives 
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– normally elected by the village tract administrator together with 10 Households 
leaders – are in practice directly appointed by the village tract administrator. 
Chapter VIII.2.2 shows that these representatives operate at different levels to 
differentiate access to MADB loans, from the application process to the repayment 
time. Eventually, farmers failing to reimburse the MADB loan in time may fall 
either into the hands of money-lenders (higher interests, 10%/month) or into 
informal borrowing arrangements organized by the MADB representative (lower 
interest, 7%/month), hardly improving the farmers’ financial situation (if not 
worsening it) but benefiting mostly the same wealthier local individuals. And 
yet, despite the multiplication of micro-finance institutions and cash transfer 
projects (especially in the Delta), the study shows that those arrive only in third 
position in loans’ frequency and amount, after MADB and private money-lenders. 
MADB, because of its ability to provide credit subsidized at below market price, 
allows it to remain the most sought after credit source, despite its clear shortfalls. 
 Recommendations
• A deep reform of MADB is needed to improve the quality of services. 
Below are some of the proposed measures: 
• Improve the timing of loans (disbursement, repayments, etc.) so they 
appropriately align with crop cycles and farmers’ cash flow constraints.
• Increase MADB loan amounts, especially for non-paddy crops 
• Train and appoint professional MADB staff employees at the village 
tract level to facilitate application, management, disbursement, and 
reimbursement of loans.
• Reduce rural cultivator dependency on private money-lenders 
through micro-finance. Supporting rural finance should also allow the 
development of new financial products such as inventory credit and 
support for farm equipment hire or purchase. 
• Improving access to affordable credit needs to take place simultaneously 
with financial education aiming at improving households’ financial 
management skills so as to reduce indebtedness.
• Ensure coordination among these publicly funded initiatives141 and with 
microfinance institutions to avoid indebtedness of those who contract 
multiple loans. 
 4.2 Increasing sustainable intensification, diversification and resilience
Improving rural livelihoods and land access can be partly achieved by improving 
agricultural productivity. Increasing demographic pressure and the disappearance 
of agricultural frontiers (at least for fertile lands) worsens land fragmentation, 
141. There are multiple publicly funded initiatives, namely from MADB, Cooperative Department (Tha Ma), Rural 
development department (Mya Sein Yaung), and some other smaller scale initiatives.
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which is particularly damaging given the ramifications of economies of scale. 
Indeed, contrary to many studies showing that economies of scale do not exist in 
agriculture (Johnson and Ruttan 1994), a recent report by the World Bank indicates 
its existence in rice production in Myanmar: 
“Profits tend to increase along with increased farm size. Small farms had higher 
yields but failed to translate higher yields into higher profits. Economies of scale 
allowed large farms to adopt more modern technologies and save on costs.” 
(World Bank 2016: xviii)
However, some studies show that demographic pressure is not necessarily an 
undermining factor, as farmers often find viable alternatives such as agricultural 
intensification, changes in crop patterns, as well as more systematic investments in 
agricultural and non-agricultural practices (see for example Boserup  1965, Tiffen 
et al., 1994). 
This is illustrated by the off-farm diversification of Dry Zone farmers, even 
for those having large surfaces, and by the existence of a non-agrarian landless 
category, which relies only little (if not at all) on agriculture for their livelihood. 
Changes in crop patterns can be noticed as part of this adaptation, such as the 
switch to perennial crops, especially Thanakha. The above cited report also 
highlights that paddy is less profitable than other crops, especially is some regions 
including Ayeyarwaddy and Sagaing (where green grams are most profitable) 
(World Bank 2016). 
Rural livelihoods’ sustainability also relies on households’ capacity to 
absorb shocks. The study shows that borrowing for health accounts for an 
average of 9% of contracted loans. Moreover, farmers are highly vulnerable 
to pests and climatic accidents. There is therefore a need to improve rural 
households’ resilience. Protection against these risks has to be designed and 
implemented beyond the village level notably because of the lack of horizontal 
bonds and the dominance of vertical (patron-client like) relationships. 
 Recommendations
Dry Zone rainfed land crop systems are rather extensive in order to cope 
with the scarce and unpredictable rainfall. Irrigation is thus a key opportunity 
for the intensification of agriculture, in a context of land fragmentation. But 
large scale pump-irrigation schemes would have a negative impact on 
underground water sources and on soil salinization. Hence:
• Promoting rainwater harvesting and storage, combined with soil and 
water conservation, may be a more sustainable option. Government-
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supported construction of water tanks could provide consequent 
water to complement irrigation for established crops and provide new 
opportunities during the winter season to cultivate higher value crops.  
Complementing this, extension services promoting afforestation or 
reforestation, water and soil conservation, agro ecological modern 
techniques and access to good planting materials from MoALI and 
DoA services could have significant impact on agriculture in this 
challenging agro-ecological zone. 
• In the Delta, agriculture is highly specialized in paddy. Options exist 
there for sustainable intensification: 
• Promote modern agro-ecological practices using local resources 
to simultaneously boost yields and reduce on-farm expenses and 
dependency on inputs.  
• Diversification of crops with pulses and other seasonal crops in 
suitable areas could be an option to increase income, could reduce 
farm constraints on labor at paddy-peak labor period, and may also 
improve soil management. 
• Government investments in water management infrastructure (dikes, 
drainage) would be crucial in the Delta to improve farming conditions 
and strongly reduce recurrent crop losses due to regular floods. 
• In summary, in both areas, state-led investment in irrigation and water 
management is crucial, combined with the promotion of context-
specific agricultural practices. This requires adapted extension services 
to provide technical knowledge on crops (investment, profitability, 
suitability according to agro-ecological regions) for farmers so that 
they can make efficient choices.
• Resilience of rural households could be strengthened through social 
protection schemes, notably to cover health expenses. Sustainability 
of such schemes may be achieved through their structuring beyond 
the village level. Interesting initiatives142 through the federation of 
village groups have been conducted in Myanmar.
• It would be worthwhile to explore options to cover crop-
related risks through national level crop insurance schemes. 
 4.3 Mechanization versus farm labor opportunities
Farm labor is a very important source of income for many rural households. 
The study shows that 41.8% of Dry Zone and Delta households have at least one 
member of the family earning some income as an agricultural laborer. Among 
these agricultural laborers, 87.4% are landless in the Delta against 52.4% in the Dry 
142. See for example the work of Welt Hunger Hilfe (WHH) in Htantabin township (Yangon region). 
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Zone. As a consequence, pushing mechanization through large farm machines143, 
such as big combined harvesters, needs very careful thought to avoid driving away 
families depending on farm labor, keeping in mind that options for other livelihoods 
and jobs in urban areas are still relatively limited (Boutry et al., 2015). This risk may 
be particularly strong for those in the Delta, where working as a farm laborer is 
very specific to the landless and to very small landowners (owning less than three 
acres144). On the other hand, the qualitative study found that in the Delta, finding 
farm laborers during peak periods (such as for transplanting and harvesting) can 
prove to be very challenging and partly explains why many farmers are unable 
to cultivate the entirety of their lands in summer. However this constraint allows 
temporary access to lands to landless or very small farmers in summer. As such, the 
recourse to farm laborers can somewhat be interpreted as a wealth redistribution 
mechanism, not only by the fact that it provides jobs but also because constraints 
promote temporary land access to the landless. 
Interestingly, discussions addressing the labor shortage in Bogale have 
led farmers to spontaneously recommend arrangements with laborers, such 
as temporarily providing a plot of lands in exchange for the guarantee that the 
laborers would provide farm labor.  
5.  Taking into account the diversity of rural households for  
      effective targeting of policy and action
There are different types of farming households – in terms of life cycle, 
landholding size, as well as in terms of multi-activity (on-farm, off farm activities) 
– and each type has their own constraints and specificities. This section aims to 
look into how policies and rural livelihood support actions can better take into 
consideration the fact that ‘smallholders’ are not one uniform category.
 5.1 Smallholders are not one uniform category
Putting this more specifically in the context of the study findings, it means 
creating and/or enforcing a context where those accessing land are not at risk 
of losing it because of foreclosure, and where those having no access to land yet 
may observe improved possibilities to do so. It also means improving access to 
non-farm livelihoods, both for farming and non-farming households. Indeed, the 
study shows that in the Delta, apart from the ‘Capitalized farmers’ who are largely 
specialized in agriculture, small farmers (under 5 acres) are generally more secure 
in terms of livelihoods by relying on other activities such as husbandry or fishing 
143. Access to small scale machinery (such as power tillers for paddy lands) is however essential. 
144. In the Dry Zone this activity is more evenly practiced by different landholding categories. 
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as their primary or secondary source of income. Agri-specialized small farmers 
who rely mostly on agriculture (and on-farm labor) are more precarious than other 
categories, regardless of the surface they cultivate (between 2.5 and 10 acres). In 
the Dry Zone, the high variability and unpredictability of rainfall make access to 
irrigation a crucial differentiating factor amongst farming households, but overall, 
they all need to rely on other – generally off-farm – activities. In both regions, the 
households specialized in small farming are the most at threat of food scarcity and 
livelihood precariousness. 
Access to land for smallholders and young households – even those destined 
to become capitalized farming households (cf. Chapter VII.6) – is highly linked to 
the fact of having some capital that one can dispose of, meaning that even for 
those households benefiting from inherited land, available capital (money, cattle, 
laborers, but also social capital) will have an impact on their capacity to retain 
their farming livelihoods and possibly capitalize on land during their lifetime. 
For smallholders often starting with little investments, temporary arrangements 
(sharecropping, rent) on land (especially in the Delta) and off-farm activities (Dry 
Zone mainly) are important means of generating capital to secure permanent 
land use rights and productivity in the long term. Capital can also be accessed 
through credit, beginning with the main institutional source of loans for farmers, 
the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB). Conversely, credit can also 
be a strong driver of exclusion. Foreclosure on land for failing to repay debts finds 
a strong echo in Myanmar lowlands’ history, especially at the beginning of the 20th 
century when large tracts of land ended up in the hands of money-lenders, such 
as the Indian Chettiars. But exclusion due to credit is still at work, even if at a more 
discrete scale, at the village level. This pertains both to institutional weaknesses 
(untimely delivery of MADB loans to farmers, limited loans for non-paddy crops, 
lack of follow-up) and resource capture to the benefit of village level elites. 
In all these dimensions of rural livelihoods (multi-activity, access to capital 
and institutional credit schemes, and distribution of resources) there is room 
for improvement. Nonetheless, in front of such a huge enterprise, there is a 
need for prioritizing. Fortunately, a closer look at farmers’ ‘trajectories’ (access to, 
accumulation of, and loss of land) helps to distinguish categories of farmers more 
in need of support than others. Likewise, a closer look at landless households’ 
livelihoods can provide with more nuanced features regarding the precariousness 
of land access in the studied regions.
 5.2 Targeting ‘young’ households: life cycle and land patrimony’s trajectories 
The household’s life cycle is recognized as one of the major factors differentiating 
whether a given household has access to agricultural land. The study shows that 
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access to land does not have the same meaning for households at different stages 
of their respective lives (Chapter VII). Indeed, it can often be a temporary state for 
younger households who will inherit and are saving to buy land, while landlessness 
becomes a permanent form of land exclusion for households headed by a person 
over 40-50 years old. Landlessness rates are 80% in the Delta and 61.5% in the Dry 
Zone among households whose head is aged under 30, while only 40% in the Delta 
and 27% in the Dry Zone among household heads above 60 years old. This can be 
explained mainly by inheritance of farmlands from parents or spouse’s parents. 
In the Dry Zone especially, access to a small plot of land through inheritance at the 
beginning of the household’s life cycle seems to provide financial capacity to invest 
in other livelihood activities. Also in the Dry Zone, land security is highly associated 
with cattle ownership. In the Delta, by contrast, the study shows that livestock 
mainly serves as a saving asset or as a ‘safety net’ (in case of health problems, 
funerals, etc.), especially for small landowners.
In addition, young households are also more prone to initiate changes 
and to migrate, if necessary or in link with opportunities. It is important to 
keep in mind also that the context is changing. Land is getting relatively 
scarcer with time (under demographic pressure and the closing of the 
agricultural frontier) and this may increase the difficulty for current young 
households to access land, compared to the young ones of the past decades. 
This may increase the disparities between young and old households. 
 Recommendations
• It is crucial to understand and to take into account households’ life 
cycles to formulate policies and livelihood support actions that 
respond to the specific needs of different age groups. 
• Prioritize ‘young’ smallholders and landless households – whose head 
is aged under 30 – for specific support for their farming projects
• Support ‘young’ Dry Zone households to access cattle. 
• In the Delta, promote the use of temporarily vacant lands (especially 
under summer paddy) through temporary arrangements, especially 
for ‘young’ smallholders and landless households. 
 5.3 Better understand and tackle the issue of ‘landlessness’
First and foremost, the occurrence of landlessness has much to do with historical 
and agricultural features of the studied zones. For instance, the Dry Zone is the cradle 
of Burmese society, with long-established villages and stronger social organization, 
while the Delta is a frontier society and has been more impacted by predatory 
policies such as the ‘Compulsory Paddy Quota’. For these reasons, landlessness rates 
are often higher in the Delta than in Dry Zone villages. In addition, there are strong 
IX. Conclusions and recommendations
275 
disparities between villages of the same region, highlighting the complexity and 
intertwinement of different factors – such as agro-ecological conditions and the 
importance of power relations at the local level – for determining land access. The 
importance of differences between regions but also among villages of the same 
region shows that large scale surveys and uniform ‘one size fits all’ solutions on 
land tenure bear risks as they are not able to effectively address local and context-
specific problems. 
We already underlined in the section above the link between the age of the 
household head and access to land. Chapter VII.7 shows that careful analysis 
taking into account a household’s livelihood trajectory, livelihood diversity (on-
farm and off-farm oriented households, migrations, etc.), and a household’s life 
cycles can help determine those households to be prioritized when considering 
creating access to land – in other words, which of Myanmar’s landless households 
are in most dire need of accessing land. 
 Recommendations
• Undertake more systematic field research to ground analysis of 
landlessness and disaggregate agrarian landless from remaining 
categories.
• In any land redistribution project, prioritize the most vulnerable 
agrarian landless households:
Households whose head is over 40 years-old who will not inherit land
Delta specific: farm labor cum fishing households.
Dry Zone specific: farm labor households.
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 XI.   Annexes
Annex 1
Table 1: Number of household members (HH mb) according to the age 
category of the household head
Under 30 
 
30 <40 
 
40 < 50 
 
 50 < 60 
 
60 and  
over 
Total 
 
Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R
1 33 16.6 51 25.6 37 18.6 22 11.1 56 28.1 199 100.0
2 68 15.2 181 40.5 93 20.8 55 12.3 50 11.2 447 100.0
3 2 0.9 39 17.7 73 33.2 47 21.4 59 26.8 220 100.0
4 13 8.1 59 36.9 54 33.8 34 21.3 160 100.0
5 
and 
over
2 2.0 32 31.7 41 40.6 26 25.7 101 100.0
Total 103 9.1 286 25.4 294 26.1 219 19.4 225 20.0 1,127 100.0
Chi-Square=268.2  dof=16  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.244
Table 2: Sex of household head according to age category of household head 
Sex of HHH Male Female Total 
AGE 
CATEGORY of 
HHH
Nb HH %R Nb HH %R Nb HH %R
Less than 30 103 99.0 1 1.0 104 100.0
30 to under 
40
274 95.8 12 4.2 286 100.0
40 to under 
50
262 89.4 31 10.6 293 100.0
50 to under 
60
173 79.0 46 21.0 219 100.0
60 and above 155 68.6 71 31.4 226 100.0
Total 967 85.7 161 14.3 1,128 100.0
Chi-Square=104.5  dof=4  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.304
1.  Basic demography data (Delta and Dry Zone combined)
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Table 3: Age category of Household head and HHH education level
Primary 
school 
 
Middle 
school  
 
High 
school and 
university 
 None 
 
 
Total 
 
 
AGE 
CATEGORY 
of HHH
Less than 
30
Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R
30 to 
under 40
56 53.8 31 29.8 11 10.6 6 5.8 104 100.0
40 to 
under 50
205 71.7 48 16.8 23 8.0 10 3.5 286 100.0
50 to 
under 60
239 81.3 46 15.6 8 2.7 1 0.3 294 100.0
60 and 
above
179 81.7 30 13.7 2 0.9 8 3.7 219 100.0
Total 188 83.2 18 8.0 4 1.8 16 7.1 226 100.0
867 76.8 173 15.3 48 4.3 41 3.6 1,129 100.0
Chi-Square=78.5  dof=12  p=0.001  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2)  Cramer’s V=0.152
Table 4: HHH age/ number of HH members working outside of the village tract
None 1 or more Total 
AGE CATEGORY 
of HHH
Nb HH %R Nb HH %R Nb HH %R
Less than 30 92 88.5 12 11.5 104 100.0
30 to under 40 235 82.2 51 17.8 286 100.0
40 to under 50 201 68.4 93 31.6 294 100.0
50 to under 60 158 72.1 61 27.9 219 100.0
60 and above 171 75.7 55 24.3 226 100.0
Total 857 75.9 272 24.1 1,129 100.0
Chi-Square=25.9  dof=4  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.152
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Table 5 : Delta landownership and internal migration
HHH Born inside V 
or VT 
HHH born outside 
V or VT 
Total 
 
Nb HH %R Nb HH %R Nb HH %R
Landowners 179 83.3 36 16.7 215 100.0
Landless 215 68.0 101 32.0 316 100.0
Total 394 74.2 137 25.8 531 100.0
Chi-Square=14.7  dof=1  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.167
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Table 1: land-owning households having land cultivated by others (yes) through 
temporary arrangements, by age class (in Delta and Dry Zone)145
Yes No Total 
AGE category of 
HHH
Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R
Less than 30 3 4.2 10.7 25 5.0 89.3 28 4.9 100.0
30 to < 40 9 12.5 8.3 99 20.0 91.7 108 19.0 100.0
40 to < 50 16 22.2 9.8 147 29.6 90.2 163 28.7 100.0
50 to < 60 16 22.2 13.9 99 20.0 86.1 115 20.2 100.0
60 and more 28 38.9 18.2 126 25.4 81.8 154 27.1 100.0
Total 72 100.0 12.7 496 100.0 87.3 568 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=7.43  dof=4  p=0.113  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 1)  Cramer’s V=0.114
Table 2: distribution of land owning households involved in land temporary 
arrangements (contracting out) by sex of the household head (in Delta and Dry 
Zone)146
Contracting out No contracting out Total 
Male Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R
Female 56 77.8 11.4 436 87.9 88.6 492 86.6 100.0
Total 16 22.2 21.1 60 12.1 78.9 76 13.4 100.0
72 100.0 12.7 496 100.0 87.3 568 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=5.56  dof=2  p=0.06  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2)  Cramer’s V=0.099
145. Data is presented in aggregated form for Dry Zone and Delta together as both zones have similar trends. 
146. Data is presented in aggregated form for Dry Zone and Delta together as both zones have similar trends. 
 2.   Key figures on contracting out lands for farming by others
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Table 3: Ratio Land cultivated by the household itself / owned landholding 
size147 
 0% not 
cultivated by 
HH 
 
 
Above 
0%<50% 
cultivated by 
HH 
 
50% 
to<100% 
cultivated by 
HH 
 
100% 
and over 
cultivated by 
HH 
 
Total 
 
 
 
 
Land 
owned 
Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R
0.3<2.5 8 10.1 1 1.3 1 1.3 69 87.3 79 100.0
2.5<5 8 7.6 2 1.9 11 10.5 84 80.0 105 100.0
5<10 9 4.6 7 3.6 23 11.7 157 80.1 196 100.0
10<15 4 4.0 4 4.0 17 17.0 75 75.0 100 100.0
15 and 
above
3 3.5 1 1.2 23 26.7 59 68.6 86 100.0
Total 32 5.7 15 2.7 75 13.3 444 78.4 566 100.0
Chi-Square=29.8  dof=15  p=0.013  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 10)  Cramer’s V=0.133
147. Data is presented in aggregated form for Dry Zone and Delta together as both zones have similar trends although 
contracting out is more widespread among large farm owners (>15 acres) in Dry Zone (28% of these contract out in 
Dry Zone against only 16% in Delta). 
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Table 1: Distribution of households practicing animal husbandry among the 
different classes of Total Income (TI) in Delta
AniH NoAniH Total
Nb HH %R Nb HH %R Nb HH %R
TI <750,000 84 53.5 73 46.5 157 100.0
TI 750,000 to 
1,500,000
95 63.8 54 36.2 149 100.0
TI 1,500,000 to 
3,000,000
76 67.9 36 32.1 112 100.0
TI >3,000,000 82 72.6 31 27.4 113 100.0
Total 337 63.5 194 36.5 531 100.0
Chi-Square=11.7  dof=3  p=0.009  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.148
 Table 2: Distribution of households practicing animal husbandry among the 
different classes of Total Income (TI) in Dry Zone
AniH NoAniH Total
Nb HH %R Nb HH %R Nb HH %R
TI <750,000 82 60.3 54 39.7 136 100.0
TI 750,000 to 
1,500,000
107 62.9 63 37.1 170 100.0
TI 1,500,000 to 
3,000,000
115 69.7 50 30.3 165 100.0
TI >3,000,000 83 85.6 14 14.4 97 100.0
Total 387 68.1 181 31.9 568 100.0
Chi-Square=19.7  dof=3  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.186
 3.   Livestock
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Table 3: Distribution of livestock income HH categories among landownership 
categories in Delta. 
AH<10 AH 10-100 AH 100-350 AH>350 Total 
Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R
Landless 208 65.8 59 18.7 28 8.9 21 6.6 316 100.0
0.3-2.5 17 58.6 4 13.8 7 24.1 1 3.4 29 100.0
2.5-5 26 56.5 8 17.4 8 17.4 4 8.7 46 100.0
5-10 36 54.5 13 19.7 9 13.6 8 12.1 66 100.0
10-15 20 47.6 6 14.3 11 26.2 5 11.9 42 100.0
>15 17 53.1 3 9.4 5 15.6 7 21.9 32 100.0
Total 324 61.0 93 17.5 68 12.8 46 8.7 531 100.0
Chi-Square=25.2  dof=15  p=0.047  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 6)  Cramer’s V=0.126
Table 4: Distribution of livestock income HH categories among landownership 
categories in Dry Zone
AH<10 AH 10-100 AH 100-350 AH>350 Total 
Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R
Landless 182 74.3 15 6.1 19 7.8 29 11.8 245 100.0
0.3-2.5 25 49.0 13 25.5 6 11.8 7 13.7 51 100.0
2.5-5 34 56.7 12 20.0 7 11.7 7 11.7 60 100.0
5-10 76 58.5 32 24.6 14 10.8 8 6.2 130 100.0
10-15 41 70.7 6 10.3 4 6.9 7 12.1 58 100.0
>15 43 79.6 1 1.9 3 5.6 7 13.0 54 100.0
Total 401 67.1 79 13.2 53 8.9 65 10.9 598 100.0
Chi-Square=49.7  dof=15  p=0.001  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2)  Cramer’s V=0.166
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Table 1: Average monthly farm gate paddy price of Bay Gyar Lay variety from 
March 2012-to May 2014
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
2012 6,155 6,033 6,125 6,009
2013 4,577 4,700 4,680 4,800 5,485 5,700
2014 6,138 6,096 6,025 6,417 6,790
 
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
2012 6,105 6,242 6,661 6,195 4,667 4,330
2013 5,937 6,125 6,118 6,055 5,793 5,478
2014
Table 2: Average monthly farm gate paddy price of Khun Ni variety from March 
2012-to May 2014
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
2012 4,781 4,675 4,636 4,669
2013 4,244 4,291 4,338 4,400 4,956 5,094
2014 5,071 5,100 4,900 5,800 5,822
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
2012 4,714 5,052 5,800 5,300 4,488 4,000
2013 5,163 5,534 5,600 5,525 5,525 5,100
2014
 4.   Farm gate paddy prices at Bogale-Mawlamyinegyun area –  
        for 4 different varieties (2012-14)
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 Table 3: Average monthly farm gate paddy price of Hnan Karr variety from 
March 2012-to May 2014
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
2012 3,388 3,125 3,370 3,386
2013 3,488 3,817 3,855 3,825 4,167 4,207
2014 4,060 4,178 4,200 4,200 4,200
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
2012 3,808 3,629 3,573
2013 4,267 4,000 4,000
2014
 Table 4: Average monthly farm gate paddy price of Htee Htut Yin variety from 
March 2012-to May 2014
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
2012 3,063 2,692 2,818 3,150
2013 3,544 3,458 3,850 4,211
2014 3,925 3,800 3,880
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
2012 3,761 3,968 4,378 4,238 4,180 4,180
2013 4,168 4,690 4,858 4,748 4,640
2014
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 5.   Profit and loss statement of paddy production  
        (monsoon and summer) in Delta
Monsoon paddy (Transplanting), 2013 
Total work 
hour
Cost/
hour
Total 
Cost
Labor charges 84,625
Nursery preparation and seed 
sowing
12 375 4,500 
Seed Sowing /Broadcasting -00 -00 -00 
Transplanting 90 375 33,750 
Fertilizer Application 10 375 3,750 
Harvesting (hand) 40 625 25,000 
Assistant labor for Threshing Ma-
chine
5 375 1,875 
Transporting of paddy pile (from 
field to house)
20 600 12,000 
Freight (from boat to Miller) 3 1,500 3,750 
Machinary cost 24,750
Hired Machinery (land preparation) 10 375 3,750
Thresher Machine 5 4,200 21,000
Amount Unit Unit price Total
Materials cost 53,760
Seeds 6 Pyi 500 3,000 
Urea 34 kg 400 13,600 
T-super 25 kg 440 11,000 
Potash 25 kg 560 14,000 
Fuel for land preparation and 
Threshing
20 bottle 608 12,160 
Fuel for Irrigation 0 -00 -00 -00 
 Hired pump for Irrigation 0 -00 -00 -00 
TOTAL per acre  163,135
 Table 1: Average costs of paddy per acre,  Monsoon paddy  
(Transplanting), 2013
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Monsoon Paddy (Broadcasting), 2013 
 Total work 
hour
Cost/
hour
Total 
Cost
Labor charges 84,625 
Nursery preparation and seed 
sowing
 -00 -00 4,500 
Seed Sowing /Broadcasting  4 375 -00 
Transplanting  30 375 33,750 
Fertilizer Application  3 375 3,750 
Harvesting (hand)  40 625 25,000 
Assistant labor for Threshing Ma-
chine
 5 375 1,875 
Transporting of paddy pile (from 
field to house)
 20 600 12,000 
Freight (from boat to Miller)  3 1,500 3,750 
Machinary cost 30,375
Hired Machinery (land preparation) 25 375 9,375
Thresher Machine 5 4,200 21,000
Amt Unit Unit price Total
Materials cost 64,600
Seeds 20 pyi 500 10,000 
Urea 34 kg 400 13,600 
T-super 25 kg 440 11,000 
Potash 25 kg 560 14,000 
Fuel for land preparation and 
Threshing
20 bottle 800 16,000 
Fuel for Irrigation -00 -00 -00 -00 
 Hired pump for Irrigation -00 -00 -00 -00 
TOTAL per acre 151,475
 Table 2: Average costs of paddy per acre,  Monsoon Paddy (Broadcasting), 2013
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Summer paddy (Broadcasting), 2014
Total work 
hour
Cost/
hour
Total 
Cost
Labor charges 47,375 
Nursery preparation and seed 
sowing
-00 -00 -00 
Seed Sowing /Broadcasting 4 500 2,000 
Transplanting -00 -00 -00 
Fertilizer Application 15 500 7,500 
Harvesting (hand) 35 600 21,000 
Assistant labor for Threshing Ma-
chine
5 375 1,875 
Transporting of paddy pile (from 
field to house)
20 600 12,000 
Freight (from boat to Miller) 2 1,500 3,000 
Machinary cost 36,600
Hired Machinery (land preparation) 19 600 11,400
Thresher Machine 6 4,200 25,200
Amt Unit Unit price Total
Materials cost 103,880
Seeds 20 pyi 500 10,000 
Urea 100 kg 520 52,000 
T-super 25 kg 460 11,500 
Potash 13 kg 560 7,280 
Fuel for land preparation and 
Threshing
16 bottle 600 9,600 
Fuel for Irrigation 5 bottle 700 3,500 
 Hired pump for Irrigation 10 hour 1,000 10,000 
TOTAL per acre  187,855
Annex 5
 Table 3: Average costs of paddy per acre,  Summer Paddy (Broadcasting), 2014
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Table 1: Ratio number of working HH members engaged as farm laborer/ total 
number of working HH members
Delta Dry Zone Total
Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R
de >=0.01 à 
0.25
1 0.4 14.3 6 2.6 85.7 7 1.5 100.0
de >=0.25 à 0.5 26 11.0 28.9 64 27.7 71.1 90 19.2 100.0
de >=0.5 à 0.75 58 24.5 38.7 92 39.8 61.3 150 32.1 100.0
de >=0.75 à 
4.001
152 64.1 68.8 69 29.9 31.2 221 47.2 100.0
Total 237 100.0 50.6 231 100.0 49.4 468 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=57.2  dof=3  p=0.001  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2)  Cramer’s V=0.349
Table 2: Relationship between fishing and household head age in Delta
Fish No fish Total
Age category of 
HHH
Nb HH %R Nb HH %R Nb HH %R
< 30 41 63.1 24 36.9 65 100.0
30 < 40 82 58.6 58 41.4 140 100.0
40 < 50 65 45.8 77 54.2 142 100.0
50<60 40 41.2 57 58.8 97 100.0
60 and over 20 23.0 67 77.0 87 100.0
Total 248 46.7 283 53.3 531 100.0
Chi-Square=35.8  dof=4  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.26
 6.   Supporting data for income generation (on farm wage labor, 
        fishing, off farm activities)
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Table 3: Relationship between fishing income and landholding size in Delta
< 70000 MMK/
year 
 
70000 
<365000 
MMK/year 
365000 MMK/
per year and 
above  
Total 
 
 
ACRES Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R
Landless 46 25.1 72 39.3 65 35.5 183 100.0
0.3-2.5 4 36.4 4 36.4 3 27.3 11 100.0
2.5-5 6 54.5 2 18.2 3 27.3 11 100.0
5-10 13 56.5 5 21.7 5 21.7 23 100.0
10-15 8 61.5 1 7.7 4 30.8 13 100.0
>15 5 71.4 2 28.6 7 100.0
Total 82 33.1 84 33.9 82 33.1 248 100.0
Chi-Square=20.3  dof=10  p=0.026  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 12)  Cramer’s V=0.202
Table 4: Distribution of households engaged in different types of self-employed 
activities, for Delta and Dry Zone
Delta 
% of HH over total HH 
surveyed in Delta (531) 
Dry Zone 
% of HH over total HH 
surveyed in Dry Zone (598) 
Nb of HH % of total HH 
Delta (531)
Nb of HH %  of total 
HH (598)
Construction 15 2.8% 7 1.2%
Weaving 0 0.0% 101 16.9%
Arts and crafts 15 2.8% 9 1.5%
Food processing 15 2.8% 9 1.5%
Small shop 39 7.3% 20 3.3%
Services (transport, 
health, education)
32 6.0% 7 1.2%
Broker, money-lending 32 6.0% 8 1.3%
Other services 6 1.1% 13 2.2%
Total HH self 
employed OF
126 23.7% 148 24.7%
 Average off-farm 
income per HH (MMK)
674,099 743,422
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Table 5: Distribution of households having at least one member employed in 
off-farm activities, for Delta and Dry Zone
Delta (531 HH)
% of HH over total HH surveyed 
in Delta (531) 
Dry Zone (598 HH)
% of HH over total HH surveyed 
in Dry Zone (598) 
Nb HH % of HH Nb HH % HH
Construction 10 1.9% 142 23.7%
Weaving 0 0.0% 44 7.4%
Arts and crafts 10 1.9% 3 0.5%
Food 
processing, 
shop keeping, 
mining)
10 1.9% 25 4.2%
Services 16 3.0% 6 1.0%
Total HH with 
wage income
46 8.7% 187 31.3%
Average off-
farm income 
per HH (MMK)
630,457 973,571 
Table 6: Distribution of households having off-farm activities among total 
annual household income categories in Delta
OFact No. OFact Total
TI <750,000 Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R %R %C %R
TI 750,000 to 
1,500,000
44 23.4 28.0 113 32.9 72.0 72.0 29.6 100.0
TI 1,500,000 to 
3,000,000
58 30.9 38.9 91 26.5 61.1 61.1 28.1 100.0
TI >3,000,000 42 22.3 37.5 70 20.4 62.5 62.5 21.1 100.0
Total 44 23.4 38.9 69 20.1 61.1 61.1 21.3 100.0
188 100.0 35.4 343 100.0 64.6 64.6 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=5.38  dof=3  p=0.144  (Peu significant)  Cramer’s V=0.101
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Table 7: Distribution of households having off-farm activities among total 
annual household income categories in Dry Zone
OFact No.OFact Total
TOTAL INCOME 
(TI)
Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R Nb 
HH
%C %R
TI <750,000 59 19.9 38.6 94 31.1 61.4 153 25.6 100.0
TI 750,000 to 
1,500,000
87 29.4 49.2 90 29.8 50.8 177 29.6 100.0
TI 1500000 to 
3000000
103 34.8 60.6 67 22.2 39.4 170 28.4 100.0
TI >3,000,000 47 15.9 48.0 51 16.9 52.0 98 16.4 100.0
Total 296 100.0 49.5 302 100.0 50.5 598 100.0 100.0
Chi-Square=15.8  dof=3  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.162
Table 8: Relation between off-farm income and total household income  
in Delta
Under 
50,000 
 
 
from 
50,000 
to under 
250,000 
from 
250,000 
to under 
700,000
from 
700,000 
to under 
1,250,000 
More 
than 
1,250,000 
 
Total 
 
 
 
Total 
Income (TI)
Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R
TI <750,000 120 76.4 21 13.4 15 9.6 1 0.6 157 100.0
TI 750,000 
to 
1,500,000
94 63.1 20 13.4 19 12.8 15 10.1 1 0.7 149 100.0
TI 1,500,000 
to 3000000
75 67.0 8 7.1 10 8.9 11 9.8 8 7.1 112 100.0
TI 
>3,000,000
72 63.7 7 6.2 8 7.1 12 10.6 14 12.4 113 100.0
Total 361 68.0 56 10.5 52 9.8 39 7.3 23 4.3 531 100.0
Chi-Square=50.5  dof=12  p=0.001  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2)  Cramer’s V=0.178
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Table 9: Relation between off-farm income and total household income  
in Dry Zone
Under 
50,000 
 
 
from 
50,000 
to under 
250,000 
from 
250,000 
to under 
700,000
from 
700,000 
to under 
1,250,000 
More 
than 
1,250,000 
 
Total 
 
 
 
Total 
Income (TI)
Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R Nb 
HH
%R
TI 
<750,000
101 66.0 23 15.0 28 18.3 1 0.7 153 100.0
TI 750,000 
to 
1,500,000
91 51.4 9 5.1 18 10.2 43 24.3 16 9.0 177 100.0
TI 1,500,000 
to 
3,000,000
68 40.0 12 7.1 16 9.4 22 12.9 52 30.6 170 100.0
TI 
>3,000,000
52 53.1 4 4.1 8 8.2 9 9.2 25 25.5 98 100.0
Total 312 52.2 48 8.0 70 11.7 75 12.5 93 15.6 598 100.0
Chi-Square=128.9  dof=12  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.268
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Table 1: Total income categories and categories of farmers in Delta
multi-active 
small farmers 
 
capitalized 
farmers 
 
Agri-
specialized 
small farmers  
Total 
 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Less than 
750,000
6 16.7 1 1.1 4 4.5 11 5.1
From 750,000 
to less than 
1,500,000
9 25.0 1 1.1 31 35.2 41 19.0
From 1,500,000 
to less than 
3,000.000
11 30.6 6 6.5 48 54.5 65 30.1
More than 
3,000,000
10 27.8 84 91.3 5 5.7 99 45.8
Total 36 100.0 92 100.0 88 100.0 216 100.0
Chi-Square=146.1  dof=6  p=0.001  (Val. théoriques < 5 = 3)  Cramer’s V=0.582
 7.   Total income per farmers categories
Table 2: Total income categories and categories of farmers in Dry Zone
Multi-active 
small farmers 
 
Capitalized 
farmers 
 
Agri-
specialized 
small farmers  
Total 
 
 
Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C Nb HH %C
Less than 
750,000
1 0.9 33 29.7 50 39.1 84 23.8
From 750,000 
to less than 
1,500,000
6 5.3 28 25.2 50 39.1 84 23.8
From 1,500,000 
to less than 
3,000.000
33 28.9 46 41.4 27 21.1 106 30.0
More than 
3,000,000
74 64.9 4 3.6 1 0.8 79 22.4
Total 114 100.0 111 100.0 128 100.0 353 100.0
Chi-Square=213.0  dof=6  p=0.001  (Very significant)  Cramer’s V=0.549
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8.  Methodology for quantitative survey 
Categorization for farmers 
The farmers categories analysed here have been built with a Factorial Analysis 
of Correspondences (FAC) done on households currently having long term land 
use rights (landowners, in short). Trying to go further in categorizing the Delta 
and Dry Zone rural societies (in terms of social and economical mobility as well as 
regarding ‘livelihood security’) surveyed for this research, several FAC have been 
performed, taking into account different variables. After conducting flat sorting 
and cross sorting, variables (on demography, agricultural practices and wealth…) 
have been selected among all the survey questions, according to their significance 
in differentiating different ‘groups’ in a meaningful way. These variables have then 
been used to conduct different FACs.
As a matter of fact, treating in a same batch landless households – those not 
owning any land use right – with landowners systematically results in, more or less, 
two categories with landless on the one hand and landowners on the other (this 
even for FAC relying only on non-agricultural variables such as loans contracted 
for health, food, access to remittances, etc.). This observation speaks in itself on 
the crucial role that access to land plays on households’ economic conditions and 
social status. To bypass the weight of this variable (landless vs. landowner), FACs 
have been performed for each of these two groups. The current FAC is based on 
surfaces cultivated by the farmers, profit order of different activities (agriculture, 
off-farm work, small business, fishing) and the total incomes households get each 
year. This FAC was first done on the two zones indistinctly, and then for each of 
them. The first FAC (without regards to location) resulted in 3 groups, quite distinct, 
which can be characterized in regards of the different variables available from the 
survey. 
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    Table 3: Variables introduced in farmers FAC 
Variable Modalities 
Total Area of farmland Total Area of farmland
Total annual incomes (million MMK) Total annual incomes (million MMK)
Weaving Weaving
Fishing Fishing
Profit order from livestock Profit order from livestock
Profit order from agriculture Profit order from agriculture
Profit order from on-farm wage labor Profit order from on-farm wage labor
Profit order from off-farm wage labor Profit order from off-farm wage labor
Profit order from business Profit order from business
Categorizing landless households
The differentiation between the 2 zones is predominant when performing a 
Factorial Analysis of Correspondences (FAC), grouping most of landless households 
from Dry Zone together and Delta households together. Yet, a third category can be 
distinguished among them. The FAC on both zones took into account the different 
possible activities as seen in Table 4. 
Table 4: Variables introduced in the landless households FAC (both zones)
Variable Modalities 
Area Dry Zone; Delta
Cultivated land under temporary 
arrangements
Yes; No
Rented land Yes; No
Paddy Cultivation Yes; No
Home gardening Yes; No
Fishing Yes; No
Weaving Yes; No
Animal breeding Yes; No
Nb of ducks (breeding) < 30; 30 < 110; ≥ 100 
Owning cattle Yes; No
On-farm wage labor Yes; No
Practicing agriculture Yes; No
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Another FAC, taking into account incomes and activities (see Table 5) has been 
performed on Delta landless households. 
Table 5: Variables introduced in the Delta’s landless households FAC 
Variable Modalities 
Practicing agriculture Yes; No
Cultivated land under temporary 
arrangements
Yes; No
Paddy Cultivation Yes; No
Fishing Yes; No
Animal breeding Yes; No
On-farm wage labor Yes; No
Total incomes (million MMK) < 0.75; 0.75 to < 1.5; 1.5 to < 3; ≥ 3
Table 6: Variables introduced in the Dry Zone’s landless households FAC 
Variable Modalities 
Home Gardening Yes; No
Involved in off-farm activities Yes; No
Benefiting from migrants’ remittances Yes; No
Weaving Yes; No
Animal breeding Yes
Owning cattle No
Profit order of livestock Yes; No
Profit order of on-farm wage labor 1; 2; 3
Profit order of off-farm wage labor 1; 2; 3
Profit order of small business 1; 2; 3
Total incomes (million MMK) 1; 2; 3
< 0.75; 0.75 to < 1.5; 1.5 to < 3; ≥ 3
 This study emerged out of an identified need to document social 
processes leading to land insecurity, and those leading to investment 
and sustainable use of lands by rural populations. Focusing on the 
Delta and Dry Zone, the main paddy producing regions of Myanmar, 
this analysis unravels the powers at play in shaping rural households’ 
relationship to land. From British colonization to the 2012 reforms, 
many issues have remained relatively unchanged with regards to 
local dynamics of landlessness, exclusion processes, local power plays, 
restrictions in farmers’ land rights and the State’s excessive focus on 
rice. In the midst of a fast evolving legal context, this work provides a 
typology of farmers and the landless and argues that more attention 
needs to be paid to understand the diversity of rural households and 
forms of landlessness.
Of Lives and Land Myanmar research series
The Of Lives and Land series emanates from in-depth socio-anthropological 
research on land and livelihoods dynamics. Through various thematic focuses – 
urban, peri-urban and rural land issues, migration, conflict and resettlement – the 
series presents a rigorous analysis of how people from various regions of Myanmar 
shape land relations in a rapidly changing social, economic and political context. 
From the exploration of grounded realities, the series aims to address some of the 
challenges that Myanmar people, the state and other stakeholders are facing in 
managing land and associated resources and seeks to provide insights to inform 
policy dialogue and law formulation processes.
The series is peer reviewed by a committee of professionals and academics. 
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